ML19320C752
| ML19320C752 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 06/24/1980 |
| From: | Seyfrit K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Eric Turner HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8007170676 | |
| Download: ML19320C752 (1) | |
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UNITED STATES
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3 June 24, 1980 NSIC CENTRAL FILES In Reply Refer To:
RIV Docket Nos. 50-498/IE Circular No. 80-14 50-499/IE Circular No. 80-14 Houston Lighting & Power Company ATTN:
Mr. E. A. Turner, Vice President Power Plant Construction and Technical Services Post Office Box 1700 Houston, Texas 77001 Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Circular No. 80-14 is forwarded to you for information.
If there are any questions related to your understanding of the suggested actions, please contact this office.
Sincerely,
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Enclosures:
1.
IE Circular No. 80-14 2.
List of IE Circulars Recently Issued 1
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SSINS.: 6830 UNITED STATES Accession No.:
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8005050074 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D. C.
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- ui IE Circular No. 80-14 Date
June 24, 1980 Page 1 of 2 RADI0 ACTIVE CONTAMINATION OF PLANT DEMINERALIZED WATER SYSTEM AND RESULTANT INTERNAL CONTAMINATION OF PERSONNEL This circular describes an event which occurred at a nuclear power facility; however, the generic implications may be applicable to research reactors, and fuel cycle facilities.
On March 17, 1980, a licensee informed the FRC resident inspector that portions of the plant demineralized water (DW) system were found to be radioactively contaminated. A temporary hose used to add demineralized water to the spent fuel pool was the pathway for the cross-contamination. After this fuel pool makeup was completed on March 14, the tesporary DW line (still connected to the DW beader) was inadvertently left,ubmerged in the fuel pool.
Since the DW header pressure at the point of sapply was relatively low (a DW booster pump had been secured), a siphoning action occurred, resulting in radioactive contamination of portions of the DW header.
On March 17, 1980, while performing routine secondary system chemical analyses, thelicenseediscoveredthatthedemineralizedwatertapin_ghechemistrylab contained high levels of boron and had activity of 1.5 x 10 uCi/ml (mainly Cs-134, Cs-137, Co-58, Co-60 and Mn-54).
It was subsequently discovered that demineralized water from the chemistry laboratory supply tap had been used to make five (5) pots of coffee.
The remaining coffee was confiscated and the twenty-three (23) individuals who had consumed this coffee were whole-body counted. All involved individuals showed no intake greater than an equivalent 0.01 MPC-HRS. Analysis performed by the licensee's radiation consultant, based on the maximum concentration of radioactivity found in the coffee, indicated that the resultant 50 year dose commitment to an individual dritking eight ounces of this coffee would be less than 1 millirem.
Further licensee investigation revealed that the non-radiological chemistry DW supply tap was the only DW supply point outside the Auxiliary Building controlled area.
Tnis DW supply tap was tagged prohibiting human consumption to prevent a similar event in the future.
It is recommended that you review your facility's use of demineralized water (DW) via temporary ccanections and give attention to the following:
1.
Provisions should be made to assure that radioactive materials are not inadvertently introduced into your faci.ity's DW system via the improper use of temporary connections.
A tempc acy cross connection between contaminated systems and the DW system without adequate physical controls to prevent cross-contamination should be prohibited.
IE Circular No. 80-14 Date: June 24, 1980 Page 2 of 2 2.
In addition to some physical means of preventing backflow into the DW system, appropriate administrative controls should be established to ensure that the DW supply valve is secured and temporary hosing is disconnected from the DW supply header after use.
3 Use of plant-supplied DW for human consumption should be prohibited.
The potable water system should be the only authorized source of water for human consumption.
4.
Examine potable and demineralized water systems to determine if pathways exist allowing or having the potential to allow contamination of these systems including temporary connections whereby siphons could cause situations described above.
No written response to this Circular is required.
Your review of this matter to determine its applicebility to your facility and any corrective and preven-tive actions taken or planned, as appropriate, will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
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IE Circular No. 80-14 June 24, 1980 RECENTLY ISSUED IE CIRCULARS Circular Subject Date Issued To No.
Issued 80-09 Problems With Plant 4/28/80 All holders of a power Internal Communications reactor Operating License (OL)
Systems or Construction Permit (CP) 80-10 Failure to Maintain 4/29/80 All holders of Reactor Environmental Qualifi-Operating Licenses (OLs) cation of Equipment and Construction Permits (cps) 80-11 Emergency Diesel Generator 5/13/80 All holders of a power Lube Oil Cooler Failures reactor Operating License (0L) or Construction Permit (CP) 80-12 Valve-Shaft-To-Actuator 5/14/80 All holders of Reactor Kcy May Fall Out of Place Operating Licenses (OLs)
When Mounted Below and Construction Permits Horizontal Axis (cps) 80-13 Grid Strap Damage in 5/18/80 All holders of Reactor Westinghouse Fuel Operating Licenses (OLs)
Assemblies and Construction Permits (cps)
Enclosure
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