ML19325F036

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Forwards FEMA Exercise Repts for 881025 Exercise of Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan for Plant & 891003 Transmittal Ltr from FEMA to NRC
ML19325F036
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 11/02/1989
From: Ronald Bellamy
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To: Sieber J
DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
References
NUDOCS 8911130265
Download: ML19325F036 (2)


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I N O V 0 2 1999 i"

Docket Nos. 50-334 50-412 r

Duquesne Light Company ATTN: Mr. J. D. Sieber Vice President Nuclear Group L

Post Office Box 4 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 Gentlemen:

Subject:

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA), REGION III, EXERCISE REPORT FOR THE OCTOBER 25, 1988 BEAVER VALLEY EXERCISE (OH PORTION) r Enclosed are the FEMA Exercise Reports (Ohio portion) for the October 25, 1988 exercise of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness plan for the Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station and the October 3, 1989 transmittal letter from FEMA to the NRC. There were no offsite deficiencies identified during the exercise.

If you have any questions concerning the above or the enclosures, please give me a call at (215) 337-5200.,

sincerely, r tiaal Si;:ned By:

f:auki R. Oc!!amy t

Ronald R. Bellamy, Chief Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

Enclosures:

As stated

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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY BV - FEMA REPORT RESPONSE -

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t J. J. Carey, Executive Vice President.. Operations J.' O Crockett, General Manager, Corporate Nuclear, $ervices W. S. Lacey, General Manager, Nuclear Operations h

N. R. Tonet, Manager. Nuclear Engineering T. P. Noonan, General Manager, Nuclear Operations' 3

S. C. Fenner, QA Manager K.'D. Grada, Manager, Nuclear Safety H. R. Caldwell, General Superintendent, Nuclear Operations f

Public Document Room (PDR) i b

Local Public Document Room (LPDR)

Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

NRC Resident Inspector Commonwealth of Pennsylvania l

t bec w/ encl.

Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)

Management Assistant, DRMA-(w/o enc 1)

C. Cowgill DRP i

P. Tam, NRR PA0 (10) SALP Reports Only r

J. Dyer, EDO i

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S3 RI:DRSS Fox /mk Lazarus Bellamy 1[/ / /89 11/ / /89 11/ "'/89 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY BV - FEHA REPORT RESPONSE -

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j Federal Emergency Management Agency I

Washington, D.C. 20472 0

4 W3m MEMORANDUM FORT Frank J.

Congel i

Director l

Division of Radiation Protection gnd Emergency Preparedness Of I

</.fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation c

U S. Nuclear Regulato'r Commission 4VJt4/ f kows ennis H. K FROM:

Assistant Associate Director office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs

SUBJECT:

Exereire Report for the October 25, 1988, Exercise of the Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Plans for the Beaver Valley l

Power Station l

Attached is a copy of the exercise report for the October 25,

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1988, joint exercise of the offsite REP plans for the Ohio portions of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) for the Beaver Valley Power Station.

The State of Ohio and Columbiana County participated in the exercise for that portion of thu plume exposure pathway EPZ which is within Region V of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

The report, dated September 22, 1989, was prepared by FEMA Region V and transmitted to FEMA Headquarters on September 22, 1989.

There were no offsite deficiencies identified during the Beaver Valley Power Station exercise.

The State of Ohio was provided i

with a draft copy of the report dated March 7, 1989.

The State submitted a schedule of corrective actions on April 17, 1989, which is included in the exercise report.

i Based on the results of the exercise, FEMA considers offsite emergency preparedness adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public living in Ohio in the vicinity of the site in the event of a radiological emergency.

Therefore, the approval under FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 on June 5, 1987 will remain in effect.

If you have any questions, please contact me at 646-2871.

Attachment As Stated gy

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EXERCISE REPORT BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION i

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY JOINT EXERCISE I

i Facility Location Located in the State of Pennsylvania along the Ohio River approximately five (5) miles from the State of Ohio Exercise Date:

October 25, 1988 T:.

Date of Draft Report:

March 6, 1989 Date of Final Reportt June 28, 1989 4

Date of Revised Final Report:

September 22, 1989

Participants:

State of Ohio (partial);

Columbiana County (full) and Duquesne Power and Light company (full) l l

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Federal Emergency Management Agency Region V Natural and Technological Hazards Division 175 West Jackson Boulevard Chicago, Illinois 60604 ff. 9d*@#g Of '

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TABLE OF CONTENTS l

IARLE OF CONTENTS page 1

t EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

page 2

l State of Ohi-page 2

Joint Public Information Center page 4

Columbiana County page 4

j EXERCISE REPORT page 7

l Introduction 1.

Exercise Background page 7

2.

Participating and Non-Participating State and i

Local Governments page 7

i 3.

List of Evaluators page 8

4.

Evaluation Criteria page 8

5.

Exercise Objectives page 8

6.

Summary of Scenario page 9

7.

State and Local Resources Planned To Be Used in the Exercise page 9

i 8.

Exercise Findings in Past Exercises page 10 9.

Exercise Objectives Still To Be Effectively Achieved page 10 Narrative page 13 1.

State of Ohio page 13 2.

Joint Public Information Center page 19 3.

Columbiana County page 21

SUMMARY

LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS page 32 i

State of Ohio 1.

Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety page 33 l

2.

Required Corrective Actions page 34 l

3.

Recommendations for Improvement page 36 Columbiana County 1.

Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety page 37 i

2.

Required Correctfue Actions page 38 3.

Recommendations for provement page 40

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f EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

The purpose of the Executive Summary is to provide an overview of the findings for the off-site evaluation of the State of Ohio partial participation and Columbiana County full participation during the October 25, 1988, unannounced exercise at the Beaver Valley Power Station.

This evaluation is a consensus of the eleven Federal evaluators who made up the evaluation form for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

l The exercise findings in this report will be identified into one of the following categories:

Deficiency: If this event happened or failed to happen during a real emergency public health and safety would have been affected.

Area Reauirina corrective Action:

The event observed during the exercise would not affect public health and safety if it had occurred during a real emergency.

The issue is serious enough, l

though, for FEMA to require a schedule of corrective action.

Area Recommended for Inorovement:

The event observed during the exercise wculd not affect public health and safety if it had occurred during a real emergency.

The issue is brought to the i

attention of State or local government as a recomtendation to improve plans cnd operations.

No schedule of corrective actions are required by FEMA.

The post exercise participants meeting to discuss the preliminary 4

results of the October 25, 1988, exercise was conducted at 1:30 i

p.m.

Thursday, Octcber 27,
1988, in the Columbiana County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Lisbon, Ohio.

The Public and Media Briefing was at 3:00 p.m., Thursday, October 27,1988, in the Columbiana County EOC.

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l STATE OF OHIO This exercise was an unannounced and partial-participation exercise l

for the State.

The utility operators notified the State EOC, in the person of the Emergency Services Director, of the Alert conditions at the utility. The initial notification and activation of the EOC staff was implemented by State staff that were presently on duty.

All required locations and contacts were properly notified of the status at the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) including the responsible agency in the Canadian Province of j

ontario.

The State EOC was staffed in a timely manner and in accordance with the exercise scenario.

The staffing included representation from the Governor's office and the Pennsylvania Emergency Management l

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Agency.

State staff were flown by helicopter, from Worthington, Ohio, as liaison to the utility's EOF, the County EOC and the JPIC.

Radiological Field Asi.essment teams and a communications van were dispatched via ground transportation to the staging area in Columbiana County.

The EOC staff was subsequently notified of the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency conditions at the plant, via a dedicated conferencing telephone, between the Beaver Valley Power Station, the Ohio Emergency Management Agency, Columbiana County and those Pennr.ylvania and West Virginia Counties impacted in the 10-mile EPZ l

of the BVPS. The conferencing on the dedicated telephone line also included the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, the State of West Virginia.

l The Chief of

Staff, acting as the Deputy Director was the individual effectively in charge of the EOC operations.

Briefings l'

were held and the staff participated in the decision making process.

Copies of the plan were available for reference and staff l

members had SOPS and excerpts of the plan that pertained to their respective responsibilities.

All necessary maps and displays were available in the EOC.

An effective message system was initiated and worked well throughout the exercise.

The State Field Teams were dispatched and adequately demonstratac equipment and procedures for determining field radia+. ion measurements, including airborne radiciodine concentrations la the presence of noble gas.

Dose assessment staff demonstrate.d the ability, within the plume exposure pathway, to project dosege to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field dato.

The field team data was collected by the field monitoring teams dispatched from the communications team.

The communicatior,s van l

relayed this information back to the State Dose Assessment Staff manning the communications center in the State EOC.

The field teams in coordinatien with the communication van relayed information back to State Dose Assessment Staff manning the communications centor in the State EOC.

Field teams had been issued emergency worker dosimetry kits prior to being dispatched.

At the General Emergency notification the staff coordinated with Columbiana County to insure the activation of the alert and notification system in Columbiana County.

The State made the decision that the ingestion of KI, by emergency workers, was not l

necessary based on the projected release from the plant.

Columbiana County and all Ohio organizations responsible for participation in the emergency response were kept abreast of the situation at the utility as the situation developed.

The State of Ohio coordinated their response with the States of Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Michigan and the Province of Ontario, Canada.

The F mte requested Federal assistance of FEMA and the USDOE.

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8 JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER (JPIC)

The staff at the JPIC were notified of changes in the Emergency Classification Levels by the utility staff at the JPIC, the State EOC staff and the State staff at the EOF.

These levels were understood and interpreted for implementation of the emergency response.

The State JPIC staff was dispatched from the State EOC in real time following the Alert notification.

They were air lifted to the Aliquippa area by helicopter.

This procedure expedited the States emergency response capability.

Columbiana Cc.dnty did not have a representative at the JPIC.

The State PIO/Spokesperson was effectively in charge of the State JPIC operation.

Information was coordinated with the State EOC in Worthington before release.

The State JPIC staff had one telephone line assigned as their primary means of communication.

Telefax was available for hard transmission.

The staff demonstrated their secondary copy communication capability of radio by contacting the State EOC, the EOF and the Communications Van.

l The JPIC is located in Duquesne Lighus's Western District Headquarters at Aliquippa, PA.

The utility furnished typewriters, i

copiers and telefax machines.

Detailed emergency operations maps were not initially available.

Access to the facility was controlled.

During the course of the exercise five briefings were held for the media.

The States of Ohio and Pennsylvania and Hancock County, W.

V. participated in the final four briefings.

Information released was coordinated with the State EOC, Columbiana County EOC and the State staff in the EOF.

The rumor control telephone number was announced by the State during the first briefings in which the State participated.

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l number was included in the first printed release issued by the l

State from the JPIC.

COLUMBIANA COUNTY t-l l

The unannounced activation of the Columbiana County Emergency Operation Center (EOC) was initiated by the notification to the L

County Warning Point of an Alert emergency classification at the I

Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS).

Personnel assigned to the County EOC were activated.

The EOC was staffed and operational in

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approximately one hour.

Field personnel were later assembled 4

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l-promptly when their locations were activated at the Site Area classification.

Columbiana County did not have a

i emergency spokesperson at the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC).

i The EOC staff received, recorded and prominently posted the emergency classification levels. Under the direction of the County Emergency Management Agency (EMA) Coordinator, implementation of j

the County Commissioners' decisions was effectively demonstrated throughout the exercise.

The EOC staff successfully demonstrated emergency response activities consistent with their plan and i

procedures.

l Radio, telephone and facsimile systems provided the EOC Staff the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.

The EOC is a compact structure l

which has sufficient equipment, displays and amenities to support emergency operations.

The organizational layout is effective.

It is recommended that additional hard copy capability be added for transmission of operational information between the plant, State l

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and County.

Emergency worker exposure control was demonstrated at the decontamination

center, assembly
area, care center and the access / traffic control point by personnel at each location.

They demonstrated knowledge of the use of personnel dosimetry, exposure record keeping and exposure limitations.

The County Board of Commissioners concurred with the protective I

action recommendations (PARS) of the State in a timely manner.

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In response to a siren activation in Beaver County, PA for a i

hazardous material spill, an initial Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) message and simulated siren activation was issued.

The County demonstrated the ability to coordinate the formulation l

and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion.

A siren activation and EBS message

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containing the PAR of evacuation of the public in sub-area A and l

sheltering in sub-areas B, C, D, and E with sheltering of lactating i

animals in the area was issued within the required time limit.

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By request of the County EMA Coordinator, public information and j

media briefings for the County were conducted at the JPIC by the 1

State.

The organizational abilities were discussed with the PIO in the County EOC.

No media briefings were held in the County Media Center.

A rumor control number was announced in the County EOC, but no simulated rumors were received to test the system.

Though the use of KI was not given as a protective action, the EOC staff discussed their procedures for administration.

KI was available to the emergency workers in their kits.

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i The organizational ability to implement the protective action of evacuation and sheltering for the effected area was demonstrated by the EOC Staff.

This included coordinating the activation of assembly / care centers, arranging for transportation of transit-dependent, assisting nursing homes and hospitals and determining not to open schools the next day.

The Columbiana County Sherif f Department and Ohio State Highway Patrol coordinated the establishment of the traffic / access control points in the EOC.

The Ohio State Highway Patrol, District #15 dispatched a trooper to the traffic control point in Columbiana County.

The trooper arrived in his patrol car which was equipped with the necessary emergency documents pertaining to accidents at the BVPS.

The Assembly Area at the Hegley Fire Department and the Reception / Congregate Care Center at the East Palestine High School demonstrated capability in communicating with Columbit.na County EOC and each other during the exercise.

The reception / congregate care center in East Palestine was fully staffed, provided rosters for three eight hour shif ts, had adequate security and carried out radiological monitoring and decontamination procedures in an effective manner.

This performance corrected a previous area requiring corrective action.

The care center demonstrated their readiness to provide shelter, food, emergency medical care and ccunseling to the evacuees.

The Volunteer fire department at Glenmoor has procedures and capability to perform service as an emergency worker l

decontamination station.

These personnel demonstrated in-depth knowledge of the monitoring and decontamination process, adapted l

their facility into a decontamination center and followed their written procedures to accomplish their purpose with enthusiasm and professionalism. It is recommended that surgical masks be provided and worn by the radiation monitors along with their other protective garb.

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EXERCISE REPORT INTRODUCTION 1

1.

Exercise Background This was the sixth joint exercise for the Ohio Emergency Management Agency and Columbiana County, Ohio resulting from a simulated accident at the Beaver Valley Power Station.

Other off-site participants included the States of Pennsylvania and West Virginia and the Counties of

Beaver, Pennsylvania and Hancock, West I

Virginia.

FEMA Region III will write the exercise report for the States of Pennsylvania and West Virginia and the Counties of Beaver, Pennsylvania and Hancock, West Virginia.

The first joint exercise was on February 2,1982, and involved full participation by the State of Ohio and Columbiana County.

The second joint exercise was on July 14, 1982, and involved partial participation by the State of Ohio and full participation by Columbiana County.

The third joint exercise was on February 16, 1983, and involved full participation by the State of Ohio and Columbiana County.

The fourth joint participation exercise was conducted June 27, 1984, and involved partial participation by the l

State of Ohio and full participation by Columbiana County.

The fifth joint participation exercise was conducted November 19, 1986.

This exercise was conducted of f hours between the apprcximate hours of 1800 November 19, 1986, to approximately 0100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />, November 20, 1986.

It involved full participation for the State of Ohio and Columbiana County.

This report addresses the partial participation of the State of l

Ohio and full participation by Columbiana County, Ohio in the joint exercise for the Beaver Valley Power Station conducted October 25, 1988.

The exercise was conducted between the approximate hours of 1400 to 2400 hours0.0278 days <br />0.667 hours <br />0.00397 weeks <br />9.132e-4 months <br />, October 25, 1988.

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2.

Participating and Non-Participating State and Local Governments The

" Plume Exposure Pathway" (10-mile EPZ) incorporates the planning for all or part of the following counties:

Columbiana County, Ohio; Beaver County, Pennsylvania; and Hancock County, West Virginia.

The population within the 10-mile EPZ was approximately 142,000 in 1980.

No community has a population in excess of 25,000.

All three of the above Counties and the States of Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia participated in the October 25, 1988, exercise.

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The " Ingestion Exposure Pathway" incorporates the planning for 7

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y, the following' Counties:

Columbiana County (Ohio), Peaver, Mercer,

Butler, Lawrence, Allegheny, Washington,
Green, Fayette, Westmo" eland,-

Armstrong, and Venago Counties (Pennsylvania),

Hanec:k, Brooke, and Marshall Counties (West Virginia).

None of the Counties outside the 10-mile EPZ of the Fetver Valley Power Station participated in: this or any previoaa Seaver Valley exercise.

3.

List of Evaluators For thi ixercise there was a total of eleven Fed.trcl evaluators observir., off-site exercise activities for the State of Ohio and Columbiana County, Ohio.

The FEMA Region V off-site evaluation team included five evaluators from FEMA Region V, four evaluators frem Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and two evaluators from the Center For Planning _Research (CPR).

The Nuclear Regulatory l

Commission (NRC) evaluated actions taken by the Beaver Valley Power

'j Station and they will prepare a separate report.

offsite Exercise Evaluation Team Director:

Gordon Wenger, FEMA State of Ohio Evaluation Team:

Woodie curtis, Team Leader, FEMA Ed Sears, Accident Assess, CPR Willica K Merzer, Comm Van and Field Monitoring Teams, ANL i

Frank Wilnon, EOF, ANL l

Ray Kellogg, JPIC, FEMA Columbiana County Evaluation Team:

Janet Quissell, Team I' Tder, CEOC, FEMA Edwin Hakala, CEO;;, Al.

Bill Small, Assembly Aret. & Reception / Congregate Care, CPR Carol Lofton, Assembly Alea & Reception / Congregate Care, ARC Evaluatar Trainee Rick Anthony, Emergency. Worker Decontamination Center, CPR Gordon Henger, Access Control, FEMA Ray Kellogg, JPIC, FEMA 4.

Eveldation Criteria The plans being evaluated by this exercise were developed using i

the " criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Revision 1)."

Therefore, these criteria and the Exercise Evaluation Modules based on Guidhnce Memorandum EX-3 " Managing Pre-Exercise Activities and Post Exercise Meetings, dated February 26, 1988 were used for exercise evaluation.

5.

Exercise Objectives Objectives for this exercise were selected from among the standard 8

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4 objectives listed in Guidance Memorandum. EX-3,

" Managing Pre-Exercise Activities and Post Exercise Meetings," dated February 26, 1988.

The exercise objectives were selected at a January 22, 1988 1

meeting, conducted at the Pittsburgh, PennsylvaniL International j

Airport.

Participants at this meeting included FEMA Region III and V,

NRC Region I, Duquesne Light and the States of Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia.

The State of Ohio on July 18, 1908, submitted for FEMA Region V l

approval the objectives selected by the State of Ohio and 4

Columbiana County.

FEMA Region V reviewed and approved the Objectives for the State of Ohio and Columbiana County on August 19, 1988.

Tha exorcise objectives are Attachment I to this report.

6.

Summary of Scenario The Beaver Valley Power Station radiological emergency preparedness exercise scenario, developed by writers from the utility, the State I

of Ohio, and Columbiana County, took into consideration weaknesses L

identified in past exercises in order to develop a scenario that I

would allow demonstration of past exercise weaknesses, as well as allow demonstration of exercise objectives selected by the State of Ohio and Columbiana County.

The State of Ohio on September 9, 1988, submitted for FEMA Region V approval the scenario for the Octocer 25, 1988, partial, joint Beaver Valley unannounced exercise.

FEMA Region V, according to FEMA HQ. requirements, submitted this scenario for review to the Idaho Nuclear Engineering Laboratory (INEL) September 22, 1988.

l The written review performed by Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Company Incorporated.was provided to FEMA Region September 29, 1988.

FEMA Region V, on September 30, 1988, approved the scenario.

The offsite sequence of events portion on the Beaver Valley exercise scenario is Attachment II of this exercise report.

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State and Local Resources Planned To Be Used In The Exercise During this exercise the State of Ohio planned to use the State EOC in Worthington, Ohio, the Joint Public Information Center in Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, the State Mobile Communication Van and three Radiological Field Monitoring teams in Columbiana County.

The State of Ohio also planned to use the necessary communications systems to conduct er.svgency operations.

l Columbiana County activated and staffed their EOC at Lisbon, one l

I access control point (State Route 7 and East Liverpool),

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Reception / Congregate Care Center at East Palestine High School, one Assembly Area at the Negley Fire Department and one Emergency Worker Decontamination Center at Glenmoor Volunteer Fire Department.

Columbiana County also planned to demonstrate their ability to have their spokesperson coordinate information at the l

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Joint Public Information Center (JPIC). Columbiana County also l

demonstrated emergency response staff coordination and communications

systems, and access control capabilities.

Columbiana County conducted a Medical Drill June 7, 1988, that was evaluated by FEMA Region V.

8.

Exercise Findings in Past Exercises There were two areas requiring corrective actions (NUREG-0654 Criteria items I.8, N. 2.d & G.4.6) and ten (10) recommendations for improvement identified for the State of Ohio during the evaluation of the November 19, 1986, off-hours, joint participation Beaver Valley exercise.

The October 25, 1988, unannounced joint exercise demonstrated that corrective action has been taken to correct the two areas requiring corrective actions for the State of Ohio.

One area requiring corrective action (NUREG-0654 Criteria item A.4) and six recommendations for iuprovement were identified for Columbiana County during the November 19, 1988, off-hours joint exercise.

The October 25, 1988 unannounced joint exercise demonstrated that corrective action has been taken to correct this one area requiring corrective action.

9.

Exercise Objectives Still To Be Effectively Demonstrated Six ' lear Exercise Cycle The FEMA Guidance Memorandum PR-1: POLICY ON NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 AND 44 CFR-350 PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS dated October 1,

1985, l

established a six year biennial exercise cycle and revised and/or clarifies exercise requirements.

Applying PR-1, the October 25, J

l 1988, Beaver Valley Exercise was the first exercise of the second l

six year exercise cycle for the State of Ohio and Columbiana County.

This is also the first exercise using the revised objectives as issued in FEMA GM EX-3, dated February 26, 1988.

With the successful demonstration during this exercise of the previously identified areas requiring corrective action both jurisdictions have successfully completed all the first six year cycle objectives and periodic requirements for the Beaver Valley Power Station site.

To facilitate tracking the new objectives this second six (6) year cycle the following TABLE A depicts the results of the objectives i

as selected and demonstrated during this exercise.

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i TABLE A Beaver Valley Power Station Exercise October 25, 1988 GM EX-3 Objective Ohio Columbiana State County GROUP A

1. Use ECLs D

D

2. Mobilize & Activate P

P

3. Direct & Control D

D

4. Communications D

D

5. Facilities Equipment Displays D

D

6. Emer Worker Exposure Control D

D 7.

Field Monitoring D

NA

8. Airborne Radioiodine Measure D

NA

9. Particulate Sample / Lab Analyst NS NA
10. Plume Dosage to the Public D

NA

11. Plume Protective Action Decis D

D

12. Initial. Alert-10 mile /15 min NA D

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13. Coordinate Emer. Info /Insruct FA D

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14. Brief Media P

ND l

15. Rumor Control P

P GROUP B

16. KI - Emergency Workers D

D

17. KI - General Public NA NA
18. Implement Plume EPZ PARS NA D

'19. Implement Plume Schools PARS NA NS

20. Traffic / Access Control NA D
21. Monitor /Decon of Evacuees NA D

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22. Adequacy of Congregate Facility NA D

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23. Transport Contaminated / Injured L
24. Med Facility Contamina/ Injured l
25. Decontamination /Emer Workers NS D

GROUP C

26. Federal Assistance D

NA

27. Ingestion Pthwy Sampling /Trans NS NA L
28. Ingestion Pthwy Lab, Ops /Proced NS NA
29. Ingestion Pthwy Dose Proj/ PARS NS NA
30. Implement Ingestion Pthwy PARS NS NA
31. Est Total Population Exposure NS NA
32. Determine Controlled Reentry NS NS
33. Implement Controlled Reentry NS NS
34. 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Staffing / Shift Change NS NS
35. Coordinate Onsite Evacuation NA NA
36. Unannounced Off-hours Activat l

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  • Demonstrated'during Emergency Medical Drill on 06/07/88.

~# Demonstrated unannounced this exercise /Off-hours on 11/19/86.

i LEGEllD-D: Fully Demonstrated NS: Not Selected for Demonstration P: Partially Demonstrated NA: Not Applicable ND: Not Successfully Demonstrated 4

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o NARRATIVE STATE OF OHIO State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)

SEOC staff demonstrated the ability to monitor, understand and use classification levels (ECLs) through the appropriate emergency implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs as required by the scenario.

The emergency classification levels were prominently displayed in the State EOC.

The staff was aware of the current ECLs as the exercise progress 6d.

All relevant functions and activities were implemented in a manner that is consistent with the organization's plan and procedures.

The Staff was notified by the operators at the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS), via telephone, of the Alert at 1508, the Site Area L

emergency at 1837 and the General Emergency at 2105.

The notifications were received via a dedicated conference. telephone i

l line and verified by telephone calls back to the utility.

The t

dedicated telephone conferencing capability included the States of Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia and the 10-mile EPZ Counties of Columbiana (Ohio), Beaver (Pennsylvania) and Handccck (West l

Virginia).

All locations received notification from. the BVPS l

simultaneously.

The staff demonstrated the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both f acility and field-based emergency l

functions. The exercise was initiated af ter the State was notified of the Alert conditions at the utility, at 1508, which was during the normal work day.

The SEOC facility was activated at 1510, at which time the call up of SEOC staff was initiated.

The SEOC was declared operational at 1530 and fully staffed at 1533.

Field staff (i.e., State liaisons to the EOF, JPIC staff, radiological monitoring teams, communications van, etc.)

had reached their designated locations at 1907.

l The shift supervisor at the utility initially notified the State Emergency Management Coordinator of the Alert conditions at the l

BVPS, via telephone.

The Emergency Management Coordinator, assisted by the Deputy Director, OEMA and other staff, notified l

key individuals of the EOC staff, the Governor 8 s office, FEMA, the l

State of Michigan, the staff of the responsible individual in the l

Province of Ontario Canada, etc., in accordance with the State plan.

The key EOC staff when initially notified became responsible to notify staff of their respective organizations and those organizations which support the emergency response (i.e.,

Red Cross, Salvation Army, RACES, etc. ). The staf fs to be notified were alerted in a timely manner, from a written telephone call up list, 13

which appeared to be current and correct.

1 SEOC was partially staffed for the State's partial The participation in the exercise per the exercise limiting conditions agreed to in the objectives selection.

The staff consisted of individuals from the Ohio Emergency Management Agency (OEMA), Ohio Department of Health (ODH), Ohio Environmental Protection Agency I

(OEPA)

(simulated by ODH representative in EOC) and a liaison representative from the Pennsylvania Emergency "anagement Agency (PEMA).

State liaison staff were dispatched to Columbiant EOC county and the utility's EOF, and the Joint Public Information Center.

All relevant functions and activities were implemented in a manner that was consistent with the organization's emergency plan and procedures.

The SEOC staff demonstrated the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities.

The OEMA Chief of Staff was the individual in charge of the EOC operations.

Briefings were held to update the staff on the situation.

The staff was actively involved in the briefings and participated in decision-making. Copies of the plan were available in the EOC for reference and the staff had excerpts of the plan that pertained to their respective responsibilities. Message logs were kept for all incoming and outgoing messages and transmissions.

Messages were reproduced and distributed, as necessary by use of u

l an effective message handling system.

Protective action decision implementation was coordinated l

effectively with all appropriate organizations.

The relevant functions and activities were implemented in a manner that is consistent with the organization's emergency plan and procedures.

The State EOC staff demonstrated the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel through the use of primary and backup means of communications.

The primary and backup means of communications were demonstrated by l

use of commercial telephone, and two-way radio during various phases of the exercise.

Conferencing via telephone is available in the EOC.

A datafax machine was available for hard copy capability between the County and State EOC and the JPIC.

The datafax machine was reliable and reasonably fast.

The primary and l

back-up systems were able to bandle communication flow without L

undue delays.

Commercial telephone was primarily used between dose assessment staff, the utility and Columbiana County.

Commercial telephone was also used to coordinatu protective action decisions with Pennsylvania and West Virginia. Radio was used to communicate with 34

}

f the communications van and monitoring teams in the field.

Walkie talkies and telephones were used between the dose assessment team and the State communications room.

The communications room used the point-to-point OEMA radio system to contact the communications van and monitors in the field.

The system workad well with experienced operators. Each message was verified by hard copy from the communications room to dose assessment staff.

Emergency functions and activities were implemented in a manner that is consistent with the organization's emergency plan and procedures.

The SEOC staff demonstrated the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays and other materials to support emergency operations.

The SEOC is located in the basement level of the National Guard Armory at Worthington, Ohio. The facility is situated well outside the EPZs of all nuclear power plants in the State of Ohio and adjacent States.

The facility has sufficient furnishings, space,

lighting, restrooms, telephones, backup electrical
power, typewriters, computers, copiers and other amenities to support extended operations.

The noise level in the EOC was adequately controlled.

Access to the EOC was controlled by a secured door at ground level of the building.

Emergency classification levels were posted and a status board was clearly visible to the EOC staff.

The status board was kept up to date on significant events by EOC staff assigned that responsibility.

The required maps were posted in the EOC.

The maps depicted the plume EPZ with sectors labeled, evacuation routes, relocation centers, access control points, radiological monitoring points, and population by evacuation areas.

The Dose Assessment staff demonstrated their ability to project dosage to the public via plume exposure based on plant and field data.

The calculations were based on wind speed and flow rates from the reactor containment, using plant data.

The projections were made by a computer program and verified by hand calculation.

The projected plume was plotted and displayed on a wall map. This was used in making protective action recommendations (PARS).

The State demonstrated the ability to make appropriate protective action decisions, based on projected or actual dosage, EPA PAG's, availability of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates and other relevant factors.

l After plume dose projections were made, protective action decisions were made and communicated to the County and monitored in the field.

The decision was made to evacuate subarea A and to shelter sub areas B, C,

D and E.

The State Health Department issued the dairy advisory recommending that all lactating animals within the 10-mile EPZ of the utility site be sheltered and fed stored feed and protected water.

The utility PARS were a part of the decision making process along with coordinated action with Pennsylvania and West Virginia.

Pennsylvania was slow in making a decision on 15

Therefore, the State of Ohio acted alone, initially, evacuation.

after discussion with the liaison from the Governor's office and Columbiana County.

At 2120 the Ohio Governor's decision was determined and communicated. Approximately twenty-eight minutes later, the State of Pennsylvania decided to evacuate the population within the 10-mile EPZ in Pennsylvania.

1 The issue of coordinated action with Pennsylvania has been observed in previous exercises.

Coordination with Pennsylvania, as 1

discussed

above, was slow in getting agreement as to what protective action should be taken.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:

The three State Emergency Management Directors should discuss coordinate PARS decisions and actions prior to recommending protective actions.

KI was included in the dosimetry kits issued to the radiological prior to being dispatched field teams and communications van staff The EOC staff made the decision that the consumption to the field.

L of KI by emergency workers was not neccssary, based on plant and field team assessments.

staff demonstrated the ability to identify the need for The EOC After assistance from Federal and other outside support agencies.

notification of the Site Area Emergency conditions at the plant State, through the OEMA Chief of Staff, requested Federal the assistance of FEMA and the USDOE at 1843 and 1848, respectively.

FEMA was requested to provide administrative assistance and USDOE was requested to fully activate the FRMAC.

at 1850, was requested to The Federal Aviation Administration, Conrail and the Norfolk and restrict air traffic over the EPZ.

Western Railroads were requested to restrict rail traffic into the EPZ, at 1901.

Communications Van Mobilization of the communications van (CV) was timely.

This activation was in real time.

The CV personnel were at their normal workstations and received verbal notification of activation.

Mobilization of the CV took about a half hour with departure about The CV arrived in E. Liverpool a couple minutes after 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br />.

7:00 P.M. (1900 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.2295e-4 months <br />) and was on the air about 30 minutes later.

A copy of the emergency plan and standard operating procedures were not available for CV personnel use.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:

Appropriate plans end/or standard operations procedures (SOP) should be maintained in the communications van for reference.

The communications van (CV) was activated and directed by Columbus Radio contact was maintained while in to depart for E. Liverpool.

16

. - ~

I transit.

Other activities precluded the field monitoring team i

(FMT) dispatcher from traveling with the CV.

The FMT dispatcher arrived about 1930 hours0.0223 days <br />0.536 hours <br />0.00319 weeks <br />7.34365e-4 months <br /> and took over the management of the CV and the FMT dispatch operations.

The communicat/ons van (CV) has five separate communications links on board.

The radio volunteer (ham operator) provided additional back-up communications capability through the County EOC. The Ohio EMA frequency was used extensively and had no operational difficulties.

Radio checks by the communications van and the JPIC

& EOF were demonstrated.

Not all the radio contacts were logged, only the significant ones.

The telescoping antenna mast worked properly.

The location of the CV on high private property (radio volunteer) provided the CV with an excellent vantage point to maintain communications links with the exercise participants.

A motor home has been converted into the OEMA communications van.

The amenities were satisfactory.

Work space and deployment of the

' individual radio systems through the van allowed for a free flow of operations as a communications link and dispatch of FMT.

A system of outside lighting, fixtures to and powered by the van is suggesled.

This would provide for safe movement around the vehicle and in particular enhance the safe deployment of guy wires and antenna telescoping during a night time activation, once on location.

Field Monitoring Team The mobilization of field monitoring team personnel was timely.

Each member was at their normal work station and alerting was verbal.

It took about one hour for the team to check out the I

equipment and load the van.

It took about three hours for the team to drive the distance to Columbiana County.

State EOC (Ohio EMA) directed the OEMA communications van to a i

predetermined E. Liverpool, Ohio location. Upon arrival of the field monitoring team dispatcher, he took over direction and control of the CV and deployment of the field monitoring team l

(FMT).

The primary communications link between the field monitoring team (FMT) and the Communications van (CV) is a FM 2-way radio.

Back-up communications would'either be a spare radio, obtained from the l

The FM radio worked continuously l

CV, or the local phone system.

I and satisfactorily between the FMT and the CV.

1 Communications links from the State field monitoring teams to the communications van were timely and clear.

Each FMT member received a personnel radiation control kit.

Each l

kit included two dosimeters ( 0-20 R & 0-200 R), TLD, KI, and a sheet of paper having instructions, dose limits, and an area to 17 l

l

~

record dosimeter readings.

Initial or " zeroed" readings were not recorded prior to departure from Columbus.

Knowledge of dose limits and authorizatLon procedures were indicated by the FMT.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

(NUREG-0654 Criteria Item REOUIRING AREA Initial or zeroed dosimeter readings should be recorded K.3.a.)

when the field monitoring teams are deployed to the field to do surveys.

Procedures for recording initial or zeroed RECOMMENDATION:

dosimeter readings should be practiced everytime the State field monitoring teams are dispatched.

The State field monitoring teams demonstrated the appropriate equipment and prccedures for determining field radiation measurements.

The field monitoring teams (FMT) have equipment listed in the FMT SOP for determining ambient radiation.

A micro R meter and a beta / gamma instrument were demonstrated proficiently.

Instruments were within calibration periods.

The probes were not covered with plastic.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:

Cover probes with plastic to prevent them from becoming contaminated.

The FMTs demonstrated the appropriate equipment and procedures for 1

measurement of airborne radiciodine concentrations as low as 10 -7 The field monitoring team uCi/CC in the presence of noble gases.

(FMT) used equipment listed in the FMT SOP to measure radioiodine The team used a concentrations in the presence of noble gases.

portab]e gas generator to provide 120V service to the air sampler.

For each The air sample was taken according to written procedures.

item, counting of the charcoal absorber and paper filter were accomplished using reproducible geometrics. The kit checklist does not indicate a pair of tweezers.

l AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:

It is recommended to modify the l

kit checklist to add a pair of tweezers.

The tweezers, could be used to remove the filter paper from the air sampler, placing both items into a plastic bag or when the sample is to be counted in the I

sample holder.

18

.u

JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER The Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) staff was dispatched from the State EOC real time following the Alert notification.

They were air lifted to the Aliquippa, Pennsylvania area, arriving at the Joint Public Information Center at 1830.

The State of Ohio staffed the JPIC with a Public Information Officer /spokesperson and a Public Information Officer Assistant per shift.

Staffing for two shifts were present during the course of the exercise.

Staff from both shifts were used throughout the entire exercise to meet the exercise objectives.

Since two shifts were used to accomplish objectives for one shift this may indicate a need to increase staffing at the JPIC.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:

The State of Ohio may want to consider increased staffing at the JPIC so that date collections, organization and preparation of media releases can be accomplished while the spokesperson is conducting media briefings.

The staff at the JPIC were notified of changes in the Emergency Classification by the utility staff at the JPIC, by the State EOC staff and by the State staff at the EOF.

The Emergency Classification level was not posted in the JPIC media briefing room.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: The Emergency Classification Level should be posted in the JPIC media briefing room.

State of Ohio and Columbiana County plans indicate Columbiana County is to have a Public Information Officer /spokesperson at the l

l JPIC. The exercise objectives for Columbiana County also indicated a Columbiana County Public Information Officer /spokesperson was to be at the JPIC to coordinate information with the spokespersons from the State of Ohio and the Duquesne Light Company.

The State of Ohio Public Information Officer /spokesperson was effectively in charge of the State Joint Public Information Center Operations.

He also coordinated with Columbiana County, the State Emergency Operations Center, the States of Pennsylvania and West Virginia and Duquesne Light company.

The off-site plans for the Beaver Valley Power Station was available and referred to when necessary.

Media releases were reproduced and distributed as j

appropriate.

The primary means of commt.nication was telephone.

The State of Ohio JPIC phone was connected with the State EOC, the utility emergency operations facility (EOF) and Columbiana County EOC.

Telefax was used for hard copy transmission between the above locations.

One telephone was assigned to the State and one to Columbiana County.

The staff for the State of Ohio used both these 19

,m m

- -, --. ~

4 C

j 3

phones as well as two other phones assigned for other uses or other agencies.

t AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:

(NUREG-0654 criteria item F.1.b.)

The one telephone assigned to the State of Ohio JPIC steff not adequate.

During the exercise the State used their was assigned phone, the Columbiana County phone, as well as, two phones not assigned to

them, in order to collect and coordinate i

information.

RECOMMENDATIOri:

During future exercises assign more than one telephone to the State of Ohio.

For this exercise, all. of the amenities were available.

The utility furnished typewriters, copiers and datafax machines.

Various displays and graphics were available to assist the spokespersons in their presentations.

After some searching, maps showing the Ohio portion of the emergency planning zone were located.

AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:

(NUREG-0654 Criteri8s Item H.3.)

evacuations Maps showing the Ohio emergency planning zone areas, reception and congregate care centers were not set up in

routes, the JPIC until late in the exercise and then only at the insistence of the State of Ohio Staff.

RECOMMENDATION:

Maps showing the Ohio emergency planning zone evacuation routes, reception and congregate care centers

areas, should be positioned in the media briefings room when the Joint Public Information Center is first set up.

l l

During the course of the exercise five media briefings were conducted.

Duquesne Light Company conducted the first media briefing.

The State of Ohio and Pennsylvania and Hancock County, West Virginia participated in the last four media briefings.

The State of Ohio staff coordinated their materials with the staff in the State EOC, the Columbiana County EOC and the Ohio State Staff I

i at the utility EOF.

The State and County EOCs staffs provided accurate information concerning protective actions for release to i

l the media by the JPIC staff.

The area impacted by protective actions was described in terms of familiar boundaries and landmarks.

Copies of media releases were provided to the media at the JPIC in a timely manner.

Copies of the media releases were filc0 in sequence.

The utility staff monitored both radio and television broadcasts to insure that information was reported correctly.

The utility had background information kits available at the JPIC for the media.

The rumor control phone number was announced by the State of Ohio spokesperson during the 1923 media briefing.

The rumor control telephone number was also included in the first written media release issued by the State of Ohio.

20 l^

l

+

COLUMBIANA COUNTY The Columbiana County EMA Coordinator received the notification of the Alert Emergency Classification Level (ECL) at the BVPS from the sheriff's dispatcher at 1508.

Later ECLs, Site Afea Emergency at 1837 and General Emergency at 2105, were received from the BVPS in the Columbiana County EOC.

The ECLs were prominently displayed, and the staff was routinely briefed on the meanings of the current ECL.

The predetermined actions in the SOPS based on ECLs were effectively demonstrated by the CEOC management and staff.

As per SOPS, the Columbiana County EOC was activated at the Alert emergency classification.

Cells to mobilize emergency personnel commenced at 1522 by the sheriff's dispatcher per direction of the Columbiana County EMA Coordinator. A written, current correct call list was used, and calls ware completed in a timely rannar by 1602.

All EOC personnel required by the plan were present, with the EOC staffed by 1632.

On a separate action, the EMA coordinator directed a PIO.to proceed and report to the JPIC at approximately l

1600.

Constant checks with the JPIC revealed that the PIO never reported.

AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:

(NUREG-0654 Criteria Item E.2.)

The Columbiana County EMA Coordinator dispatched a County PIO to the JPIC at approximately 1600.

He never reported there.

There was no other PIO available to send to the JPIC.

Columbiana County L

did not have a representative at the JPIC as required by State and County plans and exercise objectives.

EECpMMENDATION:

In future exorcises Columbiana County must follow the State and County plans and have a

Public Information Officer /spokesperson at the JPIC.

Additional County staff should l

be identified and trained to provide needed depth in this position.

The concept of operation of the County EOC as specified in the plan was effectively demonstrated.

The Executive Group consisting of the County Board of Commissioners, County Sheriff, County Engineer l

and County Emergency Management Agency (EMA) Coordinator conferred and decided on the appropriate emergency responses consistant with the protective actions recommended by the State and plant.

At 1929 during the Site Area Emergency Classification the County Commissioners approved and signed the Emergency Proclamation that declared a " State of Emergency" in the county.

Under the direction of the County EMA Coordinator, r.cting a.s the Chief of Staff, implementation of the Executive Group decisions were effectively demonstrated throughoat the exercise. Periodic briefings were held with the CEOC staff and included updates on the emergency situation and the status of the emergency responses of the CEOC agencies' personnel.

Copies of the plan end procedures were available and referenced by the EOC Staff.

Messages logs were maintained and copies of the messages were routed to the necessary agencies.

21

c Coordination within Ohio State, Beaver County, PA and Hancock, WV EOCs was maintained continuously using the dedicated telephone in the Executive Group room.

The EOC's communications systems demonstrated the capability to reach appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.

The telephone was the primary system, backed by radio.

The latter medium included nets for emergency management, law enforcement, and fire egencies.

Back-up radio was provided by amateur radio components which included " Packet" radio, which provided hard copy or video display when tied to an IBM PCXT computer.

Though not used officially during emergency operations, the " Packet" system has great potential.

Though a datafax machine was available and used to send and receive from the JPIC, it appeared that an additional machine would enhance communications of operational information between the State and County EOCs. There were no undue delays noted, as all transmissions were made within a minute of start time.

The satisfactory demonstration of communications was consistent witn emergency plans and procedures.

Communications for the Assembly Area at the Negley, Ohio Fire Station was provided by two-way fire radio with the Columbiana EOC, commercial telephone between the Assembly Area and the EOC and alt.o the Keception/ congregate Care Center in the East Palestine, Ohio, High School.

RACES portable two-way radio was provided as a back-up system to both the County EOC and the Reception / Congregate Care Center; commercial telephone was the primary system with RACES two-way radio back-up.

Police and fire personnel at the center had two-way radio contact with their departments with walkie-talkie and vehicular radios.

All systems were tested during the exercise and functioned properly providing communications with the County EOC, the Assembly Area, and the local police and fire departments.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:

It is recommended that additional hard copy capability be added for transmission of operational information between the plant, State and County.

The County EOC is a compact, well-designed facility which readily supported emergency operations.

Various spaces are set aside for I

executive, operations, and radiological activities as well as support functions, i.e., rest rooms, communications, and a limited food area.

Lighting, ventilations, and furnishings are adequate, and office machines, including a copier, are available. Security was provided and access was effectively controlled.

Emergency operations were readily supported by maps of the plume EPZ and appropriate planning area with population indicated, evacuation routes and care centers, radiological monitoring points, and a large EPZ map for agricultural information on ingestion.

The clearly visible status board was updated in a timely manner, indicating ECLs, protective action decisions, and weather data.

Organized consistent with the county plan, the EOC was an effective demonstration of facilities, equipment, and displays.

22

i i

Emergency Worker Exposure Control Emergency workers assigned to the plume EPZ were equipped with a high and low range dosimeter, a TLD, KI, and appropriate record cards and instructions.

Emergency workers at the decontamination i

station, access / traffic control point and care center were knowledgeable of dosimetry, allowable radiation
levels, and knowledgeable c.' proper procedures to follow if radiation exposures readings increased.

Knowledge and actions of field personnel, and the procedural knowledge of staff at the EOC, indicate trained i

professionalism consistent with the County ple.n, and was a highly satisfactory demonstration of emergency worker exposure control.

Each of the volunteer fire people at the station were issued kits containing KI tablets, a lov and a high-range dosimeter and an eniergency instructions sheet which included instructions for use of dosimeters and the KI.

All perscnnel were knowledgeable of the and purpose of the dosimetry.

As decontamination center use operators, they were well informed of exposure control procedures and demonstrated their functions as prescribed by the current plan and standard operating procedures.

Due to the lack of actual emergency workers returning from the EPZ, a utility observer was drafted to be processed through the " hot line" and was properly monitored, decontaminated and fictitious records of his exposure l

were generated, using forms prescribed by the plan..

The department consists of 14 volunteer firefighters who had been on a fire call throughout the night prior to the exercise.

After that fire, they had gone to their jobs.

It is noteworthy that six of these volunteers, who had not slept in approximately 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />, responded when paged for the exercise and performed their assigned functions enthusiastically.

Their obvious f atigue was overcome by their dedicated effort to demonstrate their excellent capability in decontamination, which is foreign to normal fire fighting

skills, f

All emergency workers at the Assembly Area were issued a dosimetry kit consisting of a CDV 730 (0-20R), CDV 742 (0-200R) dosimeters, l

a TLD and a bottle of KI pills with instructions and an exponure record card. The staff of the Assembly Area demonstrated excellent knowledge of their personal dosimetry, the dosimater chargers, recording procedures and exposure limits.

They also demonstrated and vehicle monitoring techniques using the CDV-700.

personnel I'

The staff of the tteception/ Congregate Care Center was equipped with dosimetry kit similar to the ones issued to the Assembly Area emergency workers. The Reception / Congregate Care Center staff were knowledgeable of the use of the dosimeter, exposure record keeping i

l and exposure limits.

Each emergency worker was equipped with 0-20R and 0-200 R dosimetry and the TLD.

They had been trained in their use and random 23

i N

questioning sampling indicated adequate knowledge of the equipment, its use, recording procedures and exposure limitations.

Plume Protective Action Decision-muking In the CEOC the Coun,y Executive Board concurred with the protective action recommendations of the plant and State to evacuate and shelter during the General' Emergency in a timely manner (two minutes).

Public Alert, Notification and Emergency Instruction During the Site Area Emergency Classification, the EMA Coordinator was advised via the dedicated telephone by the Beaver County EOC that they were going to sound their sirens in a few minutes and requested that Columbiana County do the same.

The Beaver County EOC was in the process of implementing a four mile evacuation in response to an actual hazardous materials spill.

The hazardous materials accident was not a threat to Columbiana County, but due to the fact that residents of East Liverpool, Columbiana County can t

hear when the Beaver County sirens are sounded, it was determined that Columbiana County necded to inform their residents that they vere not included in the hazardous materials spill evacuation. The l

Executive Group agreed and an EBS messace was prepared that advised the residents in the portion of the BVPS EPZ in Ohio that there was I

no action for them to take in response to the hazardous materials j

I spill.

The discussion with the adjacent Counties of Beaver, PA and Hancock, WV was at 2000.

The sirens were activated at 2009 and the EBS message was relayed to the radio station at 2009.

1 l

Although this hazardous material spill event was not a part of the Ohio scenario, the exercise activities impacted the Columbiana l

County operation.

The County Officials reacted with sound judgement to provide public instructions in a timely manner.

At 2105, when the BVPS notified the off-site organizations of the

)

escalation of the event to a General Emergency, they also provided the protective action recommendations (PARS) of evacuation of sub area A with sheltering of cub areas B C D E.

The Ohio State EOC accident assessment and emergency management staff agreed and obtained the Governor's approval. At 2120 the Ohio Governor's decision was determined and communicated to Columbiana County. The County Board of Commissioners concurred after a brief two-minute discussion and ordered the activation of the sirens and EBS systems.

The County EMA Coordinator, using the dedicated telephone. tried to synchronize the siren activation time with Beaver County but was unable to since PA had not yet decided the PAR.

Co3umbiana County activated their sirens and issued the EBS message at 2135 meeting the fifteen minute time requirement.

The EBS message contained the description of the area to be evacuated and sheltered in geograpnical/ political boundaries. Residents were instructed to refer to their emergency public information brochures 24

for information on evacuation routes and sheltering locations.

A PAR Instructions for sheltering in their homes was also given.

for lactating livestock in the EPZ included sheltering and placing them on stored feed and covered water.

public Information There were two people assigned to the Public Information function in the EOC.

One staff person collected the information and maintained the telephone communications with the JPIC and the other Once operated the facsimile machine sending hard-copy to the JPIC.

the EBS messages were issued to the radio station they were sent The Executive Group also originated brief public to the JPIC.

information statements to be sent to the JPIC and responses to the JPIC inquiries were obtain and communicated.

There is a Media Center located near the EOC building. Procedures for conducting briefings and the necessary displays were discussed but no media briefings were held.

A rumor control nuxber was announced in the County EOC, but no simulated rumors were received to test the system, f

AREA REOUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:

(NUREG-0654 criteria item i

G.3.a.)

No media briefings were conducted at the County Media Center.

RECOMMENDATION:

Media briefings should to be conducted at the media center during the next exercise.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

(NUREG-0654 criteria item AREA REOUIRING A rumor control telephone number was announced in the G.4.c.)

County EOC, but no simulated rumors were received to test the system.

RECOMMENDATION:

The County EOC PIOS should demonstrate responding to simulated rumors during the next exercise.

Protective Action Implementation Though the use of KI was not authorized, the EOC staff demonstrated good knowledge of procedures relative to use of this protective measure.

Emergency workers were issued KI in the radiation protection kits, with instructions for its use, and for recording While the decision for authorizing use of KI would their dose.

have been made at the State Department of Health, the EOC staff was fully cognizant of the bases of which such an authorization would be made.

Supplies of KI were adequate.

Knowledge of the foregoing, consistent with the

plan, is a

satisfactory demonstration of the use of KI in this exercise.

The Columbiana County EOC demonstrated the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the 25

]

1 impacted. permanent and transient plume EPZ population which included transit-dependent persons, special needs populations,

.I handicapped and institutionalized persons.

J resources necessary to implement any appropriate protective The actions were identified in h recently up dated Columbiana County Emergency Resource Manual (Revised 8/88). In addition to staff lists of the City, County and State Agencies; there are the list f or schools, nursing homes, hospitals, amateur radio operators, relief organizations, ambulances, quantity of buses and bus drivers, vans with wheelchair lifts and tow trucks, as well as an extensive list of industrial resources.

The County Transportation Officer followed the SOPS for and implementing the evacuation by insuring the necessary buses ambulances were available to assist in the evacuation of the nursing homes and hospitals and by coordinating with the County Health Officer.

Rail and airport traffic was also stopped in the area.

People identified as needing transportation or who were l

mobility impaired were provided transportation.

c Site Area Emergency Classification, as per the SOPS, During the the potential assembly areas and reception / congregate care centers were identified and personnel were prepared for activation.

The American Red Cross representatives and the County Human Services operate the care centers.

For this exercise, the assembly area at the Negley Fire Department was activated and the reception / congregate care center at the East Palestine High School was activated. When the evacuation was ordered, these care centers demonstrated their emergency functions.

Since this was an evening exercise, the. schools and day care centers were not operational.

The School Services Officer insured all extra curricular activities at the schools were cancelled and announced that schools would not be opened in the affected area the next day.

Access Control Point During the exercise, a'c the declaration of the General Emergency, the Ohio State Highway Patrol ordered the demonstration of traffic control at a traffic access point.

The location selected was at the junction of State Route 7 and County Route 425 which is located approximately eight miles southeast of Lisbon, Ohio, the County seat of Columbiana County.

Assigned at the traffic control point was a trooper of the Ohio Highway Patrol, District #15, Lisbon, Ohio.

The nuclear power station General Emergency was declared at 2103, the trooper The received his assignment at 2130, he arrived on scene at 2144.

time it took from his assignment to his arrival was within a reasonable time span.

26

The trooper had a good knowledge of his assignment.

He understood the protective actions; the need for public evacuation or sheltering in place, special facilities and planning

areas, routes, the location of relocation centers and the evacuation access control points. A copy of the section of the emergency plan which pertained to the State Patrol's emergency response was available in the patrol car.

The trooper was knowledgeable of the plan and could readily turn to the page necessary for detailed information.

The communications capability was demonstrated adequately by the State Patrol radio in the patrol car.

Back up capability would be the use of a nearby public, telephone or nearby private telephone.

It was expressed that other patrol cars would be at the access control point who would assist in getting vital communications through to supervisory personnel at the District Headquarters in Lisbon.

Equipment in the patrol car included personal dosimetry, l

record keeping materials and instructions on dosimetry use.

l Dosimeters in the trooper's possession were CDV 742 (0-200R) and CDV 730 (0-20R) in addition to a TLD.

The trooper was familiar with the taking of readings and at what intervals and safe levels for his own personal safety.

instructions were to keep traffic moving from the The trooper's declared evacuated area by the evacuation route and not to allow entry by anyone unless specified by his superiors at the District l

Hea6uarters.

l Instructions from the County EOC to the trooper could be l

communicated by radio from the County EOC to the State Patrol Headqu arters District in Lisbon and on to the troopcr at the l

traffic control point.

During the brief demonstration of traffic l

protective actions did not change.

The control by the trooper, l'

emergency classification was General Emergency with the order to evacuate the area bordered by the traffic control point.

l Methods to remove Impediments were discussed but not demonstrated.

1' traffic flow impediments were adequately discussed by responsible county agencies.

This discussion adequately demonstrated their l

capability to keep roadways open to vehicle traffic.

Assembly Area and Reception / Congregate Care Center The Negley, OH Fire Chief and Deputy received the Alert message at 1638, at which time partial activation of the Assembly Area was The site directed. This partial activation was completed at 1700.

Area Emergency message was received at 1845 and full mobilization of the Assembly Area was directed. Full activation of the Assembly Area was completed at 1910.

Use of personal dosimetry, record keeping, knowledge of exposure limits, and operation the CDV 700 for personnel and vehicle monitoring were capably demonstrated.

27

h The Reception / Congregate Care Center Manager was directed to stand At 1843 he was advised to report to the Center and at i

by at 1531.

1845 directed to notify staff to report to the Reception / Congregate Care Center.

The staff reported by 1915 and the Center was operational by 1929.

The American Red Cross managed the center which adequately demonstrated readiness to provide

security,

- radiological monitoring, decontamination und registration services.

The Center staffing was organized for three, eight hour shifts operation.

The radiological monitoring and decontamination procedures were demonstrated by the East Palestine Fire Department in a very satisfactory manner.

The Reception / Congregate Care Center staff demonstrated readiness to provide security, sheltering, feeding, emergency nursing care, and counseling services to evacuees.

Provisions had been made to food and sleeping areas for evacuees.

The Red provide clothing, Cross maintains size-sorted clothing, the school food supplios had been inventoried and arrangements made for deliveries of food and necessary supplies from local

vendors, and cots were l

other stockfilled to provide beds for the displaced population.

Nursing i

service was provided by the County Health Service and local ministers were available for disaster counseling.

The East Palestine High School Reception / Congregate Care Center was operational.

Emergency Worker Decontamination Center After notification of the Site Area Emergency, in activation of the decontamination station, the two fire trucks were moved from within the parking bay area to each side of the cement parking ramp in front of the fire station.

The trucks were spaced approximately 60 feet apart.

The space between them was provided for decontaminating emergency workers' vehicles.

The ramp sloped slightly to the downhill side where run-off water would enter a drain into the underground drain sewer system.

Contamination washed from the vehicles would be contained within this system and it's outlet until experts could assess and dispose of it.

at

" Clean" vehicles would be parked across the street in a paved lot that could accommodate about 60 cars.

Vehicles that could not be decontaminated to safe levels would be moved into a separate parking area by the fire station and retained as long as necessary.

Vehicle decontamination was not selected as an exercise objective to be demonstrated, but was explained by knowledgeable personnel and existing capability at the fire station was well adapted to the purpose.

The three empty parking bays inside the station were quickly With converted into the emergency worker decontamination mode.

the bay doors closed, foot traffic was routed through a side door toward the front of the building.

Butcher paper was unrolled and taped to the floor to make a path for emergency workers to follow to the radiation monitors, the contaminated clothing barrels and 28

=

s showers.

If this paper had become contaminated, anotner layer would have been unrolled on top of it and taped into place to trap radioactive particles and provide a new " clean" path.

Additional layers would be added as required.

All layers would be rolled up at one time for disposal.

Two shower heads, approximately six feet apart projected from the rear wall of the parking bay area.

Each was surrounded by a circular ehower rod and curtain.

During activation, cut pieces of pipe were taken from an attic-like storage area and assembled into a frame work for two dressing areas that also enclosed the showers.

Curtains were hung on the frame to provide privacy and contaminated clothing disposal barrels were placed in each.

The barrels were marked for radioactive waste materials.

Plastic tubs about 2 1/2 feet square and 18 inches deep were placed inside each shower curtained area.

A 2 or 2 1/2 inch plastic pipe was connected to the tubs' drain connections and extended some 8 or 10 feet to a floor drain into the sewer system.

Soap, towels, paper robes and disposable. coveralls were available in each dressing room.

Six CDV-777 kits or radiation monitoring instruments were available.

Batteries were installed and the instruments were checked and zeroed.

Each volunteer firefighter who responded from paging and the sounding of the local fire siren was issued a kit containing high and low range dosimeters, a TLD, a bottle of KI tablets and an exposure control record form.

The dosimeters were charged and the forms were completed as of that time.

Two firefighters, one male and one female, were assigned to be the monitoring team.

These two individuals dressed in disposable radiation protective coveralls, hoods, booties and double gloves.

Hoods and cuffs were properly taped to prevent radioactive particles from getting on the skin or on the regular clothing worn under the protective clothing.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:

It is suggested that surgical type masks be provided for wear by the two monitors to prevent their inhalation of any radioactive particles that might become airborne or transferred through contact during monitoring.

It was noted that the monitors' emergency worker kits were attached to the outside of their protective clothing to be accessible.

1 To provide " hot line" demonstration an observer f*om the utility was volunteered to serve as an emergency worker decontaminee.

He i

entered the decontamination area, was directed to keep on the paper path to the monitoring station.

The first monitor was equipped with forms on a clipboard and recorded identifying information.

Then the other monitor began the actual monitoring.

She passed the probe over the individual's arms, hands, head, body, legs and feet very slowly and methodically, aware of the slow reaction time of I

I the CDV-700.

She was careful to hold the probe with the open 1

29 l

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4 window toward the source being monitored and approximately an inch from the surface being monitored.

At all times, she watched the probe and depended upon the earphone, glancing at the meter only i

-when she was prompted by the controller that she had detected radiation. She told the monitor / recorder the intensity encountered and anatomical location.

He recorded this information on the worker's record form.

Upon completion of monitoring, because intensity above.3 mr/hr was detected on the worker's hands and trouser leg, the worker was instructed to simulate washing his hands first at the shower tub, then, in the dressing room, removing and discarding his shoes and trousers.

After re-monitoring, he would have been provided disposable coveralls and booties to wehr home.

The estimated value of his discarded clothing and shoos was recorded.

The " trigger point" radiation level requiring decontamination was known by all the volunteer firefighters.

It was also on a sign posted on the wall near the showers.

In addition, the Fire Chief and Assistant Fire Chief explained the process for referring or transporting individuals to a medical facility for any required further assistance.

In final summary, the volunteer fire department at Glenmoor developed procedures and capability to perform service as an emergency worker decontamination station.

These personnel demonstrated in-depth knowledge of the decontamination process, adapted their fecility into a decontamination station mode and followed their written procedures to accomplish their purpose.

It is noteworthy that these volunteers had been firefighting all l

night prior to the exercise, had worked at their regular jobs that l

day and yet, without sleep for at least 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />, responded to the

, exercise and displayed enthusiasm and interest throughout the I

exercise.

Tired as they were, they performed the decontamination tasks in a highly professional manner.

(-

I The October 25, 1988 exercise, for the BVPS was unannounced.

No one at the County level knew the exact day or starting time of the exercise; they were provided only with a one week window.

The staff alerting started at 1522 and was completed at 1602.

Telephone and pagers were used to alert EOC Staff.

The first EOC Staff person that reported who did not already work in the building was the Sheriff at 1530.

The EOC was completely staffed at 1632.

The unannounced mobilization of staff activation of the EOC was successfully demonstrated in a timely manner following their plan and procedures.

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LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS-SITE: BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION OCTOBER 25, 1988 i

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LISTING OF' EXERCISE FINDIEGS SITE:

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION

s OCTOBER-25, 1988 i..

STATE OF OHIO

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NUREG 0654 Proposed Estiimc '.cd Criteria

  • Summary Statement Corrective Action Date

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-LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS SITE:

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION OCTOBER-25, 1988

- STATE.OF 'OHIQ

. 2. Areas Requiring Corrective Action EUREG 0654 Proposed Estimated I

Criteria

- Summary Statement Corrective Action Date 4

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Initial or zeroed dosimeter readings

'The State procedures call should be recorded when'the field for the recording of:.' dos-monitoring teams.are deployed to go imeter readings at the surveys.

Radiological Monitoring Staging Area, not the' N,-

EOC.

These procedures will not be changed since the teams may require' add-itional members at the staging area.

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The'one ' telephone assigned to the

,Ad'ditional line's will be May 2, 1990 State of Ohio Joint Public

'available for State activ-Exercise Information staff wa's not, adequate'.

.ities at Duquesne Light's During the exercise the State used new JPIC.

4 their assigned phone, the Columbiana e.

County phone.as well as two phones

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not assigned to them, in order,to,.

collec[t and coordinate informatign.

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-LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDIbGS

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SITE:- BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION OCTOBER 25, 1988

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STATE OF-OHIO

' 2. Afeas-Pequiriing Corrdctive Act, ion

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Proposed Estimated Criteria Summary Statement Corrective ~ Action Date g

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Maps showing the Ohio emergency plan-.

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" Procedures are in place in ing zone areas, evacuation r6utes, to ensure proper set.Lup of reception'ated congregate care centers-the'JPIC.and training for were not set ~up in the Joint Publ5ic this procedures, and will be Information Center until late in the completed by February'28, 1990.

exercise and then only at..the. insist-ence of the St;Le of. Ohio staff.

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LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINdS.

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SITE:

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STATE,OF OHIO

, 3. Areas Recommended For' Improvement 1.

The three States' Emergency Management Directors shou.14 discuss coordinated acticns in*

PARS decisions and complete pre-planning prior to recommet.fing protective actions.

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2.

. Appropriate pla'ns and/or standard operations procedures (SOPS) be maintain <?d in the

. ceumiunications van f,or reference.,

3.

Cover probes, wit.h plastic to prev,ent them from becoming contaminated'. '

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It is recommended to modify the kit checklist to add a pair of. tweezers.

The tweezers, could be used to remove the filter paper. from the air sampler, placing both items into a

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plastic bag or when sample.is to be counted in the sample holder. ^

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' 5.

The State of Ohio :nay want to consider increased stbaffing at the,+,JPIC so 'that data collection, organization and presentation of media releases can be accomplished.while the spokesperson is conducting media' briefings.

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The Dnergency Classification Level should be pos.ted in the JPIC media briefug, room.

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BEAVER" VALLEY POWER STATION OCTOBER 25,,1988

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COLUMBINNACOUNTY

-1. Deficiencies

.: e NUREG 0654

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' Criteria Summary Statement.

Proposed Estimated Corrective Action Date 1

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LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS.

SITE:

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION s

OCTOBER 25, 1988 1

COLUMBIANA COUltrY

. 2. Areas Requiring Corractive Action

..gf NUREG 0654 Proposed Estimated Critsia

. Summary Statement as Corrective Action Date v

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E.2.

The EOC Coordinator dispatched a The County EOC has two Completed, county PIO.to the JPIC at approx-responders whose _speci'fic will be imately 1600..He never reported

, duty is to report to the demonstrated there., There was no other PIO available to send to the JPIC. ~

JPIC.

We have procured at the next additional volunteers t'o drill.

Columbiana County did not hav6 respond to the JPIC and a representative at the Joint Public they are currently being.

Information Center as required by trained in that positioh.

State and County plans and exercise

',, _ iobjectives.

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No media briefings were conducted at ~

A meeting was called and Completed, the County Media Center.

arrangements made with will be the local media that rep-demonstrated resentatives of the media at the next?

would be called'to the

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drill.

Media Center at drill time

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LISTING"OF EXERCISE FINDINGb SITE:

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION y

OCTOBER 25, 1988 y.

COLUMBIANA COUNTY

2. Areds Requiring ~ Corrective Action NUREG 0654-Proposed Estimated Criteria Sunuuary Statement

,g Corrective Action Date I

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A rumor co'ntrol telepone number was Rumor Control prompts will Will be demon-G.4.c'.

announced in(the County EOC, but no j

simulated rumors were received to

. he issued to PIO respond,ers strated,at during next drill.

the next-test the system.

6 drill.

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LISTING OF EXERCISE FINDINGS ~

SITE:

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION 1

OCTOBER 25, 1888 COLUMBIANA COUNTY 3.sAreas Recommended For Improvement l'.

It is recomunended that additional hard-copy capability be added for transmission ~ of operational information between the plant, State and County.

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2.

It is suggested,that surgical type masks be provided to be worn by the two monitors to prevent their ingestion of any radioactive particles that might become airborne or transferred through contact during monitoring.

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