ML19322A881
| ML19322A881 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 03/27/1973 |
| From: | Murphy C, Warnick R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19322A878 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-73-03, 50-269-73-3, NUDOCS 7911270637 | |
| Download: ML19322A881 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000269/1973003
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UNITED STATES
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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
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DIRECTORATE OF REGULATCRY OPERATIONS
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RO Inspection Report No. 50-269/73-3
Duke Power Conpany
Licensee:
Power Building
422 South Church Street
28201
Charlotte, North Carolina
Facility Name: Oconee Unit 1
Docket No.:
50-269
License No.:
B2
Category:
Oconee County, South Carolina
Location:
\\
Type of License:
Type of Inspection: Special, Announced
Dates of Tnspection: March 4-7, 1973
February 3-4 and 7-16,1973
Dates of icevious Inspection:
f/2/[7f
[
4
p' M
,7 Date
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Principal Inspector:/R. F. Wabiok,)teactor Inspector
Facilities Test and Startup Branch
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None
Accompsaying Inspectors:
None
Other Accompanying Personnel:
rd7
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Datie
C. E. Murphy,(Adi:;tf Chief, Facilities Test and
Reviewed By:
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Startup Branch
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RO Rpt. No. 50-269/73-3
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
E
1.
Enforcement Action
A.
Violations
Technical Specification 6.1.1.6
1.
the Unit 1 minimum shift staffing require-
It appears-that
ments are being violated in that the assistant control
operator on each shift is also the Unit 2 shift supervisor
and has the Unit 2 people reporting to him while Unit 2 is
engaged in the conduct of the preoperational test program.
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(Details I, paragraph 2)
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2.
Technical Soe'cification 6.1.2.1
.
The Station Review Committee (SRC) failed to review and/or
document their review of an approved, safety-related test
(Details I,
procedure as required by the specification.
paragraph 3)
Nonradiological Environmental fechnical Specification 1.2
3.
DPC failed to sample the caste water collection basin for
13, 1973, as. required by the
pH on February 6 throughIn addition, the waste water collection
specification.
basin was outside the allowable pH range (6.0 to 8.5) on
10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19, 19 73.
(Details I,
February
paragraph 4)
Criterion V of Accendiy B ;o 10 CFR 50, " Instructions,
4.
Procedures and Drawinas"
'
Contrary to the requirements of Criterion V which states, in
that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by
part,
documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type
appropriate to the circumstances, the work which lead to
the oil fire of March 6,1973, was not covered by a
(Details I, paragraph 5, and attached
written procedure.
Advance Inspection Information memorandum dated March 12,
1973)
3.
Saferv Items
Noce
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RO Rpt. No. 50-269/73-3
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Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Matters
II.
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A.
Violations
Design Changes (See RO Inspection Report No. 50-269/73-2,
Summary of Findings)
The operations organization had no documented instructions
or procedures to implement the requirements of the fourth
paragraph of Criterion III, " Design Control," pertaining
to the reviews, approvals, and control of design changes
'
including field changes.
This item was not inspected.
.
B.
Safety Items
None
1
III. New Unresolved Items
73-3/1 Nitrogen In-Line Heater Design Change Documentation
Heaters have been added to the nitrogen supply line
feeding the core flood tanks. The design change
documentation was requested for review. Only certain
engineering calculations have been made available to date.
This item will remain unresolved until sufficient information
is available to determine if the requirements of Criterion
III of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 have been satisfied and until
Region II has inspected the design change.
(Details I,
paragraph 6)
IV.
Status of Previously Reoorted Unresolved Items
,
70-9/16a.
Axial Power Imbalance (R0 Insoection Recort No.
50-269/70-9, Summary - Outstanding Item 16a)
TP-800/24, " Power Imbalance Detector Correlation,"
determines the relationship between the indicated
out-core and in-core power distributions and it verifies
the adequacy of the imbalance system trip setpoints.
This item is closed.
(Details I, paragraph 3)
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RO Rpt. No. 50-269/73-3
(Also RO Inspection Report No.
71-7/1
Thin Walled Valves
50-269/71-5, Details C.3.)_
The licensee's report on the wall thicknesses of valves
within the reactor coolant system pressure boundary has
been received by Region II and remaining deficiencies
identified.1/ The Region is awaiting action by DPC.
Flowmeter Error Analysis and Tests
71-10/1
IP-800/25, "NSS Heat Balance," verifies the accuracy
of the primary flowmeter by determining reactor coolant
This item
system flow using a secondary heat balance.
remains open until appropriate acceptance criteria are
(Details I,
incorporated into the test procedure.
paragraph 3)
Verification of In-Plant Air Flows _
72-8/4
,.
The licensee has determined that air does not flow from
waste handling areas to the normally noncontaminated areas
This item is closed.
of the auxiliary building.
(Details I, paragraph 7)
72-8/15
Verification of Hood Air Flows
This item is
Hood air flows have been measured.
closed.
(Details I, paragraph 8)
J
Filter Test of Hydrogen Purge Svstem
t
72-8/16
The efficiency of the high efficiency particulate air
filters installed in the hydrogen purge system was
,
This item is close,d.
(REPA)
tested and determined to be 99.98%.
f
(Details I, paragraph 9)
Resolutien of Test Deficiencies
73-1/2
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(Details I, paragraph 10)
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This item remains active.
50-269/73-1, Details VII, paragraph 3.
1/ See 20 Inspection Report No.
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RO Rpt. No. 50-269/73-3
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73-1/4
Preoperational Tests to be Completed Prior to Initial
Criticality
This item remains active since all tests have not yet
been completed.
(Details I, paragraph 11)
.
73-1/6
Analysis and Aporoval of Preonerational Test Results
Required Prior to Initial Criticality
.
This item remains active. The reviews have not yet
been completed.
(Details I. paragraph 11)
73-1/7
Emergency Operating Procedures
.
Of the nine emergency conditions remaining to be
co.vered by written procedures, five are now covered
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previously existing procedures, and two remain to be
written.
(Details I, paragraph 12)
73-1/8
Alarm Procedures
Alarm procedures for all o-fety related systems have
been rewritten. Thess will be approved prior to initial
criticality.
.
V.
Design Changes
None
VI.
Unusual Occurrences
None
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VII. Other Significanc Findings
None
VIII. Management Interview
At the conclusion of the inspection, a management interview was
held on March 7, 1973, with the following DPC representatives
present:
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RO Rpt. No. 50-269/73-3
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J. E. Smith - Plant Superintendent
J. W. Hampton - Assistant Plant Superintendent
K. S. Canady - Nuclear Engineer
D. C. Holt - Assistant Nuclear Test Engineer
R. M. Koehler - Technical Support Engineer
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L. E. Summerlin - Staff Engineer
The following items were discussed:
A.
Enforcement Action
The status of enforcement action, as described in the summary
of findings, was discussed with the plant superintendent during
the management interview and by telephone following the
inspection. The reportability of the oil fire was also
discuss ed.
B.
Design Chance on Nitrogen In-Line Heaters
The inspector stated that this would be carried as an unresolved
item until the design change documentation including design
description, evaluation, reviews, and approvals are made
available fc- kegion II to review, and the review is completc.d.
(Details I, paragraph 6)
C.
Previous 1v Reported Unresolved Items
,
The status of previously reported unresolved items, as
described in the summary of findings, was discussed.
D.
Power Ascension Test Procedures
The inspector stated that he had reviewed 17 out of 31 power
ascension test procedures, that one more would be reviewed in
,
the regional office, and that Region II comments had been
discussed with station management. The inspector repeated
each of the comments and his understanding of DPC's position
on each comment. The inspector was informed that his
understandings were correct.
(Details I, paragraph 3)
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R0 Report No. 50-269/73-3
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DETAILS I
Prepared By: N
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Date
.R. F. Wkrdicy7 Riactor
Inspector, Facilities
Test and Startup Branch
Dates of Inspection: Marc
4-7, 1973
/!'/1
Reviewed By:
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C. E. Murpdyy/Acjtng
' Ddte
Chief, Facilities Test
and Startup Branch
.
1.
Individuals Contacted
Duke Power Cocoany (DPC)
J. E. Smith - Plant Superintendent
J. W. Hampton - Assistant Plant Superintendent
M. D. McIntosh - Operating Engineer
R. M. Koehler - Technical Support Engineer
L. E. Su==erlin - Staff Engineer
R. L. Wilson - Performance Engineer
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G. W. Cage - Assistant Operating Engineer
L. E. Schmidt - Assistant Operating Engineer
R. O. Frink - Assistant Plant Engineer
C. L. Thames - Health Physics Supervisor
O. S. Bradham - Instrument and Control Engineer
2.
Shift, Staffing
that Unit 1
Technical Specification 6.1.1.6 states, in part,
minimam si.ift staffing for other than cold shutdown will be
,
in accordance to Table 6.1.1 and this mini =um operating staff
shall be permitted to assist in the prelicensing activity of
Units 2 and 3 only to the extent that it does not affect their
full availability for Unit 1 operation.
In addition, Table 6.1-1
specifies one shif t supervisor with a senior operator (SRO) license,
.
one con' trol operator with at least a reactor operator (RO) license,
one assistemt control operator with at least an RO license, and
two utility operators.
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-269/73-3
The inspector learned that the~ assistant control operator on each cf
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2 and
the four rotating shifts was also the shift supervisor for Unit
The inspector was assured by DPC
had Unit 2 people reporting to him.
management that the personnel with Unit 1 primary assignments had been
instructed and in fact were involved in Unit 2 prelicensing activities
only to the extent that it does not affect their full availability for
Despite these reassurances, it appears that the Unit 1 shift
staffing requirements are being violated in that the shared responsibilities
Unit 1.
are not of a minor nature.
3.
Power Ascension Test Procedures
The licensee's power ascension test program is described in 31 test
The inspector reviewed TP-800/23, " Controlling Procedure
procedures.
for Power Escalation Sequence," and 17 other power ascension testh
.The contents of the procedures were compared with t e
procedures.
Technical Specifications, and other applicable documentation.
Although TP-800/5, " Reactivity Coef ficients at Power," had been
approved by the Station Review Comnittee (SRC), the minutes of the
SRC meeting in which the test was discussed and approved were not
This appears to be contrary to the requirements of Technical
available.
Specification 6.1.2.1, " Station Review Committee," which states that
1
the SRC will review all proposed tcsts that af fect nuclear safety and
that ninutes of the SRC meetings cf.331 be maintained.
The inspector summarized his comments of the reviewed tests and discussed
,
them with the plant superintendenc. The inspector's cccments and the
licensee's response are is follows :
4
In TP-800/23, the reactor protective system overpower trip setting
of 50% at the 15% of full pcwec
.'.s higher than the FSAR implies it
a.
The FSAR states en page 13-8, "The reactor protective
should be.
system power level trip point ~111 initially be set at a low value,
At 40%
and raised as the power. escalation program progresses."
of full power, thE trip setting specified in TP-800/23 is 50%.
The trip setting while at the 15% power level should be more
conservative.
The licensee agreed to set the trips more conservatively at 15%
power, but had not decided on the exact setting.
This will be reported in the next inspection,
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RO Rpt. No. 50-269/73-3
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The acceptance criteria stated in the abstract of TP-800/23 in the
b.
The licensee
FSAR have not been included in the Procedure TP-800/23.
stated they would be included in the test acceptance criteria.
The abstract for TP-800/3, " Biological Shield Survey," in the FSAR
s
talks about neutron ceasurements but no neutron surveys are required
c.
by Procedure TP-800/3.
The licensee stated that they intend to make neutron surveys at each
He stated that the test data sheet requires bcth
power plateau.
neutron and gamma readings to be documented,
Although the reactor vendor commented on the power ascension tes*
d.
procedures, certain applicable B&W ccm=ents were not incorporated
into IP-800/5.
,
The licensee agreed to re-review B&W comments on pcwer ascension
tests to ensure that all applicable comments were incorporated into
the test procedures.
sts do not contain suf ficient instructions for reactor
e.
Cev
For example:
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TP-800/4, "Latural Circulation Test" - This procedure does e.o,t
discuss reactor trip, nor expected reactivity changes, nor operator
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actions concerning control rods and boron concentration.
TP-800/5 - Step 12.1.7 does not tell the. operator what to do with
rods, boron, or power level.
TP-800/13, " Unit Loss of Electrical Load" - This procedure assumes
No
integrated control system (ICS) operation will be smooth.
reference is made to possible proble=s or to operator actions
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concerning reactor control, rods, or boro'n.
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The licensee agreed to re-review all power ascension test procedures
to ensure they contain sufficient instructions for personnel
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operating the reactor.
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Step 6.3 of TP-800/5 states as a limit and precaution that the
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boron concentration in the reactor coolant system shall be within
What
+10 ppm of the concentration in the letdown storage tank.
actions are required if +10 ppm is exceeded?
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-269/73-3
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The licensee stated that this limit applied to equilibrium operation
only and that the step would be clarified.
In TP-800/10, " Xenon Reactivity Worth and Rapid Depletion Test,"
g.
steps 12.1.5, 12.1.7, 12.2.5, 12.2.7, 12.3.5, and 12.3.7 need more
information concerning how reactivity will be plotted and the
xenon peaks determined. Step 12.3.3 should state the maximum
allowable percent power change per minute that power may be reduced.
The licensee agreed to add needed instructions.
h.
In TP-800/5, "NSS Heat Balance," no acceptance criteria is listed
for the reactor coolant system flow determined by a heat balance
of the secondary coolant systems.
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A DPC management representative stated that the desired correlation
between flowmeter instrumentation and the indicated flow based on
the secondary heat balance would be specified in the procedure.
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The inspector reviewed the following power ascension test procedures,
well over 50% of the category I tests:
TP-800/23, " Centro 111ng Procedure for Power Escalatien Sequenre"
TP-800/2, " Nuclear Instrumentation Calibration at Power"
.c
TP-800/3, " Biological Shield Survey"
TP-800/4, " Natural Circulation Test"
TP-800/5, " Reactivity Coefficients at Power"
TP-800/8, " Integrated Control System Tuning"
TP-800/10, " Xenon Reactivity Worth and Rapid 'Jepletion Test"
TP-800/11, " Core Power Distribution"
TP-800/13 " Unit Loss of Electrical Load"
TP-800/14, " Turbine and Reactor / Turbine Trip Test"
TP-800/24, " Power Imbalance Detector Correlation"
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R0 Rpt. No. 50-269/73-3
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TP-800/29, " Unit Load Transient Test"
TP-800/30, " Loss of Control Room"
TP-800/31, "Psuedo Control Rod Ejection Test"
TP-800/32, " Loss of Offsite Power"
TP-800/33, " Dropped Control Rod Test"
TP-710/4, " Initial Radiochemistry"
.
The inspector determined that the power ascension tests and the
power levels at which the various tests will be conducted are in
agreement with the AEC's Guide for the Planning of Initial
Startup Programs.
1/
TP-800/24 satisfied the previously identified unresolved item"
in that it does determine the relatiunship between the indicated
out-core and in-core power distributions and it verified the adequacy
r
of the imbalance system trip setpoints. This item is now closed.
TP-8n0/25 satisfies the previously identified unresolved item-2/
in th:t it does verify the accuracy of the primary flowmeter by
determining reactor coolant system flow using a secondary heat
balance. This previously reported unresolved item will be closed
as soon as appropriate acceptance criteria are incorporated into the
test procedure.
4.
Chemical Discharge Limits
Specificacion 1.2 of the Nonradiological Environmental Specifications
requires among other things that all water discharged from the waste water
collection' basin shall have a pH between 6.0 and 8.5 and that the
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pH anu apa.cific conductance of the waste water collection basin shall ,
be determined and recorded daily,
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On February 16, the plant superintendent informed the inspector by phone
that the above requirenents had inadvertently been violated. The
.
inspector received the following details of the violations while at
the site'.
.
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jf See R0 Inspection Report No. 50-269/70-9, Summary - Outstanding Item 16a.
2/ See RO Inspection Report No. 50-269/71-10,Section II, paragraph 4.
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The first sample of the waste water collection pond, taken on February 10,
some four days after the operating license was issued, indicated the pH
was 8.9.
The next sample, taken on February 12, indicated the -9 was
9.2.
The basin was full, so additional holdup was not possible. The
basin is normally full and continuously overflowing.
Actions to correct the high pH were taken on February 14.
On February 15,
the pH was 5.8 and on February 16, the pH was 4.2.
About the same time that action was taken to correct the low pH, other
high pH water was added to the basin from a draining operation at the
station and again the pH overshot the limit. On February 17, the pH
was 9.3 and it decreased to 9.0 by February 19.
On February 19, twenty gallons of 96% sulfuric acid was' added to the
basin. The sample on February 20 was 6.60, within the requirements
of the Technical Specifications, and subsequent results have also
been within l'imits.
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The licensee informed the inspector that during the time the waste
water collection basin was outside the limits of the specification,
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samples were taken of the yard drain (which includes the overflow
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from waste water collection basin as well as other area drains) and
at all times during the time that the vaete water collection basin
was outside the pH limits, the yard drain discharge to the environment
(Lake Hartwell) was within the pH l'mits.
The SRC has reviewed this violation'of Technical Specifications and has
recommended that the waste water collection basin be enlarged to provide
a longer holdup time and a larger quantity of dilution water, and that
provisions be included so that there are three distinct volumes avail-
able for holdup. They have also recommended a change to the require-
ments of the Technical Specificativas to make the limit apply to the
water being discharged to the environment.
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5.
Oil Fire
.
In addition to the information contained in the attached, Advance
Inspection Information memorandum dated March 12, 1973, the inspector
was informed on March 9 that both the upper and lower motor bearings
were undamaged and that both the a.c. and d.c. oil lift systems were in
service. The licensee was still engaged in determining the extent of
the damage, but is proceeding with cleanup of affected areas.
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Design Change - Nitrogen In-Line Heaters
.
During the January inspection, DPC was requested to make the design
change documentation, for the nitrogen in-line heaters, available
for the RO inspector's review.
During February,' DPC made engineering
calculations available but not prints and evidence of engineering
reviews and approvals connensurate with those received by the original
I
design as required by Criterion III of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50.
This will remain an unresolved item until sufficient information is
available to determine if the requirements of Criterion III have been
met, and until Region II has inspected the design change.
2/
,
7.
Verification of In-Plant Air Flows
)
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On February 27, 1973, representatives of DPC and the ventilation contrac-
tor, Gamewell Mechanical, Inc., measured air flows in the auxiliary
building in doorways between waste handling areas and normally noncon-
taminated areas. They determined that in no case does air flow from
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waste handling areas to clean areas.
,
The inspector reviewed the summary of the results of the air flow tests
and then personally *.erified, with a tissue test, that positive air.
flow does exist frem clean to contaminated areas.
.. .
This previously reported unresolved item is closed.
3/
8.
Verification of Air Flow in Laboratory Hoods
On February 27, 1973, representatives of DPC and the ventilation contrac-
tor, Gamewell Mechanical, Inc., measured the air flow in each laboratory
hood.' The air flows in the five hoods ranged from 591 cfm to 847 cfm.
This previously reported unresolved item is closed.
,
1/ See RO Report No. 50-269/73-1, Summary of Details, paragraph V.b.
2/ See RO Report No. 50-269/73-1, Details V, paragraph 5.
3/ See RO Report No. 50-269/73-1, Details V, paragraph 11.
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RO Rpt. No. 50-269/73-3
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9.
Filter Testing of Hydrogen Purne System
The inspector reviewed the completed test IP-115/1, " Air Filter Tests
High Efficiency Particulate Air Filters," and verified the results of
the test indicate that the high efficiency particulate air (HEPA)
filters in the gaseous waste disposal (GWD) system are 99.997%
efficient and the HEPA filters in the hydrogen purge system are
99.98% effecient.
The test summary stated the results of the control room ventilation
HEPA filters. The inspector did not verify efficiency calculations;
however, the results met the test acceptance criteria and the requirements
of the Technical Specifications.
This previously reported unresolved item is now closed.
10. Resolution of Preoperational Test Deficiencies
The inspector requested that DPC prepare a su= mary showing the resolution
of the deficiencies described in the su= nary of the results of TP-600/1,
,
" Controlling Procedure for Hot Functional Testing."
A representative of DPC indicated this would be done. This understanding
was ccnfirmed in the management interview.
2/
11. Review of Completed Preocerational Tests
The inspector determined the following tests had been completed,
the results evaluated, reviewed, and approved by DPC:
TP-125/1, " Strong Motion Recorder Calibration"
T?-125/2,
" Peak Recording Accelerometer Calibration"
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TP-150/t0, " Reactor Building Cleaning"
TP-161/3, " Reactor Building Purge System Functional and Operational Test"
TP-161/4A, " Hydrogen Purge System Leak Test".
.
TP-170/1, " Auxiliary Building Vent Fans Valve Controls Electrical Test"
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1/ See RO Report No. 50-269/72-1, Details V, paragraph 12.
2/ See R0 Report No. 50-269/73-1, Details II, paragraph 2.b.
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TP-203/6A, "500 PSIG Low Pressure Injection Engineered Safeguard Test"
TP-234/10, " Quench Tank Operational Test"
Gaseous Waste Disposal System Waste Gas Decay Tank Discharge
"
Flow"
TP-270/32, " Main Steam Stop Valve Leak Rate Test"
TP-360/1B, " Process Radiation Monitoring System 1 RIA-44 Vent Iodine
Monitor"
TP-360/8, " Process Radiation Monitoring System 12 Point LPSW Monitor,
RIA-31"
,
TP-360/10, " Process Radiation Monitoring System 1 RIA-35 LPSW Discharge
Manitor"
.
TP-600/28, "2iping System Vibration Test"
The following procedures remain to be completed and/or the results
evaluated, reviewed and approved prior to initial approach to criticality.
This was discussed at the management interview.
" Penetration Room Flow,; Pressure Drop, and Filter Test"
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TP-115/5, "HEPA Filter Inspection Test"
" Hydrogen Purge Test"
TP-203/5, " Low Pressure Injection Functional Test"
TP-230/8B, " Coolant Treatment Evap<.rator Functional Test"
TP-230/8C, " Waste Evaporator Fune*.icnal Test"
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TP-302/2, "Incore Instrumentation Electrical Test"
TP-330/1, " Integrated CRD System Test"
TP-600/10, " Reactor Coolant System Hot Leakage Test"
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RO Rpt. No. 50-269/73-3
1-10
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12. Emergency Overating Procedures
Since the last inspection, DPC has prepared the following approved
emergency procedures:
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EP-1800/21, Inoperable Centrol Rods
EP-1800/22, Loss of Flux Indication
EP-1800/23, Loss of Containment Integrity
EP-1800/24, Abnormal Release of Radioactivity
EP-1800/14, Loss of Steam Generator Feedwater
These procedures were reviewed by the inspector and compar'ed with the
requirements of the Technical Specifications. The inspector determined
that the emergency procedures do implement the actions required by
the Technical Specifications.
High activity in the re, actor ccolant system has been covered in alarm
procedure 1708/21, " Process Monitor Radiation High." This was
reviewed by the inspector.
Malfunction of the ptassurizer relief valves is covered by the existing
procedure EP-1800/4, " Loss of Reactor Coolant."
l
Acts of nature (other than earthquake) still remains to be written.
13. Seismic Detectors
Oconee Unit I has nine seismic detectors. The two strong motion
,
recorders have a trip sensitivity of .01g and display a visual
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signal at the detectors when tripped. The film 'must be processed
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and evaluated by the detector vendor before the intensity of the
earthquake can be determined. One seismic detector will alarm
in the control room at .05g.
Six peak recording accelerometers
will record acceleration up to .25g.
The inspector was informed
that the recordings can be optically read by DPC personnel at the
site and the intensity of the earthquake determined. Other
information on the seismic detectors was reported previously.2j
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1/ See R0 Report No9 50-269/73-1, Details III, paragraph 2.a., and
50-269/73-2, Details I, paragraph 7.
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2_/ See R0 Report No. 50-269/72-10, Details I, paragraph 4'.
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