ML19319B944

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Application for Amend to License NPR-3,requesting Change to App a Tech Spec 3,reflecting Pressurizer Heater Interlocks & Associated Instrumentation.Safety Evaluation & Tech Spec Change Request Encl
ML19319B944
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 03/20/1978
From: Roe L
TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19319B942 List:
References
NUDOCS 8001290681
Download: ML19319B944 (11)


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O APPLICATION FOR AMENDMENT TO LICENSE NO. NPF-3 FOR DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT NO. 1 Enclosed are forty-three (43) copies of the requested changes to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications, -

Appendix A to License No. NPF-3, together with the Safety Evaluation of the requested change.

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By( j M / p [ Q V' ice President, Facil'ities Development Sworn to and subscribed before me this twentieth day of March, 1978.

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Miita@'Public FR W. GERMAIN Notary Public - State of Ohlo My Commissien Exc:res Oct. 30.1992 8oo1290 C8/

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REQUESTED CHANGE TO THE DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT NO. 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (Appendix A to License No. NPF-3)

The desired changes are shown on the following attached pages:

Page 3/4 3-11 l Page 3/4 3-12 Page 3/4 3-13 Page 3/4 3-22 Page 3/4 4-2 Page 3/4 4-3 Page 3/4 5-4 ks e/8 I

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TABLE 3.3-3 3 SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 9' ,

MINIMUM S'

TOTAL NO. UNITS UNITS APPLICABLE 81 OF UNITS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION

!" FUNCTIONAL UNIT

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3. MANUAL ACTUATION
a. SFAS (except Containment Spray and Emergency Sump 2 2 2 ALL MODES 11 Recirculation)
b. Containment Spray 2 2 2 1,2,3,4 11
4. SEQUENCE LOGIC CilANNELS 4 2*** 4 1, 2, 3, 4 9#

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5. INTERLOCK CllANNELS
a. Decay lleat Isolation Valve I l 1,2,3,4,5 12#

[$ 1 1.

b. Pressurizer lleaters 2 2 2 3,4,5 13#

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE with RCS pressure below 2800 psig. Bypass shall be automatically removed when RCS pressure e.ceeds 1800 psig.

Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE wi " RC'S pressure below 600 psig. Bypass shall be automatically removed when RCS pressure exceeds 600 psig.

      • One must be in SFAS Channels #1 or #3, the other must be in Channels
  1. 2 or #4.
  1. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 9 -

With the number of OPERABLE functional units one less than the Total Number of Units operation may proceed provided both of the following conditions are satisfied;

a. The inoperable functional unit is placed in the tripped condition within one hour.
b. The Minimum Units OPERABLE requirement is met; how-ever, one additional functional unit may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.1.

ACTION 10 - With any component in the Output Logic inoperable, trip the associated components within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

ACTION 11 - With the number of OPERABLE Units one less than the Total Number of Units, restore the inoperable functional unit to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN with-in the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

438 l ACTION 12 - a. With less than the\Mimimum Units OPERABLE and reactor l coolant pressure > psig, both Decay Heat Isola-tion Valves (DHil and DH12) shall be verified closed. ]

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b. With less than the\ Minimum Units OPERABLE and reactor coolant pressure < psig operation may continue; l

, however, the functional unit shall be OPERABLE prior to increasing res; tor coolant pressure above psig.

438 ACTION 13 - See Attached Sheet DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-12 i i

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ACTION 13 - Uith lo::o thin tha Minimum Units OPERABLE and racctor coolant p rsc- e (438 psig., cparation may ec Enua; howsvar, tha functional unit .anil bs OPERABLE prior to incrac.cing rsector coole.nt prescura above 438 psig. , or the inoperable functional unit shall be placed in the tripped state.

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2 TABLE 3.3-4 h ' SAFETY FEATURES AC10AT10ft SYSTE:i I!!STRilllEllitTI0il TRIP SETP0lflTS M

. fuflCTI0fiAL UNIT TRIP SETP0lfli ALLOWABLE VALUES c .

M INSTRU!lEfiT STRiflGS

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a. Containment Radiation < < 2 x Background at l2 x Background ilERMAL P0llER at RATED RATED TilERMAL POWER,
b. Containment Pressure - liigh < 18.4 psia 1 8.52 1 psla#
c. Contairunent Pressure - liigh-liigh < 38.4 psia < 38.52 psia #
d. RCS Pre'sure - Low . > 1620.75 psig > 1615.75 psig#

2 e. RCS Pressure - Low-tow > 420.75 psig > 415.75 psig#

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L f. BWST Level

~> 49.5 and < 55.0 in. l10

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2 -> 48.3 and

< 56.7 in. l120 #

SEQUEllCE LOGIC CllAliflELS

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a. Essential Bus feeder Breaker Trip (90%) -> 3744 volts for > 3558 volts for 7 11.5 sec [ for 71 1 R "r# l k b. Olesel Generator Start, Load Shed on a Essential Bus (59%) > 2071 and < 2450 volts 2 -> 2071 and < 2450 .

for 0.5

  • 0.1 sec

~ volts for-7, z

0.5 1 0.1 sec#

. INTEltLOCK CllAllflELS

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a. Decay IIcat Isolation Valve and Pressurizer lleater (438 psig. <443 psig#*

I Allouable Value for CIIAffilfL fuflCTI0flAL lEST and CllAfillEL CALIBitAT10fl.

  • l<eferenemi to the centerline of Dil-11 and Dil-12 l

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TABLE 4.3-2 ll SAFETY FEAlURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS k CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH El CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST l}

REQUIRED gg 5. INTERLOCK CHANNELS 4 a. Decay Heat Isolation Valve S R ** 2 3

b. Pressurizer lleater S R ** 1,4,h 3, , 4, 5
    • see Specification 4.5.2.d.1

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,, TABLE NOTATION 1:

4' E$ (1) Manual actuation switches shall be tested at least once per 18 months during shutdown. All other circuitry associated with nanual safeguards actuation shall receive a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days.

(2) The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include exercising the transmitter by applying either vacuum or pressure to the appropriate side of the transmitter.

REACT 0k C00LAN* SYSTEM.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATICN (Continued)

MODES 3, 4 and 5:

a. Operation may proceed provided at least one reactor coolant loep is in operation with an associated reactor coolant pump or decay heat re oval pump.' 1

( b.c. The See below provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

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! 'Ali reac: r coolant pumos and decay heat removal train pum s may be j de-energi:ed fer u; to I he'Jr to accor:Taccata : na h;;t . s;G' P J.;

d;him; Op:r:ti:=, surveillance tasting and pre-operational testing, 4

provided no cceratiens are ser::itted which could cause dilution of the reactor c:clant system boron concentration.

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b. Not more than one decay heat removal pup =ay be operated with their

( sole suction flow path through DH-ll and DH-12 unless the control

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power has been removed from the DH-11 and DH-12 valve operators, or =anual valves DH-21 and DH-23 are opened.

SURVEILLANCE REC'11REMENTS

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4.4.1 The Reactor protective Instamentation channels specified in the applicable ACT:CN statement at:ye snali be verified to have had their trip se::oints changed to tne values ssecified ir Specification 2.2.1 for the applicable num:er of reactor coolant pumps operating eitner:

a. Within 4 hcurs after switching to a different pump combination if the switen is made wnile operating, er
b. Prior to reactor criticality if tie switch is :rade while shutdown.

1 DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 4-2 Amend:nent No. ,13 ,

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a J REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SAFETY VALVES - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION Decay Heat Removal System Relief Valve DH 4849 3.4.2 h shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of

<330 psig7% and lined up to the Reactor Coolant system with DH-ll and DH-12 open and control power to their valve operators APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5. removed.

ACTION:

With DH'4849 not OPERABLE, make' the valve operable with 12 hrs or go to Mode 6 within the ne::.c 7 days.

Jith DH-11 or DH-12 closed, DH-21 and DH-23 aust be open.

m Jith the control power not removed from DH-11 and DH-12 remove the power to the valve operators at the Motor Control Centers within I hour.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS

, 4.4.2 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

  • The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

L DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 4-3 i

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTI"5

$URVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS

b. At least once per 31 days by verifying that the ECC5 picing is full of water by venting the E005 pump casings and discharge piping high points.
c. By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clotning, etc.) is present in the containment which could be trans;crtec :: the containment emergency sump and cause restriction of the pump suction during LOCA con-ditions. This visual inspection snail be performed:
1. For all accessible areas of the containment prier to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and
2. Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of each centainment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is es tabl ished.
d. At least once per 18 months by:
1. See Attached Sheet
2. A visual inscection of the containment emergency sump which verifies that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and tnat the sumo ecmoonents (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.
3. Verifying a total leak rate < 20 gallens per hcur for the 1 LPI systam at-a) Normal operating pressure er hyde static test oressure of 3,150 psig for those parts of tne system dcwnstream of the pump suction isolatien valve, and b) 3,45 psig for the piping frem the containment energency sump isolation valve to the pump suction isoltcion valve. -
4. Verifying that a minimum of 72 cubic feet of solid granular trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (T5p) is *

. contained within the TSP storage baskets.

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DAVI5-BESSE. UNIT 1 3/4 5-4 Amendment No. 3 l l

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d. 1. Vorify th0t dho intsrlocks: -

. c. Clozcs Du 11 cnd DH-12 cud donnargizas the prsssurizsr hsstars, if oicher DR-ll or DH-12 is open and a simulated reactor coolant system pressure which is greater than the Trip Setpoint (4438 psig) is applied.

i b. Prevents the opening of DR-il and DH-12 when a stzulated or actual reactor coolant system pressure which is greater than the Trip Setpoint

(<438 psig) is applied.

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