ML19319E081
| ML19319E081 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 02/01/1977 |
| From: | Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Mattimoe J SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003310591 | |
| Download: ML19319E081 (11) | |
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February 1,1977 DISTRIBUTION:
Docket File '
50-312 ORB #4 Rdg VStello VBenaroya KRGoller KGauec--
TJCarter WButler Sacramento Municipal Utility District
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Attorney, OELD OI&E (3)
ATTN:.itr. J. J. Mattimoe RReid
'and Chief Engineer __.
VRooney (2)
Assistant General Manager.
RIngram
.DEisenhut i
6201 S Street Sacramento, California ~ 95813' T8Abernathy P. O. Box 15830 fC R c n
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Gray File
_ Gentlemen:
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,e In ourJletter to you dated September 30, 1976, dealing with fire protection we requested, in enclosure 2 to that letter, certain -
information. We asked that you begin collecting that~:infomation
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, :-but defer submittallof your response;in_ order 1to codainesit with r
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./ w % )k t 31, 1976, describing, We have now reviewed your1 submittal _ of August the fire protectio'n program at Rancho Seco using the guidelines of Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1.
In addition, our-fire protection review
.tu:m visited the Rancho ~ Seco facility 'on October 19-22, 1976..Your
~ August 31, 1975 response does;not proviele sufficient information about the implementation of the guidelines, the basis for not ieplencnting certain guidelines, or_ the fire; hazards analysis that is the, basis for the fire protectionfrogran to pcmit us to reach a conclusion.
We have identified in Lthe enSiostire to this letter some of the.. -
, C ' additional information wesil) need to' complete our fire protection ~ '
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' review. -Item numbers in' the enclosure refer to -item numbers in your s
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. A gust.-30,.1976 submittal.1Although we expect to request further-pfire. protection,inforration from you in the. near future; we are rating. -
dthis request at1this tine-~in. order to complete our review in a timely manner.
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Sacrarento Municipal Utility District We request that you provide the information requested in the enclosure to this letter and also the infomation requested in enclosure 2 to our September 30, 1975 letter within 60 days of receipt of this letter.
Sincerely,
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Robert W. Reid, Chief Operating Reactors Branch !4.
Division of Operating Reactors
Enclosure:
Request for Additional Infomation cc w/ enclosure:
See next page
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.s Sacramento Municipal Utility District cc: David S. Kaplan, Secretary and General Counsel 6201 S Street Post Office Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813 Business and Municipal Department Sacramento City-County Library 828 I Street Sacramento, California 95814 Chief, Energy Systems Analyses Branch (AW-459)
Office of Radiation Programs U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Room 645. East Tower 401 M Strect, S.W.
Washington, D.C.
20460 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region IX Office ATTN:
EIS COORDINATOR 100 California Street San Francisco, California 94111 i
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ENCLOSURE REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT RANCHO SEC0 GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-312 1.
(Item 5) a) Provide an analysis which shows that if a fire main breaks in the auxiliary building, there is sufficient time for the operator to react to prevent flooding of decay heat removal equipment.
b) Provide an analysis which shows that the capacity of the auxiliary building drains are sufficient to remove the water released from sprinklers and fire hoses or that the standing water does not damage safety-related equipment necessary for safe shutdown of the plant.
For diesel generator rooms, the analysis should include fire fighting water and day tank contents.
c)
Identify any safety-related systems which are disabled by initiation of a fire protection system, either by a direct interlock or as a result of the application of extinguishing agent.
2.
(Item 9) a)
Item 9 states that all redundant safety-related electrical switchgear cubicles and panels are separated from each other by three hour fire walls; state the fire rating of the floors, ceilings, and penetrations, b)
Describe the separation of redundant safety-related cables, cable trays, and conduits.
Identify areas where redundant safety related cables, cable trays, and conduits have non-safety-related cables interposed between these redundant groups in such a manner as to jeopardize both redundant groups by the same fire.
Describe what means will be provided to prevent a fire froin involving both redundant groups.
3.
(Ite 11) a)
Item 11 states that conduits carrying Class 1 instrumentation cables are wrapped in Thermobestos when they are located parallel to or above power cables.
Describe the effect of loss of these instrumentation cables on safe reactor shutdown and decay heat removal.
Describe the protection afforded by the Therrobestos wrap.
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- b)
Provide the analysis and rationale which demon-1 strates that a fire in one division, will not cross the 18 inch vertical separation between cable trays of different channels to the other division. This analysis should include test data of the fire resistance characteristics of the Haysite polyester board being used as a fire barfier between crossovers of cable trays carrying different channels, and between power cable trays and Class I instrumenta-tion cables, c)
Identify, the function of safety-related cabling from one division which is routed into the switchgear room and cabinet (s) of the other division.
Provide the analysis of the consequences of a fire in the switch-gear room which involves this cabling.
4.
(Item 14)
Identify areas containing safety-related cable trays above suspended ceilings where the cable trays are not protected by an automatic fire extinguishinn system. State the criteria which establishes tt-concentration of cable trays above suspended ceilings that requires automatic fire protection.
5.
(Item 17)
Describe the provisions that prevent the spreading of a flammable liquid fire via the drain system to areas con-taining safety-related equipment.
6.
(Item 18) a)
Provide an analysis which shows that the fire barrier penitration seals are adequate for the combustible loading-to prevent the spread of smoke and fire through the barrier.
The analysis should show the effectiveness of pipe penetrations, fire doors with metal panels above the door frames, and ventilation ducts and dampers to prevent the spread of smoke and fire through the barrier.
The analysis should describe the manner in which fire and smoke are pre-vented from spreading from area to area via the nonnal and emergency ventilation systems in all parts of the Auxiliary Building, Fuel Storage Building and Reactor Building.
Describe the location, actuation method and fire rating of dampers used for fire and smoke control in both air supply and return air systems.
Describe the details of interlocks for ventilation system shutdown or mode change that can be utilized for fire and smoke control.
i b) Describe the methods which would be employed for heat and smoke removal using either fixed or portable air handling equipment for each area.
Describe how exhaust and make-up air would be provided to achieve adequate air movement. Where portable ducts are utilized, describe the route that would be used to reach the outside, the reduction in rated fan capacity because of the duct length, time required to place units in operation, and the ability of the j
equipment to handle high temperature gases and particulates.
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c) Discuss the potential fire haza.rds for all types of air filters including charcoal, pre-filter, high efficiency and HEPA, and describe the fire detection and suppression capability and fire prevention measures.
Analyze the effects of a filter fire in terms of heat, smoke generation radiationrelease,anddamagetosafety-relatedequIpment.
For filters inside containment, analyze the potential effects of complete combustion on containment temperature and pressure, and the response of station's systems.
7.
(Item 20)
Describe the hydrogen system used to scavenge oxygen from the main coolant.
Describe:
frequency of use; provisions for inerting; alarms or indications on loss of flow or pressure;-
hydrogen detecticn or a ventilation monitoring system for the make-up tank room; the routing and protection of hydrogen lines to minimize susceptibility to damage; and the provisions to cut off hydrogen flow.
8.
(Item 21) a)
Identify the quantity and location of materials pack-aged or wrapped in plastics which are located or stored in safety-related areas, and describe the fire protection provided in these areas.
b)
For,the Underwriter's Laboratory listed plastic wrapping materials, state the name of the manufacturer, his pro-duct identification name and number, and the UL standard to which the material is qualified.
9.
(Item 25)
Identify the safety-related cabling in the outside area north of the Reactor Building, and describe the con-sequences of a fire in this cabling.
10.
(Item 27) _ Provide a detailed description of fire breaks and fire stops l
referenced in Item 27.
Provide sketches, identify the l
materials of construction, and describe the test results t
which demonstrate the effectiveness of fire stops used on electrical cubicles, vertical cable trays in the Reactor l
Building, and intersections between horizontal and vertical cable runs.
11.
(Item 28) a) State whether the flame test described in Item 28 were performed on all three types of cable construction at Rancho Seco; i.e., crosslinked polyethylene single cable insulation, neoprene jacketed cable, and PVC insulated cable.
b)
Provide the acceptance criteria and results of the flame tests, including time to cable ignition, time to short-circuit or ground, time of insulation or jacket afterburn, and extent of damage.
Identify the flame temperature 4
used, the exposed area, and the heat release rate.
c) Provide a comparison between this test procedure and the IEEE 383 flame test procedure.
12.
(Item 35)
Identify the areas where ventilation systems and components are located within the area they serve.
Provide the bases for your conclusion that it would be unreasonable and impracticable to locate the power and control cabling and electrical components for these systems outside the area, or provide bases for leaving ventilation systems' power and control cables within the area they serve.
13.
(Item 37)
Provide drawings which show the location of each air intake and exhaust for normal and emergency ventilation systems.
14.
(Item 42) a) Provide an evaluation of the potential for a single fire to cause damage tq electrical wiring which would result in the loss of both regular and emergency lighting to safety-related areas not involved in the fire or areas providing access to safety-related areas.
b)
Item 42 states that emergency backup lighting is provided for vital plant areas.
Describe the emergency lighting for areas which provide access to vital plant areas.
15.
(Item 49)
Describe the measures taken to restrict access to the Communications Room or to prevent tampering with fire detection systems therein.
16.
(Item 52) Describe the automatic transfer of the CO2 system power sources; identify whether the transfer is to a redundant power source.
5-17.
(Item 57)
Provide hydraulic design calculations for the largest sprinkler or deluge system flow to verify that a single fire pump can provide this demand plus the required manual hose streams.
- 13. (Item 58) a) The reference to Item 53 does not seem appropriate for a discussion of the sources of water.
Identify the correct reference.
b) Provide an analysis which shows that a failure of the fire protection system will not degrade the function of the ultimate heat sink.
- 19. (Item 59) a) State whether hydrants, hose couplings and stand pipe risers are compatible with the local fire departments, or justify the incompatibility.
b)
Describe the provisions for equipping the hose houses on the plant yard loop with 2-1/2 inch lined fire hose.
- 20. (Item 60)
Describe the provisions for locking open all valves on the laterals or headers which supply the Auxiliary Building and Turbine Building fire protection system.
- 21. (Item 62) Provide the sprinkler system design criteria including the NFPA standard used and design densities or pipe schedules applied.
- 22. (Item 63) Provide an analysis that verifies that all points of safety-related areas can be reached with the hose lines stored-at the interior manual hose installations.
- 23. (Item 65)
Provide an analysis which shows that the quantity and type of foam concentrate is adequate for the potential fire fighting needs of the facility, and thot the foam concentrate materials and application equipment are listed by Underwriter's Laboratories or Factory Mutual.
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- 24. (Item 67) Provide:
the CO2 system design concentrations and soaking times for each area; the test results which demonstrate the i
effectiveness of this protection to handle deep-seated electrical fires; and the data which demonstrate the reliability of CO2 systems.
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~6-25.
(Item 69) a)
Identify the function of the cables in rigid steel conduit runs which are adjacent to the emergency charcoal filter units.
b)
Identify the potential ce", auences on safe shutdown, decay heat removal, and con.inment for a fire at the electrical penetration areas ir3 side the Reactor Building.
- 26. (Item 71) a)
Provide the qualification test data on the combusti-bility of the control room carpet.
b)
Identify those safety-related control room and computer room cabinets which contain cables from both divisions.
Provide an analysis of the con-sequences of a fire in each cabinet; the analysis should take into account damage which occurs to wiring and irstrumentation in adjoining cabinets due to heat generated.
- 27. (Item 72)
Provide the location and activation method for ventilation i
fan shutdown and damper closure in areas protected by car-bon dioxide systems.
Provide data which substantiates that the system design is adequate to compensate for,
leakage through any openings that are not closed auto-matically on actuation of carbon dioxide systems.
- 28. (Item 76)
Des: ribe the provisions for alarm upon loss of ventilation to the battery rooms due to fan or motor failure, (i.e.,
failures of fan coupling, or closure of ventilation damper).
- 29. (Item 77) a)
Provide the electric'al drawings which detail the loads connected to the two redundant 4160 to 480 volt service transformers.
Provide an analysis of the suscepti-bility of the two redundant 4160 to 480 volt transformers to damage from lightning, turbine building fires or main generator hydrogen explosions.
b)
Describe how a fire in the Turbine Building is prevented from affecting tha emergency diesel generator cooling and return lines which are located on the Turbine Building side of the Auxiliary Building wall.
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. 30. (Item 78) a)
State the rate at which the condenser pit sump contents can be pumped to the oily water separator, b)
Provide drawings of the diesel generator air intake /
exhaust system.
Provide an analysis which shows that a Turbine Building Fire cannot affect both diesel generators via their air intake.
- 31. (Item 82)
Describe the potential effects of a fire in the radwaste area in terms of radiation release.
- 32. (Item 84)
Describe the provisions which assure that an oil spill from the oil filled transformer adjacent to the contain-ment emergency hatch is contained and that a fire of such oil will not adversely affect either of the nuclear _'ser-vice cooling water pumps.
- 33. (Item 87) a) Several' gas cylinders are stored in a small room adjacent to the health physics lab.
Analyze the potential for a fire or explosion from these gas cylinders affecting safety-related equipment, sur.h as through the open ceiling area.
b)
Several flamable materials are stored in the Chemical Storage Room in the Auxiliary Building.
Analyze the potential for a fire in this area affecting safety-related equipment, such as through the ventilation system.
- 34. (Item 90)
Identify those fire' diitectors protecting safety-related equipme'nt or located in areas containing a potential fire hazard to safety-related equipment, whose protective signaling circuitry is not a NFPA Code 72D Class A system.
35.
Provide an analysis, supported where necessary by test data, substantiating that_the sensitivity of fire detection devices and that the number and placement of detectors are sufficient to assure detector response in time to pre-vent loss of safety-related systems required for safe plant shutdowns.
The analysis should include both fire detection devices used to notify personnel and those used to actuate fire protection systems.
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,g Sacramento Municipal Utility District cc: David S. Kaplan, Secretary and General Counsel 6201 S Street Post Office Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813 Business and Municipal Department Sacranento City-County Library 828 I Street Sacramento, California 95814 Chief Energy Systems AnalysesBranch(AW-459)
Office of Radiation Programs U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Room 645, East Tower 401 M Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C.
20460 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region IX Office ATTN:
EIS COORDINATOR 100 California Street San Francisco, California 94111 i
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