ML19323E655

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Safety Evaluation Re Postulated Fuel Handling Accident Inside Reactor Bldg.Util Analysis Is Adequate
ML19323E655
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/06/1980
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML19323E649 List:
References
TAC-08882, TAC-8882, NUDOCS 8005270099
Download: ML19323E655 (3)


Text

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0 UNITED STATES g

E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o

s WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 n

Enclosure SAFrTY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION TOR POSTULATED FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT INSIDE REACTOR BUILDING CRYSTAL RIVER, UNIT NO. 3 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION DOCKET NO. 50-302 Introduction 4

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By letter dated January 17, 1977, the staff requested the Florida Power Corporation (the licensee) to evaluate the previously unevaluated poten-tial consequences of a postulated Fuel Handling Accident Inside Contain.

ment (FHAIC) et Crystal River Unit 3.

The licensee submitted, in a letter dated March 15, 1977, an evaluation of the FHAIC for Crystal River 3.

The licensee stated that the potential consequences of this postulated accident are 11 Rem thyroid and 0.2 Rem whole body at the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) and 0.4 Rem thyroid and 0.006 Rem whole body at the Low Population Zone Boundary (LPZB). The licensee concluded that these doses are well within the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100.

Evaluation We have cmpleted'our review of the licensee's March 15, 1977, submittal which addresses the potential consequences of an accident involving spent fuel handling inside contaiment. We have perfomed an independent analy-sis of the FHAIC. Our assumptions and the resulting potential consequences at the EAB are given in Table 1.

The calculated potential consequences of the postulated fuel handling accident inside contaiment are appropriately within the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 and are, therefore, acceptable.

,1ppropriately within the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100 has been defined as less than 100 Rem to the thyrcid. This is based on the probability of this event relative to other events which are evaluated against 10 CFR Part 100 exposure guidelines. Whole body doses were also examined, but they are not controlling due to decay of the short-lived radioisotopes prior to fuel hand-ling. The potential consequences of this postulated accident at the LPZB are less than those given for the EAB in Table 1.

Environmental Considerations

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o The. environmental impacts of an accident involving the handling of spent fuel inside centaiment have been addressed in Section 6.1 of the Final En-vironmental Statement (FES) dated May 1973 for the operation of Crystal River 3.

80052708 j

. Conclusion The staff has evaluated the licensee's analysis of the postulated FHAIC.

j Af ter performing an independent analysis of the radiological consequences of an FHAIC to any individual located at the nearest exclusion area boundary, the staff concludes that the doses are appropriately within the guidelines values of 10 CFR Part 100 and are, therefore, acceptable.

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Table 1 ASSUMPTIONS FOR AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE POSTULATED FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENTS AT THE EXCLUSION AREA B0UNDARY FOR CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 Assumptions:

Guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.25 Power Level 2544 Mwt Fuel Exposure Time 3 years Peaking factor 1.65 Equivalent Number of Assem-bli'es damaged 1

Number of Assembiies in 177 core Charcoal Filters available None Decay time before moving fuel 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 0-2 hours X/Q Value, Ex-clusion Area Boundary

-5 (ground level release) 9.6 x 10 sec/m Doses, Rem Thyroid Whole Body Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB)

Consequences from Accidents Inside Containment 24 0.1 g

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