ML19322B743
| ML19322B743 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 03/17/1976 |
| From: | Burnett P, Epps T, Robert Lewis NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19322B737 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-76-02, 50-269-76-2, 50-270-76-02, 50-270-76-2, 50-287-76-02, 50-287-76-2, NUDOCS 7912050742 | |
| Download: ML19322B743 (20) | |
See also: IR 05000269/1976002
Text
~4A
h
UNITED STATES
- -
g
2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.
~
REGION il
<
,,
'
/
(!
233 PEACHTAEE STR EET, N. W. $UITE SIS
P
j
ATLANTA. GEO RCI A 30303
,
- ....
.
1
IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-269/76-2, 50-270/76-2 and 50-287/76-2
Licensee:
Duke Power Coapany
Power Building
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, North Carolina
28201
Facility Name: Oconee Units 1, 2 and 3
Docket Nos.:
50-269, 50-270 and 50-287
License Nos.:
Category:
C,C,C
-
,
Location:
Seneca, South Carolina
Type of License:
Type of Inspection:
Routine, Announced
Dates of Inspection:
February 23-27 and March 2-4, 1976
Dates of Previous Inspection:
February 3-6 and 10-13, 1976
Principal Inspector:
T. N. Epps, Reactor Inspector
Reactor Projects Section No. 2
Reactor Operations and Nuclear
Support Branch
.
Accompanying Inspectors:
P. T. Burnett, Reactor InEpector (March 2-4, 1976)
Nuclear Support Section
Reactor Operations and Nuclear
Support Branch
W. W. Peery, Radiation Specialist (February 23-27, 1976
Radiation Support Section
Fuel Facilities and Materials Safety
Branch
A. D. Kowalczuk, Radiation
Specialist (February 23-27, 1976)
Radiation Support GeqLion
Fuel Facilities .at Ma;crials Safety
Branch
.
f
'W.
%
a $e
T 79120'50 / 2
. . . . .
-
-..
.
.
..
.
,E,
IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-2,
2-
-
l
J
50-270/76-2 and 50-287/76-2
.
.
.
~
K. R. Kingsley, Environmental
Engineer (CO-OP) (February 23-27, 1976)
Radiation Support Section
,
Fuel Facilities and Materia 1_s Safety
Branch
W. L. Britz, Radiation Specialist (February 26-27, 19761
Radiation Support Section
Fuel Facilities and Materials Safety
Branch
Principal Inspector:
/l
7-/ 7 -7 b
u
T. N. Epps, React'or Inspector
Date
Reactor Projects' Section No. 2
Reactor Operations and Nuclear
Support Branch
$
7.!'/4
'
Reviewed by:
'e
. < u
s,
%
s
R. C. Lewis, Chief
()
Date
Reactor Projects Section No. 2
Reactor Operations and Nuclear
Support Branch
.
S
0
I
1
.
g"*"w"
.
4.w-
e.gggWag%e
- =
- "5
-6
-
,.
'
'IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-2,
-3-
50-270/76-2 and 50-287/76-2
i
.)
-
.
.
.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
I.
Enforcement Items
Infractions
1.
Contrary to Technical Specification 3.9.6 liquid waste effluent
monitor readings were not compared with expected readings for
liquid waste releases76-111 and three batches released in
February, 1976.
(Details III, paragraph 2)
2.
Contrary to Technical Specification 3.9.7, the effluent
control monitor was not set to alarm or automatically close
the waste discharge valve to assure that appropriate require-
ments were met for liquid waste releases made during February,
1976.
(Details III, paragraph 3)
3.
Contrary to the survey requirements of 10 CFR 20.201(h),
surveys, the inspectors found on February 23, 1976, that the
interim waste building vent gas monitor, RIA-52, was not
operating.
(Details III, paragraph 4)
-
4.
Contrary to Technical Specification 4.11.1, analysis of
environmental samples has not been performed to the sensi-
tivities listed in Table 4.11-3 for all water and milk samples
as evidenced by analysis results in the licensce's semi-annual
report of January to June 1975 and verified by the inspectors
with licensee personnel during the inspection.
(Details III,
paragraph 5)
.
II.
Licensee Action on Previousiv Identified Enforcement liatters
Not inspected.
III.
New Unresolved Items
76-2/1
Process and Effluent Monitor Calibrations and Functional
checks
Monitor calibration and functional check procedures were
inadequate in the areas of setpoints, response correla-
tions, source checks and alarm status.
(Details III,
,
paragraph 6)
i
_ _ _ . . _ _ .
,
. _ _ _
- *
-
..
-
__ ._ _ __ . - _ _ _
-____
.
.
,
.
.
IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-2,
-4-
-
,,
i
)
50-270/76-2 and 50-287/76-2
!
-
.
.
.
IV.
Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items Oconee 1 (50-269)
73-12/1
Calibration of Effluent Monitors
Not inspected.
74-3/3
Training of Unlicensed Utility operators
The licensee has not fully developed this program.
The
item remains open.
Oconee 3 (50-287)
.
74-13/2
Reactor Coolant Flow Anomaly
This problem has been referred to the Office of Reactor
Regulation (Licensing).
It remains open pending further
verification that no problem exists.
74-14/2
Ventilation Control Between Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings
.
This item remains open.
I
Oconee 1, 2 and 3 (50-269, 50-270 and 50-287)
.
74-10, 08, 11/4
SRC Quorum
Not inspected.
.
74-10, 08, 11/5
Procedure Changes
,
Not inspected.
75-12, 13, 14/1
Fire Protection Program Weaknesses
This item remains open pending installation of
reflash on fire alarms to be done by June 1,
1976.
(Details I, paragraph 4)
76-1/1
Instrument Calibration
A program of scheduled periodic calibrations had not
been established for instrumentation associated with
safety-related systems but not identified as requiring
calibration in the Technical Specification surveillance
requirements.
Not reviewed during this inspection.
'
.
S
e
.%
,gw
w,
.
,.e
..%,e.w.e-
--.
~
^
..
.
'
'IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-2
5-
-
-
.
,
J'y
50-270/76-2 and 50-287/76-2
-
'
.
.
76-1/2
Electrical Equipment Caliter. tion
Administrative control for coordinating and scheduling
- periodic calibration and preventive maintenance on
safety-related relays and breakers will be transferred to
the station maintenance group by August 1, 1976.
Not
reviewed during this inspection.
V.
Other Significant Findings
Unit 1 refueling is in progress.
VI.
Management Interview
A management meeting was held by W. W. Peery, W. L. Britz,
A. D. Kowalczuk and K. R. Kingsley on February 27, 1976, with
J. E. Smith and members of the Oconee staff.
Items discussed
included the infractions in Section I and the new unresovled item
in Section III of this summary.
'
A second management meeting was held by T. N. Epps and P. T. Burnett
on March 4, 1976, with J. E. Smith and members of the Oconee staff.
Subjects discussed included the Unit 1 refueling outage, status of
IE Bulletins 75-04, 04A, 04B and 08, and unresolved items 75-12,
13, 14/1, and the surveillance speciman holder tube problem.
.
e
0
0
-
O'
e
%
-g
.
_
,
g
,
-
--
, -
--
,
,
.
- . _ - _ . . . -
- _
- z_
-
'.
.
IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-2
I-l
.
_
50-270/76-2, and 50-287/76-2
DETAILS I
Prepared by:
<'
3 -/3 ~ 7b
T. N. Epps, Re;(ytor Inspector
Date
i
Reactor Projedt[s Section No. 2
'
,
Reactor Operations and Nuclear
'
Support Branch
i
Dates of Inspection:
February 23-27 and March 2-4, 1976
Ms
U[
Reviewed by:
[
o/s /
.u
-
R. C. Lewis, Chief
6
Date
Reactor Projects Section No. 2
Reactor Operations and Nuclear
Support Branch
1.
Individuals Contacted
Duke Power Company (DPC)
Site Personnel
J. E. Smith - Manager, Oconee Nuclear Station
-
L. E. Schmid - Superintendent of Operations
O. S. Bradham - Superintendent of Operations
R. M. Koehler - Superintendent of Technical Services
T. S. Barr - Technical Engineer
R. T. Bond - Fucis Manar,ement Engineer
J. Iten - Safety Supervisor
.
Operations Personnel
2.
IE Bulletin 75-08 - RCS Temperature / Pressure Instrumentation
IE Bulletin 75-08 requested information describing reactor coolant
system temperature and pressure instrumentation used to record
verification of adherence to the temperature / pressure limitations
in Technical Specifications.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated January 12,
1976, and compared information in the response with instrumentation
'
in the Oconce control rooms.
It was determined that the information
i
in the licensee's response was incomplete in that the outlet water
temgerature from the core is recorded with a range from 520 F -
620 F and this instrumentation was not identified in the response.
The inspector cautioned the licensee to assure that information
in response to IE Bulletins is completed.
The inspector had no
-
further questions.
,
..
-
-
_-
n _ __ ... ._ _ _
_
_
_ _ _ _ .
__
.
IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-2'
I-2
'
'.
.50-270/76-2, and 50-287/76-2
,
.
3.
IE Bulletins 75-04, 04A and 04B Cable Fire At Browns Ferry
The inspector conducted additional followup on IE Bulletins 75-04,
04A and 04B.
This review included verification of the following
items.
'
Construction personnel activities are controlled by the site
a.
maintenance organization.
b.
Licensee maintenance procedures define floor and wall electrical
penetration materials.
c.
Control of ignition sources is covered by administrative pro-
cedure No. 38 approved December 17, 1975.
d.
The licensee's policy is to defer maintenance and modifica-
tions, which would impact safety, until shutdowns where
possible.
e.
Administrative Procedure number 38 requires inspection of work
areas for fire hazards where cutting or welding is done.
f.
Ignition sources are not allowed in areas where flamable
materials exist.
g.
Information requcsted in IE Bulletin 75-043 was provided on
December 16, 1976.
The inspector had no further questions on the abo,ve bulletins.
4.
Unresolved Item 75-12, 13, 14/1 Fire Protection Program Weaknesses
Commitments made by the licensee on this subject are complete except
a modification to install a reflash mechanism on the control room
fire alarms.
A licensee representative stated that equipment necessary
to accomplish this task has not been received.
The modification is
to be completed by June 1, 1976.
.
!
.
O
-.
- - -.
.
.-
.
-
IE Rpt. No. 50-269/76-02
II-l
j
, /
.
DETAILS II
Prepared by: [ /
/ gag. g
M # ,2 / N g
P. T. Burnett, lleactor Inspector
Date
Nuclear Support Section
Reactor Operations and Nuclear
,
Support Branch
Dates of Inspection: March 2-4, 1976
Reviewed by:
. O,e
J /6 hla
,
H.' C. Dance, Chief
/ Date
Nuclear Support Section
Reactor Operations and Nuclear
Support Branch
1.
Personnel Contacted
.
J. E. Smith - Plant Manager
O. S. Bradham - Maintenance Superintendent
R. M. Koehler - Superintendent of Technical Services
N. Pope - Operating Engineer
L. E. Schmid - Operations Superintendent
R. Adams - I&C Supervisor
,
R. T. Bond - Fuels Management Engineer
-
T. S. Barr - Technical Engineer
Various SRO's, RO's and utili'ty operators
2.
Preparation for Refueling
An approved copy of the procedure, OP/1/A/1502/02, " Refueling
(Cycle 3)," was reviewed in the office about two weeks before the
on-site inspection.
An inspector-identified error in the statis-
tical analysis used to confirm operability of the neutron monitors
was discussed over the telephone with licensee personnel. They
in turn committed to make the appropriate changes in the procedure
,
prior to using it.
Timely implementation of the procedure change was verified during
the on-site inspection.
In addition, the inspector independently
analyzed two sets of data from the neutron monitors and confirmed
the results of the licensee's chi-square analyses.
3.
Pre-Fuel Handling Activities
The completed copy of procedure OP/0/A/1503/01, " Preparation for
Refueling," was reviewed.
This procedure assures that refueling
equipment and refueling system interlocks (Technical Specification
Table 4.1-2, item 4) are functional prior to use.
Iue licensee was
--
..
.
4
_ - _______-_-_ ___- __ _____________
i
,
..
S
IE Rpt. No. 50-269/76-02
II-2
'
!
'
.
.
unable to make the cast up-ender in the refueling pool operable.
Hence, the refueling procedure was revised to use only the west up-
ender.
The control room working copy of procedure OP/1/A/1502/02, "Re-
fueling (Cycle 3)," was reviewed to confirm that operability of
radiation monitors (T/S 3.8.1) and communication systems (T/S 3.8.5)
was established prior to beginning refueling activities.
The completed copy of OP/l&2/A/1104/06, " Checkout of Spent Fuel
Pool Coolant System," was reviewed and found complete.
The licensee has no specific requirements for ventilation of the
reactor building or of the spent fuel pool area.
4.
Fuel Handling Activities
The inspector observed that fuel handling was being directed by a
SRO whose duties were limited to that acti"ity.
The composition of
the station crew for the 1600 to 2400 shifc on March 2, 1976, was
l
found to exceed the requirements of Technical Specification 6.1.
.
All requirements of Technical Specification 3.8, " Fuel Loading and
Refueling," are addressed directly in OP/1/A/1502/02, except for
items 3.8.8 and 3.8.11.
Physical arrangement of the fuel handling
equipment and the sequence of operations specified by the procedure
appear to preclude violation of 3.8.8.
Licensee personnel stated
that it was physically impossible to initiate fuel handling ac-
tivities in less than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after shutdown; hence, there is littic
potential for violating 3.8.11.
Conformance to this section of
Technical Specifications was confirmed by observations made in the
control room and reactor building, and by review of logs of boron
concentrations, valve alignments and neutron monitor count data.
The licensee had experienced considerable equipment and procedural
dif ficulties during the outage.
Between the time the refueling
procedure was approved, February 13, 1976, and the time the in-
spector arrived on site, March 2, 1976, fifteen approved changes
had been made in'the procedure, most to accommodate these dif-
ficulties and the concomitant changes in the fuel shuffling se-
quence.
Two attempts were made to observe fuel handling activities during
an evening shift.
The first was aborted by a mechanical failure in
one of the neutron monitoring systems.
On the next day, the
inspector witnessed two hours of effort to remove an assembly that
_
9
4
a
IE Rpt. Ns. 50-269/76-02
II-3
-
,
i
N
.
'
hung up on every attempt to raise it more than 2-3 feet. Once it
became obvious that a procedure change would be required, a time
consuming process on a back shift, the inspector left the reactor
buihling.
It was observed that the configuration of the startup source and
NI-2 was such that there was no fuel, except for the assembly
containing the source, between the detector and the source. Removal
of a partially consumed assembly from a position adjacent to the
source assembly and insertion of a fresh assembly in the vacated
position, 0-13, were observed from the control room.
The chart
"
recorder for NI-2 indicated an increase in count rate when the
first assembly was removed, and then a decrease to near the original
rate upon addition of the fresh assembly.
However, analysis of
digital data did not indicate a significant change in the count
rate of either monitor as a result of the exchange. Digital data
were not recorded during the time position 0-13 was without fuel.
The source monitor configuration was discussed with plant personnel.
They took the position that the function of the detector was to
monitor boron concentration and that they did not expect to obtain
useful reactivity measurement from the monitors with the system
I
heavily borated and rodded.
This subject was discussed further
i
during the exit interview.
It was pointed out to management that
the configuration could preclude the use of the detector as a
reactivity monitor, and that this was contrary to the thinking that
established the monitor level as a trigger for the reactor building
i
evacuation alarm.
The inspector also stated that the inverse-multi-
plication curve derived from MI-2 during the approach to critical
might be difficult to interpret.
The licensee agreed to re-evaluate
,
the source location prior to restart.
Source location is not
j
addressed in Technical Specifications or in the FSAR.
.
5.
Fuel Examinations
The post-irradiation examination (PIE) program for this outage had
been completed by contractor personnel by the time the inspector
arrived on site. Licensee personnel reported that only one anomaly
had been observed in the inspection:
A v-shaped piece about 1-inch
on a side had been removed from the top of the spacer grid on the
lower end fitting of one assembly.
They speculated that this was a
result of brittle chipping.
The inspector was told that the SRC
,
had consulted with the fuel vendor, reviewed the inspection results,
including a video tape showing the chipped area, and had concluded
that the assembly could be reused.
_
T
4
4
- - .. .
- . -
_
.
.e
_
a.
a
-
.
-
. - . , - .,
-
-.
_
_
i>.
.
! ;,
IE Rpt. No. 50-269/76-02
II-4
i
)
l
l
,
j
-
6.
Personnel Training for Fuel Handling
From discussions with plant personnel, it was learned that retrain-
ing of experienced personnel was limited to participation in the
checkout of fuel handling equipment such as up-enders and bridges.
New operators were trained on the job.
No up-to-date list of
qualified bridge operators is maintained, but the shift supervisor
and SRO (tefueling) are expected to know which personnel are qualified.
This subject was discussed in the exit interview, and the licensee
agreed to prepare a list of qualified operators.
7.
Hoisting and Rigging Equipment
During the previous inspection the licensee committed to implement
a program to control and inspect slings and rigging equipment.
Implementation for equipment to be used during the refueling outage
was to precede the outage and full implementation was to be obtained
by July 15, 1976.
From a review of directions issued by the licensee
and discussion with his personnel, it was concluded that acticn to
date was limited to inspection.
The licensee agreed to increase
his effort on control, and reiterated his commitment to full
implementation by July 15, 1976.
i
l
-
.
j
_
g
OO
, p
g
9
-
,
.
'
'IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-2,
.
50-270/76-2, and 50-287/76-2
III-1
sl
DETAILS III
Prepared by:
[
C
6
,
W. W. Peery, Radl/ation Specialist
'Date
Radiation Support Section
Fuel Facility and Materials Safety
Branch
W
' A.
<.3 ll
+'e t
A. D. Kow9 czuk, Radiation Specialist
Date
1
,.
,
,
Radiatio ( Support Section
Fuel Facility and Materials Safety
Branch
Dates of Inspection:
e ruar
23-27, 1976
Reviewed by: /
' /tt bos
//
[
s
- ,.,
A. F. Gibs 6n, Chief
Date
Radiation Support Section
Fuel Facility and Materials Safety
Branch
All information in these details applies equally to Units 1, 2 and 3.
,
1.
Individuals Contacted
J. E. Smith - Manager, Oconee Nuclear Station
J. W. Hampton - Director, Administrative Services
L. E. Schmid - Operating Superintendent
O. S. Bradham - Maintenance Superintendent
,
"
R. M. Koehler - Technical Service Superintendent
T. S. Barr - Technical Service Engineer
R. C. Adams - Instrument and Controls Engideer
C. Yongue - Health Physics Supervisor
J. R. Leonard - Assistant Health Physics Supervisor
D. L. Davidson - Assistant Health Physics Supervisor
J. A. Long - Health Physics Labman
P. Deal - Health Physics Labman
D. C. Smith - Chemist
R. L. Wilson - P.crformance Engineer
L. L. Lewis - System Herlth Physicist, Charlotte Office
i
M. Burch - Health Physicist - Charlotte Office
2.
Liquid Waste Monitor Response
Technical Specification 3.9.6 requires the liquid waste effluent
monitor readings to be compared with expected conitor readings for
each batch discharged.
Expected readings are currently determined
.
G
- * *
~ ~ * ~
-.!
- . . -
- -
..9
,
--
- .
.
_-
.
~
,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - . - - - _ - - - - _
.
,
,
l -~
IE Rpt. N:a. 50-269/76-2,
l! )
50-270/76-2, and 50-287/76-2
III-2
.
I
i
.
from vendor supplied calibration curves.
Each calibration curve is
.
based on a specific radionuclide and gives-the net counts per
minute of response expected for various specific radioactivity
concentrations, normally in units of microcuries per milliliter.
Records of Liquid Waste Release 76-111 were examined by the inspectors
during the period February 23-25, 1976. The recorded fission and
corrogion product activity based on a laboratory analysis was 1.18
x 10
microcuries per milliliter.
At this concentration RIA 33,
the low range monitor, is expected to be on scale; however, the
The RIA-34, high range monitor,
record showed it was over-rangedy
response was recorded as 2 x 10
microcuries per milliliter.
Recorder chart records were examined to verify the above conditions.
At least three additional liquid waste release records for February,
1976, reflected similar discrepancies.
Discussion with management
representatives did not reveal any notice of the above response
dfscrepancies or any planned corrective action.
The net monitor
response (response excluding background) in counts per minute is
not recorded on the liquid waste release form nor do the calibration
procedures or functional checks for the monitors include comparisons
of monitor response uith the actual liquid being monitored.
3.
Liquid Waste Monitor Setpoint
Technical Specification 3.9.7 requires the effluent control mon-
itors to be set to alarm and automatically close waste discharge
valves so that the appropriate requirements of the specification
are met.
On February 23, 1976, the inspectors examined the liquid
waste release form for LWR 76-111 and several additional liquid
waste release forms for releases made in February, 1976.
Instructions
on the LWR Form state that the alarm point on the high range
monitor is to be set one-half decade above the detector reading.
Actuation of the alarm initiates the isolation function required by
T.S. 3.9.7.
When set according to the above instruction, the
monitor will not be set to limit the instantaneous concentration of
radioactivity to a value less than or equal to that given in
Technical Specification 3.9.3 when a high background condition
exists.
Management rcpresentatives and chart recorder records
confirmed the existence of high background conditions due to
contamination of the monitor.
A comparable item of noncompliance
was identified in Inspection Report Nos. 50-269/75-3, 50-270/75-3
and 50-287/75-3.
4.
Radiation Surveys
On February 23, 1976, the inspectors found that the interim waste
building vent gas monitor, RIA-52, was not operating.
This instru-
ment would monitor all waste building airborne radioactivities in
--
. . - .
- __
.
S
IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-2,
50-270/76-2, and 50 *37/76-2
III-3
'
'
.
the building ventilation system prior to release to the atmosphere.
The inspectors also observed that the RIA-52 monitor did not apparently
have monitoring capability for particulates or iodine.
Licensee
representatives apparently were unable to provide a record of cali-
bration of the monitor.
-
5.
Environmental Monitoring Sample Analysis Sensitivities
Technical Specification 4.11.1 for Oconee requires that environmental
samples be analyzed for radioactivities to the sensitivit ies listed
in Table 4.11-3 of the Technical Specifications.
The table lists
sensitivities for gross beta of 0.03 picocuries per liter and
0.5 picocuries per liter for iodine im all water and milk samples.
Review of the licensee Semiannual Report for January through
June, 1975, revealed a number of instances in which the analyses
results for water and milk samples did not meet the applicable
sensitivities of Table 4.11-3.
Examples of the inadequate sensi-
tivities are as follows:
Water
gross beta, range of <0.81 to <0.94 picocuries per liter.
iodine-131, range of <7.3 to <312 picoeuries per liter.
,
Milk
iodine-131, 11.7 to <322 picocuries per liter.
The apparent failure to meet the sensitivity requirements in Table
4.11-3 was verified with licensee representatives during the in-
spection and discussed during the management exit interview.
6.
Process and Effluent Monitor Calibrations and Functional Checks
Calibration data and procedures for the following process and
effluent monitors were reviewed by the inspectors during the period
February 23-27, 1976:
RIA 33
RIA 37
RIA 45
RIA 51
RIA 34
RIA 44
RIA 32
Management representatives were unable to locate the calibration
records for RIA-52.
Functional check procedure PT/0/A/230/01 and
functional check data were also reviewed during the above period.
Calibration procedures typically refer to establishing setpoints at
oce-half decade above background and in some instances no setpoint
is specified.
The above setpoint criteria conflict with setpoints
specified by PT/0/A/230/01 and are not related to radioactivity
levels of safety significance.
Setpoints related to limits in
Technical Specifications, 10 CFR 20, or other official or technically
recognized documents are appropriate.
Neither calibration or
!
-
,
'
'
'IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-2,
-
,}
50-270/76-2, and 50-287/76-2
III-4
'
I
.
.
functional check procedures include comparison of net monitor
response to radioactivity concentration in the actual fluids and
particulates being monitored.
Monitors are in an alarmed condition
when no apparent off-standard or unsafe condition exists.
Based on
discussions of monitor indications and meaning of the indications
with operations, health physics personnel and management representa-
tives, the above conditions appear to be resulting in interpreta-
tions of monitor readings that are inaccurate and inability to make
an interpretation of monitor indications.
Functional checks on
iodine monitors do not use the Barium-133 check source response
determined during calibration to establish the acceptability of
responses observed at subsequent check intervals.
The iodine moni-
tors are designed and adjusted to preferentially select pulses in
the gamma energy range of Ba-133 and I-131.
Licensee representatives
stated that the procedures will be revised to correct the problem.
7.
Gas Monitors
The normal and high WD gas monitors for Units 1 and 2 were in an
alarmed condition for several days during the period February 23-
27, 1976.
Operators stated the alarms were due to residual radio-
(
active gas remaining in the monitors after a release was completed.
'
Modification record ID No. ON-0396 indicated that a purge line had
been installed for the Unit 3 monitors and that purge lines were to
be installed for the Unit 1 and 2 monitors.
The inspectors observed
that the Unit 3 monitors were not alarmed.
8.
Calibration Records
.
Calibration records for level instrume: ation on the condensate
monitor tanks could not be located by management representatives
4
during the period February 26-27, 1976.
A greater than 30% disagree-
ment in volumes derived from tank level records in conjunction with
the tank curve and the liquid waste discharge flow integrator data
recorded on Liquid Waste Release 76-111 was identified.
Comparable
differences were noted on several LWR records examined by the
inspectors.
Management representatives stated that the level
'
instrumentation calibration would be checked.
Review of liquid
waste discharge flow integrator calibration records and further
comparisons of integrator data with level changes in other tanks
appeared to verify the integrator data.
9.
Radiological Environmental Analysis Data
i
Data for stations 004.1 and 006.1 in semiannual reports does not
distinguish between raw and finished water samples taken from the
water supplies. Management representatives stated that tritium and
i
i
l
i
,
, . . . _
.
-.-
'
-
-
.
.
.
IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-2,
-s( )
50-270/76-2, and 50-287/76-2
III-5
!
l
.
-
gamma analysis data are from finished water and that gross activit3
.
data is from raw water and that future reports would distinguish
between raw and finished water.
10.
Radioactive Release Ouantities and Volume
The volume of liquid waste released fr a the plant and the radio-
activity content of the liquid released has exceeded the amounts
projected by the licensee's environmental impact assessments and
the Final Environmental Statement while the fuci defect percentage
is less than was projected.
The causes of this situation were
discussed with management representatives. Marginal evaporator
performance and a greater number of startups and shutdowns than
anticipated appear to be the primary causes.
An interim waste
processing facility has been backfitted to the plant and is in
operation.
An assessment of environmental radiation doses resulting
from various exposure pathways as a result of the 1975 radioactivity
,
releases was made by the licensee.
The results of the dose assessment
indicate that the design objectives in sections 3.9 and 3.10 of the
Technical Specifications have been met.
.
(
11.
Milk Sampics
,
The Semiannual Report for January through June, 1975 submitted by
the licensec, indicates that no milk samples were obtained from
family cows within a five mile radius of the plant site. Management
representatives stated that the families were unwilling to provide
!
weekly samples of the size needed to obtain the 0.5 picoeuries per
liter analytical sensitivity required by Technical Specifications.
The inspectors commented that the families might be approached to
provide samples on a less frequent basis and commented that an
offer to replace the milk used for samples might induce the families
to be more cooperative.
Management representatives stated that
they would make further attempts to obtain the samples.
12.
Environmental Pathway Dose Calculation
Clemson University has a dairy downstream of the plant.
The dairy
cows are estimated to obtain about one half of their drinking water
from the Hartwell Reservoir.
Plant discharges flow into the reservoir.
No assessment of the cow-milk-child exposure pathway using drinking
water as the source of iodine-131 in milk had been made in previous
analyses.
The dairy is currently being relocated and this pathway
will have no future significance with respect to the Clemson Dairy.
Neverthclcss, licensee representatives stated that they would
evaluate the above pathway.
-
-
- _
4
.
_ _
__ _
_
.
,
IE Rpt. Non. 50-269/76-2,
sd
50-270/76-2, and 50-287/76-2
III-6
.
u
.
13.
Personnel Familiarity with Radiation Monitor Indications
As noted in other sections of this report, the inspectors examined
process and effluent radiation monitor records and discussed the
'
operation of the monitors with operators, health physics personnel,'
instrumentation personnel and management representatives. 'It was
apparent to the inspectors that most of the personnel contacted -
were weak in their understanding of monitor functions and monitor-
,
indications, and that there was a general inability to relate-
monitor indications and alarms to radioactivity levels, Regulations
and Technical Specifications.
-
14.
Routine Secondary Radioactivity Detection and Monitorine Program
By memorandum dated November 19, 1975, the licensee corporate staff
'
recommended an expanded program of sampling and analyses for normally
nonradioactive and low level radioactive effluents.
The majority
of the samples were already being collected and analyzed; however,
the recommendation specified type analysis and frequency for specific
points such that all nonradioactive and all possible environmental-
y
3
release points are being adequately monitored.
This inspection
'
effort verified that the program has been instituted as recommended.
'
i
15.
Radioactive Shipments
"
The NRC was notified by letter from a licensee dated February 11,
'
1976, that a shipment of radioactive material had been received
i
from Oconce which had an external radiation reading greater by
l
their survey than was recorded on the Oconee shipping documents.
Oconee representatives stated that they had concluded that the
higher reading may have been caused by slight movement in transit
i
of the radioactive material (flux wires) inside the shield.- This
was a sole use vehicle and no regulatory requirements were apparently
violated. Oconee supervision had already issued an instruction to
appropriate personnel to emphasize care in accurately surveying
radioactive shipments.
In addition, discussions were held by the
inspector with Oconee personnel concerning emphasis in packaging of
shipments to prevent movement of the radioactive material inside
the shipping container.
This item was discussed during the exit
interview and concurrence indicated by management.
,
'16.
Filter Testing
The inspector noted that licensee approved procedure No. 110-5,
Inplace Testing of HEPA Filters and Inplace Charcoal Adsorbers,
contained acceptance criteria for percent efficient different from
the acceptance criteria in the Technical Specifications.
A licensee
,
-
,
..s~
-,
..n..
-_.p.
.
.
C
i
_
<
.-
.
.
.
i
"'s
IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-2,
-
'
(
f/
50-270/76-2, and 50-287/76-2
III-7
I,
-
--
.
I
representative stated that the procedure was that of the testing
company and the acceptance criteria being used was the Technical
Specific.ation requirement.
The licensee representative stated that
the procedure would be revised to reflect the use of the Technical
!
I
Specification acceptance criteria and management concurred during
the exit interview.
17.
Other Areas Inspected
Other than the items discussed in the above paragraphs, additional
areas inspected about which the inspectors had no further questions
included the following:
abnormal occurrence reports, liquid and
.
gaseous effluent records, routine semiannual reports, instrument
j
calibrations and tests, licensee procedures for the control of
effluent releases, tests of containment air cleaning and tests of
reactor coolant water quality.
i
w
.
k
-
- - - -
- . . - .
. __
w
P
e--
.
'
'
IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-2,
I {])
50-270/76-2, and 50-287/76-2
IV-1
i
.
.
.
.
DETAILS IV
Prepared by:
-
0
'
W. L. Britz, Radiation Specialist
Date
Environmental and Special Projects Section
Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Branch
Dates of Inspection:
February 26-27, 1976
Reviewed by: [ I.
8d,t<.a>
3//.2/76
R. L. Bangart,fChief
'Date
Environmental and Special Projects Section
Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Branch
1.
Individuals Contacted
J. E. Smith - Station Manager
R. M. Kochler - Technical Service Superintendent
J. L. Dunlop - Assisrant Quality Assurance Engineer
J. R. Leonard - Assistant Health Physics Supervisor
2.
Quality Control of Analytical Measurements
The quality assurance and control of analytical measurements was
inspected.
The radiation counting room equipment and procedures
are not included in the plant quality assurance program.
A letter
from the corporate office to the plant staff delineates a quality
control of counting measurements program by periodic instrument
checks.
The instrument records of these checks were inspected.
Recommendations for improving the forms were made.
The licensee
stated these forms were in the process of being revised.
The
merits of having the radiation counting room equipment and
procedures included as a regular audit in.the qualitp assurance
program was discussed.
The inspector had no further questions.
3.
Confirnatory Measurements
a.
Scope
The licensee is required to measure the quantities and
concentrations of radioactive material in effluents from
his facility to assure that they are within the limits
specified in his license and the NRC Regulations.
This
inspection consisted of testing the licensee's measurements
of radioactivity in prepared test standards by comparing
his measurements with those of the NRC's reference
laboratory.
The results of previous split samples and
test standards were discussed.
.
e
-
"+s
.m..
..
, ,
yM%
___
_
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . .
. _ . . . _ _ _ . _ , _ . . _ _ _ . . _ . _ , . _ _
_
B
' '
.IE Rpt. Nos. 50-269/76-2,
-
50-270/76-2, and 50-287/76-2
IV-2
-s
s
I( ,,
.
-
,
b.
Comparison of Analytical Results
(1)
Liquid and Gas Radwaste Split Samples, May, 1975
Fifteen measurements were compared on the samples.
Ten were in agreement, one in possible agreement,
and four in disagreement.
The disagreements were
on the gross beta and three gamma isotopes on the
liquid sample.
Liquid test standards were sent to
the licensee to analyze and resolve these disagree-
ments.
The gas bulbs sent to the NRC's reference
lab were broken and thus no comparison made on them.
'
!
(2)
Liquid Test Standards, September, 1975
Liquid test standards were sent to the licensee to
resolve the May disagreements.
There were five measure-
ment comparisons for gross beta and gamma isotopic analysis.
All results were in agreement.
The previous disagreements
4
are now resolved.
(3)
Liquid and Gas Radwaste Split Samples, September, 1975
Eleven measurements were compared on the samples.
Five
l
were in agreement, three in possible agreement, and
t
three in disagreement.
The disagreements were on tritium
and cobalt-60 in the liquid sample, and krypton-85 in the
gas sample.
Krypton-85 was present in concentrations which
were not seen on the licensee's analysis due to the back-
ground and counting time.
Recommendations for using a
'
longer count time for these comparisons and a good determina-
tion of background at the 511 key peak area were recommended.
The licensee stated a shield to provide a lower background
,
'
will be installed in the future.
The cobalt-60 measurement
l
is considered resolved by the acceptable test standard
i
measurement completed about the same time.
The licensee's
tritium measurement was high and thus conservative.
This
measurement will be reevaluated in the ne:.:t sample comparison.
(4)
Particblate Filter and Charcoal Adsorber, Test Standard,
February, 1976
Two particulate filters and one charcoal adsorber test
standard were analyzed during this inspection. Ten
measurements were compared on the samples.
Eight were
in agreement, one in possible agreement, and one in
disagreement.
The disagreement was on manganese-54 and
is in the process of being resolved.
.
e
4
..,
.
,t'
=
-
. . - -
g
,