ML19322C848

Interview of J Anderson (AR Power & Light) on 791128 in Little Rock,Ar.Pp 1-49

ML19322C848
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear, Crane
Issue date:	11/28/1979
From:	James Anderson, Creswell J ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO., NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE
To:
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001280572
Download: ML19322C848 (50)

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1 CR8634 1

TMI SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP 2

3 4

5 6

Little Rock, Arkansas 7

Wednesday, November 28, 1979 8

9 10 11 12 O

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,s 15 16 17 18 19 (THIS TRANSCRIPT WAS PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.)

20 21 22 23 24 I Acs.Fedarst Reporters, Inc.

25 L

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'8634 01 01 NRCate i

VOICE:

Okay.

The date is November 28, 1979.

It 2

is 10:05 a.m.

We are in an of fice on the second floor of 3

the administration building at ANO in Russellvilla, (m )

4 Arkansas.

6 Present is John Anderson, refueling coordinator 6

and acting auality control manager at ANO for Arkansas Power 7

& Lights also Stephen Riaqs with the law firm of House, 8

Holmes and Jewell, representing AP&L.

9 Present for the NRC TMI Special Inquiry Group ara 10 James Creswell and Frederick Hur.

(h) 11 Mr. Anderson, we've qiven you a copy of a document 12 entitled "NRC Special Inquiry Group ditness Notification."

13 Have you read the document?

14 Mad.

VOICE:

Yes, I have.

V

/%

15 W

VOICE:

Do you understand the information 16 contained in it?

I/

[)n cl.

VOICE:

I understand it and I don't think of any 18 questions.

IV VOICE:

Okay.

If we could start out, you could 20 give us a brief nistory of your nuclear-related experience.

21 h)ncl.

VOICE:

Let's see.

The dates, it would be back 22 about 1967 when I was assistant superintendent at our 23 Ritchie steam electric plant, fossil unit, when I was 24 selected as part of our nuclear program.

kJ 25 So I came to Little Rock for a couple years as a

3 8634~01 02 NRCmte i

mechanical engineer at our general office, workino on the 2

nuclear program.

Then I was assigned chief quality 3

assurance coordinator for the nuclear project for AP&L.

And

(,/

4 if my memory serves me riqht, in early 1970 I was made what 5

was then called plant superintendent of this plants and 6

served until the middle of 1978, at which time I was made 7

the refuelinq coordinator there, and I've given you that.

8 So that's the time history.

Did you have other Y

things you wanted?

h VOICE:

I think that's sati sf actory for the 10 il introduction.

Jim may have some more specific questions.

12 But I'll turn it over to Jim.

13 MJwp // VOICE:

Mr. Anderson -- Jim Creswell speaking --

14 g

could you alve us an idea of what your responsibilities were 15 as a plant superintendent?

16 r7 e/.

VOICE:

Well, it was comple te charge of the 17 plant, all the people at the site working for AP&L, involved 18 with the plant, reported to me.

So I had administrative 19 responsibilities as well as overall site re spons i bi li ti es,

20 includinq some construction responsibilities.

But 21 basically, I was concerned with the plant oer se.

22 VOICE:

Okay.

As a plant superintendent, who did 23 you report to?

24 hrj e/.

VOICE:

I reported to -- our organization has

,_s i

'v' 25 changed in Little Rock.

But I reported to our Little Rock

4 8634 01 03 NRCmte I

head office, to the director of power production, and la te r 2

on to the vice president in et)irge of production, which was 3

the generation and construction department, which came into

()

4 beings and some intermediate titles in between there.

h S

VOICE:

Okay.

Mr. Anderson, who specifically did 6

you report to in the time period of say September of 1974 to 7

the end of 1975?

[n d.

VOICE:

I reported to Bill Cavanauch during that 8

9 period.

h VOICE:

Okay, sir.

Now, you mentioned bef ore that 10 11 you were a OA coordinator.

12

[n d.

VOICE:

Yes, for the construction of ANO-l.

h VOICE:

What were your duties as a OA coordinator?

13 hn d.

VOICE:

My duties consisted of the GA effort of 14 g

U 15 ApdL.

I was in charge of that.

16 VOICE:

I see.

I/

4,9ol, VOICE:

It was a small organization.

It consisted 18 of auditina and of really -- I had some inspectors, also, 19 who were stationed on the site.

And I had site 20 responsibility as well as of f-site responsibility.

I went 21 around to the manuf ac turers and audited their programs, 22 looked at their shops, reviewed all of our vendors' 23 programs.

I'm not saying I did this all persona 11yt I was 24 responsible for their proorams, including the U

25 architect-engineer for this unit, the Bechtel Corporation.

8634 01 04 5

NRCmte 1

So my responsibility, in a nutshell, was all of 2

the QA-type responsibilities for AP&L as in regard to the 3

nuclear plant.

()

())

VOICE:

Okay, sir.

You men tioned that you had 4

5 some re spons i bili t ies in the area of conducting audits at 6

manuf ac turing f acilities.

Did you personally conduct or do 7

you know of any audits that were conducted at the Babcock &

8 Wilcox facilities, either at Lynchburg or, say, Mount Vernon 9

in Ohio?

/hno/,

VOICE:

Yes, indeed, I have.

I have conducted 10 11 audits at the Mount Vernon facility, and also the -- what is 12 i t, the Canton facility?

h) 13 VOICE:

Barberton?

/hne/,

VOICE:

Bar berton f acility.

And Lynchburg, the 14 7s

/

15 general o ffices, yes.

()

16 VOICES During any of thosa audits, did you review 17 the design or construction of the pressurizer for ANO-l?

18

/hvid.

VOICE:

I doubt it.

I doubt that I went into 19 detailed engineering.

However, I did -- in that 20 responsibility, we reviewed -- a small staff reviewed 21 engineering work of B&W, and in that capacity I don't 22 remember whether I -- I do not remember whather I reviewed 23 the pressurizer or not.

24

(

Vt, ICE:

Do you recollect ever observing the

_s 25 pressurizer during construction?

i i

,8634 E01 05 6

NRCmte.

1

/ld VOICE:

Oh, yes.

h VOICE:

.You did do th'at?

i 2

[ sol,

= VOICE:

Yes,:I did.

The installation, you're 3

3

/

'4 talking about, during construction?.

l 5

VOICE:

At the plant here?

6 4

VOICES: Yes.

/

VOICE:

Yes.

I was speaking more'like its --

8 during its fabrication.

9 no/,

VOICE:

No, I don't believe that I -- I remembe r 10

.the-steam generator as well, but I don't -- and I remember 11 the pressure vessel (Inaudible).

I nean, well, I don't 12 remember whether I saw the pressurizer under construction or 13 not.

I don't: remember.

14 VOICE:

Okay.

Mr. Anderson, I'm going to show you pO 15 a copy of a memorandum from the Babcock & Wilcox Company 16 dated September ~ 6th, 1974, from a Mr. Kaylin, the site i

17:

operations managar for B&W, addressed to you.

I'd.like for

{

18 you to look at that and. refresh your memory.

19 On d-VOICE:

Okay.

l' 20 (Pause.)

Mf1c/, VOICE:

Yes, I -- my memory is. refreshed.

f 21 h

22 VOICE:

Okay, sir.

23

( Laughte r. )

h' 24 VOICE:

In this memorandum. Mr. Caylin is pointing 25 out that they had a test at Three Mile Island which showed i.

I l

I..

,,,--,c

- -,~- - -

8634 01 06 7

'NRCmte.

'I that their pressurizer level dropped.to 33 inches, as 2'

indicated. by: their level instrumentation.

He further says 3

that it was probably compounded -- this response was

):

4 compounded by.a turbine bypass valve sticking open.

Andlhe 5

says that evaluation of data of transients from other 6

plants, like Oconee Units I and 2 and Three Mile Island Unit 7

1, confirms that relatively low levels in the pressurizer

'8 may be reached before a transient is' turned eround.

He 9

further points out that the lower tap at' Arkansas is 40 10 inches above the lower tap at TMI and Oconee I and 2, and-11 that the possibility exists that the level indication will-12 be temporarily lost during a significant reactor coolant 13 temperature tiip, pressure transient.

4 14 And he recommends that you increase the normal O

15 ope ra ting level in the pressurizer to 210 inches.

And he 16 says, if you have any questions about that, get back in 17 touch with him.

18 What -- Mr. Anderson, what did you do with that 19 memo af ter you got it?

/hr/ d,l 20 VOICE:

This memo was brought to the attention of 21 my staff and we had considerable -interest in it.

So we i

-22 analyzed or we studied it.

We looked at it.

We did the 23 normal things you do whenever you find some thing that you're 24 immediately interested in in a plant - that's starting up.

25

()

VOICE:

Well, how did that information strike

2

~

8 i

8634 O! 07L NRCmte l

you, Mr. Anderson?

[nd, 2

VO ICF' We ll, in one. sense I~~- what we had pushed j

3

~ B&W for was to be sure and let us know of thinos tha't you

~

4

find at other plants. ' Don't stick them in your files 5_

.somewhere.

So,'in the positive note, this was'--

(f 6

VOICE:

How'd you go about t.at, Mr. Anderson, 7

letting-B&W know that yoti wanted to know about these other.

g

{

9 j-@n al..

VOICE:

Wel'1, we had meetings with them all the 10 time during thatcperiod and earlier, particularly earlier..

11 And I had come from a startup of a supercritical fossil 12 plant, and so I recognized that a lot of these things 13 weren't getting f rom one customer to another of the 14

. manufacture.- of, in that case boilers, in this case NSSS.

.(

15 systems.

And other people, not just me.

i i

16 So we in these meetings tried to make sure that 1

j i7 B&W knew that they needed to get this information e.ut.

I 18 don't know if this was a result of that.

I just know we did i.

19 that, and from this I thought that was a positive note, to

~

20-say that, yeah, we've got this concern.

So that was my 21 reaction It was a positive thing that they had brought 22 this to-our attention.

(f 23

' VOICE:

I see.

Do you remember who you talked to

- 24 at IkDT during these meetings and expressed this concern that 25^

they provide; you with information about what's going on at 4,

I. '

f

....,.. _.. _. -. _ _. ~. _. _.,

8634 01 08 9

.NRCmte.

I

other plants?

2' v7 VOICE:

I can't name.any names.

That's been too 3

lona ago.

But we were ~ in like dozens and dozens of l( )

4 meetings, as you know, durino the construction phase and the-S beginning of operation phase.

I'm sure that any number of 6

people at B&W were knowledgeable of our concern.

But I 7

don't have any names.

()

8 VOICE:

Do you recollect any instances where you 9

felt that B&W hadn't apprised you of problems that they'd 10 picked up on other plants?

11

/ nod VOICE:

Well, I can't think of any specifics at 12 a ll, you know.

But during the years to follow, if this is 13 pertinent, what I think was the most important meeting that 14 I attended was the-B&W users meeting, whereby the O

15 superintendents and managers all got together.

And we --

16 during -- I remember any number of times -

not me 1/

particularly, but others have said Be sure and keep l'

18 le tting us know of these site-related problems.

19 I don't know.if it was brought up, any specific 20 instances where they were not.

But we all recognized this 21 thing that we've been talking about.

Vendors tend to want 22

-- or tend to not bring out, maybe, some of their troubles.

- 23 I think B&W's been better than the ones I've been f amiliar

- 24 with in (Inaudible.

(

i 25-So I. don't-know.

I don't have any specifics, and L

e t

i

8634-01 09 10-

.NRCmte i

I don't at all -- but as -I say. I remember the users meeting 2

.at which this also came.up with myself and various other

.( }.

3 superintendents saying, be sure and keep us informed of what

(

4 others are doing.

()

5 VOICE:

Okay, sir.

'Now, looking at tha't memo, 6

now, you said you contacted your plant staff.

Who.were the

/

types of people that you would contact over an issue like 8-that?

9 Mgd VOICE:

This would normally -- would come -- I

~

10 would normally bring up something like this at -- what we 11

.had at that time was a group supervisors meeting.

We had 1

12 seven.or eight group leaders under myself and the assistant-13 superintendent, whica covered all of the areas.

And we met i

!4 right along.

(:)

15 And also, the plant safety committee.would have 16 been given this kind of information.

Probably specifically i

17 the operations manager would have been given this 18 information.

(h 19 VOICE:

Okay.

Next I'm coing to show you a 20 document here that looks like it's a routing sheet to the 21 plant safety committee from yourself, and it has a written i~

22

' statement here, "Unreviewed safety question documented in u

23

_PSC minutes."

And the initials on here are "GHM."

Could i

l 24 you identify who that is, please, s ir.?

25-

/ 4 d'.

VOICE:

Yes.

That's Gordon flarvey Miller.

11 8634 01 10 NRCmte I

(

Va!CE:

Okay.

Do you recall his making a comment 2

like that?

/kbid.

VOICE:

No, I don't quess I specifically remember

/

3

(,)

4 that exact comment.

I just remember the total situation.

I 5

don't remember specifically that comment.

()

6 VOICE:

The next document I'm going to refer to is 7

a memorandum from Gordon H. Miller, chairman of the PSC --

8 that's the -- the PSC is --

/ka o/,

VOICE:

Plant safety commi ttee.

9

()

10 VOICE:

Plant safety committee.

Addressed to il you.

And this is dated October 2nd, 1974 And I ouote from 12 a bou t the second page of this document.

It says:

13 "The PSC feels this is an unreviewed safety 14 question, since no analysis appears to have been conducted

(,_ )

15 to verify that pressurizer will not ao solid durina a load 16 re Jec tion wi thout reactor trip, thus also causing potential I/

loss of pressurizer level indication.

The PSC recommends 18 that R&W be requested to justify the location of the low 17 level tap at AND based on the Three Mile Island Unit I and 20 Oconee I and 2."

21 Do you recall what action was taken as a result of 22 the plant safety commi ttee concerns in this area?

23

/ P?d.

VOICE:

I think in generali ties I remember, yes.

24 We were -- the plant safety committee, they reported to me.

( \\

k/

25 And I was very concerned at the situation, because it had

i

' 12 8634 01 11 NRCmte

?l.

been brought up.

So the actions that were_taken were to try 2-to get something moving on 'this, to resolve i t.

And are --

3 and I dealt with Little Rock to oet them' involved in this

(~

4 4

evaluation and requested -- and of course, on-the~ site B&W

'S was involved as well, knowing our concerns.

6 so yes, that was the action that was taken.

We 7

involved Little Rock and B&W in this.

i (f) 8

. VOICE:

Okay.. sir.

Lookino at the next document

.9 here, a memo from yourself to.Mr.fWilliam Cavanauch, dated 10 October 15th, 1974, you state that Considerable ANO staff 11 review, including that of the plant safety committee, has 1

12 resulted in no specific recommendation as-to whether to 13 change our pressurizer set point to 210 inches, as 14 recommended by the ref erenced B&W 1etter.

We hesitate to go i - s

~

-15 to the higher setting because of the possibility of the 1

16 pressurizer going solid under certain conditions.

Please i

j 17 investigate this B&W request.

18 Consideration should be given to the reason that 19 the ANO pressurizer lower tap is 40 inches higher than Three 20 Mile Island ~and Oconee I and 2, which gives us less 21 indication of pressurizer level.

When your review is 22-

- complete, I recommend the B&W request be reviewed by the SRC 23 to determine that.no un x71ewed safety question exists.

24 Okay.

Now,.you've asked a nuestion here

-Why;is

(:

25 the ANO pressurizer level lower tap 40. inches higher than i

i 1

4 v-,ay,---.u--v---

-e

.-e c-e--,-#

r

+

m y

y,

,w-s,,,,..

r

i8634 01 ~12 13 NRCmte I

these other plants.

What.was the response to that,

~

2 Mr.. Anderson?

'3

/1 VOICE:

i At that time I don't remember ever getting

. ( )

4 a satisfactory response from B&W on why that was changed.

5 l

VOICES-.Okay, sir.

What was -

you say a 6

satisfactory one.

Did you receive some comments from them?

/fsf o/,

VOICE:

I-think I asked and asked here.

We all-i 7

8 asked and Little Rock asked, and we talked back and forth.

i I really -- it seems to me like they may have said that -- I 9

10 don't know what they said.

All I remember -- you know, a ll 4

11 I can say at this point is that they were telling me why-l l

-12 this was.

13 Now, whether -- I said satisfactory.

I'm sure 14 they had, you know -- must have given some reason.

'ut I

)

15 never got a -- I never got what I call a satisf actory 1

I 16 response to that.

17 h

VOICE:

Does that happen to you very often, tha t j

18 you ask a question like that and you don't get a 19 satisfactory response?

20

<dv7 d'.

VOICES-Oh, yeah.

My son in chemistry right now 21

-- ( I n aud i bl e ).

(f 22 VOICE:

Okay.

I could appreciate.that in your

-23

. personal life.

But in regards to the operation of this i

24

~ nuclear power plant, do you have any similar type of 26 experiences?

1 i

i s-w m

ec-

.ryr

.--.r

,..--,-g

..r e

t

=,'.-,-+<--*r*

r

--w

,rw--

14

'8634 01 13 hn*

NRCmte I

VOICE:

I don't know.

I'm sure I must have.

When 2

you've got nine 111110n things, you're bound to end up with 3

some of these type of thinqs.

Hopafully, they all get

's /

4 satisfactorily answered, you know, in some period of time.

5 I don't know whether I answered you or not.

6 VOICE:

Let me ask you another question, then.

/

Mr. Anderson.

In looking through this correspondence that I 8

have here on this subject, I see the words "unreviewed 9

safety question" appear several times, which lends a great to deal of siqnificance to this particular issue that we're 11 discussing.

12 Do you or have you customarily received 13 unsatisfactory answers on issues of this type in the past?

Qgy, VOICE:

Well, I didn't mean to say that we had an 14 IS unsatisfactory answer to the issue.

It's more kind of a 16 side question as to why it was there, you know, which really Il I suppose doesn't have to be answered, as long as we can --

19 It's shown that the parameter -- if it's no safety factor, 19 or answered -- I don't know that we could require an answer 20 of anybody (Inaudible) or not.

21 To me, while I really wanted the answer, out of 22 curiosity and all, I was much more interested that we 23 resolve the big picture than I was in why did you change 24 ours differently from the earlier models in these units, you

\\J 25 see.

15 8634 01 14 h

NRCmte I

VOICE:

But wasn't this, this question the result 2

of a review and a decision by the plant safety committee as 3

a body?

Q, VOICE:

This cuestion of why the level tap is 40 4

5 inches higher?

I believe they -- I believe -- maybe I'm 6

not sure about that, but I remember asking the question 7

verbally many times.

I think I asked it in writing.

And I 8

believe maybe the plant safety committee did, too.

Right 9

now I can't recall that for sure, to say that that question 10 was asked.

I believe it war.

11 VOICE:

We ll, there is correspondence that 12 indicates that Mr. Cavanaug, asked more than once the same 13 question of B&W.

14 Mvv:3.

VOICE:

I believe that's correct.

g IS (Pause.)

16 VOICE:

Well, B&W's made this recommendation to 17 increase the level, and your plant safety committee has 18 taken a look at it and they have an objection to that.

They 19 feel it's an unreviewed safety ouestion, without any 20 analysis.

21 So what's the next thing that happens?

22 htl.

VOICE:

Well, the next thing that happens is, 23 before we do anythinq, we get that reviewed.

We cet that 24 ques tion reviewed.

25 VOICE:

And that review consists of what?

16 8634 01 15 t1RCmte I

h VOICE:

Well, that review consists of the 2

engineering, normally now, an engineering review and a 3

review by the plant safety committee.

They review these

,,(_)

4 unreviewed safety questions.

So as I remember it, we asked 5

that that be reviewed by the plant safety committee, this 6

problem.

(h

/

VOICE:

Okay.

What was the result of that review?

[)ny, 8

VOICE:

Well, in the big picture -- I don't 9

remember the times or the details -- the plant safety 10 committee did review this situation.

II (3)

VOICE:

What was their deternination?

12 M nd,

VOICE:

tio unreviewed safety question.

(h 13 VOICE:

And then they submi tted that to you or to 14 your --

15

[)rd.

VOICE:

Well, I'm a memoer of the safety review 16 committee.

Yes.

I don't remember if they submitted im to 17 me or I got copies of all the safety review committee 18 meeting minutes.

And I can't say that I was there and 19 involved or whether I cot the minutes or just what happened 20 there.

()

21 VOICE:

You don't recall whether you ob jected to 22 their decision?

b Ad' 23 VOICE:

No, I don't recall.

C3)

VOICE:

This is all taking a little bit of time, 24 p

(_/

25 and the plant is goino through startup.

What's happenina

8634 01 16 17 NRCmte I

at the plant meanwhile to address this problem?

2 hnd,

VOICE:

Let's see, what is happening at the plant 3

to address this problem?

I guess it was more what we talked (n) 4 about, sending it aff and talking about it among ourselves 5

and the staff talking about it, more than -- that's the 6

thing, I guess, that happened.

h 7

VO ICE:

But I'm askino more to the effect, is the 8

operator having to take any action to counteract this 9

tendency to lose level indication?

h ad, VOICE:

Well, during -- during our early 10 11 operations, we indeed found that our pressurizer level 12 indication did go offscale low.

And so they were aware.

13 They took -- they were aware of it and they took necessary 14 action, being aware of this potential problem.

h VOICE:

What was that necessary action, 15 16 Mr. Anderson?

ha d.

I/

VOICE:

dell, I quess -- I think what we did was 18 watch to see -- we watched to see that it did not cet us 19 into trouble.

Now, there were some actions taken during the 20 whole period there of time.

h 21 VOICE:

Yes.

I'm trying to understand what those 22 actions were.

hysd, 23 VOICE:

All right, now.

Say it aaain so I can 00 24 back specifically and see if I can answer.

h 25 VOICE:

Sure.

18 8634 o f 17 tlRCmte i

VOICE:

I'm not sure I can answer, out I can try.

h 2

VOICE:

Okay.

Let me ao oack and res'. ate the 3

q ue s t i o n.

f4hile all these reviews are takinq place, there pV 4

is a problem under certain conditions at the plant where you 5

will lose pressurizer level indication.

flow what I'm askina 6

you i s, s pe c i f i ca lly, was the operator givan any

/

instructions during this period of tima to take any actions 8

to deal with the problem?

M4d, VOICE:

tie l l, I don't remember specific 9

10 instructions that were given to do this action other than do il your normal thin >s well and keep this -- keep aware of this 12 potential problem of coing off the scale at the lower end.

13 The thinas that you do, we more or le ss wanted to make sure 14 we did all those things.

15 VOICE:

de ll, what are the thinos that you do?

hnd, VOICE:

All of the things that you do during a 16 17 trip, do you mean, or what?

h 18 VOICE:

You said there are things that you do to IV address this particular problem.

Vihat are those things that 20 you do?

21

hnd, VOICE:

Piell, one of the thinos you can do is 22 start additional makeup pumps.

23 VOICE:

Okay.

24 nd.

VOICE:

Make sure you take your proper action on (D

(>

25 your letdown system.

19 8634 02 01 NRCmte i

VOICE:

That's to isolate it?

[had.

VOICE:

Or throttle it.

I don't know what.the 2

(_)

3 procedure is.

Whatever the procedure is.

()

VOICE:

Was there a procedure change made during 4

5 this time period to instruct the operators to do that?

[)hd.

VOICE:

I don't know whether there was or not.

I 6

/

meant -- you know, when I knew you were coming, I meant to 8

find that out and look back and see.

But as far as my 9

memory goes, I can't tell you.

I wasn't that involved in 10 that much operational precision detail.

()

11 VOICE:

But your perception is that the operators, 12 if they had a problem, would start an additional charging 13 pump and isolate letdown?

[)n cl.

VOICE:

Yeah, it needed it, and we did start k-14 15 additional makeup pumps on various occasions, as we tried to 16 see the whole ramifications here in this.

p VOICE:

Okay.

I'm going to show you another I7 18 document now.

This is fron a Mr. Kaylin, who was site 19 opera t: ons manage r f or B&W, directed to you, dated Oc tober 20 29th, 1974 And the subject is the acceptance criteria on 21 pressurizer level.

Would you take a look at that and 22 refresh your memory?

23 (Pause.)

n I._)

24 b nd.

VOICE:

Yes, I'm familiar with this.

25 (Pause.)

20

-8634 02 02

[ ad, VOICE:

I may have to refer to if there are NRCmte I

2 detailed questions, because I don't -- I'm not memorizing it

,/ \\

(._)

3 or anything.

I'm just familiar generally.

(h VOICE:

Okay, sir.

Mr. Kaylin states in this memo 4

5 that a recent scheduled reactor trip at ANO-1 from 40 6

percent f ull power resulted in pressurizer level varyin7 7

from 180 inches to a minimum of 34 inches.

He says the test 8

procedure acceptance criteria for pressurizer level limits 9

-- for pressurizer level limits the variation in level to 10 180 inches plus or minus 140 inches, which puts the level 11 reached during the trip slightly below the minimum.

12 The 40-inch level is above the highest pressurizer 13 hea te r bank, and is the heater power cuto f f.

That would g

14 infer that the level reached during the trip was sufficient 15 to cut the hichest pressurizer heater bank off, or perhaps 16 a ll the heaters.

1/

Do you -- could you comment on what the 18 significance is of that statement, that is, that the heaters 19 would cut off?

20

[ Ad.

VOICE:

No, I don't quess I can.

(h 21 VOICE:

Would that tend to remove the pressure 22 control capability of the pressurizer?

23

[k nd, VOICE:

Yeah, I'm not really -- I would think so.

o) i

(_

24 I'm not really 'ble to comment much on that.

I would think 25 so.

i

21 8634 02 03 NRCate I

(

VOICE:

Okay, sir.

2 It says:

During normal pressurizer operations the

()

3 level must be maintained between 40 and 320 inches 4

indicated, for the entire system to automatically restore 5

the desiqn reactor coolant pressure and pressurizer level.

6 It further states that During reactor trip, the only

/

requirement which should be imposed on the pressurizer is 8

that the level remain between zero and 320 inches 9

indicated.

10 He says:

The location of P.he instrumentation is 11 such that you ensure sufficient volume of water in the 12 pressurizer at zero inches, and that a steam bubble will 13 still exist when the level is at 320 inches on the high

("/

T x-14 side.

He says:

The design of the pressurizer is such that 15 the volume of water remaining in the pressurizer would not 16 be sufficient to keep all the heater banks coverad during 17 the cooldown of the reactor coolant following reactor trip, 18 but was sized to keep the lower head completely full durino 19 a reactor trip from 100 percent full power.

20 He says:

The acceptance criteria end your test 21 procedure should be revised to apply only to normal 22 pressurizer system operation, and another acceptance 23 criteria of zero to 320 inches indicated be established for s

\\_/

24 a transient associated with a reactor trip.

25 What did you do with this memo once you received

22 8634 02 04 NRCate I

it?

hd, VOICE:

Oh, gosh.

I can't remember.

You know, 2

,V 3

you're asking me to remember back many years ago, and I 4

can't.

I don't know what I did with it specifically.

h VOICE:

It appears that the --

5 6

nd.

VOICE:

I assume we -- you go ahead.

VOICE:

It appears that the acceptance criteria 7

8 was changed on the test and then you signed of f on the 9

test.

[p d,

VOICE:

I believe that - I imagine that would be 10 il right, yes.

I imagine -- what I was going to say -- I 12 imagine what we did is -- de had a test working group 13 during this startup and initi?1 opera tion period.

And what 14 we probaoly did -- what we did, I imagine, was take this 15 ur. der consideration in the test working group and do our 16 homework and look at it and see if we could change our 17 acceptance criteria.

18 VOICE:

So your perception is or your recollection 19 is that the test working group approved that change?

20 b A d.

VOICE:

My perception is that the test working 21 group approved that, yes.

22 VOICE:

Okay.

P!ere you relying predominantly on 23 them to make the technical decisions as to whether the test

(~'s

(,!

24 was adequate or not?

25 bad.

VOICE:

Well, on the test working group?

23 8634 02 05

()

VOICE:

Yes.

NRCmte I

[h ad, VOICE:

Well, we looked to them.

We put a lot of 2

p) 3 responsibility on them.

And it's not like it was

(

4 unreviewed, and it's not like our operational group did not 5

get involved, and it's not like our Little Rock group didn't 6

get involved on this, the whole picture, the initial writing 7

of the test procedure as well as changes.

8 But yes, I in the end had to sign off en these, 9

and of coursa I tried to stay aware, too, and see that the 10 proper review was given.

But we did have considerable 11 expertise on this test working group.

So we -- we put 12 considerable responsibility on them, yes.

i 13 VOICE:

Mr. Anderson, do you recollec t at any time g

\\>

14 during this review that anyone mentioned that there miaht 15 possibly be some design deficiency associated with not being 16 able to meet the acceptance criteria?

17 n d-VOICE:

I don't -

no, I don't remember that.

I 18 just know that we all, once we got to digging into this 19 thing, we a ll -- I'm t alk ing about the sta f f here -- we 20 wondered, was this -- why this situation was.

And we wanted 21 to get to the bo ttom o f i t.

rle wanted to be assured, and we 22 wanted to know that there was or wasn't a problem.

23 But no, I don't specifically remember anybody who (3

(_)

24 or anybody bringing up that question.

(h VOICE:

Mr. Anderson, what I'm trying to 25

24 8634 02 06 NRCmte I

understand, I guess, is this:

Why would the test be 2

approved if there were still these outstanding concerns and 4,.j 3

ouestions?

[hn d, VOICE:

Well, you know, thera are -- that's what 4

5 the testing progran is for, I think, to see if -- you ao 6

through the tests and you analyze them and you look at

/

them.

And if the turbine generator has some problem that 8

might not be according to tha test, you analyze that and you 9

see if indeed the original specs wera wrong, or if you need 10 to ad just those, or you need to tighten down on them.

I 11 think the same thing would hold true to an NSSS system.

You 12 ao through these tests, and obviously everything you write 13 down oriqinally, even to how you do each one of these tests, 14 has to be altered.

IS So you go through a review of all of these, and if 16 there are adjustments that have to be made, you do the 17 proper things to get those adjustments made, and you're 18 aware of the significance of some of these.

Some are much 19 more significant than the others.

So you just do your --

20 you da what your responsibility is.

If you hit a brick 21 wall, you stop right there until you cet somethinq 22 resolved.

23 I don't -- I'm not sure I'm answe-ing it, but I'm

(";

(,)

24 tryino to.

(4) 25 VOICE:

Did you have a chance to talk to 4

1

25 8634 02 07 NRCmte i

Mr. Cavanaugh about the things in this acceptance criteria?

2 h a el.

VOICE:

At that time, I haven't not the slightest

()

3 idea if I did or not.

I just dor't know.

I imagine I did.

4 but I don't know.

5 h

Vo!CE:

Okay.

6 (Pause.)

$ Q VOICE:

Next I'm going to show you a memorandum,

/

8 again from Mr. Gordon H. Miller, chairman of the safety 9

re view commi ttee, to yourself, datad February 3rd, 1975, and 10 the sub ject is Arkansas Nuclear One plant saf ety committee 11 meeting.

This meeting took place January 2Rth, 1975.

12 (Pause.)

h 13 VOICE:

There's a statement in this memorandun

(,

C')

14 under the suoject of new business which states:

The 15 commi ttee reviewed Letter NDC-2183.

That would have been a 16 piece of AP&L correspondence?

I/

VOICE:

(Inaudible).

h 18 VOICE:

And it sayst pressurizer level set 19 point.

And did not concur with loss of indication 20 statement.

Committee views this as an unrevieweo safety 21 question.

h a d' VOICE:

I don't remember details, but cenerally I 22 23 think I know it.

h 24 VOICE:

Okay.

Did you ever consider, during any 25 step of this process that we've gone throuch in discussing

26 8634 02 08 NRCmte I

this correspondence, at that period of time, notifying the 2

NRC of these problems?

bnd.

)

3 VOICE:

I don't have the slichtest idea.

I'm sure 4

that they were here all the time during that period, and S

they knew what was going on, and we talked with them.

And 6

you know, with a Jillion and one problems, as you know, when 7

you start up a plant.

And it's not like you record all the 8

conversations and whether it was documented we talked to 9

them or not.

I just don' t know.

But I'm pretty sure they 10 must have been aware of this problem.

They were right here 11 with us.

12 I would say my quess is they knew.

Q VOICE:

I'm not necessarily calling for you to 13 t

}

'd 14 have documentation that you talked with tham.

I'm asking 15 you, say, diJ you ever call them into your o f fice and 16 discuss this issue with them?

I/

( h cI.

VOICE:

I don't know.

I swear, I could not begin 18 to remember that f ar back.

I might -

no, nothing comes to 19 mind that I can say I called them in my office and talked to 20 them about this.

21 VOICE:

Ara you aware --

22 (Gap in rocording.)

hj[ h VOICE:

23 Are you aware of anyone on your staff GQ 24 communicating these problems to the NRC7 hod. VOICE:

From my memory, I'm not aware if they did 25

~...

v 27

,8634-02 09

~

_NRCmte-l ~

or didn't.

You k,now, I just can't go back that far and come

'2

- up:with that kind of; detail..

I wish I could,.but-h 3

- ( Inaudi bl e ).

j 14

()

VOICE:

Okay, sir.

Let me ask you this How-did 5

you normally with the NRC. inspector as f ar as problems are 6

' concerned?

Did you ever-talk to them just informally about 7

some of these problems?

/hno/,

VOICE:

They interf aced in their good -

you know, j

8 9

their good time, as opposed to me, they came to certain 10 meetings, I remember, you know, and were welcome.

And they 11 talked to my staff and myself.

But i t was more -- my 4

12 interface was more like if problems scame up, then they 13 would come in and talk.

14 And then they always. -- bac k 'then -they didn't have 15 a resident inspector, and they would come in in this period i

16 of. time.

Nearly all-the time they were here.

But they.

j 17 would come in when they got here and they would exit

{

18 interview with me. 'And any problem they would have -if they 19 would have a problem getting any information or if they l

20 would have a problen of any kind, th9y came.in to me.

And 9

l 21 then we would talk about plant status, and that I re, ember.

22 But I cannot in any way remember whether the 2:3 precise subject was brought up or not.

I sure don't.

24-VOICE:

Okay,. sir. [ncl, VOICE:

I'm just. guessing that-it certainly was.

- l 4

i w

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,,eb, y.-

r ew e

--,e..,

,,ye,-~,w.

..,w3, iy>,,.-w,-yc.

..*w,

.,9

f 28

,8634 02 10 NRCmte i

Everything else was.

I don't know why that shouldn't have 2

been.

(-

(,)

3 (Laughter.)

[hund.

VOICE Whether we wanted to talk about it or 4

5 not.

No, we talked to them.

We talked to them, had 6

communication with them.

()

7 VOICE:

In your opinion, in your judgment, as a 8

standard procedure would you have discussed a matter like 9

this with the NRC inspector?

10

/ n d.

VOICE:

Well, there were not just this one 11 problem, but many of them, of course, during any startup, 12 and we were no different.

And we discussed with them.

But 13 I -- there was not like at that tire any checkoff sheet,

)

14 even mentally a checkoff sheets Have I told him everything?

15 It was more that they set their pace, what they wanted to, la and they went to the meetings and they went in the plant, 17 and they looked at the record.

They did things more than 18 dependina like me or some staf f member telling them 19 precisely what it was.

20 They, in their sense of independence, if that's 21 the right word, and wanting to set their own pace, they 22 wanted to say what we'll look at, so that they didn't get 23 influenced by us to look at somethinq while something else tb

(,_)

24 was coing on.

And they more took the initiative.

25 Cat then we did sit down occasionally and talk.

29 8634.02 11 NRCmte i

B u t t he re wa s no -- I had no mental checklist that I would 2

try to keep that would say, have I told them about this (n) 3 problem or that problem, other than the requirements for 4

reporting things.

It was more their type initiative, I 5

would say.

6 VOICE:

Okay, sir.

The next memo andum I'm going 7

to show you is f rom yourself to Mr. Cavanaugh, dated 8

February 6th, 1975.

And you state Below are comments on V

regard named subject, the subject being the Unit 1 10 pressurizer level set point, as listed by the plant safety 11 committee.

You said:

I concur with the plant safety 12 commi ttee and -- and I'm nuoting this out of context:

As 13 far as the plant safety committee is concerned, when all p

\\J 14 pressurizer level indication is lost, then there is no way 15 to know whether the core is covered with water, and 16 therefore a safety question exists which is unreviewed and 1/

probably not easily solved.

18 What do you mean by "probably not easily solved"?

19 4d VOICE:

Well, i t turned out easier than I 20 thought.

I just didn't think this might be any easy 2f solution to this kind of -- or any easy way to define all 22 this properly.

I guess right at that time I just didn't 23 think it would be something that could come about overnight

,,\\\\.I 24 by the waving of a wand.

25 And you know, durino operations we like to have

30 8634 02'12 NRCmte I

everything perfectly good, so that there's no way we can 2

ever get in any problem.

And enginee ring has to look at the

()

3 details of can we do this kind of thino or not.

4 So in the process of our normal feeling of, hey, 5

let's cet -- let's make sure that evarythinq here is 6

totally right -- we were concerned about this.

And so,

/

specifically, it did not seem up to this point that there --

8 Just exactly what the final iuaalution might be and how we V

could do that.

10 So we worked at it.

We talked about it.

Ne were il concerned.

We didn't right all see how that if that 12 pressurizer dropped out below the chart, below the ze ro on 13 the chart, for one instant, we didn't know where it was, you x 'l

(

14 see.

And at the moment we didn't realize there were other is parameters that might assure us that we would be all right, 16 which we later on began to see.

17 So we were just expressing our concern and that we 18 didn' t have -- we weren't able to o f f er anything that would 19 wave this wand or that would get us started on a solution 20 that would be acceptable to myself and to the plant safety 21 committee.

It looked like a tough problem at that time to 22 finally resolve.

(h VOICE:

What made it so easy to esolve?

23 l( )

24 h)ad.

VOICE:

Well, we were later on shown, and af ter 25 enough talking and analyzing and seeing, figuring, studying,

31 8634 02 13 NRCmte I

we were able to see that, if we could not cool down the 2

reactor coolant -- and I don't -- I mean, I'm talking

( )

3 something you probably know a lot more than I do about the 4

whole thing -- but if we could simply not cool this, the 5

reactor coolant inventory down rapidly, if we could keep it 6

wa rme r, then it would not shrink as much and it would not I

disappear below the chart, the zero on the chart.

8 Now, we knew we had lots of level left in the 9

pre ssuri ze r.

But to an operator, when it's below the zero, 10 you know, you just don't like to see that as an operator.

11 So --

12 VOICE:

Did your operator--- excuse me, 13 Mr. Anderson.

Did your operators complain about this, not

(,)

14 having enough level indication?

15

/hh d, VOICE:

I don't remember that they complained 16 a bout it.

They rere involved in some of the talking on l '/

this.

18

(

VOICE:

Were they concerned about the loss of 19 level?

/ )n d, VOICE:

Oh, yes, they were concerned.

20

()

VOICE:

It is one of the ma jor parameters that an 21 22 operator looks at during a transient, is it not?

NA c/,

VOICE:

Yes.

23 1_)

24 (Pause.)

25 VOICE:

Okay.

The next document is a transmittal

'8634:02 14-NRCmte

.1-f rom Marshall L. Pendergras, secretary of the safety review ~

42 committee, to the members of the~ safety review committee.

(k

'3 The subject was Arkansas Nuclear ane, Unit-1, safety review 4

commi ttee meeting minutes 1 of March 3rd, 1975.

.In this 5

document it's' stated:

6

- Follow-up action was recommended on the 28th 7

January minutes.

The plant safety committee' reviewed 8

Letter NDC-183, pressurizerolevel set point, and determined 9

it to constitute an' unreviewed. saf e ty question.

The SRC, 10 which is --

11-

[ gd, VOICE:

Safety review committee, the Little-Rock 11 2 -

-- the off-site committee.

()

VOICE:

-- had previously reviewed-this le tter-and 13 O.

.14 found-it -- found'it to not-constitute an unreviewed-safety

~ 15 ~

question.

Since there had been little com unication between 16-any plant safety committee members -and safety review 17 committee members on this1 matter..there was some confusion 4

18 a bout it.

19 -

More information will be gathered and presented at l

20 the-next SRC-meeting.

l-21 That tends to indicate that there really wasn't a e

22.

firm position on the safety review committee's part at this 23 point in time as to whether it was a safety.-- unreviewed l(

24 safety. question or not.

[ gid, 25 VOICE:

I don't know.

I guess what I remember o

a J

1

33 8634 02 15 NRCmte I

i s -- wha t I think I remember is that the safety review 2

committee had said that there was no -

you know, we had

()

3 asked for a review of this question.

And what I remember 4

was that they came out with the answer that there-was no 5

unreviewed safety question here.

()

VOICE:

How would you have known that?

6

/hygd, VOICE:

Well, as I say, I wa s e i the r -- I was a 7

8 member of that committee, and then -- I don't say I a ttended 9

all the meetinos all, but I got all of their minutes, both 10 in the normal process of sending them to the plant and as a il member.

So I would have cotten them in either one of two 12 ways.

Or maybe -- maybe it was that.

I don't remember.

13 VOICE:

Well, do you recollec t whether they asked

\\2 14 you to do anything else, or just more or less stay in that 15 state there, where there was soms confusion?

16 (Pause.)

[hvid.

17 VOICE:

No, I don' t remembe r.

I don't remember.

18 I just rememoer that the big picture was that they had said 19 no unreviewed saf ety question in the end.

()

VOICE:

Next document here, dated April 15th, 20 21 1975, from Mr. Cavanaugh to yourself, subject, Arkansas 22 Nuclear one, pressurizer level set point.

And it sayst 23 Attached is reference three from B&W, which provides their g

(_)

24 answers to PSC comments on loss of level indication in the 25 pressurizar following reactor trip.

From that le tter it can j

l l

34 8634 02 16 NRCmte I

be seen, as long as water remains in the pressurizer the 2

core will remain covered and the high pressure injection set q(_)

3 point will not be reached.

If the pressurizer empties, hiqh 4

pressure in jection will be automatically initiated due to S

the rapid pressure drop mentioned in their le tter.

6 How did that memo strike you?

/

(Pause.)

[h pg d,

B VOICE:

Well, we -- in the big picture, we were 9

concerned that we understood and knew what would happen, and 10 we agreed -- I don't remember how this one struck me.

But 11 we began to understand better what they were talking about 12 as we corresponded and as we communicated with them.

So it 13 was a oradual understandino on our part of what -- I mean, t>

14 we got across our concerns, I think, and they got across --

15 and Little Rock worked with us.

And B&W finally 16 communicated with us.

Il It was a crowing process on all our parts, I 18 think.

And we be gan to ge t a better handle on the whole 19 picture, the handle being that no longer on a normal trip 20 would it -- I don't say it'll never go below zero; I'm 21 saying that as this progressed on and as we had trips, we 22 did not go below the zero mark in a normal trip on the 23 p re ssuri ze r.

()

24 So it all began to come toqether in an 25 understanding of what we did have here, a better

35 8634 02 I7 NRCate 1

understanding.

2 VOICE:

ilext I'm going to read from the minutes of 3

plant saf ety committee meeting that took place on April 4

29th, 19/5.

In unreviewed business, it's stated:

5 The committee reviewed the letter of B&d to 6

Mr. Cavanaugh dated April 3rd, 19/S, addressing pressurizer

/

level set point per your reauest, '4r. Anderson's request.

8 The letter wa3 reviewed and committee concurs that this 9

answers the test deficiency.

10 What deficiency are they referring to?

Any idea?

hMd. VOICE:

lI No, but I imacine it's the test that 12 required 40 inches, that the level not go below 40 inches, 13 I imagine.

I don't know.

14 VOICE:

So at this point you would be resolvina 15 the test deficiency from the reactor trip?

Med.

VOICE:

I ouess, I quess.

16

!/

VOICE:

Okay.

k nd. VOICE:

Without researching I can't say 18 IV specifically yes.

But I think.

h VOICE:

And this says:

20 21 The plant sefety committee feels that it's 22 questionable that this is satisfactory for operation to 23 allow the level to ao off-scale.

The only way to maintain atJ 24 pressurizer level on-scale is to initiate high pressure 25 in jec tion upon reactor tr ip.

Recommendation that the

.~

t 36 f86340301 NRCmte il safety 1 review committee review this, considering the high 2

' pressure to the. reactor coolant system thermal sleeve design

.3 cycle limitations.-

4 It seems to-me that you and your staff are, S

.throughout -these correspondence, raising issues, raising i

~6 concerns.

_hd, VOICES ~

7 Yes.

h VOICE:

And you're forwarding them on up into 8

9 corporate headquarters.

. I' O -

had, VOICE:

Yes.

()p 11 VOICE:

You're acting with some tenacity about 12 this subject.

You have a concern here.

Over and over and 13 over.again it's demonstrated, 1

i.

14 Do you -f eel that those concerns were adequately i

15 a ddre ssed ?

[hyqd. VOICE:

I believe they were.

I think they --

16 17 well, you know, as the correspondence seems to show, we 1

18 didn't-back away from it.

Nobody seemed to back away from 19 it.

We kept working on it and working at it, and our 20-concerns were transmitted, and tenacity indeed was shown, 21 and the answers were forthcoming and the proof was in the i.

22 pudding of the later trips, it seems.

l' f

23 I don't-say everything_ about this plant or any

( )-

24 plant or ai.

school bus or anything else is perfect.

But 1

25 yes,fif you seek less than perfect, which you have'to --

i v

~.

i 37

!8634;03 02

.NRCmte 1-nothing -

nothing is perfect".

And'the fact was that we --

2-as we went on, we began ta resolve this to the plant's

' h-3 satisfaction.

4 We weren't -- we weren't willing to let it go 5

until we -- by somebody in B&W saying, hey, we're the-6

. ultimate, we know it's all right, socyou guys just take our 7

words on it and let i t go.

We weren't willing to do that.

8 So we kept our tenacity.

We kept any ouestions we had.

And 9

- we would keep referring back.and trying to get-the answer,

.10 until' we finally got the thing resolved to our-b 11 satisfaction.

Whether it's perfnct or not, I don't know.

(])

12 VOICE:

In July of 1975, i t would appear that'B&W 13 finally did an. analysis, a ouite extensive analysis here, 14 consistiny of some 31 pages of text and draf ts, about this 1

e 15 subject.

Do you recall what was done after'this analysis 16 was received as f ar as Arkansas Power & Light was concerned?

17

[hn d, VOICE:

No, I don't.

You know, I can gi/e you'the j-18 big picture, I think.

But the sequence, without a detailed 19 study, I don't believe I can give you.

I think I've

{

20 answered what you asked.

I'm not sure.

I know we did have 21 a considerable analysis and I know we have -- did look at i

22 the injection, as we looked at our control room and our 23 safety valves, and we looked at all the parameters, and we

()

24 did things.

And just the sequence of it, 11 don't know.

25:

VOICE:

Do.you reco'llect a visit to the site by l

'r W

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g9.-ar-9 w*ywp-g'T h*fT'bMT'

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"#T

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38

' 8634:03 03 NRCmte

Mr. Jim Finney of B&W Lin the. spring of 1.97.5?

2~

-h nd, VOICE:

No.

3 VOICE:

I believe it-was May of-1975.

b d.- VOICE:

I don't recollect specifically.

4

'5-VOICE:

Do you recollect ever talking to a - B&W 6

employea about that you were still considering.this_ issue to-

/

be a significant safety c,ncern and considering reporting it

-8 to-the-NRC?'

h4 VOICE:

No, I don't.

That doesn't come back to my 9

10 memory _right now.

I'm not saying I didn't, because many Il gallons of water have been undsr the bridge.

And no, I

~

12 don't specifically remember -- I've talked to Jim Finney 13 many times, you know, and I couldn't begin to separate out 14 the time and the date you mentioned.-

15 VOICE:

I have a document here=from Arkansas Power

- 16

& Light addressed to Bechtel Power Corporation, which I

)

17 assume was the architect-engineer for your project.

b d.

VOICE:

Yes.

18 19 VOICE:

A letter from Mr. Cavanaugh to Mr. Stoker, 20 who was the project manager.

b d. VOICE:

Yes.

21 22 VOICE:

It's dated August Sth, 1975.

The subject 23-Arkansas Nuclear-One, Unit 1, pressurizer level transmitter

'O 24 medificetten.

cen veu -- there egneers to se e strino ef 25 correspondence involved with this subject.

Can you give us i

i

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,v, g.,,-,,%,+,w-,,--,y vm.,w

,-w-,-,

--r%-

39 8634 03 04 NRCmte I

your recollections of why Bechtel was contacted?

k rgd, 2

VOICE:

I can give you the big pic ture. I think.

()

3 As a result of looking into the situation of the pressurizer 4

level going below zero on the chart, and recognizing that 5

other B&W NSSS systems had a lower tap for the pressurizer 6

level transmitter, since we looked at things that we might 7

could do about lows ring our -- or increasing our readings, 8

lowering the lower tap, if you will, so that we could read 9

lower.

10 And one of the things we considered and had 11 Bechtel to look at was what could we do.

One of the things 12 that came up was tepping into the lower part of the surge 13 line below the pressurizer level, the line that attaches to

(

)

14 the lower pressurizer.

And there was a possibility of 15 connecting onto a drain there to give us an increase in 16 level indication.

17 And as I remember, they were asked to look at the 13 possibility of attaching this pressurizer level there, and 19 they did look at this.

And in the process of evaluating 20 this, there were, I guess, two things: One is I guess we 21 began to get a handle on the whole thing and maybe not need 22 its and the second thing was that, to ao this route, you 23 have to consider that on a trip the velocity out of the

, ~ ~

\\

24 pressurizer through the surge line wi ll a f f ec t --

the 25 pressure differential between the two that makes it surge

40 8634 03 05 NRCate 1

out would affect the level indication, since the level 2

indicator is a pressure differential device, and would ma ke x_f 3

it read incorrectly to the low direction when the surge was 4

out of the pressurizer.

And as I remember it, that was the S

basic reason we did not go to that system there.

6 So we were l ooking at all, we thought all the 7

possibilities that we could look at.

8 (Pause.)

(h VOICE:

The last piece of correspondence that I 9

10 found on this issue was dated December loth, 1975, in a 11 letter f rom Mr. Smi th, the project enoineer with Bechtel, to I?

Mr. Cavanaugh.

The subject was the pressurizer level 13 transmitter modification, and it states:

I i

\\

14 During the Nuvember 20th, 1975, AP&L-Bechtel 15 Engineering coordination meeting, we promised to suomit a 16 proposal to resolve the pressurizer level indication 17 problem.

Our proposed solution is to provide a new level 18 transmitter, to be installed as shown on the attached f igure 19 and used in conjunction with the existing level 20 transmitter.

21 And he goes on to describe the phenomenon that 22 you've been discussing, where it can give you e rroneous 23 readinos and so forth.

Apparently, one of the things that

(

)

24 you wanted to do with the level indication was determine 25 if the B&W calculations were accurate, by actually

8634 03 06 41 NRCmte i

measuring these changes.

2

[a c/,

VOICE:

I forget that.

h 3

VOICE:

What -- what was done after this?

This 4

says Please advise if you want us to proceed with the 5

detailed design.

6 vj c/,

VOICE:

Well, what I remember was that it was j

7 decided not to go with this lower level tap, because of the 1

i 8

you know, you can have too many indicators on your board, l

9 and i f you don't trust one you're a lot worser -- worse --

10

" worser" -- a lot worse off than you are without it.

You 11 ought not to have it if you don't trust it.

So what I 12 remember was that I believe we just decided rot to go with 13 that.

[J 14 Now, I don't remember beino in -- I don't remember IS this, the de tails of how we decided or when or anythino 16 else.

And I can't even swear that's why we decided that l

17 way.

But that's what sticks in my mind.

h 18 VOICE:

Is that where the issue died, roughly 19 around the first of 1976?

hn c/.

VOICE:

I wouldn't know the time frame at all.

I 20 21 believe that -- around the first of '76.

May be so, pretty 22 well.

23 VOICE:

Okay.

I want to change the subject now.

(

?!

/ kcl, VOICE:

Okay.

24 25 VOICE:

I'd like to talk about an event that t

e 42 8634 03 07 NRCmte I

happened, and I'm not sure when it happened.

My best que ss 2

is it was 1974 It involved the failure of an EMOV.

)

3 electronatic operated valve.

4 o ch VOICE:

Right.

()

5 VOICE:

And I'd like to get your recollections of 6

what happeneJ during that event.

7

/ hind, VOICE:

Well, if it's -- I know a little bi t abotit R

electromatic relief valves, since for 30 years now -- 30 9

years ago I first wes involved with electromatic relief 10 valve and have dealt with them through that time to one 11 degree or another, originally doing some actual tests on 12 them, and safety valves, too, 13 liha t I recall was that our address to the p_

t' 14 electromatic relief valve during hot functional testino --

15 we call f or a test of that relief valve, and in the process 16 of testing it this relief valve stuck open.

And so, by the

!/

proper manipulation, we closed of f the block valve ahead of 18 this.

19 Of course, that's, as you know better than I do, 23 that this electronatic relief valve is not a code safety 21 valve, and the reason it's there is so you can close off and 22 work on it and repair i t.

So that then you can open it back 23 up and use it instead of your code valves, r'

(N) 24 Well, anyhow, this failed open.

So we closed off 25 the block va ve, and then we 'vorked on it, and I think we

43 8634 03 08 NRCmte I

found that the pilot -- this thing isn't -- well, you know 2

how they work.

This has a pilot on it, and the pilot I

)

3 discharges somewhere, and it discharged in, essentially into 4

the quench tank, into the line from the safety valves and 5

this valve that goes to the quench tank.

6 Anyhow, we f ound that i t went into there.

So that 7

was changed to ao to the reactor building atmosphere, the 8

pilot valve and the discharge line.

And that's all --

9 that's what comes to mind.

But I'm not sure that's either 10 what you had in mind.

11

(

VOICE:

Do you have c..)y idea when the event 12 actually happened?

13

/hn cd.

VOICE:

During hot functional testing is the only

/'

14 time, as I recall, it happened, before we ever went 15 critical.

16

)

VOICE:

Okay.

Now, it appears that the desion 17 change that was made to reroute the vent from the pilot was 18 made in September, around September 16th of 1974, which is 19 af ter you went critical and started power ascension testing.

20 M M.

VOICE:

Uh-hmm.

21 VOICE:

Now, what was the condition of the valve 22 since it had failed in hot functional testing until it was 23 repaired?

e

~

/hbc/,

VOICE:

I don't know whe tho r we had that block lJ 24 25 valve closed off there or not.

I assume we did.

44-

'8634 03 09 h

NRCmte I

VOICE:

Did the plant safety committee review that 2

decision to do that?

()

3

(%),

VOICE:

I just don't -- I just don't know.

I 4

don't know.

It would not take that.

It would not take 5

their review in a situation like that.

6 VOICE:

Okay.

Is there anything else you could 7

tell us about that event that you recall?

bcl.

VOICE:

No.

8 9

VOICE:

The impact on the opera tors when it 10 happened, or anything that happened in the plant?

Any other 11 equipment damage that happened?

b d.

VOICE:

l2 Not that I recall.

Not that I recall.

13 VOICE:

Do you remember whether the test that --

(~)

'v' 14 when the valve failed, were the tests worked out 15 satisfactory, satisfactorily?

kol, Io VOICE:

I haven't thought about that since it I/

happened and I could not begin to tell you without some 18 research.

I'm sure it did.

In the or ace ss of doing our 19 tests, we looked at all the tests and got them all properyly 23 signed off.

21 VOICE:

Before you into initial criticality and 22 power operation, you should have, what, test deficiencies 23 like that cleared up?

gm

( )

24

' A d.

VOICE:

We11, I don't know about ones like that or 25 not.

That's not a code safety valve.

It's like exce ss --

45 8634 03 10 NRCmte I

not excess valuei that's not a true statement.

It's a 2

desirable -- it's a desirable feature rather than any (n) 3 required feature.

4 So I doubt that we would have required that 5

something like that -- you know, it's like something on the 6

secondary system that you can do without, may be. -That may 7

not be a good comparison.

But it's something that you can 8

do without.

So I don't think that we would require that to 9

be signed off, finished, before we went critical.

(h) 10 VOICE:

Well, we've been looking at the test 11 documentation for that test and we can't find the records in 12 there where the valve failed.

Maybe we haven't looked at it 13 close enough.

/

\\

14 nd, VOICE:

You know more than I do about it.

It's 15 been a long time ago.

16

()

VOICE:

Okay.

At this point I'm coing to turn it 17 back to Fred and see if he has further questions.

h ess VOICE:

Let me ask one question.

We talked a lot 18 19 about the plant safety committee and the safety review 20 committee.

Mould you te ll me uhat is the plant safety 21 committee, what are its responsibilities, and what is the 22 saf ety review committee and what are its responsibilities, 23 and how they relate?

[ n d, VOICE:

Plell, that's a lona speech there.

But 24 25 generally, the safety review committee, the o f f-si te L

I 46 9634 03 11

. f4RCa te I

c ommi tt ee, is composed of individuals who cover the spectra 2

of the things you do at a nuclear plant, and it is a big

(~N sjg>

3 review committee that does audits and looks at records, the 4

necessary records, and who is interested that the safety --

5 that the whole -- everybody invo. ved with the company and 6

with anything else, anybody else that's here, that they 7

consider safety as a prime factor.

And with this expertise, 8

they're able to lock at the whole coverage of things that 9

they're chartered with.

10 And they, for instance, look at certain il procedures, and they look at potential unreviewed safety 12 questions.

They are the assurance in the setup that says 13 the plant is operated according to all the standards and the

(,\\

/

14 codes and is operated safety, and i sn't bypass ing these 15 things and isn't in trouble because their QCR organization 16 is not functioning or functioning wroncly, or their 17 operating group doesn' t have the training, or something like 18 that.

19 So that's thr, saf ety review com:..i ttee.

But of 23 course, we have in our tech specs the specific requirements 21 of what they do and the details and the way they operate.

22 And we have had a charter and have one now, which defines 23 precisely what they do.

And they loc k at -- we ll, for n

(

24 instance, they look at the minutes of the plant safety 25 co mmi t t ee.

l t

)

f.

1 47

'8634 03 12 NRCmte i

And there's always been one or two or three 2

members of he plant safety commi ttee on ihe safety review-

-n

!,)

3 committee.

So they communicate in that way and by the other 4

ways of correspondence and by their coming up here 5

periodically.

6 Now, the plant safety committee is concerned with, 7

again there, they're whole -- all of their requirements are 8

in technical specifications, and what they do and how they 9

do it.

And they -- that group consists of knowledaeable 10 individuals, again, in the fields that the plant deals with 11

-- health physics and operations and the various phases of 12 manacement and all.

13 And they're charged with rasponsibilities of

\\/

14 looking also at any unreviewed saf ety questions, looking at 15 procedures, at special, for instance, work plans that come 16 up.

So that we are sure that, from the plant -- well, f rom 17 the plant as well as other places -- wa are sure that things 18 are done accordina to our tech specs and codes and 19 standards, and they're done safely.

And a lot of things you 20 como across, like in the work plan, you know, it could say, 21 repair the -- let's ay, make it, repair the code safety on 22 the pressurizer of sonething.

And in their revi they' ll 23 make sure that the proper conditions are there and that the vs I

\\

\\_/

24 plant safety i s not lowered and it's done at the right time 25 and a ll of tha t.

48 8634 03 13 NRCmte I

So they look at special problems submitted by the 2

plant manager, at his request.

r~s

(,)

3 Vo!CE:

Is it fair to say that both aroups 4

basically perform the same function, but maybe the plant 5

saf ety commission -- commi ttee -- performs it on a more 6

detailed level than the safety review committee, and the 7

saf ety review committee is an overview committee on a 8

corporate level?

[b1d.

9 VOICE:

They do that, yes.

But the safety review 10 c ommi ttee looks at a lot blaaer -- the safety review 11 committee looks at all the things that are not just 12 on-site.

But generally speaking, the plant safety committee 13 looks at things on-site in detail, whereas the r^s

)

14 corporate-level off-site committee, one of their functions IS is to look at the plant safety committee to see that it is 16 performing.

But they look at things off-site and they --

17 Security Is a good example.

The plant safety 18 commi ttee does not look normally at like industrial safety 19 or so much a t security.

But the saf ty review committee 20 off-sito is charged with enough audit to see that security 21 in performed properly, an audit function.

The plant safety 22 commi ttee does not audit security.

(5}

23 VOICE:

Okay.

I have no more detailed questions.

/m()

24 I quess if you have anything you would like to state, any 2S comments you'd care to make, we appreciate them at this N

y 49 8634 03 14 NRCmte I

time.

2 VOICE:

I don't think of anythina, except to say

( )

3 that we hope that we have cooperateo to the best of our 4

knowledge.

A lot of detail, I have to confess, I just 5

don't remember.

I could look up perhaps some of it and oet 6

it if I had to.

But I hope that's not interpreted to mean

/

that we weren't to -- I wasn' t tryino to remember, because I B

was.

And so in my case, in our case, we're trying to 9

cooperate with you and give you what you want, and we hope 10 you get it.

11 VOICE:

We certainly appreciate that, and I think 12 we recognize it was a long time ago.

We're askina you about 13 some specific thinos many years ago.

')

14 Wi th that, it's now 11:35 and we'll te rmina te the 15 interview.

We thank you very much for your time and your 16 effort you put forth this morning.

17 VOICE:

Thank you.

18 (End of recording.)

19 20 21 22 23 O.

k.

24 25