ML19322A713
| ML19322A713 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 11/29/1971 |
| From: | Moseley N, Murphy C, Whitener H US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19322A705 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-71-08, 50-269-71-8, NUDOCS 7911210756 | |
| Download: ML19322A713 (11) | |
Text
.
O
- a UNITED STATES
[
- s ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION l
e l
DIVISION OF COMPWANCE REGION ll - $UIT E 818 230 PE AcMT REE ST R EET, NORT HWEST Tatapuous (404) 826 49 C3 AT L ANT A. GEORGI A 30 3o 3 TESTING AND STARTUP INSPECTION REPORT C0 Report No. 50-269/71-8 Duke Power Company Oconee 1 Seneca, South Carolina Docket No. 50-269 License No. CPPR-33 Category: B1 Type of Licensee: PWR-2452 MW(t), B&W Type of Inspection: Routine, Unannounced Dates of Inspection: Septemb er 7-10, 1971 Dates of Previous Inspection: June 28-29, July 29-August 1,and Augus t 4, 1971 Principal Inspector:
Y
///2J/7/
C. E. Shpff, P4 actor Inspector (T&SU) 6atl '
%41 d4 skhi H. L.' Whitener,' Reactor Inspector 7 Dath (Operations)
Other Accompanying Personnel: None Reviewed By:
F
///)9/7/
N. C. Moseley, Senior Rea Inspector
'Date Proprietary Informati n: None Scope of the Inspection - Areas examined during this inspection included a review of management operations relating to construction, a review of plant security, records relating to preoperational tests, installation of components to ensure separation of redundant systems, and the effectiveness of management as related to the preoperational test program.
i i
79112107 N
m i
?
Duke 269/71-8 SECTION I Enforcement ; :lon A.
Noncomo11ance Items 1.
Criterion XVIII of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 - Failure to perform management audits of construction activities (Section II, Paragraph 2).
2.
Criterion XI of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 - Failure to demonstrate that seats of reactor internal vent valves had been inspected.as required by Reactor Internals Vent Valves Inspection Test Procedure (Section II, Paragraph 4).
3.
Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 - Failure to use properly-documented procedures in performing the vent valve inspection test (Section II, Paragraoh 4).
4.
Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 - Failure to separate redundant systems to preclude single accident-type failures (Section II, Paragraph 6).
5.
Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 - Conducting tests prior to approval of test procedure (Section III, Paragraph 3).
6.
Criterion VI of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 - Failure to follow instructions and procedures in modifying approved test procedures and in recording test data (Section III, Paragraph 3).
Licensee Action en Previously Identified Enforcement Matters Corrective action has not been completed on items identified in C0 Report No. 50-269/79-8.
Unresolved Items 1.
Plant Security (Section II, Paragraph 5) 2.
Primary coolant loop flowmeter tests (Section II, Paragraph 7) 3.
Weaknesses in licensee's construction QC organization (Section II, Paragraph 3)
Status of Previously Resorted Unresolved Items Corrective action has not been completed on unresolved items reported in l
C0 Report No. 50-269/79-8.
l l
l I
k 9
[\\
t Duke 269/71-8 ~
Unusual Occurrences None l
Persons Contacted i
J. C. Rogers - Project Engineer D. G. Bean - Assistant Project Engineer D. L. Freeze - Principal Field Engineer i
J. E. Smith - Plant Superintendent J. W. Hampton - Assistant Superintendent M. D. McIntosh - Operating Engineer R. M. Koehler - Technical Support Engineer L. E. Summerlin - Staf f Engineer T. F. Wyke - Mechanical Engineer, Design E. E. Sibley - Field Engineer, Mechanical Management Interview The management interview was held at the conclusion of the inspection on Septemb er 10, 1971, and was attended by Rogers, Bean, Freeze, Smith, Hampton, McIntosh, Koehler, Summerlin and Wyke. The following items were discussed:
1.
Failure to conduct management audits of construction activities -
The inspector advised Rogers that the failure to perform audits appeared to be a violation of Criterion XVIII of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50.
Rogers stated that he would contact his management to expedite the initiation of management audits. (See Section II, Paragraph 2.)
I 2.
Plant Security - Rogers stated that the security forces had been instructed to register all persons that enter the facility gates.
4 (See Section II, Paragraph 5.)
i 3.
Primary loop flowmeter - Smith stated that the licensee is attempting to obtain the test results for these meters.
(See Section II, Paragraph 7.)
4.
Vent valve test deficiencies - The inspector advised Smith that the licensee appeared to be violation of Criteria V and VI of Aopendix B to 10 CFR 50 relating to this test.
Smith stated that he would reemphasize the i=portance of following procedures in the conduct of the test program.
(See Section II, Paragraph 4.)
i 1
q 7
V
/~
Duke 269/71-8 5.
Single failure criteria - The inspector advised Rogers that the primary loop flow instrument transducer tubing did not appear to meet the criteria relating to protection from single f ailures as required by Appendix A to 10 CFR 50.
(See Section II, Paragraph 6.)
6.
Leak rate test deficiencies - The inspector advised Smith that the licensee appeared in violation of Criteria V and VI of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 relating to these tests. Smith stated that he would give his attention to these matters and these conditions would be corrected.
(See Section III, Paragraph 3.)
7.
Weaknesses in construction QC organization - Rogers advised the inspector that steps will be taken to strengthen the operations of the construction QC activities.
.i I
i l
1 6
'f
-s Duke 269/71-8 SECTION II Prepared By:
C. E. Murphy ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS INSPECTED, NOT IDENTIFIED IN SECTION I. WHERE NO DEFICIENCIES OR UNRESOLVED ITEMS WERE FOUND 1.
General Office Review Committee >Enutes - Reviewed minutes for neetings held in May and June 1971.
DETAILS OF SUBJECTS DISCUSSED IN SECTION I 2.
Management Audit The inspector discussed with Rogers and Bean the need for the licensee to observe the requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50.
In response to the inspector's questions, Rogers stated that to his knowledge the management of Duke had never audited the operation of the construction activities at Oconee as required by Criterion XVIII of Appendix B.
The inspector advised Rogers that this failure to conduct audits appeared to be in noncompliance with 10 CFR 50 and that this item would be discussed in the inspector's letter to the licensee.
The inspector reviewed this item in the management interviev.
3.
Weaknesses in Construction QC Organization The inspector reviewed the Oconee staffing changes with Rogers and Bean.
He pointed out that the transfer of key personnel to McGuire coupled 4
with the resignation of H. L. Hunnicutt, Principal Field Engineer, had i
resulted in relatively inexperienced personnel filling some of the QC supervisory positions. In particular, the inspector pointed out that Freeze, the new Principal Field Engineer, had only four years experience, none of which was directly concerned with quality control and he had no previous experience in supervising a large group of men.
Rogers and Bean agreed that Freeze did not have the level of experience of his predecessors, but said that he was the most qualified person available in the Duke organization to fill the position. The inspector stated that he did not have the information available to nake a comparison of Freeze's qualifications and of others in the Duke organization.
He could only co= ment that Freeze's experi appear adequatetoqualifyhimforhispcsition.gpcedidnot The inspector requested that the licensee consider what could be done to strengthen the position of Principal Field Engineer. He advised Rogers and Bean that he would review the effectiveness of Freeze's performance on future inspections.
The inspector also expressed concern to Rogers and Bean that other QC personnel were not suf ficiently familiar with applicable codes and
_1/ See Exhibit A.
-e e
" Duke 269/71-8 regulations. The inspector stated, for example, that in discussions with Sibley, Sibley had admitted that he had never read Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 and did not know the requirements of this document. The inspector advised Rogers and Bean that he would follow up on this item on future inspections to determine if action was being taken to cor-rect such weaknesses and to upgrade the QC organization. Rogers stated that the QC personnel would be required to become familiar with the codes and regulations.
The inspector discussed the need for strengthening the construction organization during the management interview. Rogers advised the inspector that steps would be taken to strengthen the QC organization and upgrade the training of the personnel.
4.
Test Program Deficiencies The inspector reviewed Test Procedure TP 1 A 200 1 1, Reactor Internals Vent Valve Inspection Test. The procedure had been approved by the Site Review Committee (SRC) on April 20, 1971, and the test had been conducted on April 20 and 21,1971. The prerequisite conditions for the test had been revised on April 21, 1971, however, and those por-tions of the test conducted on April 20, 1971, had not been retested.
The information contained in the test log indicated that the test personnel had been unable to examine the valve seats as required by the test procedure. A test deficiency notice had not been preparad as required by the " Guide for Conducting the Oconee Initial Test Program" (Guide). The Guide also requires that the master copy of the test procedures be kept in the Master File. When this procedure had been requested by the inspector, however, it could not be immediately located.
It was eventually found in the desk of one of the operations s upervisors.
The inspector discussed these deficiencies with Smith and advised him that the failure to use properly documented test procedures appeared to be a violation of the requirements of Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50.
The failure to document that the test requirements had not i?en satisfied appeared to be a violation of Criterion XI of Appendix B.
These deficiencies were discussed in the management interview and Smith was advised that they would be included in the inspector's letter to the licensee. The inspector expressed particular concern that the types of deficiencies noted during this inspection had been found during previous inspections. Smith assured the inspector that the importance of eliminating the deficiencies would be reemphasized to the men.
~
1 Duke 269/71-8 5.
Plant Security The inspector discussed the need for tighter plant security with Rogers and Bean. He advised Rogers that the licensee should'take steps to prevent unauthorized entry to the plant since fuel was now being stored in the auxiliary building.
Rogers and Bean both assured him that special guards were not required in the auxiliary building since the gate guards and the receptienists at the construction office and the operations building required that everyone sign a register prior to entry. In order to test the eff ectiveness of the system, the inspec-tor attempted to pass the operations building receptionist on two occasions and the gate guard one morning.
The receptionist required that the inspector log in.
The gate guard permitted the inspector to enter the Unit 1 area without requiring identification and without requiring that the inspector sign the log.
This item was discussed in the management interview. Rogers assured the inspector that the security would be strengthened.
6.
Seoaration of Flowmeter Transducer Tubing The inspector reviewed the installation of the tubing connecting the reactor coolant system flow sensing element with the transducers. He observed that the tubing for the A loop was arranged such that a single missile could damage the lines to all flow transducers. The lack of separation and protection from a single f ailure appeared to be a violation of the requirements of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50.
This item was reviewed in the management interview and the inspector advised Rogers that it would be discussed in the inspector's letter to the licensee.
7.
Reactor Coolant Flowmeters The inspector had, during previous inspections, requested to review the cest records for the reactor coolant flow meters. Each time the licensee had advised the inspector that the test results would be available during the next inspection. During this inspection, the inspector advised Smith that these results must be reviewed prior to core loading. Smith stated that at present the licensee did not have the records but that he would attempt to expedite the records for the inspector's review. This item was discussed in the management interview.
1 9
~
Duke 269/71-8 SECTION III Prepared by:
H. L. Whitener ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS INSPECTED, NOT IDENTIFIED IN SECTION I, WHERE NO DEFICIENCIES OR UNRESOLVED ITEMS WERE FOUND 1.
General This inspection was directed toward review of preoperational test procedures and data. Outside of this scope, the general status of construction and scheduling was not discussed at this time.
2.
Test Procedures Reviewed a.
Equipment Hatch Leak Rate Test (TP 1A 150 04) b.
Reactor Building Structural Strain Gauges Readout Equipment Calibration (TP 1A 150 02 A) c.
Reactor Building Structural Strain Gauge Instrumentation Initial Balancing (TP 1A 150 02 B) d.
Reactor Building Structural Strain Gauge Instrumentation Routine Reading (TP 1A 150 02 C) e.
Reactor Building Structural Strain Gauge Resistance and Base Readings (TP 1A 150 02 D) f.
Reactor Building Structural Carlson Gauze Readout System (TP 1A 150 02 E)
~
DETAILS OF SUBJECTS DISCUSSED IN SECTION I 3.
Review of Precoerational Test Procedures and Data Twelve preoperational tests pertaining to the reactor building structural instrumentation and leak testing of containment penetrations, accesses, and reference vessel system were reviewed for adequacy of test procedures, test data and results, and implementation of tests.
Deficiencies were identified in five of the tests reviewed as follows:
a.
Tests Performed Prior to Aceroval of Test Procedure Inconsistent dates in test records indicate that, in two ins tances,
the licensee performed tests, or parts of tests, prior to the -
approval of the test procedure.
O r
. Duke.269/71-8 The " Reference Vessel System Leak Rate Test" procedure (TP 1B 150 09) was approved for use on: July 28, 1971. The
" Test. Procedure Record of. Approval,. Changes,.and Test Performance,!'.(cover sheet), and chronological log attached to.the procedure show that the dates of test performance are June 23,1971, to July 28, 1971. The log indicates that operations intended to. be governed by. detailed instructions..in the procedure, were performed throughout dae. period.. June.23 to July 28. The test was concluded at 7 :55 a.m., July 28, 1971.
The " Reactor. Building. Pressure Wide Range. Instrument Calib ration".tes t procedure. (TP.1B 150 1 E).was approved for..use on. July.1, 1971.
A. calibration _ data sheet. pertaining to Section D of this procedure was signed off as completed June 21,1971.
b.
Changes to Approved Test Procedures Nine changes were listed on the.. cover sheet of the " Personnel and Emergency. Loek_ Leak._ Rate Tes t" ptocedure- (TP _13 150 08).
None of these. changes..were. initialed to show who. authorized the. change...Iwo.of. the indicated changes were not made in the body of the. procedure.
The. " Electrical Penetration 0-Ring Seal Leak. Test". procedure (IP 1A.150.05).had been reviewed. during a. previous. inspection, July 29-30,.1971
.At.that time, three. procedure changes.were documented _on the. cover. sheet. Since. July.30, four additional changes _were. =ade to this, procedure and legged on the cover sheet as made on July.24,1971, 1/
Failure.to. follow the appro ad instruction-- in making changes to approved. procedures is a.ecurrent problem._1/
c,
. Data Recording Section 10.3 of the "hference Vessel System Leak Test" procedure. (IP.lB.150 09). specifies that temperature and pressure data _be. recorded hourly. This data was not included in the test data package.
1/
~"' Duke Power. Company's " Guide for Conducting the Oconee Initial Test P rogran"
~~~2/C0 Report No. 50-269/71-5; CDN issued to Duke Power Company dated 5/23/71.
l
~
n i ~
\\.
Duke 269/71-8 The Test. Coordinator for the " Reactor. Building ' Isolation Pneumatic. Leak. Tes t" (TP 1A 150.06). told the inspector that in this test. the uncorrected barometer readings were recorded on. the calculation sheet..The test calculation-sheet specifies that the corrected barometer reading will be recorded.
Temperature at.the barometer was not. recorded as specified i
by. Sections 10 and 12.4.3 of the procedure.
Attachment:
Exhibit A e
e
_ _ _ ~
O s,;
9 RESUME Mr. D. L. Freeze, Principal Field Engineer, Oconee Nuclear Station, was graduated from North Carolina State University with a BSCEC in 1967.
He joined Duke Power Company in the Construction Department in 1967. He worked in various capacities in Duke's Construction Field Organization as Assistant Field Engineer and Field Engineer at the Oconee Nuclear Station, and was made Principal Field Engineer in August of 1971. He attended the Duke Power Nuclear Training Course in 1970.
Mr. Freeze is a member of the American Society of Civil Engineers Exhibit'A
'~
Page 1 of 1
.-