ML19319D439
| ML19319D439 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 06/05/1973 |
| From: | US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19319D436 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8003170569 | |
| Download: ML19319D439 (20) | |
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CRYSTAL RIVER I:UCI. CAR GE.; ERAT!' C PI./J'T; U::IT ::0. 3 Req u es t-for 1dditional Infora ti.in 2.0 Site and Environrent 2.1 Section 2.4.2.1 (par;c 2165) of the TSAR has listed access openin;;s to the varicus plant structures (iten a) and has stc:cd that flood protection has been provided by concrcta bulkhesse er renovable stoplog.a.
Foc 2;.ch opening Ider.tified (13 total plus uctet-tight stal areas), provide the clevation lxatica of
..e opendn;; and ti.e specific type of protection provided.
2.2 Section 2.4.2.1 of the FSAR -lso st ates that local protectcan a
of varicus plant comper.cnts froa. flooding and/or fren result.':t wave actica vill be provided.
For protection that depend upcn concrete bulkheads, concrete water barriers, raiced walls, er raised equipment (items a through e page 2. 16b) provide the following informaticn:
(a)
The resent design height of each protective tecns er device necessary to protect against the probable ccxinua hurricane.
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m, - 1~q (b) The ec::inun projected design height of each protective means or devicca necessary to protect against the current riedel under discussion for the probable taximun hurricane.
2.3 Essential equipment, necessary for safe shutdeun, located adjacent to or balcu the structure cpening or penatrations have baen provided with drains and diesel powered dewatering pumps.
Provide the location end capacities of the equipment provided to hand.le the flood Icakage.
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_Conta nnent Sya.c, r d F.tructurea 5.0 j
5.1 Section 5.2.1.2.5 of the FSAR provides a dcscriptien of design 1:aw tornado-borne tissiles considered for this facility, c::pand the cpectru:a of tornado nisciles considered to include the following-(a)
A 4" x 12" by 12 foot 1cng wooden plank traveling end-on at 300 ta.p.h.
(b) A missile equivalent to a 3 inch di;ncter schedule 40 pipe, 10 ft. long, travelin; and-on at 100 r.p,h.
For cach cf the aheve, discuss the abilit7 of Clcss I structures to withstand the e fects cf these torn:Ac aissiles 5.2 For each of the tornado-borne taissiles considered (total spectrun), describe the cdec,uce of the design of all Cla:s I structures to preclude the generation of secondcry missile-within thcsc structures cad the effects en safety related equipment and syste=s.
5.3 Scismic Class I structures are designed with personnel and/or equipment exterior access openings or penetrations.
Discuss the ability of these openings or penetrations to withstand D
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the ef fects of the design bases torncdo ::1usiles.
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'the missile protection provided sarcty related equipment and syster.s in the escnt that the openings or pen 2traticas do not preclude missile entry.
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8.0 Electrical Svst ers 8.1 k'ith respect to the ercargency dicac1 generators, the follouing information is required:
(a) Provide the results of a singic failure code and cffects analysis for the dicsci fuel transfer and storage systen and include a piping and instruncntation diagran of the systen in sufficient d2 tail that vill enchle us to revieu the systcars' saf ety capability.
(b)
Inferr.ation pertaining to tha cescntial subsysters of the dicscis hes not becn providcd in sufficient detail to permit c deteruinatica that a single event vill not disable all ete r;:g_ncy en-ti te ?.C pcuer r.ystens.
Provide a piping and instrunencation drcuing and a single faile -
analysis for tha following subsystems:
(c) the air intche and its filtering systcc, (b) the lubrication and.its filtering systen, (c) dicscl ecoling water systen, cnd (d) the air starting systen.
(c)
Provide an integrated description of the protection provided and capabilities of the diesel generator (rocus), diesel generators subsystens, and the fuel storage tanks and
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transfer systen to precluele danage resulting frca environ =catal effects cuch as tornado nisciles, interrally generated missiles, flooding by tbc P'.il or fire protection cysten, and cncessive reca reg arctures, so that thc1:
perfornance trill not be nitigated when called upon.
Include in the description the physical separation provided redun-dant cocponents of the systems.
(d) 7he underground dicsci cil storac.c tanks have been designed to scismic Class I requirements.
Uith the aid of a drating, deceribe this undergrcund storage facili;y in nore detail cnd also the preenution tz.kan to preclu22 the folletting:
(a) leng-tarn cerrosion cf the Larks, (b) failure that wcuJd perait oil to centcminate water supplies or safety related equiprent, and (c) degradation of the fuel supply by water renalting fron the effects of natural phennaena, condensatien, and/or poor oil supply.
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e 9.0 Auxiliarr and li2rrency S stens-9.1 The high pressure injectica c=urgcncy core cooling systcn is an
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integral part of thc r,aheup and purifica:. ion systcu and is designad accordingly (scismic Class I).
Uith respect to this systcc, provide the follouing infor:aation:
(a) Section 5.1.1.1 C states that the letdown coolers, letdown filters, and nahcup tank are designed ac seianic Class I compcnents. Utilizing rigurc 9.2, identify the letdown filters and ctate uhether all valves and pipin~
between the letdevn coolers and makeup tanh arc designed to seisaic Clann I requirenc.nts, cud (b) pr evide the results of cn annly:ia to deconstrate that the failures er naifunctions o! seis=Ic Class II equ4 cent will not cffect tha scismic Class I portion of the system.
9.2 The F?*.R only states that process carpling lines that pcnctrat2 the 4
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However, process sampling lines are connected to cther seisnic Class I system for sampling purposes outside containment.
Describe the isolation capabilitics provided for the sarpling system (including the scisnic design classification) to assure that failure of the Class II sampic line connections will not l
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o affect the integrity of t'ta scistic Class 1 sycten.
9.3 The spent fuel cooling rysten has been designed to scismic Class I requircr.. cats (sec tion 5.1.1. lf purpc, heat exchangcrc, pipinc, and valves). Uith respcet to ri.c,ure 9.5 identify the Class II portions of the system and the valves utilized to isolate the scismic Class II portion from the scismic Class I decir,nad systen.
9.4 Section 9.3.2.3 has identified sc"eral scurces of water capabic of providing naket p to the epant fuel storage pool cad ecsk area.
These sources design classification range frcn scismic Class I to Clr.,s III.
therefore, identify the sources thar have been d w irned to scisnic Cla.s I re!uirencats including their a-Jao iated valves and n pinc.
9.5 Eg requ2st nur.ber 9.7 rcquestcd arrangunaats that.-zould be made fer the cmar ;ency cooliag of 1 1/3 cores of spant fuel if ecolant was lost.
Uith respect to your respcase, state ehy the decay heat removal systea hochup was not includ:d as part of your consideratice for encreencv cooline,.
9.6 Section S.5 Cooling Water Systems, Figures 9.7 and 9.8 of the FSAR indicates that the nuclear service sea water system and the nuclear service closed cycle cooling unter sys ca are designed to withstand
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a the effects of a single active failure but are not apparentJy capable of withstanding a single pascive Ccilure ti.hout loss of the complete syctcc.
In light of the essential functions these systens perform, revieu this design aspect for nornal operating condi-tions and for emergency long-tern post-accident ccoling. requirencuts and provide sufficient justification regarding the acceptability of the systen design.
9.7 Identify the cooling ' rater systen that provides cooling services to the cuergency dicsci generators.
Uith respact to this systen, discuss its capabilitics to uithstend the effcet of a single cetive or paraiva fcilure to assure thct caf2 shutdoun can he achieved during the loss of off-site pc.cr and the loss of off-site poucr coincidcut :ith the accident condition.
9.8 Discuss thc arceautic.:s tak2n to prevent and detect the pressacc of scle tra:cr inlechar,e to the nuc1 car scrvice clcocd cycle cooling water cnd decay heat cooling water systcra frca their respectiva sea.ater service systems.
9.9 Uith respect to the new and spent fuel storage fccilitiec, provide the following information:
(a)
State the degree of suberiticality provided by the fully loaded new fuel storage rack in the dry and ficoded condition.
(b)
State the degree of suberiticality provided by the fully loaded spent fuci storaga rack wh?n stered in borated water and unborated vater.
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Describe tha ability of the new and spent 4
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(d)
Deccribe the ranns provided to detect and centrol I
Icakage fron the spent fuel pool an<i. cash area.
(c) Describe the n:ans provided to detect and prcvent the loss of spent fuel pool water through inlet and c: cit lines.
(f)
Describe the spent fuel cask area in rore detail and discuss its c'aility to *cithstand the drop casb accident.
Inclu?.c in the discuscica the ascociated effects on the cask area and s,w - fuel peal.
(g)
Diccuss the perenticl da:.w;c to the unent fuci peo! :.C cemequenecc ruulting fro: a dropped ecsk stri:ing the edge of the ccek secrage poci are: in nuen a.:aaner so that the cash trill hit the cppes tte ;all of the storage area and tur.ble or roll into the fuci pool area.
(h)
Describe the n2ans provided (interlochs or mechanical stops) to assure that the shipping cask cannot be inadvertently transported over the spent fuel pool.
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Describe the spent fuel pool m ssile shielding, i
including theit natcrial of ccustructica, sine, utight, shape, properties that provent nissiles ponctratica and the reason for their ability to float.
(j)
Descri'oc in detail the applicable codes and standards used in the design, fabrication, installation and testir3 of the facility cranas, trolleys, hoists, and associated equipment.
(k)
Provide a list of n2jor refueling equi:.r.ent that are designed to scisri: Class I requirenente and discuss th:,
asaccic ted s.:fany c pects of ajor r.-fueling equip- _ut not dc.aig. icd to seter.ic Clars I requirear.t; ccasid erin ;
their failure.
10 rigure 9.10 of the FSAR indicated that the 'leactor Dailding Cavity Cooling unita are provided by coolins cater fror the industrial ccoler or the nuclear service clcsed cycle cooling unter system.
Provide a 4 cription of the normal operations, and cnargency operations (if required) and also provide the seismic design classification of the systen.
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9.11 Describe the auxilicry building cpent fuel pit ventilation subsystcu uith respect to its functional cpcrat.ional r;qu iren.2nts during normal and c.T.ergency operatin3 conditicas.
9.12 The exhaust cystem for the fuel bandli-g crea cnd other arcas vill operate continuously in the event of a fuel hcndling accideat.
Therefore, provide the results of an enal:cis that demonstretcs that the exhauct system is capable of uithstanding the effects of a safe shutdcra carthquake (seism.ic) event.
9.13 The rsta, section 9.7.20, states that the exhaust systen for the vericuc areas centains fcur 5C, ccpacity fans and four 25.": capacity filtc r arc =bli ca.
'.'ith rcSpect to thic er,u!?r. cat and the fuel handling accident potentinl, the felic.:ing inforration is rquired:
(a)
Provide the functional perfetT.: nce requirencats for the exhaust fans during normal and caergency operating conditions.
(b)
Describe the means providad for the starting of the redundant fans in the exhaust system in the event of a failure in the operating unit.
(c)
Describe the type of exhauct fans utilizcd in the systen.
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Provide the functional performance requirements for the filter asacablics during normal and crcrgency
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operating conditions and state the basis for the 257; capacity sizing of the filter asce:.blies.
.(c),For both the normal and energcncy operatin:; condi tions, describe the effects on the system's capabilitics to perform its intended functica considering the follmeing:
(1) one filter assembly is cut of service for repairs er repicccment, and (2) the above-filter is out of service along with a single failure in another unit.
(f)
Provile the results of an analysis that d er..on s t ra t e s that iselntion cf the exhaus2 system from other areas such as auniliary building arecs, controlled access arene.,
spent fuci pit, and penetration cooling areas is not required to maintain a sufficient negative pressure or ventilation capability in the fuel handling area during a refueling accident.
9.14 Figure 9.11 indicates that an auxiliary building recirculation fan has.been provided to. circulate system air.. Describe this fan a
systen in more detail and provide its functional performance e
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.a requirements during normal ned 2ner7,cucy operations including the starting und stopping signals.
9.15 Section 9.7.2.13 of the FSla states that cutccatic smoke and tenparature detect $on. devices isolate the switchgear, relay, cable, inverter, er battery races frca the centrol room.
Other areas are also capable of intreducinc air-borne centaniannts (snohe) to the control reca; therefera, describe the location of s:.okc detectica devices that i:lli preclude sn.ohc icJen air frca cll creas frca being recirculated to the control reo...
Describe the automatic Isc-1r.ti n cim.'.ls requiced to netonte the cuergercy rcticcula:: ion cys t u.: to isolata i.ha caatrol rora froa the ra t cf tha stetica C C7.p 10:*.
9.16 I M rst.2 states that a hi.;h radiatica siran1 uill cutenatically trip the normal control roon fans and the emergency fans are nnnually started.
Justify this design cspact or describe the.odificatiens necessary to actorctically stcrt the erargcncy fans upon receipt of a radiation signal.
9.17 The nornal and e.ergency control recirculation fan-filter assenblics have beca provided with 100% redundant cquipment.
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9.18 Miscellanceus air conditioning and ventilation syster.c provida ventilated air to creas such as (a) penetration rocns, (b) diesel generator rooms, (c) intermediate buildiar,, (d) turbine building, and (c) turbine building switch;; ear aren.
Describe these ventilation systcr:s in core detail including their functional perform:nce requirenants, the sciscic desigi classifications, isolatio.. capabilities, single failure requirenents, air flow requircrents cnd instru:acntation necessary f or operatic,n of the systecs.
9.19 See:. ion 9.7, ventilation Systen, cade no re ?arence to ce2rgency equip;ent beia opera:cd frm. the euercenc lusses daria; the loss of all off-cite po'.er.
Provide a listing of all ventilatica systen s that vill be provided with energency power f roa the dic=ci gencrctors.
9.20 Provide a process and instrumentation diagram for the fire protection systcm (FrS) and a drauing that details the main loop and branch piping, valving, pumps, tanks and hydrant locations.
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9.21 Provide an cnalysis to dccenstrate that che design of tha IPS will assure that failucc of any part of tha systcu not scianic
. Class I will not preclude fire protection to Class I structures, systens, or.conponents necessary for safe shutd %m and that the
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or failurc.(rupture of piping) prevent essential systen or components from perforning their intended function.
9.22 Provide a listing, in tabular fora, of all safety related systcus, or components ne:cssary for safe shutdoten and indicate the type of fire protectica provided.
Include also, the follouin;;:
(a) whether the systen is manual cr autenatically activated, (ii) associated detectica equf pnent and clarme,, (c) for hand eperated fire protection devices, the location of the fire r c uccion devices iith respect to equipecnt being protected, and. (d) the distance and type of the nearest secondary or bachup fire fighting equip: cat.
9.23 The compressed air system has not been designed to scisnic Class I requirements.. Provide a listing of all safety related equipment
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_or components (including valves) necessary for safe shutdctm that 0
j the compressed air system supplies and provide the results of an analysis that demonstrates that in the ev(tt of a system failure each component trill be in the fail-safe mode 9
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9.24 The cor:4unicatien systen is designed to provide effective con =unicacica betueen vitc1 plant areas.
From the inferaction provided, it is not clenr that offcctiva cen2unicatiena can be provided during accident or incident condi tions when ma::imua poten-tial noise levels (bloudcun) are obtained.
Vrovide a discussion of the communication systea's capability to provide effective co m un-ication bat::een cll vitcl plant arcas in the prcacnce cf high potential bachr,round noice levels.
9.25 Fer cl1 tanks that contain g:s under pressure (.such as nitre _;en, hydropa, o: gan. air, end CO, tankr? pro /ide the followin ;:
(c) the d2 sign a:.d op,eratin; pressure, (b) the eszinua pressure of gas supply, (c) che location of the tank, (d) the caxitum total stored energy, (e) the possibili:.y of the tank to act as a =iasile, (f) the protective tensures taken to prevent a tani frca becening a nissile due to a connecting pipe failure, (g) the protective measures taken to prevent the loss of function of adjacent equip-ment essential for a safe shutdout condition, and (h) for each vessel identify, discuss and supply the basis for any exceptions or deviations that ::111 he taken to the positicas set forth in the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, OS1129 Crit 1910.
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10.1 Provide a piping and instrum:.ntation diagran for the circulating water system and describe the precauticas taken to prevent and detcet direct inleah:ga of the salt water circulatint, unter into the condenser. Also provide a discussion of the detection systc='s capabilities with respect to sensitivity, redundancy, rnd actica required ehen maxinua tolerabla leake;;c occurs.
10.2 In response to our request dated Septcaber 26, 1972, frilur2 of any non-category I (seistic) equiprent, your letter dated Decer;.b er 19, 1972 states that a failure of an expansion joint in the circulatory rator systen and the resultant ficaling of the turbiac rac: base:-" :t could be avoidcl by tripping th2 circu]at;n, water pumps.
Expand your response to include the fel.louing infornation:
(a) The time required to step circulating water ficw (tite scro being the instant of failure) including all inherent delays such as detection times, operator veri'.1 cation and reaction timas, drop cut times of the control circuiting, and flou coastdown times.
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.(b)
State uhether the control circuitin;; for tripping tha f
circulating water pun;>s naets the require...-ats set forth in IEEE-279.
(c)
Assuning that turbine building ficoding vill result, with the aid of a drauing if necessary, identify all essential systens or components nacessary for safe reactor shutdova that could bccer.e inoperable as a result of this ficoding.
Include in your considerr.ti^n potentir.1 flood paths such as parnagn"avs, pipe charca and/or tia cable.:._ya jcinin;; the flachu apace te other spacou coa:ainin3 cssencial cquipncat.
(d)
The effects of tua failure of the condencate systen chould also be evaluated with rear act to the infornetion recuested above and sinilar type of eialu-ation provided for the circulating water systen.
10.3 Section 10.2.2 of the TSAR indicated that the main stean line isolation valves (M3L1V) utilized for this facility are the sanc as those that have been or are being installed in a number of other nucicar facilities. The najority of these facilitics that utilize the MSLIV also utilize dried stean (little or no water cat yover
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tiith t.bc ateca because of the stern driera located in the stear system) which acts in conjunction.:ith the inatrumentction to isolate the main stesa lines.
Therefore, provida the rcsults of cn annJycis to deuonstrate that the effects of lo*.i cuality stean (water dropicts being carried over during steen generator blottdown) acting on the }OLIV trill not affect the perfornance characterictics of the valve ro that isolction enn b2 cchieved.
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