ML19321B246

Special T4 Teledyne Valve Operator Performance of Unit in Steam Environ Indicated in Westinghouse Equipment Spec G676258

ML19321B246
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	10/20/1969
From:	CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19268C980	List: B10035, Discusses 800630-0701 Site Audit by NRC & Franklin Research Ctr Re Environ Qualification of Electrical Equipment,Sep Topic III-12.Info Provided & Requested During Audit Encl. Proprietary Portion Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790) ML19321B243 ML19321B245 ML19321B246
References
TASK-03-12, TASK-3-12, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8007300342
Download: ML19321B246 (11)

Text

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• I" I E.L.

S.O.

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Dole Oc t. 20 19/9 CR Ai'J E R ES E ARCH AND DEVELOPMENT VALVE LABORATORY REPORT SPECI",L T4 TELEDY :E VALVE OPEI'dTOR PEnrCR'!A"CC OF UNIT I:! STI*.M ENVInc.'MNT INDICATED IN UESTII Cil0USE EOUIP:IE:IT SPECIFICATION G576258 m

Crane Co.

4100 South Kedzie Avenue. Chicago, Illinois 60632 I

e 80073003'/23

E. I.. 7 8."? - l C I: A M E CO.

3,p, 952.073 1 L S E /. i' C il A M i>

D E V E L O P<.iE N T Dole Oct.20 l '.

V Al.V L L Allo N A T O R Y RI PO RT SPrCT ?1, T4 Ti'inPvr VATJS 0. F w.70n PER10i: :A.C:: OF Ut:I? 1:' STI M 1:,,',';;:c: :0?T I!;DICATEl) 1:? UESTIr';l:0USE i:QU;;.;.;;;T SPECIFICATIO: G676253 1

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DISTRIEUTION:

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E.L.. H P -1 CRANE CO.

S.o.

952.0D R ES E A RCil AND D E V EL O.1/.E N T Dcte Cet. 0.

VALVE LABORATORY RE P O T:T 4

SPECIAL T4 TELEDY?!C VALVE OPERATC1 PERFOR'!A;;C:: OF U:!IT 1:1 S';;;'.11 LI; VIRO.'. <;iiT

. IUDICATED I! UESTIEC"OUSE EQUIPW.:::I SPECIPICATIO:t G676258 ABSTRACT A specini T4 Toledyne Valve Operator was exposed to an environ =cnt similar to that occurring in a nucicat-emergency as described in the Westinghouse Spe<ifica-tion. Under thcoc conditions the operator would function in an att:,osphere of steam and boric acid spray.

Pressure, temperature, and humidity associated with the stenta atmosphere was deemed cost likely to be detri-mental to the valve operator. An approprictcly =odified T4 Tcledyne Operator mounted on a 6" #47 Cate Valve was encioned in a 36" dicmeter vessel and pressurized to a rea):feum of 90 psig with saturated steam.

The valve was operated in this environment and the ciectrical chart.cter-istics, temperaturcs-and pressures were measured.

Under these severe conditions the operator performed satisfactorily, meeting specification requircaents.

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. R E S E /, R C il Al'!D D E V E l. O PIA E N T Dole Oct.:20, l'r 1

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1. A l'. O R A T O R Y REPORT Posa SPECII.L T4 U.LEDT::: VALYC OTra!. TOR PEnlC J:AUCE OF UNIT IN ST /.M E: '112.ORIE ;T INDICATCb IN 1:.2:YIUCliOUSD 1.QUIIIG.I.T SPrC1FICl,TIO:: G6762M 1.

.INTn03UCTIo3 A specini T4 Telcdync Valve Operator was exposed to an environment.

similar to that occurring in a nucicar emergency as described in the Westinghouse Specification.

Under these conditions the operator would function in an atmosphere of seca: and boric acid spray.

i 1.1 Pressure, tenperature, and huuidity associated with t' stcau atmosphere was dcened most likely to be detrimental to the valve operator.

1.2 An apptopriately modified 74 Teledyne Operator, counted on a vcivo, was enc losed in c 36" dicserne vessel and pressured to a maxinum of 90 psig with scturated steca.

2.

DESCRIPT7M C~3 V/I.V2 0? m*. TOR Crane Co. designed and built a Special Tcledync T4-5 valve Operator per S.O. 736,926 and T11269 which was mounted on a regular Crane 6-Inch 150 1b. Cat. No. 47 Stcc) Cate valve, Photograph G5479.

The codifications are described in Appendix A.

3.

DFSCRIPTTO:? 07 TFST TOUTT!ENT. PTOTCr.'lAPH C5454 3.1 A 36-inch tank was designed and built for 125 psig saturated steam pressure in accordance with ASME Pressure Vessel Code.

'Ihis vessel was used to enclor.,c the valve and motor operator during test.

3.2' All c1ccorical wirin:; was enclosed in a conduit nnd so:1cd at the outlet end of the pressure vessel with " Chico X" fiber and " Chico A5" scalin;; compourd manufactured by Crouse Hinds Co.

This scalcr is specially compounded for use in hazardous locations.

-3.3 A Westinghouse Type TA Industrial Analyzer was employed to read line currents and phase voltages.

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c,,,

C I: A N E CO.

s. o. " > ?. M

R E S ti A '.C il AND D E V EL O i,..E N T Dele !b'J. : D.

P

'i VALVE LABORATORY REPORT Page 2

l i

1 t

3.

DESCnI?TTOM 0" T;'ST i711TTM!!T, Pi'CTCCEAUll C% 54 - Continued 3.4 The iron-constanton therencouple readings were obtained with a Bre.in Electronik Ten.perature Rcccrder by I;inneapolis Iloney.:cII. A totcl of fcur (4) thercocouples were uncd; one (1) located at the entrnnec of the inlet stcau pipe to the pressure vessel, one (1) inside the vessel notar the valve yoke, and two (2) in the electrical control coupartment.

3.5 Ttro Bourdon-tubs type Crosby Pressure Gegen were used; q"

one (1) at the top of the pressure vessel and one (1) in the electrical conduit upstream from the scaled exit.

q 4.

IE9T Pn0CEP"~'.E AtiD nre,tii.TS 4.1 Photographs G5454 and G5455 shzt the test vcive and equip-ment as it is being assembled tar test.

i 4.2 Pressure and temperature requirements for a 24-hour day test are shmni in Fig.1.

The cotor operator is required to operate the valve once at the end of each tc=perature and pressure icvel.

4.3 The first stonn atmosphere t.'at was conducted for approxi-mately 30.5 continuous hours with steam pressures and valve operation cycles as chown in Fig. 2.

The operator uns subjected to about 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> of the temperature and pressure conditions of 20 pain er higher; twice the ti=e required in the original specification. I:aximum and minicum voltage, current, temperature, and valve operating, time during secam test are given in Tcbic 1.

A total of 18 operating cycles were coupleted satisfactorily.

4.3.1 After co.,piction of the first t e :. t. the pren:mre vessel was opened, Photograph GS479, and the electrical control compartment cover was removed, i

Photograph G5478.

4.3.2 All parts ucre in satisfactory condition. The special exterior paint had peeled from the valve and operator, Photographs G5478 and G5479.

E,t, n...-t C I:ANE CO.

s. o. 9 >:' #t

., E S E A l',C i t - A N D D E V El. O I.. E N T Date M ~ '". I

3 V A1.V E L Allo!; AT O RY R E Po l:T Poce 5.

AnDITIO:nt TECT7m o re.t".Ts 5.1 Tests beyond the " specification were undertaken. The val'c was cycled twice each day in a 15 psig steam atmosphere for five days.

5.1.1 During. this extra secam test the valve and operator were subjected to 4 days, 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, and 20 minutes of continuous 15 psig steam pressure. Minimum and maximum readings of voltage, current, temperature and operatin3 time of valve are included in Tabic.1.

The valve uns cycled an additional 13 ti$cs during this test.

5.1.2 Examin., tion of the valve and operator revealed no chan;c in test results given previously for the first steam test.

6.

CO"CLUSION The Special Tcledyne T4-5 Operator performed satisfactorily in a saturated steam atmosphere during a test period greater than required by the specification.

<t s Written by:

D. L. Black bL Examined by:

/

T. A. hudd.i L

M Approved by:

Chester Anderson 7 Pages Including l' Table 2 Figs.

4 Photographs

C l: A N E CO.

s.o. 2;h *: '.

lies E A!:C i; AND D E V EL O PIA E N T Dat e Oct 20 19 f

4 VALVE L A B O !: AT O I Y REPOt:T Page TAEL!! 1_

Ranacc of Voltage, Current and Temperatures Tank

/. ii ? " !? i: S i

VOLTS Environ-i i

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in. ) :& :._ i Min. # * ~.l: tin.i~

._I:H n. ! Sn. l f tin. 'in::. f_:iin. ' :!ax.

^;nt l

Steca 0.090 0.99 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 400 502 482 506 480 505 Ambient 1.1 1.6 1.05 1.5 1.05 1.5 486 498 487 500 485 500 the Following Locations:

Temperatures, F, Men-ured by Thermocouple at 1 - Valve Yoke, 2 - Inlet Steam at Tank, 3 and 4 - Switch Control Compartment T 11 i' R !! O C O U P L E S Tanh l

Environ-1 __ _

2 f

3 4

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ment hin. I ?:^ :.

I Min.

Ar-hi en t 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 90 301 313 302 313 294 313 298 311 s

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60 285 290 285 288 287 304 286 291 i

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20 242 295 238 296 246 295 278 295 n

ou 15 225 234 225 234 225 234 225 234 un 1

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Environ-Clore t.9 0:' r 7 i

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Steam 36.2 37.5 36.2 37.3 Ambient 36.2 37.8 37.0 38.6

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e l: A N E CO.

so.~

is E S E A RC il AND DEV EL O! MENT Date.0ct Al9 VALVE LABORATORY RE P OI:T Poge _ 5 APPEimiX A K031r1C^.T10::r. OF T4-5 TELCDY::C VALVE OPER*sTOR TO 7'"r.T UntI'""*0::St nrnc'"Ic',TIO! CM6253 to facilitate A T4-5 Tcledyne, Serial T11269, was modified as outlined belew, sat;isfactory performence during the relctively severe test conditions specified.

A.

Motor -

Peericss, Div. of H.K. Porter Co. Inc., S'#,

1800 RPM, 220/440 volt, 60 ncrtz, 3 phase totally enciesed, weatherpros f with special grease, 0-rin?, scals, and Class "R" insulation.

Rated for ambicnt ecmperature of 15297nurmal with resistance to 31SOF nax. for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, and exposure to 50 LAD /hr radiation.

Basically per Cranc Dug. A-36090 and simildr to Pecricss Modc1 P-11521, with heater.

B.

Seals -

Regular 0-Ring seals replaced with sama size Viton "A" O-Rings supplied by Parker Seal Co.

Crease should be Standard 011 Co. Ryhon Uc. 1 E.P. rated at 1 x 10 RAD vith a dropping point f

C.

crc.csc -

d of 465 F.

I D.

Torous Suitch -

The ucchanically latching system regular with Ship-Tooth position limit necembly. Modified to relocate the seal to the elect,ric ccmpart-ment at the smallest dia=cter rather than the j

larger diameter of the bearing retainer o.D.

Wide gap (0.20") NAMCO Cat. No. NP-B Switches used.

\\

E.

Fosition Limits -

Identical to e' Skip-Tooth assembly currently reicased for production.

The switches arc NAMC0 Cat. No. DP-XP7R with cpecial tetaperature resisting covers.

F.

Paint -

Amercoat Dimetcote No. 6 on the T4-5 Unit.

Applied per Westinghouse l'rocess Spec.

PL'n 597755-2.

Closure of the cicctric compartment accomplished G.

E1cetric comeartment by a special spacer picec and cover with Cranite gaskets at both joints. This is necessary to accommodate the Skip-Tooth Position Limit Mechanism.

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E.L. 7828 - Add. 1 S.O. 952,075 September 8, 1969 HODIFICATIONS OF T-4-5 TELEDYNE VAINE OPEPJTOR TESTI:n PER E.L. 7828 A T-4-5 Tcledyne. Scrial T11269, uns modified as outlined below, to facilitate satisfactory perforuance during the relatively severe test conditions specified.

A.

En t or_ -

Pecricss, Div. of II.K. Porter Co. Inc., 5'#,

1800 RPM, 220/440 volt, 60 liertz, 3 phase totally enclosed, weatherproot, with special grease 0-ring scals, and Class "H" insulation.

I Rated for ambient temperature of 152 F normal with resistance to 316 F max. for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, and exposure to 50 RAD /hr radiation.

Basically per Crane Dwg. A-36090 and similar,to Peerless Model P-11521, with heater.

B.

Sesis -

Regular 0-Ring seals were replaced with same size Viton "A" 0-Rings supplied by Parker Seal Co.

C.

Grense -

The grease used was Standard Oil Co. Rykon No.1 E.P.

phich was rated 1 x 106 RAD /hr with a dropping point of 465 P.

D.. Torque 94 itch -

Essentially the mechanically latching system to be utilized regularly with our Skip-Tooth position limit assembly. Modified only to relocate the real to the cicetric compartment at the smallest diameter rather than the larger diameter of the bearing retainer 0.D.

Wide gap (0.20") NAMCO Cat. No. NP-B Switches were used.

E.

Position Limits -

Identical to the Skip-Tooth assembly currently re-Icased for production. The switches used were NAMCO f.

Cat. No. DP-XP7R with special temperature resisting

covers, j

F.

Pa'nt Amercoat Dimetcote No. 6 was utilized on the T-4-5 Unit, cpplied essentially per Westinghouse Process Spec. E7R 597755-2.

C.

Elcetrie Compartment Closure of the electric compartment was accomplished i

by utilization of a special spacer piece and cover with Cranite gaskets at both joints.

This was necessary to accommodate the Skip-Tooth Position Limit Mechanism.

Y'NlM<.*h I

/

GIIM : f r..

,, - - - =

G.

II. tIartin

.cc:

Mr. 11.P. Setka Mr. T. A. Ilodda

!!r.

D.L.~ diack

.E.L. 7828 -

• a

tytty, W L CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC ?OWER COMPANY Y!

"r BERLIN. CO N N ECTIC U T P. o. som 270 H ARTFORD. CONNECTICUT 06 09

]

= #.'!"*;', ii HOIC JAEl121979 LD.D.

December 29, 1978 Docket No. 50-213

~

Director of. Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn:

Mr. D.* L'.

Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #2 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555

References:

(1)

W. G. Counsil letters to D. L. Ziemann dated March 6, 1978 and July 27, 1978.

(2)

D. L. Ziemann letter to W. G. Counsil dated November 9, 1978.

Gentlemen:

Haddam Neck Plant Electrical Equipment Environmental Qualification (EEQ) e In Reference (1), Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO) submitted information on electrical EEQ to the NRC Staff. This in-formation was compiled and reformated into a standard listing by the NRC Staff and transmitted by Reference (2) to CYAPC0 for review.

As requested, CYAPCO has reviewed the NRC Staff compilation. As a result of that review, a number of changes have been mau; these changes are underlined on the attached listing.

Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT E ATOMIC, POWER COMPANY W. p;q W75l[?S&?

E?l5 f/]l u,y

a., < gg e-Jr -

"ounsil DUPLICATE DOCUMENT

.esident Entire document previously entered into system under:

aNo R., $,.H / 5, 6 %_ I N o.

of pages:

i

.5.7 Ls. a

p

" Q_Q; C ?I:.1 l-l*/ Y."

1*

Q' p

% /,v c, m2:

/ c./-/-

Actual l

' 'Ac"tu'a l' Actual Actual Qualification Ji-Equip, Mfg, qualification Qual.

Qualification Environment Qualification Equipment No.

& Model No.

Pressure

Temp, Radiation Exposure Documentation U

7 MOV 861 A-D.

Teledyne T4 40 psig 275 F 1X10 Rads.

.100% humidity " c 1.

Crane letters dated 311, 312, 313,

1. .3 s*

. boric acid in demin.

2/1/78 & 2/2/78 2

314, 871A,

'[

H2O (see Qual. Doc.

g

-8718, 200

1. 2)< ? i- ;j 2.

NUSCO evaluation dated 7/20/78 & 7/21/78 pu. r -, p,. -. i -,.-

0. ji+ h. % 55 Q...

.> r 8

MOV 23, 34, 25, Limitorque 90 psig 329 F 2.2X10 Rads

.100% humidity -

1.

Franklin Institute Rep.

26, 27, 28

• ' C for actuator el.5% horic acid in F-C2232-01 dated 29 H O *~ -

/e November, 1968 (information for 2

~

motor insulation -

2.

Limitorque letter dated being obtained) 1/31/78 ea _

g,.y 3.

Limitorque Test Report

1. 600198 dated 1/2/69 g,,

,y..,..,

MOV 2928 &

Limitorque 105 psig 340 F 2X10 Rads

.100% humidity # E 1.

Franklin Insititute Re s

t=

.see Qual. Doc. #2i ?

F-C3441 dated Sept.19f; 292C r.

M. - 1, for boric acid

' concentration.

2.

NUSCO evaluation dated 7/20/78 2 'JY%.,,, f ~., j'.C M0V 780, 781, Teledyne T10 40 psig 275 F 1X10 Rads 100% humidity 1.

Crane letters dated 803, 804

,c

. boric acid in 2/1/73 & 2/2/78 demin. Hpf)

(see Quai. Doc. #2)/

2.

NUSCO evaluations

//.: 3 < ;)

dated 7/20/78 & 7/21/78

• NOTES REFER TO FOOTNOTES TO TABLE A-1 W;

r v,,

. f, ;...,

(CYAPC0LETTERDATED3/6/78)

,y

/. r

-, c w =s

,.3.e p, *yp X4 !.

• /2:. > a //- :

< ' -: :. > !- j, 5

1*

p D

2 Actual Actual Actual Actual Qualification Equip. Mfg.

Qualification Qual.

Qualification Environment Qualifictuo Equipment No.

& Model No.

Pressure

Temp, Radiation Exposure Documenttuo 0

F-17-1, 2, 3, 4 Westinghouse 80 psicj 320 F.

2X10 Ra'ds

.100% humidity

'l.

Westingho.!+ nter environment CYW-78-51i ned 4/5/78 7FEJJJr ea mr

. boric acid (3000 ppm) 2.-

3,,, f.j,.9 2.

NUSCO ers:nion dated 7/23 1.~

s 3-Qg,,3 R

,,..:: : 3. -

6 PT 401-1, 2, 3 Foxboro 60 psig 294 F 1X10 Rads

• 100% humidity 1.

Southern !!i'arnia 611GM-DSl v-v Edison Re:ct submitted

• See Note 4

• See Note 4 coszir to NRC 07 :14/78

. Transmitters enclosed

~

in cabinet, not exposed

~

to chemical spray

'".".*,'i

[/

i

,t

. A~ f.

A p ;-- s..

2-m:,,..

i.,,,,,. y 5 9

.100% humidity 1.

Southern :!ifornia LT 401-1, 2, 3 Foxboro 60 psig 294 F 6

613HM-HSl-F

• Sae Note 5

• See 1X10 Rads Edison Re:cr submitted Note 5 to NRC o-

!;/78

. Transmitters enclosed in cabinet, not exposed

~

to chemical spray g

3.,

y, 1000 V Control Collyer

• 100% humidity /g;p "'" 1.

Collyer Tscnical Report Cable (PE insulation /'

21.5 psig

'260 F 5X10 Rads See

• See S~

1. 67-2 da:s : 110/67 PVCjacket)

Qual. Doc.

Note 6

c ' S & 44 j

.See Qual. Doc. #3

1. 3 for chemical spray.

2.

IEEE pape- 't R. Blodaer RG Fisher dated MJt. 159 3.

NUSCO eh atan dated 7/II'?

p p

3.

O Actual Actual Actual Actual Qualification Equip Mfg, Qualification Qual.. Qualification Enytronment Qualification Equipment No.

& Model No.

Pressure Temp.

Radiation Exposure Documentation 6

. Steam atmosphere -

1.

IEEE paper by R Blodget 600 V Power Okonite 50 psig 286 F 5X10 Rads Cable (Butyl insulation /

.n e ;

& RG Fisher dated May,

.See Qual. Doc. #3 1969 PVCjacket) j v'

for chemical spray.

2.

Okonite Research Report-

1. 467 dated 8/30/63 3.

NUSCO evaluation dated 7/24/78 zwv 6

Instrument Samuel Moore

-221 F SX10 Rads 1.

Stone & Webster's eval-Cable

& Co.

See Qual.

• See

-o.

uation dated 7/19/78 (PVC Insulation /

Doc. #2 no'.e 7 See Qual. Doc. #2 2.

NUSCO evaluation

F dated 7/24/78 PVC jacket -

(w?d'7og/c. e.y

• gg 3, Dekoron type

~

g f,,..

y,,., g,, A,,

1852)

-gy 43.e p-0 0 " **

w). :r - r e,m,-a. y.y.

Miw R,Q, 'yp 9

Mineral General Cable 5000 psig 302 F 4X10 Rads

. Saturated Steam 1.

Stone & tiebster's eval-Cable sheathed, epoxy

' ; < " ~,

s-4,,..,.rj fj.,.J

.p'

'.2640 ppm boron in uation dated 7/19/78 Insulated (MI cable, copper

?....

4,y_

demin, water 2.

Letter dated 3/23/78 4

7 filled gland seuls,

. ',.., -)

from General Cable silicone insulated pigtails) 3.

NUSCO evaluation' dated 7/7/78 e

~

e e

p 4.

O Actual Actual Actual Actual Qualification Equip, Mfg.

Qualification Qual. Qualification Environment QJalification Equipment No.

-& Model.No.

Pressure

Temp, Radiation Exposure focumentation 7

Silicone Collyer 51 psig 260 F 5X10 Rads 100% humidity ^ ' l.'

Collyer let'te'r dated' Insulated (silicone rubber S 3d

c 1 1/2% boric acid 1/13/67

.2

+

Hypalon insulation /Hypalon#'."D

'] #,#l

'cy. a' "2

At-e e' d

Jacketed jacket) 2.

Franklin Institute Rep.

Cable F-C 2750 dated March, 1970.

3.

IEEE paper by R Blodgett

& RG Fisher dated May, 1969.

Charcoal Fenwal Hermetically Oper Teflon insulated Hermetically,- J.

Filter Temp.

271210 sealed Temp.

Lead wires sealed 1.

Kirchner, J.

F., &

Bowman, R.

E., Effects Detectors f f.- :/ % ri./

bound 3.4X104 Rads Not subjected of Radiation on Mater-A

/--

accident J ;.,

to chemical spray tals and comoonents.

- # 'f' g -

environ-due to their New York: Rheinhold J.3.,.,,q..

ment location." ~

(1964)

., c 4. ;,

n 3.:

g s

, z: = ~ r:...,...

6 Air Solenoids Johnson Serv.

30 psig 140 F, IX10 Rads

• See Rote 9 1.

Joh;. son Service Co.

for Car Fan Co. V-24-2

• See Note 9

• See Note g e-Data Sheet No. V-24 Dampers

.>_=j 9

..e.. /

km 2.

Kirchner, J.

F.,

Bowman, R.

E., Effects i

of Radiation on Mater-ials and Components.

New York: Rheinhold (1964) 3.

1USCO evaluation dated 7/24/78,

m..

_ _..... ~.

R p

s.

Actual Actual Actual Actual Qualification Equip. Mfg.

Qualification Qual. Qua!ification Er.ytronment Qualification Equipment No.

& Model No.

Pressure Temp.

Radiation Exposure Documentation j.

Terminal Blocks Westinghouse 40 psig 285.-

2X10 Rads

.100% humidity ' "'D '

l.

PDCR #270 Technical Rev.

805432 0:.

3;e

. Chemical scray (See Qual. Doc. #1)

,2.

D. C. Switzer letter to (exposed) 7

< 'F '

e'/';

A. Schwencer, dated 6

2/2/78 & 2/10/78 General Electric 40 psig 286 F SX10 Rads

,100% humidity $f.i'.W.',3.

NUSCO evaluation EB-25 y_ :

o, t _

3, _; 4 2640 ppm boric acid dated 3/27/78 (enclosed)

'3..,

f.,,,, *.

avr:;j 4 g

~-

s 4.

D. C. Switzer letter to D. L. Ziemann, dated 3/29/78

• See

• See

• See "See Containment Components Note 11 Note 11 Note 11 Note 11 1.

D. C. Switzer letter to E. G. Case dated

^

Electrical Assembled on 5 2 c. s:_.

<+'~y p.

/ ' -

E @' ', _

12/12/77

~

~

Penetrations site 2.

NUSCO evaluation dated 7/7/78.

3.

Penetrations presently undergoing testing.

4.

R. H. Graves letter to B.11. Grier, dated 6/21/78 (LER78-iO/IT)

-nf,

w. <=. C e uns s c.

LE7~ rcg i~O D-4. -2./2//jh H W.y n, ', o,'ve

.o e

t

//

nowmmastun nss EEEEEEE-

' g J $5553db"l L

vo CY - Teledyne M0V File July 28, 1978 m

GEE-78-387 suwacT Radiation Qualification of Operators In addition to the 2/1/78 and 2/2/78 letters, Westinghouse specification G676258, and Crane materials evaluation for radiaticn qualification, we are currently investigating the time for a radioactivity release after the start of the accident (LOCA). This time will be co11 pared to the time it takes for the subject H0V's to perform their safety function (30 seconds).

It was ascertained from (both of NUSCO) that the NRC, at a meeting at Connecticut Yankee with respect to the 3/21/78 letter from D. C. Switzer to D. L. Ziemann, stated that it would take 60 seconds for radioactivity to be released after the start of the accident. Therefore, the operators would perfonn their safety function before being subjected to the accident radiation.

JBR/psn 1

4 0 5-70

(. M p t

Enc 2/2-i /, e ci J.c (,

I

4. t. g).. e.,

10 -

(Attachment 2),' requiring four CAR units operable, and electrical modifications installed during the fall 1977 refueling outage.

l

+

Specifically, as described in the June 27, 1977(2) CYAPCO letter to the NRC Staff, the modification involved an electrical tie-in of two spare circuit breakers (one on each emergency bus) to the CAR fans on the two opposite buses.

In the event of a postulated diesel generator or bus failure, three CAR fans would be capable of being powered from the operable diesel generator without,a tie-in between divisional buses.

This would be accomplished with appropriate interlocks by operator action after some diesel generator loads had been shed.

Thus, it is assumed in the dose analysis that one CAR unit starts automatically at time t = 0, the time at which radio-activity is released from the reactor core.

Two more CAR units are started manually at time t = 14 minutes following releases after diesel loads have been shed.

With this i

number of CAR units operating, flow rates through the l

filter assembly will be sufficient to effect the needed reduction in radioactive iodine concentration.

i RHR Leakage:

Proposed Technical Specification 3.14

( Attach ment 2) limits the allowable RHR system leakage to three liters per hour and this value is assumed in the dose analysis.

BOORTHEAST UT. ElES 1

,:== ===~~"

' * * ~ "

"'::=.'"

J =%':"1"=':ll'"~~

CY - MOV Teledyne File July 28,1978 yo GEE-78-396 j

% Boric Acid Concentration &

a Radiation Qualification

Reference:

Memos dated 7/20/78 and 7/21/78 On 7/28/78 Crane was contacted by phone to determine if he could send a letter documenting the % boric acid concentration and he indicated that he could not because the % is in the Westinghouse 1

1 specification No G676258 and he does not have a copy of this.

Also, asked for a copy of a rediation report'which the operators were-qualifiea for a backup to the 2/1/78 and 2/2/78 letters, indicated that this was done by a materials evaluation and th9thewilltrytolocatetheinformationandsendusacopy.

The 10 rads came from this evaluation.

JBR/psn 7/28/78 p... NE ~ ~ - _

--u--.~.

e e e e

TELEPM0*st. (2tt: 3456000 TELEX es0 M6441 TWI Ds0. (510) eneste CONVERTO-GEAR TELEDYNE

• CRANE vity, open,rons CRANE CO.

• WARRINGTON INDUSTRIAL PARK e WARRINGTON, PENNSYLVANIA 18976 February 1, 1978 NORT11 EAST UTILITIES SERVICE CO.

P. O. Box 270 Hartford, CT 06101 ATTN:

SUBJECT:

TELEDYNE Valve Operators Serial Nos. T31410,- 1413', 1416,- 1L14,

f.

- r 3421, 3422, 3424 and 3427 Gentlemen:

We are pleased to confirm our telephone convetaation regarding design of the subject serial numbered operators. Our records indicate the units furnished for the following:

Gamma radiation of 1 x 10 R total accumulative. An ambient of 275 F for a period of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with a 40 psig, 100% humidity, steam atmosphere environment.

i i

Yours very truly,

-m 4

~

,g Frank D. Butkus Valve Operator Sales FDB:mcv 1

s,

,c-se vor va O p. a t t.. -

. c %,.

P.-

,2 =

s L_

v

e e e

TEL"PnONE - (218) 34F4000 TELERMO 64-6441 Twx NO. (810) 6464420 TELEDYNE

• CONVERTO-GEAR

• CRANE y,ty, openarons CRANE CO.

• WARRINGTON INDUSTHIAL PARK

• WARRINGTON, PENNSYLVANIA 18976 February 2, 1978 NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE CO.

P. O. Box 270 Hartford, CT 06101 ATTN:

SUBJECT:

TELEDYNE Valve Operators Serial Nos. T-3411, 3412, 3417, 3418, 3426, 3428, 3429, 3430, 3431 and 3420 Gentlemen:

This letter is to verify that our records indicate that the subject serial numbered operators were furnished from our factory with design to be suitable for the atmosphere ambient environment as described in my letter dated February 1, 1978.

Yours very truly,

~ r D:y $ < 2 l -

Frank D. Butkus Valve Operator Sales FDB:mcv i

u.

n

.....,,,... m

l s

+

NORTHEAST U1. NIES

=' r==r~

5

=.7:::,7=.25" ~~

L J ::::':J 0%'.'!lCl l

CY - MOV - Teledyne File July 21, 1978 yo Mk GEE-78-382 Telecon with Fr&nk Butkus & J. B. Recan

.gn Called M and asked him if the results of Crane report "Special T4 Teledyne Valve Operator Performance" dated 10/20/69 were also applicable to Teledyne Operator Model T10 and he said yes.

M will document in a letter to us and he wil.1 also indicate that the serial numbers of our operators were ahplicable to the above test report.

JBR/psn OS 70

~

~

IdORTHEAST UT

.flES I

$h.bi'bI[db(...

m,,..........

k J:TO:0.11*0'.7%:l CY - M0V - Crane Teledyne File July 20,1978

,o yDh GEE-78-384 nou Boric Acid Concentration mm The information below was obtained in a meeting with M on 7/20/78.

The subject M0V's were tested in a boric acid /demin. H O spray, however, 2

documentation on the concentration could not be obtained from the vendor.

In discussions with the vendor it was indicated that test concentrations were greater than 1.5%.

(Try to get letter from vendor' stating this.)

The actual concentration was specified in Westinghouse spec. # G676258 and we are presently trying to obtain a copy of this document from West-inghouse or possibly other utilities in the SEP, JBR/psn e

0 5-70

NORTHEAST UTILITIES l

b552b.k[bkk5 i

I EEEf.~5:

(

'ia CY - MOV Teledyne File July 30,1979 y.

GEE-79-449 l

% Boric Acid Qualification i

Reference:

Letter No. GEE-79-251 to M from M On 7/26/79,6 of Westinghouse callgd to inform me that he checked Westinghouse specification $. 576258 Dnd our operators were subjected to 12% boric acid by weftjht during qualification testing.

M of the Operating Plant Support Group assisted W in obtaining this information. The spray at CY is 1.5Pboric acid.

JBR/psn

(

(.

. o I

FILE (Teledyne/LimitorqueMOV)

January 4, 1979 o

~

M GEE-79-10 MOV Radiation Qualification The information below supplements the February 1.1978 and February 2.1978 Crane lettars and the January 31, 1978 Limitorque letter with respect to -

motor insulation radiation resistance..

j.

The attached Crane Tele (vne operator data sheets indi.cate-that the motor i:

insulation class is "H" for all of the safety related operators supplied from Crane Teledyne. Also, the attached motor nameplate data sheets obtained from the plant indicate that the motor insulation class is "H" for the Limitorque operators (23, 34, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29).

Section 5 (attached) of Westinghouse WCAP-7744 deals with testing perforised on valve motor operawrs with class "B" and class "H" insulation. An irradiated (2 x 108 rads) and an unirradiated operator were-tested and no significant difference in response could be detected between the two units, which had class "B" insulation.

The attached Limitorque NQDS shows that slass "H" insulation is capable of withst ding a higher level of radiation then class "B" insulation.

The highest level of radiation that the above motors would be subjected to is 31 x 106 rads and the February 1,1978 Crane letter indicates that their operators are qualified to 1 x 107 rads gamma. The Limitorpe operators utilize motors of the same vintage.'same insulation class, and the same motor manufacturer (since the attached P.O. indicates that MOV's 25 thru 29 were purchased to the same motor requirements as MOV 23 which has a peerless motor) as the Crane operators.

From the above it is concluded that the subject motor insulation is acceptable with respect to radiation resistance.

JBR/cle Attachments s-

=

.=

_... ~.

NORTHEAST Ut JTIES

~

3

=,20 2 = Z'~

2.'O.0,70l;2'i?""*"'

L J :';;;;O".!TJJ.'T!.7 CY - !V.' - Teledyne File July 20,1978 yo g[

GEE-78-383 MOV 861 A-D, 311, 312, 313,

.ge, 314, 871A, 871B, 200 also, 780, 76;, 803, 804 - Radiation Analysis The motor serial numbers of the above M0V's should be obtained and given to Stone & Webster so that they can ascertain the actual radiation t'ithstand capabilities of the winding insulation material.

This will serve as a double check on the Crane letter dated 2/1/78 and 2/2/78.

The motor for these M0V's (Peerless) is the same fo'r the Limitorque M0V's (23, 34, etc.)

The above infonnation was obtained ir, a meeting withm on 7/20/78.

JBR/psn s

9 e

OMO

e

~

LIMITORQUE CORPORATION Pgiq l 5114 Woodall Road, Lynchburg, Va. 24502

{~

h Adrninistrative Office-804-528-4400 Manufacturing Plant-604-846-8401 Telex-82-9448 January 31, 1978 Northeast Utilities P. O.

Box 270 Hartford, Conn.

06101 ATTENTION:

SUBJECT:

Environmental Qualification For Existing Limitorque Actuators

Dear Sir:

Confirming our telephone conversation of January 31, please be advised that Limitorque has reviewed the Bills of Material for the actuators on the enclosed tabulation in an effort to determine the qualification level available for each unit.

These actuators were shipped during 1966 and 1967, consider-ably before any formal qualification requirements existed for valve actuators.

Limitorque Corporation did, however, qualify the exact unit shipped to you in our Environmental Test 600198, a copy of which is enclosed.

This test envelopes the environ-0 mental conditions you have requested of 260 F for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, 100%

relative humidity and 40 psig.

The test conducted by Limitorque, however, did not irradiate the actuator prior to conducting the post loca envirnomental tects and therefore Limitorque would be unable to extend this qualification to cover radiation.

Subc':,2gnt environmental tests which included radiation to 2.2 times 10 rads were done on similar actuators, however, the motor insulation material had changed substantially.

This means that the subsequent tests cannot be used as a basis for supporting l

the motors you currently have but can be used to support the actuators.

Should Northeast Utilities replace the existing motors with the current design "RH" insulation, Limitorque could then qualify the actuators in accordance with the environmental conditions listed on 600198 and also 2.2 times 108 rads.

I l

4 1

Automated Valve Ope. ator s and Jacks for Industry

Sheet No.

2 LIMITORQUE CORPORATION l

l t

January 31, 1978 Due to the age of the equipment and the quality standards that existed at the time of manufacture, we are limiting our generic seismic qualification to 4.0 G's even though the qualifi-cation report attached indicates the equipment was taken to 5.3 Gs.

I trust the above satisfies your requirements and should you need any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact my office.

Very truly 'otir s,

/lc ATTACHMENTS cc:

New York Sales Office N

e T

1 t1

, Q.%

PHILADELPHIA GEAR CORPORATION KING OF PRUSSIA, PENN. 19406 LIMITORQUE VALVE CONTROL d

,- ~

TEST OF LIMITORQUE VALVE OPERATOR TO MEET GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

((

OF AN ELECTRIC VALVE ACTUATOR IN NUCLEAR REACTOR CONTAINMENT ENVIRONMENT s

TEST REPORT Ow. 9.s 4 e - a. a d 5-c m i FIGL t) s m & o-t r.& h

l.

O' M h if % 'l l ) iwta 2ANuARx 2, 1eee

-)

w.k

• cooin i

!i 2EST REPORT - JANUARY 2, i

,9 ENGINEERING ORDER NO.

600198 The Limitorque valve operator tested was Model SMB-0 with a 15 foot pound, 3 phase, 60 cycle,"440 volt motor, with special high temperature motor insulation and high temperature resistant non-metallic components, to withstand the contemplated steam pressure, high temperature and chemical co'nditions expected in the event of

. a nuclear reactor failure within the containment vessel.

The Limitorque operator was wired for a torque seating control for closing direction and position limiting control for open direction.

A 2 3/8 diameter by 1/4" pitch, 1/4" lead, left hand stem was used to simulate the stem of a valve being opened and closed The speed

[

of operation was approximately 6" per minute over a 12" travel.

The designed seating thrust to be exerted on the stem by the Limitorque valve control was 16,500 pounds of thrust in the closed position of the valve stem.

A slide wire electric position trans-mitter was also installed and connected to a remote position receiver outside the test chamber.

1 l

TESTS TO BE PERFORMED ON OPERATOR 1.

Preliminary heat tests on component parts.

2.

_ Preliminary heat tests on actuator.

.3.

Preliminary live steam test on actuator.

4.

Heat aging-test of electric motor and electric motor with brake.

-(

1 a

e -

Shock and v ration test of actuator to limulate seismic 5.

conditions.

150 life cycle test of actuator producing approximately 16,500 6.

pounds of thrust.

7.

Test of Limitorque valve operator and electric brake motor under a simulated reactor containment post-accident steam and chemical environment.

f

[

l i

=

J

'2 -

e.+

~1.

PRELIMINAR'.'

AT TESTS ON COMPONENT pal _

The standard-Limitorque operator geared limit switch and

y f

torque switch was subjected to a dry heat test for approxi-mately 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> at a temperature of 375*F.

Periodically

~

7

'during this test, the switches were removed from the oven and actuated by hand.

The operation was satisfactory and no mal-h.

-functions occurred.

All parts functioned freely and there was i

.no binding, jamming, nor abnormal distortion of parts.

The n

test was successful in all respects.

t 2.

PRELIMINARY HEAT TESTS ON ACTUATOR l

A completely assembled and operational Limitorque operator-t 1

was placed'in an oven where the temperature was maintained at

(

approximately 325 F.

for a duration of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The unit was electrically operated every thirty minutes for a period of approxime:ely two minutes per cycle and using the geared limit switches to stop the actuator at the full open and full closed position of travel.

Indicating light -circuits were also wired to the geared limit switches.

The test was successful in every respect.

Therc. ere no malfunctions of the operator and upon inspection of the com-1 ponentl parts used, there was no noticeable deterioration or wear.

The lubricant used in the geared limit Twitch did become

.hard and caked, however the lubricant used in the Limitore2e 3

y y-y y--mn,:

gyy e

m e

,+ --

e-

~

gear housin(

cmained' pliable and had ;

original consistency.

It was determined that the grease in the geared limit switch js i'

gear housing should be changed to the same grease as in the Limitorque operator gear housing.

3.

PRELIMINARY LIVE STEAM TEST ON ACTUATOR A complete Limitorque actuator was_ set up for electrical operation and live steam was piped into the conduit taps on the top of the limit switch compartment.

One of the bottom conduit taps was left open t o drain off any condensate.

The operator was set up on a timer basis for operation over a period of approximately nine hours and operating every thirty minutes for two minutes per cycle.

During this test, the live steam

(~

in the switch compartment seemed to have no effect whatever on the function of the limit switches in their control of the operator at the full open and full closed position of travel.

In addition, the limit switches were wired up to indicating lights which operated satisfactorily.

The test was successful and there was no noticeable effect on the function of any of the parts in the limit switch com-partment.

4.

HEAT AGING TEST OF ELECTRIC MOTOR AND ELECTRIC MOTOR WITH BRAKE The electric motor for the Limitorque operator to be used l

in'the environment test and another electric motor equipped k

with a di sk type brake were subjected.to a heat aging test.

4

.=

Both electriv motors were sent to Relia...e Electric Co. for heat age-testing.

This test consisted of baking the motors L f at a temperature of 180 C. for a total of 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> to simulate aging the motor to a 40 year life expectancy.

Motor insulation

~

checks were'made and found to be within~ normal limits.

There were no adverse effects on the motors and motor insulation resistance measured infinity to ground.

5.

SHOCK AND VIBRATION TEST OF ACTUATOR TO SIMULATE SEISMIC CONDITIONS The Limitorque operator to be used in the environment test was shipped complete to the Lockheed Electronics Co.,

in Plain-field, New Jersey, for shock and vibration testing to simulate seismic co,nditions.

A copy of this report is enclosed herewith.

((

The test basically consisted of mounting the Limitorque operator i.

on a shock and vibration table to test it at 20 cycles per second vibration at 1G load for a period of two minutes on -

one minute off.

This would constitute one cycle.

The cycle was repeated five times in both the vertical and horizontal axis of the operator.

The actual test report and photographs are included here.

The test was successful and there was no noticeable effect-whatsoever on the Limitorque operator.

~1 5

s 6.

150 LIFE CYb 2 TEST OF LIMITORQUE OPERe.

>R PRODUCING APPROXIMATELY 16,500 POUNDS THRUST

((

The Limitorque operatcr was shipped to the Franklin Institute Research Laboratories, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

The operator was mounted on a stand inside the test chamber and a 150 cycle load test was made on the unit.

This test consisted of stroking the 2 3/8" diameter valve stem a total of approximately 12 inches in two minutes.

The valve stem in the full closed position produced a thrust of 16,500 pounds on a rigid plate securely bolted to the test chamber.

The thrust was measured by the same strain-gauge recordinc instru-ment used in the actual environmental tast conducted by the Franklin Institute.

The unit was wired up so that the closing

(

direction and the open position geared limit switch stopped the unit in the full open position.

The speed of traval was -

6 inches per minute.

After the life cycle testing was completed, the unit was inspected and found to be in excellent condition.

There was no noticeable wear on any of the parts.

The same electric motor which had been heat age tested at Reliance Electric Co.

was used for this life Cycle test.

There was no noticeable adverse effect on the electric motor and it functioned properly.

7.

TEST OF LIMITORQUE VALVE OPERATOR UNDER SIMULATED REACTOR CONTAINMENT POST-ACCIDENT STEAM AND CHEMICAL ENVIRONMENT The attached report of the Franklin Institute Research Laboratories describes the actual testing under this environ-SEE RMtT F l RL F.CQ.233 - 6 ) g ye;g, 6

o?o s

=...

mental'condicion, A'fter the ' test was completed, the Limitorque operator was shipped back to Philadelphia Gear Corporation, King of Prussia, Pennsylvan;a where it was disassembled and all parts were inspected.

Photographs are included showing the various parts of the operator.

All parts, including the electric motor, slide were position transmitter, seals, bearings,

-gears, and shafts, were inspected and no noticeable wear was noted.

However, the gear frame of the geared limit switch had corroded and caused a minor failure.

The geared limit switch frame had been attacked by the boric acid in the steam atmosphere.

This caused the gear-frame to corrode and resulted in ginding up of the shafts of d

the geared limit switch where they extend through the geared limit switch housing.

This caused the malfunction of the owitch as described in the Franklin Institute Research Labor-atories' Report.

A material change has been instituted to ccrrect this corrosive action of the material used in that

_particular switch.

On all present orders being processed, and on all future units to be shipped to meet environmental l

conditions sich as this, the gear frame housing of the geared 1

limit switch will be a bronze material which is not subject 4

s to corrosion by boric acid solutions.

The mctor insulation resistance after all testing was 1,000 megohms across all

.' ~k

.three motor terminals to ground at 500 volts.

4 l

7

NORTHSAS'T' U T LI'T4 B S S ERVICE CO MPANY August 3, 1978 GEE-78-411 To MOV 292 B and C File FROM SUBJECT QUALIFICATION--BORIC ACID SPRAY We have received a response to the telex sent to g on July 20, 1978 (see GEE-78-391, 393, and 394). Paragraph *_hree of Limitorque letter dated July 27, 1978, from G. Pence refers to order No. 3A 3'"..-C which is for MOV-292 B and C.

They go on to indicate that order No. 3A 3122-C is applicable to their Nuclear Qualification 1

Data (NQDS) which they attached to their letter. According to the NQD/S, our operators were chemical spray tested in accordance with IEEE-382, Page 12, Table 1.

mar l

l OS*0

4 v...-

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Weslinghouse Power Systems Electric Corporation Company ten ma Pc:sR;':Pcasp.a :a C

.,Apr'il 5, 1978 CYW-78-518

. Mr. R. H. Graves, Plant Superintendant y

Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company Haddam Neck Plant RR#1, Box 127E East Hampton, Ccanecticut, 06424

SUBJECT:

Containment Fan Cooler Motors - Encl. CYW Contaiment Fan Cooler Motor Qualification

Dear Mr. Graves:

The enclosure provides an evaluation of the environmental qualification of the Connecticut Yanket Reactor Fan Cooler Motor Design.,0ur review indicates that the fan coller motors are conservatively designed and incorporate most of the features qualified by WCAP 7829, " Fan Cooler Motor Unit ast".

Due to the unavailability of heat exchanger information, Westinght,use was unable to determine the motor insulation temperature, especially under accident conditions. The enclosure also provides recommendations which, if implemented, will allow full advantage of the WCAP qualification.

Westinghouse did not perform a detailed evaluation of the seismic qualification of the motor. Westinghouse has perforned seismic analysis of fan cooler motors of similar frame size and has shown those designs to be adequate, hoW-ever we do not believe that these analyses envelope the Connecticut Yankee design due to the extended terminal box structure. We suggest that this structure be reviewed for seismic adequacy.

j l'

Attachments Include:

l.

Maintenance Procedures

}

2.

C. V. Fields letter-to meet NUSCO Q.A. Spec.

3.

Thermolastic Epoxy, Application Data 3170 4.

Motor splice Dwg. 206C391*

~

Westinghouse will be available for further discussions on the above statements or any material within.

Sincerely, f ] Woodward, Ma/+1 J P W

?!rn< a J. D.

nager RECEIVEg Eastern Service Region 8

J. A. Cremades/vl gR10 F ^. C, DIV.

s NORTHEAST UT JTIES 1

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J =0::01"O'Or CY - Car Fan Motor File July 28, 1978

/

W GEE-78-388 Environmental Qualification of Motors Westinghouse letter dated </5/78, #CY-W-78-518 was provided to qualify environmentally the above subject motors.

To fully qualify these motors, Stone & Webster was provided with motor heat exchanger temperatures (via 10M dated 7/3/78 to L. D Davison from W. H. Becker) so that they can determine the motor insulation temperature rise under accident conditions for co.parisort with the designed insulation temperature rise.

(T)/(A) was used bacause Westinghouse was required to perform an analysis on our Connecticut Yankee motors to detennine if the WCAP7829 test report was applicable to our motors, JBR/RY/psn

)

OS70

STONE 6 WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORATION 245 SUMMER STREET. BOSTON. M ASS ACHUSETTS ADDRESS ALL CORRESPONDENCE TO P.O. SOM 2325. BOSTON. hq Ass 02:07 ihjj=-

R E C l'I V E D

!!5f,'e'01.~

CON S U L? sh G 4O G O' w a stes%QTON. O C.

G. E. & C. DIV.

September 6, 1978 or neas ity Service Company P.O. Box 270 Hartford, CT 06101 gg W r 1 1 D78 L.D.3.

Dear Mr. M x, y _ g.,w,.-

REPORT NO. 4 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIIMENT CONNECTICUT YANhEE The following information has been received from field measurements and equipment manufacturer's data covering qualification of equipment items installed at Connecticut Yankee and Millstone Nuclear Power Plant: -

A.

Containment Air Recirculation Fan Motors Based on field supplied temperature data around the CAR fan heat exchangers, it has been determined that for a maximum service water temperature of 40 C, the air temperature leaving the coolers (motor ambient) would be approximately 37 C.

During periods of lower service water temperature, the air to the motors would be proportionately lower.

Using the very conservative assumption that the air temperature into the motors is 37 C for the entire year, it has been calculated that the temperature rise of the motor would be 50 C (continuous running load of approrimately 110 hp).

Based on the minimum life curve of Thermolastic Epoxy Insulation Life vs Hot Spot Temperature (previously forwarded to you as part of Report No.1),itisestimatedthatthe@otorinsulation would' have a life of 3.6 times 10 br. (40 yra equals 3 5 x 105 hr.).

t l

LBD 2

Septsaber 6, 1978 i

i W does not agree to extrapolation of data to predict a life longer than 15 years, but suggests that periodic testing of insulation polarization index may provide data that could be used as the basis for safe operation over longer periods.

B.

Valve Operated Motors Telephone information received from Mr. J.

Richards of H. K. Porter Company indicate that the following Peerless motors (supplied as part of Teledyne Valve Operators) were wound using Class B insulation:

Motor Serial Numbers A48526B JS44431 KS44385 AW85270 JS44432 KS44386 CW87397 JS44433 KR//488 HLL68984 JS44450 KS45231 JS43867 JS44451 JS44430 JS44452 Class B insulation systems include mica, glass fiber, asbestos, and synthetic materials, not necessarily inorganic, with compatible bonding substances having suitable thermal stability.

Class B insulation systems are rated for a total

• allowable temperature of 130 C including the 10 C hot spot allowance.

Peerless indicated that other environmental 4

I qualification documentation is not available.

4 C.

Instrument Cables The instrument cables used at Connecticut Yankee were purchased from Samuel Moore &

Company in accordance with the attached P.O. ID-255.

l Samuel Moore has advised us that these cables have a melting point of 265-270 F.

This infor-mation supplements previously transmitted data identified as cable item No. 7.

r j l:

1 1

i 1

LBD 3

September 6, 1978 D.

Cable Splices & Termination We have been unable to locate any splicing or termination details used on systems rated less than 4 kv. Termination details at 480 v or lower were not shown on construction drawings.

The general requirements were outlined by a series of notes as shown on attached STD-ME-1-7-2 and STD-ME-1-8-2.

These standards were in effect during the construction period of Connecticut Yankee. Power cables were additionally quali-fied by megger and high potential tests.

Very truly yours, a

n k$YftY0l'r7b H. V. Redgate Consulting Engineer Enclosure HVR:ht

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^

NORTHEAST M.HES (J

====r-et Eft nos taanacentu TTS f LfCTaC Ctearm bb[$$5" kb, f" 3

k J

CY - Foxboro Transmitter File August 21, 1978 to rnou 6

GEE-78-456 Error in 7/27/78 Transmittal SUBJECT (Additional Info Letter) to NRC The " Qualification Documentation" section of the above transmittal lists the " Southern California Edison report submitted to NRC on 2/24/78" as the source of documentation and it should read " Amend-ment 47 to the final safety analysis for the San Onofre Station".

JBR/psn L

0540 k.

c -

i -.

t 41 anc ~at cressurizer Level Transmitters

==

Description:==

-. Pressure Trans,mitters/ Level Transmitters Manufacturer:

Foxboro 47-Model No.:

PT's-611GM-DS1

.LT's-613EM-HS1 Operation:

The above named transmitters are installed in a enclosed cabinet. Under' normal operation, these trans-mitters give pressurizer pressure and level indication to the control room and provide for automatic initia-tion of safety inj ection.

Safety injection is initiated automatically upon coincident signals from two o'ut of three pressure transmitters (indicating low Reactor Coolant System pressure (1685 psig)) and two out of three level transmitters (indicating low pressurizer.

water level (66 feet)).

PT-430, 431, 432 and LT-430, 431 and 432 need to be i

operable thirty seconds subsequent to a LOCA or MSB 47 in the following conditions:

Pressure - 46.4 psig (peak) 47 i

Temperature - 272 F (peak)

Humidity - 100%

Radiation - 2 x 10 3 rads (superimposed on a 3

dose of 8.5 x 10 rads due to normal operating conditions for forty years)

Once these transmitters have generated a signal to

-initiate safety injection, their function has been com-pleted and subsequent operation during the course of i

the accident is not required.

Results of Analysis:

Franklin Institute-Research Labo-ratories conducted qualification tests for Westinghouse i

on pressure and differential pressure transmitters Revision 11 6A-32 1

1-

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I k

t s

.... ---..---,-a..-

(differential pressure level ~ transmitter).

I

-The purpose of these tests was ~to determine thc -

4 7. _- -

f ability of such transmitters to operate properly when exposed to the temperature, pressure and humidity environmental conditions expected to be present within containment following a LOCA.

These tests indicate that the transmitters were capable of op'eration (with signal error *) at pressures and temperatures as great as 60 psig and 294 F.1 PT-430, 431 and 432 and LT-430, 431 anc 432 are located in an enclosed cabinet and are therefore not e:: posed to chemical spray.

Radiation testing performed for the manufacturer has shown that there is no effect on these pressure and level transmitters up to a dose of 106 rads.2 Based on the above, PT-430, 431 and 432 and LT-430,431 and 432 I.

are expected to be operable at the time of their required oper-5 a tior..

References:

1.

Locante, J., Topical Report Environmental Testing of Engineered Safety Features Related Equipment, December 1970, WCAP-7410-L.

2.

REIC Report #46, June 16, 1969, Battelle Memorial Institute, Columbus, Ohio 43201.

• This signal error would not inhibit the actuation of safety injection in the time frame needed subsequent to a LOCA.(several seconds).

However, signal error may inhibit the actuation of safety inj ection in the time frame needed subsequent to an MSB (30 seconds).

47 PT-430, 431 and 432 and LT-430, 431 auf '22 are being replaced with instruments which are qualified to remain undegraded for a period of one year in the projected post main steamline break accident environment as dis-cussed in response to Item 6.15.

. Revision 11 6A-33 QM -

.,+..

(,

k, H

i RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC ITEMS OF INTEREST

(

SURVEILLANCE OF REACTOR AND CONTAINMENT CONDITION (SUBSEQUENT TO MS B.

1.

PT-430, 431, 432 Pressurizer Pressure Transmitters LT-430, 431, 432-Pressurizer Level Transmitters

==

Description:==

Pressure Transmitters / Level Transmitters Manufacturer:

Foxboro~

Model No.:

PT's-611GM-DS1 LT's-613HM-HS1 Operation:

The above named transmitters are installed in an enclosed cabinet inside containment.

Under normal operating and accidanc conditions these transmitters give pressurizer pressure and level indication to the control room and provide for automatic initiation of safety inj ection.

These trans-mitters are also utilized by the operator in determining when the Residual Heat Removal System should be placed in service.

PT-430, 431, 432 and LT-430, 431 and 432 need to remain operable for a period of one year subsequent to a MSB involving a large ar small pipe break in the following post accident conditions:

~

Pressure - 46.4 psig (peak)

' Temperature - 272 F (peak)

Humidity:

1007.

3 Radiation:

8.5 x 10 rads (dose due to normal operating ~ conditions for forty years).

Results of Analysis:

Post accident environmental testing was j

performed by the Franklin Institute Research Laboratory for Revision 11 6B-17 f-y

(

RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC ITEMS OF INTEREST (3 '

Westinghouse on pressure and differential pressure trans-mitters similar to PT-430 and LT-430.

The purpose of these to determine the-ability of such transmitters tests was of a to operate properly in the post accident environment LOCA or MSB involving either a large or small pipe break.

These tests indicated that the transmitters were capable of operation (with signal error) at pressures and temperatures as great as 60 psig and 294 F.(1)

_s affect these transmitters since Chemical spray does not Published radiation they are located in an enclosed cabinet.

all of the constitucnt damage information indicates that parts will remain undegraded by radiation due to normal Nevertheless, in operating conditions for forty years.

light of the fact that post main steamline break accident pressures and temperatures may result in signal error, these transmitters will be replaced with instruments which are qualified to remain undegraded for a period of one year

~

in the~p'rojected post accident environment.

Revision 11 6B-18

(

(.

RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC ITEMS OF INTEREST

References:

1.

Locante, J., Topical Report Environemtal Testing of December Engineered Safetv Features Related Equipment, 1970 WAAP-7410, 2.

Marks, M.

A., Test and Evaluation of a Model 613 HM Electronic Differential Pressure Transmitter Which Failed While Undergoing Radiation Testing by the Westinghouse Electric Company.

Report No. PEr.71-107.

Massachusetts:

Foxboro Company, 1971.

3.

Etherington, Harold, Nuclear Engineerine Handbook, New York:

McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1958.

P Revision 11 6B-19

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M GEE-79-29

.I _

1..__. _ _..w-.

b Connecticut Yankee SEP Pressurizer Level and Pressure Transnitters

~

Reference:

Me-'.o no. GEE-78-454 dated August 21,197d The purpose of this nemo is to supolenent the infornation and revise the recomen lations presented in the above reference. This effort has been performed based u pn a revicw of the following documents:

AttachNent 1 (MCAP-7'10-L section C) ir.dicates that the Foxboro transmitters had large error signals due to radiation exposure.

Attacinent 2 (San Pnofra - Final Safety Analysis - Amenlment 27 rev.ll) indicates that FoxForo deternined that radiation !ananed the teflon insulated uire and silicone fill fluid which causeI the above error sinnals. Also, the transmitters are exoected to fail due to electrical shorting vithin r, - l'i ninutes subsequent to the initiation of chemical spray.

me,o no. '!EE-79-P021 frau P. F. L'i!curcux to J. 3. Regan) states that radiation levels will not be siqnificant in the time that they are require 1 to operate.

Further calculations are being performed by the Peactor Encineering Branch to confirn sone of the judgenents in -

this attachment.

Attachoqnt 4 (neno no. GEE-79-12 from T. A. Shaffer to J. B. Regan) describ5s a nethod of modifying the transmitters to protect them from tl.ie effects of humidity ani spray. The cost of these modifications are minor.

Sumary - From the chove it is concluied that the transmitters will perform their intende! safety function.

It is recomended that no tifications be nade to the transnitters as 3

described in ?.ttadhnent 1 during the upconing refueling outage.

ese nodifications will raise the level of environeental qualification of the transnitters.

Further evaluation of thepitimte environnental qualification requirments are continuing by the MC staff under the SEP; a111tional nodifications or replacements may be necessary in the future.

J3R/nsn cc:

$l b TYA C M/v'EN 7 4.2 RADIATION TESTING OF DIFFERI!!TIAL PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS Following the environmental tests perforned at FIRL, the instruments were subjected to seismic simulation testing at the Westinghouse Baltimore pl_nt.

Upon completion of the seismic tests, one of each supplier's dif ferential pressure transmitters was used in a radiation testing program. The trans-mitters tested included Barton Unit Serial #22420425, Fischer-Porter Unit Serial f 6907All?4A5, and Foxboro Unit Serial #2013081.

Irradiation testing of the transmitters was accomplished by connecting the transmitters in the arrangement shown in Figure 9.

After placing the dif ferential pressure transmitter, adjacent -to the Co-60 source, a differential pressure in the range of 35 inches to 50 inches of water was obtained across it by adding water to each leg. The water lines were then connected to a regulator and a static pressure of 150 psig helium was applied to the unit.

The results of the irradiation tests are included in Tables 4 and 5 and indicate that the Barton and Fischer-Forter units operated satisfactorily in the radiation environment while Foxboro unit became inoperative during Du first 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br /> of irradiation. The Foxboro unit is currently being munined in order to establish the cause of f ailure.

If this examination LWJestes that the unit f ailed because of a specific component material prchlen, the component will be replaced by one with a more radiation resistant naurial sad the unit or component will be retested.

If cause of failure tumet be corrected, any of these particular transmitters currently required 0" Long term post accident service will be provided with shielding to assure 8h** the istegrated exposure on the unit will ue less than 10 rads for one

'N' following a loss-of-coolant accident.

e ds=.

N 4-2 m=

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.:ih.*,VJ

A rrscuarsir 2

RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC ITE51S OF INTEREST 1

'II.

SURVE1LLANCE INSTRLTENTATION UTILIZED DURING AND SUBSEQUENT

/

TO A MAIN STEAMLINE BREAK ACCIDENT (MSB)

A.

SURVEILLANCE OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RRR) PERFORMANCE 1.

FT-912, 913, 914 Safety Inj ection Flow Transmitters (See i

Section I.A.)

2.

LT-950, Refueling Water Tank Level Transmitter (See Section I. A) i 3.

FT-602 RUR Loop Flow Transmitter

==

Description:==

Electronic D/P Transmitter Manufacturer:

Foxboro Model No.:

613-DM-HS1 Operation:

FT-602 is installed in the Residual Heat Removal System, downstream of the RHR heat exchangers.

Under normal operating conditions there is no flow in the RHR system, however, subsequen.t to an MSB and with the RHR system oper-ating, FT-602 senses flow in the residual heat removal lines and transmits flow indication to the control room.

FT-602 needs to remain operable for one year subsequent to a MSB involving a large or small pipe break in the following post accident conditions:

Pressure:

46.4 psig (peak)

Temperature:

272 F (peak)

Humidity:

1007,with chemical spray of 1.5%

boric acid in demineralized water 6

Radiation:

2.6 x 10 rads (dose due to normal operating conditions for forty years.)

Revision 11 6B-12

M INTEREST 4

RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC ITEMS OF i

f Post accident environmental testing o Results of Analysis:

d by th.e Franklin a Model 613 transmitter was performe The. purpose i

house.

Institute Research Laboratory for West ngability of such trans h

of these tests was to determine t e t accident environment mitters to operate properly in the possmall pipe break.

These of a MSB involving either a large orsimilar to FT-602 were tests indicated that transmitters or) at pressures and capable of operating (with signal errand 294 F.(1)

This trans-i temperatures as great as 60 ps g fail due to electrical mitter, however, is expected to t to the initiation shorting within 5-15 minutes subsequen (2) of chemical spray.

h manufacturer Further analyses of these transmitters by t e l tion resulting revealed possible damage to teflon insu a sistor and in shorted wires in the detector, output tran Teflon insulation degrades 3) amplified wiring harness.C rads.(4)

Silicone fill fluid (Dow Corning 0

diation levels 3 x 10 at DC-200) may also be degraded (gelling) at ra Since these radiation levels might be rads.(4) 6 ditions for forty of 10 exceeded due to normal operating con l electrical shorting years and in consideration of potentiafied or replaced due to chemical spray, FT-602 will be modi subsequent in order to ensure its operability for one year to the postulated accident.

6B-13

" - '. nn 11 4

t RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC ITEMS OF INTEREST

References:

1.

Locante, J., Topical Report Environmental Testing If l

Engineered Safety Features Related Equipment, DecLmber, 1970, WCAP 7410-L.

2.

Westinghouse Report SCS-75, Environmental Qualifications of San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 Instru-i mentation, February 25, 1975.

3.

Marks, M. A., Test and Evaluation of'a Model 613 HM Electronic Differential Pressure Transmitter Which Failed kaile Undergoing Radiation Testing by the Wectinghouse Electric Company.

Report No. PER 71-107.

Massachusetts:

Foxboro Company, 1971.

)

4.

Etherington, Harold, Nuclear Engineering Handbook, New York:

McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1958.

t s

l Revision 11 3 14

)

NORTHEAST UTILITIES I

"~."l."J."l."~. :f f." ",0~

Janua ry 1I,19/9 J ]i {'?'?,@,~*'h:.

Nli-79-R-071 A rrscuntwr L

L M

J. ii. Pegan fh uAA.,9(

FROM P. F. L'Heureux SUBJECT Environmental Qualification of CY Pressurizer Transmitters This memo describes the status of the Reactor Engineering Branch (REB) efforts in quantifying the containment pressure and temperature conditions at CY during various size postulated LOCA's and MSLB's.

In addition, to supplement the input of Radiological Engineering, the REB has also assessed the extent of core uncovery, i.e. potential for radioactivity release. The major interest, however, is the determination of the pressure and temperature at the location of the instrument that initiates the safety injection (SI) signal. The RELAP4 computer code has been used for the majority of the calculations. This code has a one-volume, isolated containment model and thus, tends to over-predict average temperatures and pressures.

If more refined numbers are required, we can supply Clint Gladding (GME) with the necessary input for his CONTEMPT-LT code.

This will probably be necessary for the longer duration accidents (i.e. small. breaks).

Four categories of events are under consideration:

large and small LOCA, large and small MSLB.

.Large LOCA As calculated by the licensing based LOCA analysis (l), the RCS pressure will drop below the pressurizer (PZR) pressure setpoint (1700 psig) in less than 1 ser.ond after a large break.

The pressurizer water 3

volume (. 650 ft ) will also be discharged in about 1 second at the break flow rates calculated for a large break. The safety injection signal, therefore, will be generated through coincident low pressurizer level and PZR pressure in about 1 second.

Since the detectors are physically located away from the primary system and protected by the annular shield wall, we feel that the steam entering the containment in this short time span would produce mainly a highly gradient temperature and pressure condition such that the local environment of the detectors would not be such to hinder the generation of an SI signal. As a backup, the containmert pressure is calculatep to reach the SI trip setpoint of 5 psig in approximately 1 second.t2; The

)

containment pressure detector is located outside containment and, therefore, can not be degraded by the inside steam environment.

l c

OS-70 i

J. B. Regan 2

January 11, 1979 Radiation levels at the PZR detectors will be due to either direct exposure from the reactor core or exposure from the fission pmducts that are carried into the containment by the reactor coolant. An evaluation of the long-tenn accumulated dose at the location of the detectors as well as the enhanced radiation field due to the 1 css of the reactor glant from the core has already been done by Radiation Assessment.

In addition, we contend that fission product radiation will not be significant in the short time prior to SI signal generation. The NRC themselves will allow 5 sec from time of break yn il a significant fission pmduct release is considered to occur.t3 Small Break LOCA There is a full spectrum of postulated RCS break sizes, from a 3/4" instrument line to the 27 1/2" primary loop piping.

Generally, the smaller the break, the longer until complete depressurization occurs in the vessel.

In contrast with the large break, the SI signal may not be generated until many seconds (even minutes) have elapsed since the time of the break. A very preliminary 4" diameter break that had been performed in an earlier study provides some optimism that small breaks may not be limiting (table 1).

In order to analytically confinn that the PZR detectors will be operable when called upon to generate a SI signal, a series of computer runs analyzing containment pressure and temperature for various break sizes will be conducted.

Fortunately, as part of its normal safety analysis effort. the Reactor Engineering Branch had already begun preparing a best-estimate LOCA model utilizing the RELAP4 code; nevertheless, the scope of work will require approximately 21/2 months of effort. A March 15, 1979 deadline has been established as indicated in the attached memo (GTS-78-A-480).

A spectrum of small primary breaks (6" to 3/4") was analyzed in 1972 as part of the IAC compliance.

The results show that peak clad temperatures were significantly lower (= 7500F) than the large break cases (M0000F). At these (small break) temperatures, significant fission product release is unlikely. A significant increase in direct radiation from the reactor core also is not likely since the core remains > 75% covered in all cases analyzed.

Main Steamline Break Inside Containment A break of one of the 24" steam pipes inside containment will cause a containment pressure and temperature transient similar, but slower than that due to a LOCA.

Detailed main steamline break (MSLB) accident analyses hav9 bggn perfonned as a result of the recent diesei loading modification.t4m Although the calculations were not specifically set up to maximize containment temperatures and pressures, the results can be considered applicable since steam generator inventory and feedwater flow would be maximized in both calculations. A containment-maximizing MSLB case will be included in the proposed workscope.

J. B. Regan 3

January 11, 1979 During the course of a MSLB, water in the secondary side of the steam generator flashes to steam, extracting heat from the primary coolant, which then contracts and causes the level in the pressurizer to drop.

For the cases considered in reference 5, the containment pressure trip setpoint (5 psig) would have been reached in about 8 seconds, long before the required coincident low pressure and level setpoints are reached in the pressurizer. The steam released into the containment would not have any detrimental effect on the containment pressure transmitter since it is located outside the containment.

Since the core does not uncover and fuel clad integrity is not lost, i

there would not be any fission products released into containment during a MSLB.

Small Steamline Breaks Any steamline bitak not isolatable from the steam generator will eventually completely blow down the steam generator. The longer time frame allows heat transfer in containment to moderate the resultant temperature and pressure.

REB feels that it is prudent to analytically confirm that, if safety injection is required, the PZR pressure and level detectors will respond under the environmental conditions in containment. To evaluate this for a range of break sizes, a series of computer calculations will again be necessary to detennine the temperature and pressure conditions at the time of the SI signal generation. The target completion date is also March 15, 1979.

Again, radiation effects due to the MSLB are insignificant since there is no fuel failure or core uncovery.

4 Summary Although the final confirmation of the acceptability of the PZR detectors can only be made after the detailed RELAP and CONTEMPT calculations are complete, we can draw upon the results of similar calculations already performed to make an interim evaluation; The DBA LOCA occurs so quickly the radiation and steam environment should not impair a SI signal.

The containment detector is also available as a backup. A preliminary small break LOCA (4" diameter) suggests that the temperatures reached before the PZR SI trip may be within a tolerable range. The relatively low peak clad temperatures occuring during a small break LOCA will tend to minimize fission product release as well.

For the largest MSLB, it is the containment pressure detector which is nest likely to generata the SI signal. A small MSLB will probably not even require safety injection. Radiation is not a problem with any MSLB because the core does not uncover.

1 c

J. B. Regan 4

January 11, 1979 The results of the work outlined in the attached memo (GTS-78-A-480) wil'o be used in conjunction with the CONTEMPT code to provide the exact pressure and temperature transients from which a final evaluation can be based.

J PFL/lmt cc:

L. D. Davison B. M. Fox /B. Ilberman R. T. Harris /M. P. Hills i

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.s J. B. R:gan 5

January 11, 1979-i I. C. Switzer letter to A. Schwencer, May 2,1977 D

4 2FDSA, figure 3.2-1 I

30SNRC Branch Technical Position CSB 6-4 " Containment Purging during Normal Plant Operations".

4Reanalysis of the Connecticut Yankee Main Steamline Rupture i

Incident, J. A. Chunis and Y. J. Liu, September,1978.

SCY Main Steam 11ne Rupture Analysis - Containment Response, J. A. Chunis, Septemt er 1,1978.

6. W. Miller, zumo to R. C. Rodgers, GTS-78-E-074.

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_,4 TABLE 1 Time of Trip (sec)

Accident Tyype.

Pertinent' Assumptions Level 230 ft3 Press 1700 psig Cont. 75 psig Cont. Temp. O Trip Large Break LOCA HFP

-Conservative Licensing 1*

4.1 1

260 F

' Code 0

Large'SLBA HZP

-Total S/G Blowdown 20 6*

185 F (case 3 G)

-No Cont. Heat Sinks (Probably no trip)

-0verpredicts Cont. Press for nonnal PZR Level large SLBA HFP

-Total 5/6 Blowdown 16 9*

182 F (case 462)

-No Cont. Heat Sinks (Probably no trip)

-0verpredicts Cont. Press for normal PZR Level Small Break'LOCA HZP

-4" ID Break 16*

9 82 121 F -

-No Cont. Heat Sinks

-0verpredicts Cont. Press

• Function that first causes trip G

+-

l NORTHEAST UTILITIES 1

"ZL'."'JCO'~"~~

Deceinber 15, 1978 L'L7.",""O'"O'."""~"

GTS-78-A-480 L

J COTOL'"JO'C.'

To P. F. L'Heureux rnou Y. J. Liu Proposal for CY Steam Release Inside Containment Due to LOCA and MSLB suanct for Environmental Qualification of Pressurizer Detectors The goal of the proposed work is to determine the maximum attainable containment temperature due to LOCA and SLB accidents before the initiation of a safety injection signal. Several RELAP model's for LOCA and SLB will be developed.

A wide range of break sizes will be used to obtain the containment temperature and pressure responses, yet the final break sizes should be decided after the preliminary results are available.

Initial conditions have been identified as:

1) cycle VIII core 2) hot full power

3) pressurizer normal water level 4) loss of offsite power.

Since major model modifications are needed "or the small break LOCA, two man-months are required to accomplish tnis work. An estimated schedule is shown in Table 1.

YJL/lmt cc:

R. T. Harris J. -A'. Chunis L. D. Davison/T. B. Regan B. M. Fox /B. Ilbennan 05-70

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.s Table 1 Estimated Dat(

Phase of Completion Preliminary SLR Large & Small Break 1-15-79 LOCA Large Break LOCA Small Break 1-31-79 l

Final LOCA & SLR Small Break 2-28-79 Large Break Documentation & QA 3-15-79

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NORTHEAST UTILITIES 1

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A vo J. B. Regan January 5, 197 9

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l rnou T. A. Sha,er GEE-79-12 SUBJECT Connecticut Yankee Pressurizer Pressure & Level Transmitters

Reference:

Project Assignment 78-836 Subsequent to your memorandum (GEE-78-454) of August 21, 1978, additional information has been obtained concerning environmtntal qualification of the subject transmitters.

Various SEP owners have submitted material which relates to their particular plant to NU (B. Ilberman) for review. This review (refer to attachment) was requested by the SEP owners on November ?,1978 in an effort to determine if similiarities of both equipmeat and documentation exist between plants. Also the findings have bearing on Connecticut Yankee's position.

1.

Southern California Ed. - San Onofre Standard Foxboro model 611 and 613 transmitters were originally supplied.

However, due to the results of a Westinghouse test demonstrating that post Main Steamline Break (MSB) accident pressure and temperature may result in signal error, the units have been replaced. Tney purchased Foxboro model Ell and E13 transmitters which have been tested and are qualified for the post accident environment using IEEE 323, 1971 as the basis.

2.

Consumers Power - Palisades Con umers Power Company purchased standard model 611 and 613 transmitters.

In the field modifications were made to the existing units. This modification is documented in Section 6.1.3.2 of their FSAR which includes test results.

3.

Rochester Gas & Electric - Ginna RG & E has made what appears to be the same modification to their standard model 611 and 613 transmitters as Consumers Power. A letter from R. J. Breen of Foxboro to D. F. Winters of Westinghouse (July 14, 1969) recomends the modification which could be accomplished in the field or at Foxboro. The letter also contained test results which demonstrated operability in the accident environ-ment temperatures and pressures with definable errors.

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4.

Northeast Utilities - Connecticut Yankee CY's Foxboro Model 611 and 613 transmitters are standard units believed to be similar to Ginna and Palisades before their modifications. The following portions of a letter from R. J. Breen of Foxboro to Richard Desmond of Stone & Webster (February 22, 1978) depicts CY's situation.

"As indicated in-our conversation, no special nuclear modification were made to [CY's Model 611 and 613]. Thus, a LOCA or high radiation would most likely cause failure."

"No modifications were ever made for the Model 611GM and 613HM type transmitters to increase their radiation resistance. Also, the model 611 and 613 have been with-drawn from sale, are replaceable with the Model Ell and E13 and cannot be modified either in the field or in the factory to the MCA/RRW configuration".

Foxboro, in 1969, offered both modification kits and test results which qualified the model 611 and 613 transmitters to the temperatures and pressures of a LOCA environment. However, in 1978 they make no such recommendation for CY's units. On December 5,1978, T. A. Shaffer asked Doug Ekdish of Foxboro (Hartford Office) to determine if Foxboro can supply the kit offered in 1969 or supply instructions using off the shelf type components necessary to make the modification.

Also,-Mr. Ekdish was requested to supply test reports documenting operability in the environment which were referenced in their 1969 correspondence.

Realizing that the existing transmitters may be mndified to demonstrate limited post LOCA operability, the recommenda-tion to replace the existing units as addressed in GEE-78-454 should be rescinded.

In lieu of replacing the units the following qualifica-tion program is planned:

1)

T. A. Shaffer will inspect the present CY transmitters and attempt to schedule the modifications described in the Palisades FSAR during the 1979 outage.

(Their FSAR uses the same wording to descirbe the modification as does Foxboro in their letters.) With the modifications successfully completed credit can be taken for operab.ility based on the test results documented in their FSAR.

This may require Technical Specification changes due to an increase in instrument error.

2) Review the construction of the enclosure which house the trans-mitters to determine if it degrades the effects of the accident environment upon the transmitters.

3) Review Technical Specifications and perform supporting analyses, if required, to increase the credibility of containment pressure instrumentation which also initiates a Safety Injection Signal (i.e.,5psigsetpoint).

~m

4.

s-Page 3 btt-/9-14 In a subsequent conference telephone call between Doug Ekdish and R. J. Breen of Foxboro and our T. A. Shaffer (December 6,1978) the following items were discussed.

1) Mr. Breen clarified the apparent discrepancy between his 1969 and 1978 letters by stating the model 611 and 613 transmitters could not be modified to the present qualification criteria.

2) Foxboro recommends replacing the transmitters with the Model Ell and E13's.

However, drawings do exist for the Model 611 and 613 units and Foxboro is willing to work with NU in whatever course we choose.

Exact details of Foxboro's involvement would require negotiations. Mr. Breen did express a concern relating to the requirements of 10CFR Part 21.

3) He did state that the type transmitters purchased for the Millstone Unit III would not be available until 1980 or later. This would be their new fully qualified transmitters.

He also stated that Bechtel working with Arkansas Power and Light successfully tested the Foxboro nuclear grade NEll and NE13 transmitters.

Copies of that test were not made available to Foxboro.

In summary, Generation Electrical Engineering's Instrumentatio, Group feels the qualification program aimed at the overall aspects ei.iafety Injection initiation should be attempted as outlined above. This review or subsequent SEP review topics (i.e., high energy pipe breaks and seismic) may require additional modifications. The equipment modifications or replacements should be accomplished in view of all SEP topics not a single issue. Therefore, it is not prudent to replace the transmitters at this time for environmental concerns until all supporting equipment and issues are addressed.

4 TAS/psn Attachment-e

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D

P.A. No.78-836 o4 SEP ELECTRICAL EQUIDMENT QUALIFICATION-(FEQ)

TABLE OF COMPARISON'0F SEP 0WNERS EEQ FOR FOXBOR0 INST.

San Onofre Big Rock Palisades GINNA GINNA CONN. YANKEE Foxboro EllGM Foxboro EllGM Foxboro 611GH Foxborc Foxboro 613GM Foxboro 611

& EllDm-613CM HSL

& 613[D2M

~

611GMAS1 MDL-modified

& 613 Temperature 291*F 235 F 278 F

- t Pressure 64 PSIA 42 PSIA 66 PSIA Spec. Relative Humidity 100%

100%

100".

Chemical No No Yes 4

6 5

Radiation-1.05X10 R 1.3X10 R 3X10 R Qualification Temperature 294 F 235 F 286 F 286 F 318 F 294 F Pressure 75 PSIA 42 70 75 105 60PSIG Relative ~Humidtty 100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%-

Yes Yes No Sat.5 4

IX104 IX1h6' Chemical 7

3X10 R IX10 Radiation 2X106 1X10 l

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'T. A. Shaffer

.12/15/78

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N-May 31,1979 M

GEE-79 '340 ~

Connecticut Yankee - SEP PT/LT 401-1, 2, 3 (Pressurizer Level &

Pressure Transmitters)

The purpose of this memo is to accomplish the following:

1) Surnarize previous memos on this subject to date to make people awat e of perv'ious recorcendations, assumptions, and inve tigations.

2) Address the acceptability of the subject transnitters to perfom their requirei safety. function in their present condition and under our present licensing requirements.

3) Recom.cnj that a project assignnent (P.A.) be initiated to investigate the feasi'rility of reolacing the existing transmitters so our plant will have pressurizer transmitters capable of perfoming post accident noni torir.g (P./'..:4. ).

1.

t'.cmos -

Below is a itsting and sum: nary of all menos written on this subject to date:

A) lieno !'o. GEE-73-455 dated 8/21/78 from J. B. Regan to CY-SEP-File.

This memo describei why other utilities have replaced their pressurizer transmitters.

It state.1 that Foxboro recornends we replace our transmitters, and it reconmended that we replace them during the 1979. refueling outage at a cost of approximately

$12.000.

B) !iemo No. GEE-70-454 dated 8/21/73 from J. 3. Regan to B. Fox.

This acm transnitted the above cem to B. Fox and recomended replacement of the transmitters with neu qualified units.

C) Memo No. GTS-73-A-400 dated 12/1E/73 fron Y. J. Liu to P. F. L'Heureux.

This meco provided P. F. L'Heureux with an estimate of the time required to perform computer si.udies to provide response time for initiation of safety injection. The estimated time to complete this study being two man months.

D) Memo No. IlEE-79-R-021 dated,1/11/79 fron P. F, L'Heureux to J. B. Regan.

This acmo identified that radiation levels for the various postulated accidents would not be significant in the time that the transmitters are expected to operate.

It also indicated that the computer studies nentioned above would be required to confirm the assumptions made in this meno.

9.-

4 Pag] 2 GEE-79-340 Hemo No. GEE-79-12 dated 1/5/79 from T. A. Shaffer to J. B. Regan.

/

E)

This mens described a program including a r4thod of codifying the +ransmitters during the 1979 refueling outage, a review of the tra

,itter enclosure, and a review of the tech specs rather than replacement as mentioned in the above memos.

F) Memo No. GEE-79-29 dated 1/11/79 from J. B. Regan to B. Ilbeman/C. Fox.

This meno recomended that wo modify the transmitters rather than replace them in accordance with item E above.

Meno dated 1/26/79 from B. Ilbeman to J. H. Kufel/R. H. Graves.

G)

This meno recomeMed that we modify the transmitters as described in items E and F above.

It also sumarized justification for continued-operation.

Heno Fo. NEE-79-R-119 dated 3/23/79 )from P. F. L'Heureux to J. B. Regan.

H)

This meno transmits the results of the corputer study contioned in items C and D above. The tuo tables attached to this memo indicated the time, containment temperature, and containment pressure in which the pressurizer transnitters would be required to operate following It also indicated that the containment oressure a LOCA or SLB.

detectors would operate tiefore the pressurtier transmit'ters in all of the cases analyzed except the smallest LOCA.

I) Meco No. GEE-79-220 dated 4/10/79 from T. A. Shaffer to J. B. Regan.

This meno stated that the modifications described in item E above were unable to be performed during the 1979 refueling outage and that increased inportance nust be placed on t" malysis perfomed under iten 11 above for acceptable transmitter performance.

n 2.

Present Acceptability A) Radiation Exposure It was deterained as a result of item H above that the pressurizer level and precsure transmitters are required to perfom their safety function in 14 feconds or less during a LOCA and 134 seconds or less during a SLB. Th6 raiiation one hour after a LOCA in the pressurizer 4 rads (approximately 1.4 X I M rads in transmitter area is 1.8 X 10 134 secands) and the transmitter anplifier teflon insulated wire would 4 rads. Transmitter experience damage (approximately 25%) at 3.4 X 10 malfuncticning due to radiation is unlikely in he time that they are required to operate.

B) Chenical Spray (1.5% Boric Acid in Demin. If 0) 2 Ii addition to the damaging effects of radiation exposure, chemical spray is known to have deleterious effects on the pressurizer trans-mitters, e.g., potential electrical shorting.

Containment spray is manually initiated at CY and it is unlikely that this would take place within 14 seconds following a LOCA. Also, SLB evaluations do not need to consider the effects of chemical spray.

G 4

GEE-79-340 Page 3 C) Temperature and Pressure Documentation obtained under the SEP indicates that the transmitters are capable of operation at temperatures and pressures as great as 294*F and 60 psig. These values are greater than the values calculated in item H above. Also, these parameters have not caused the trans-mitters to malfunction during qualification testing as radiation and chemical spray did.

Recently CY removed the pressurizer level criterion for SIS actuation.

A review by Reactor Engineering of the item H SLB and LOCA analysis verifies that for each case, the low pressure trip preceeded the level trip. Therefore, the containment temperatures and pressures are still conservative.

D) Conclusicis The CY pressu.rizer transmitters in their present condition will perforn their intended safety function in the times as analysed above and as required by our operating license.

3.

Replacement Program The CY pressurizer transmitters meet the requirements of our present operating license as indicated above. However, for long term post accident r:onitoring (P.A.H.) of the pressurizer pressure and level, these existing transmitters nay not be acceptable. Although P.A.H. is not currently part of the CY licensing basis it is going to be reviewed due to the SEP and other generic issues. Ac M t"g to item I above it is not feasible to modify the CY transmitters for long term operation after an accident. Therefore. I recocraend that a project assignment (P.A.) be initiated to authorize the investigation of the feasibility of replacing the existing tran mitters with units having post accident monitoring capabilities. To cly understanding our plant has pressurizer transmitters that are environ:entally qualified the least of all the utilities that have been contacted. The results of this P.A. should ^

provide CY with the best pressurizer transmitters that the instrumentation industry has to offer.

A draft of this memo was reviewed by the CY Staff and Nusco nuclear Operations.

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CON,'!ECTCUT YANK 25

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ATOMIC POW ER COMPANY L

PLANT DESIGN CHANGE REQUEST

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eao. M O Terminal Block Replacement In Containment TITLc Safety Related (Marathon) Terminal PL At4T Conn. Ynnkee SYSTEM Electrical Dist.

ccOPotJ ENT Hloyk<: i n C o qt.,,,_,_,,,

1. PROPOSED CH ANGE category I ItemQe3h:o Replace.:tarathon Terminal Blocks with Westinghouse Block at inner containment 4

penetration wall for the following:

OS6D Mb bb 1.. bis.

TIOf SAFETY RELATED MOTOR OPERATED yiLVF9 u SA t

- Residual Heat Removal (RHR)Q80,781,803,804

- Pressure Transmitters 1-1 3

3 DOEccgpcbgp.{gg.Cntainment

~ /T-

- Core Deluge - 871A, 871B g agy i

- Safety Injection Loop Stop, 861A, 861B, 861C, 861D s

- Loop II Charging - 292B, 292C

- Level Transmitters

- Seal Water Return - 311, 312, 313, 314 LT-401-1, 2, 3 SAFZTY RELATED EQUIPME'iT

- Letdown Isolation - 200 Containment Recirculation Fan

- Charcoal Spray Header 25, 26, 27, 28, 29

- Containment Spray - 23, 34 Damper Controls F17-1,2,3,4 Nold: Some other equipuent soaring same terminal blocks will also be changed.

These are listed on attachment #2 to this PDCR.

2. REASON FOR CHANGE Sample (Marathon) Terminal Block was tested at Franklin Institute at rated voltage, saturated steam at 40 psig and temperature (2850F).

Insulation breakdown occurred af er 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> and Westinghouse block that was tested sinultaneously passed 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> test requirement. The*refore, to retain integrity of sclety systems during accident conditions we are replacing the >brathon Block with the Westinghouse type terminal block.

Submitted by Date 1-28-78 2A IIiPLA'!? PAF"TY FVALUATTON Unreviewed Safety Item, Yec/

(See attachment #1) 1-28-78 Reviewed By n,

Pler,t Staff EnCineer Pact 1 9 *

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A E v. 2 DATES 4 23 75

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Unrevieved or cig-ni riennt.

2.2 FIIV T!?0!.'"....* "M. 1? A ' it! v* i FV clavirenr.cntal ir. pact Ycc h to Environmental Tech. Specs.

This design has been reviewed with respect It does not have any environmen'tal impact.

and NPDES Permits.

~

IIevicued by _)_.

Fernuson Pate 1-28 73_

j Plant Stuf f :hcineer j

i 3.0 PORC CONCURRENCE Meeting ::o. '!8-9 OATC.3*.1h f8

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.0 APPROVED / DISAPPROVED RESPONSIBILITY FOR PDCR FOLLOW

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ATE PL ANT SUPT./ ASST. PL As.T CUP T.

5.0 FORr/ARD (TO LICENSING & SAFEGUARDS ENGINEER)

/ NUCLEAR OPER ATIONS ENGIN EER DATC

/

\\

6.0 TECHNICAL P.EVIEVI 8 APPROVAL (includes Specification of Appliccble Code, Standard, &

Regulo:ory Requis c neni.)

See attached Technical Review

/~2W7 APPROVED /D' O __

/

.DATr NUSCO OtSCIPLINE IINGINCER PAGE 1OQ)

REY.2 I

n a f F. A.ii.73

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COMMECT! CUT VA..!!!O2 ATCM!C POW ER CO M P AtJY PLANT DELIGra CHANGE REQUL5T (CONT *D.)

270 NO.

UNRCvicwcn cNviRONur Nr At 7.0 EEVIRONMENT AL REVIEW I

I ' "'

to be an unreviewed environ'm"c"nEl impact by This was deemed not 28, 1978.

R. C. Rodgers by tglecon.on January c.f},,.. e.Xw f OATC NUSCO DISCIPLINC ENG4NECH j

(a) Category I ltem/Yn/No 8.5 5AFETY EV Al.l' ATION increase the

&cd 5 fety item YeS Eq7

~

This proposed change will not r

probability of occurrence or the consequence of accidents or malfunctions previously evaluatec.

from create the possibility f.or an accident or t.alfunction dif f erent The margin of saf ety as defined in the basis f or the It does not those previously evaluated.

plant technical specifications will not be reduced.

.v'

/

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'L OATC NUSCO TITLED ENGINEER 9.0 REV!EW CHIEF OF ENVIRONMENT AL PROGR AMS N/A DATC lt 3l7 l LICENSING & S AFECU ARDS ENGIN EER.

s DATE.

10.0 QU AllTY ASSUR ANCE REQUIREMENTS Purchasing to be in accordance with NUQUAM Volumes I & II.

Receipt inspection to be Work to be performed in accordance in accordance with written approved procedures.

with written approved procedures.

I!2 Y_

DATC NUSCO OPEHA' TION QU ALITY ASSUR ANCC 11.0 FORW ARDED D AT E:

NUCLCAR OPERATIONS ENGINEER

\\,

J. M. Kufel gave his approval by telecon, 1/28/78, for forwarding this PD,CR. I, p}..- ~

12.0 REVIEW & APPROVAL (AS APPROPRI ATE)

DATC APP R OVC D / DI S A P P ROV E D C AD CH AIRM AN AP P ROV C D / DI S APP ROV C D DATC N RO CHI.lRM AN 13.0 RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGNED TO /FOR PDC IMPI.D!C:TATION)

DATC PL ANT SUPT./ ASST. PL ANT SUPT.

PACE 3 OF 3 bb Sus

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CONNECTICUT YANKEE AT O MIC POWER COMPANY i

etmL8N. CONNECTICUT,

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--w DirectJr of Muclea r Reac tor Hagulation Attn

't r. A. Sc hwenc er, Chie f Operating teactors Branch #1 1'. S. N uc l ea r Re gu la t o r y Co emi s s io n.

Wa s hir.s t o n, D. C. 20555

'Jea r S ir haddam beck Plant Tnvironmental..yualificetion, of, Exposed. Termi_nal Blocks I

g As a result of a verbal request made by a member of the NRC Staff on February 1 W

l'* 76. O APL f is provi.:in l herewith information pertinent to the evaluation and a

ij re r la c emer.t of exposed terairal blocka inside containment at the Haddan Neck

{

Plant.

• him a t tac hed inforastion consists of documentation of the technical y

review and safet< evaluation conducted by CTAPCO sad P'USCO regarding the en-i viro mental qualifications of the replacement terminal blocka. Specifically, j

a 'A 'iCO Omality Assurance fort. (the ' Plant De> igo Change Esport"), meeting y

notes of the Connecticut Yankee Plant Operating Review Cotstittee and Nuclear iteview Board, and vendor test data and other analyses are included as part of 5

this docsaientation.

n N

Gl.IM nas been informed that some of thr test data (Attachment 2) is considered proprietary by a division of the Vestinghouse F.loctric Corporation since the inforancion is of the type which is customerily maintained in confidence and f

withheld frov public disclosure. The information bas been handled and classi-I ffed as ;,roprietary by nestinghouse in accordarce with its procedures and stan-L.

dardi, and we hereby make application for withholdi. - it from public disclosure ir accordance witn the provisions of 10CFR2.790. The methods, which would be

((

ce tror.ised by public disclosure of this information, were developed at con-s

'dsrable expense to the Vestinghouse Electric Corporation and-the release of J

p-p me".,;?"g=@"m**J",tT*4'S'**%yWfM]tain information without incurring J

f rg r..

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j DUPLICATE DOCUMENT p data, wbich was supplied by another

]

j Ttion, cannot be saada available for j

Entire document previously 31s intornation will be avaiIsble i

entered into system under:

)78.

ANO No. of pages:

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n AW$. i dMOsli$&AUSN&SYNA N

A 6