ML19319B529
| ML19319B529 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 06/24/1977 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19319B513 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001230643 | |
| Download: ML19319B529 (10) | |
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SAFETY EWdiR-'IQ_ : BY IIIE..OffIC!.: O_F_N.A_m_t. FCCTCit ECU.IA_TIa_.i S..U.PoC_renG Nome:C 10. 3 70 LICC.'3.C 20. NFF-3_=
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. IlnLa INrFOJUCTIGl By latter dated June 1,1977 and June 15,1T,7, the roledo Edison Comany regwsted enanges in the Tecnnical $cecifications accended to Facility Oprating icer.ne,1PF-3, for the cavis-cesse Nuclear Power station, Unit 1.
A1.o,.,e have notec an administrative error waich requires a change to tne Technical 5pecifict.tions. These changes are identified colcw:
(1) The Toledo Edison Cccceny stat *d that an acministrative errce in Tacle 3.6.2 precluded proper cperation of fif teen (15) contain.wnt icolation valves for survaillance testing and unir operation under administrative control when in Operational Modes 1, 2, 3, or 4.
(2) ne have noted that Tchle 3.3-12, pm e 3/4 3-23, is incorract because of a typcgraphical error which inprocerly identifled tne caxic.um value for the steam and feacivater ru;:ture centrol systec. i.mstrmontation trip setpoint for tne steaa generator feedwater oifferential prac urn.
(3) The Toledo Edisen Coc;any has regaested a enange to Tacle 3.5-2, cage 3/4 6-22, to allow surveillance testim of ot;roscheric vent valves ICS ll A and ICS Ila in c7 rational mode 4 instead of : ode 5 as presently stipulated in the technical scecifications.
(4) The Toledo Edisen Cormany has requested that Surveillance Require.wnt 4.6.5.1.d.4 page 3/4 6-30, te changed to verify tnat each emergency ventilation system will prcduce a necative crescure of greater tnan or equal to 0.25 inches water gauge in the annulus within lecs than or equal to 4 secondo af ter the ercergency ventilation sy:: tem fan attains a ficw rate of 5000 cucic feet par minute plus or minus ten.
percent and tnat tne test will te performed with the flow path establisned prict to starting the emergency vantilation system fan and tne other da:pers associated with the negative pressure boundary closed.
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(5) The Toledo Edison Co@any has requested that the Technical Specification 3.4.3.2 te revised with the addition of a footnote on page 3/4 3-22, stating that in operational Mode 4 and 5, when Channel Calicration or Charrel Function Test surveillance is performed, the interlock for one of the two cecay heat isolation valves will be taken out of service.
9 PEES $1 (1) The roledo Edisen Corrpeny has stated that in Tsole 3.6.2, on pages 3/4 6-20, 3/4 6-21, and 3/4 6-22 an asterisk (*) was emitted or added incorrectly to certain containnent isolatien valves by actinictrative error. The asterisk (*) in Tac h 3.6.2 defines those centainJent isolation valves which :*ay be coened en an intermittent easis to allow for propor egeration of specific contain ent isolation valves for surveillance testing ar.d unit operation urx:or shinistratIve control
- ten in Cterational Itdes 1, 2, 3, er 4.
The Toledo Edison Cc=cany has recuested that an asterisk (*) te added to tne follewing genetration ntreer and its associated valve numcer in Tacle 3.6.2 as follows:
Penetraticn :lo.
Valve ::o.
29 DI! 11 23 D:! 23 39 Ms 107 39 tis 107A 40 MS 106 40
?G 106A 57 MS 603 57 as 603A 53 PS 611 58 MS 611A 74C Du 2735 74C Dtl 2736 Tha Toledo Edison Cosiaany has requested than an asterisk (*) te deleted frcas the following penetration ntster and its associated valve number in Table 3.6.2 as follows:
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Penetration No.
Valve 25 SA 536 25 SA 532 25 SA 535 (2)
'rie have ncted a typograohical error in Table 3.3-12, page 3/4 3-28, of the technical specifications which defines the tric setroint and allowanle valves for the steam generator feedwater differential pressure as ceing greater than or equal to (
) the ntrrers assigned in line 3 of Tacle 3.3-12, The proper nctation for line 3 should specify that the trip setpoint and alleuaole valves are less th.?n or aqual to (
) the nt=&rs assigned in line 3 of Table 3.3-1:2.
(3) The technical specifications raquire that all centaircent isolation valves ce oporacle prior to entering t'ede 4, which in turn recuires tnat all acclicable surveillance testim be perfor cd in ;' ode 5.
The Toledo Odison Cocpany has irdicated tnat atrostreric vent valvas IC3 IIA anc ICs lla could te daraced when tested in Mcde 5 because there is no steam flow available in a cold stardby condition.
(4) 5.:rveillance Recuirecent 4.6.5.1.d.4 requires that the ! clado Ediscn Comany " Verify that each system produce a negativa pressure of greater tnan er equal to 0.25 inctes of water in the annulus within 12 seconds af ter a start signal". The purpose of this technical specification is to provide assurance that the energency ventilation system coundary integrity will be maintained followim a pastulated loss-of-coclant accident.
The Toledo Edison Company in their request for a change in Surveillance Requirement 4.5.3.1.d.4 stated that the intent of the require.:ent was to test the draw down in tne annulus after 50C0 cuoic feet car cinute flow was estaclisheo in tne emergency ventilation cystem fans.
Toledo Edison Ccx=any further stated that Serveillanca Requirement 4.6.5.1.d.4 as presently written requires tnat the ewrgency ventilation system valve arxi dampar oprating times plus the fan start time occur in the 12 secords response time.
Toledo Edison Company has requested that Surveillance Raquirement 4.6.5.1.d.4 be changed as follows:
- Verify that each rystem produces a negative cressure of 0.25 inches W.G. in the annulus within four seconds after than fan attains a flow rate of 8000 cubic cfm 104. This test is to be performed 099tC S P SWWM AME
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.s with the flow cath established crior to startirq the EV5 fan, ard the other da: rcrs asscciated with the nemitiva prassure courdary closed.
(5) The Tachnical 3::ecifications, Table 4.3-2 recuire that tne Cocay tieat Isolation Valve Interleck Channels be cparational in ENes 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.
In order to perform the Channel Functional Test and Channel Calibration, these interlock cnannela must eitner ce maae incparacle er result in the closure of the valves in the Mcdes I and 5 wnicn results in the less of the r<eactor Coolant sifstem overpressurication ;rcrection. This would te a violation of the recuirement of 10 CFR 53, Accendix G.
The Toledo Edison Concany has recuestM tnat the tecnnical crecifications on paje 3/4 3-22 ce revice! to allow perfor:arce of a enannel calicration or cnannel functional test on the cecay near icolatic-v:1ve interlec<
channels. This will recuire that tne interice'< fer cna of the two decay heat isolation valvec be taken cut Of cervice to cr avent c10 cure of tne valve in icden 4 and 5.
We have discussed the recuestea chance as ntsted scva witn tne Toledo aiison Ccrapany ard we have datarmirAi that changes are rocuirad in 1icensing condition 2.C.(3)(]) and Tachnical specificat ion 4.5.2.d.1, page 3/4 5-4, and Technical C;acificaticn 3.4.1.d of Action ?cdes 3, 4, and 5, page 3/4 4-2, as avended, to allow r.ne survaillance and preoperational testing which is recuirad to assure that saferrrelatad cerxcnents, instrunentation, and sycte;;a will be c;erasle.
These changes are delineatec in tha evaluation anction of thia recort.
Toledo Edison Comcany concurs in thoce enanges.
EVAGATICH (1) 5 (2) The changes to the Technical Seacifications for itets (1) and (2),
as discussed above, serve to correct typograpnical ard administrative errors, and do not involve any signifiernt hazards considerations, ard therefore, we find these charges to be acceptacle.
1 (3) 'Ihe Toledo Edison Comagny has stated that steam flow through atmoscheric vent valves ICS llA and ICS llB is desirable wnenever these valves are opened in order to prevent particles which could be dislodged from o-Aents above the valves from falling onto the seat of the valve and OFFICE P ouaseant >
DATE M NRC POR.84 318 (9 76) NRCM 0240
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i therecy damaging the sealing surface wnen the valves are closed.
Therefore, Toledo E.dicon Cc.cany has requasted that these valves be curveillance tested in Pode 4 wnen steam f1cv will be available.
iie have cetermined that at capheric vent valves ICS 11A and ICS 113 wuld be closed at all tires in Mode 4 except far tne surveillance testing of tnese valves when in Mcde 4 as recuested oy Toledo Edicon Cc::rf.cny.
The technical scecifications cefine tne maximum orimary syctem trecerature allowed in :cde 4 to ce 250 degrees Fanrenneit, which correspords to a steam ger.erator secondary side caturation precrure of atout 50 pounca cer scuate inch abcolute. Tha cinL uc design presnure for which the:u valves will open in abcur 300 pounds per scuare inch abcolute which is well accv0 the.v.cxim:n st%m. generater recendary side pressure of 50 ccends yr squara inen ancolute allmsable in Scde 4.
By letter dated Acril 7,1377, the ~'oledo Odisen Ccenany cc:mitted to ccerating the f acility unit witn ene decay neat rmcval systte when in ocerational Mode 4.
An autceatic serroint of 320 pounds :;ar acuare inen gauge on the decay heat remcval relief valva ascures that primary pressure will therefore not exceed 320 pounas per Iguare inch gauge when the decay heat removal syster is in opera:icn.
Therefore, we have determinM that in the avent of a stee:n generator tuc.e ructure accident in coaraticnal wxie 4, ccecuate acaerance ia erovidsd tnat the nexima crimary reactor ecclant pressure that could ba a: plied to valves ICS 11A.pd ICS 113 muld ce 320 ccunds cer scuare inen gcuge wnich ic calov the ainicum design crossure of 300 rounds car scuare inen gauge regairec to ocen these valves.
Alco,.<e have deterTaincd that the radiolccical ecnsecuer. css of a railure in Mcde 4 will be within the radiological consequences evaluated for rnis facility at full newer arJ pressure which was evaluated in our Safety E. valuation Report.
13ased on our review abcVe4 ve have determined that adequate assurance is provided that contair=ent scolation valves ICS 11A and IC3113 will be closed in Mode 4 f rer; eittar the maxinn pri;ary or seccedary cressure whicn eculd t>e appliad to tnace valves when in operational F. ode 4.
- Also, the surveillance testing of enese valves in Mode 4 will assure that their contairrent isolation function is operaole in tha event of a loss-of-coolant accident. In addition, the surveillance testing of these valves in Pode 4 o,ric s,
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. increase tne coerational reliacility of tnese valves by osreasing the probability of dange to these valves. Tharefore, we finJ Toledo Edison Company's requast to
.Prferni the required surveillance tecting of valves ICS IIA and ICS 113 in Mode 4 to be acceptable.
(4) In the Final Safety Analysis Report for Davis-Besse Unit I the accident analysis asstres that the annulus s;: ace cetween the secondary contairrent (shield building) and the = teel contaire.ent vecsel can be at a negative cressure of 0.25 inches water gauga witnin 730 seconds fc11cwing a postulated locc-cf-ccolant accident.
The purpose of surv-illance raquirment 4.6.5.1.d.4 is to verif/
by test concitiens that tne e ergency ventilaticn system can drau down the annulus tailure to a negative prescure of 0.25 inches water gauue within 780 seccrds followira the postulated less-of-coolant 3Ccident.
Actual test conditiona precluca the heat incut to the annulus ac woula occur urder less-of-coolant conditicns. Therefore, the Toledo ulison Cc::pany has determined that rest conditiens ter simulating tha loss-of-ccolant cercitions reouire that tne e:nergency ventilatien systen fan will draw down rne annulua space to a na3ative pressure of greatar than er equal to 0.25 frches vater gauge within the tire interval of less than or acual to 4 secon.is frem the ti;:e the ewrgency ventilation system fan corains 3000 cubic feet per minute flew plus or minua ten percent.
it.'en calculating t'w degescarization tire of the annulus voltsne following a loss-of-coolant acciuent,,, initial estimate xuat ba :.ade of the leakage rate into the annulus. Tna decres:suri:ation tira of the annulus cacc-es a direct fu cticn of the asstred leakage rate. hhen the Toledo Zdisen Cct: an/ caleclated the 733 saccrd deprassurization tire for tne annulus volum, a 2.4 square foot muivalent leasage area was assured in the shield buildinc. Cre of tne orirary curposes of Tecnnical Specification 4.6.5.1.d.4 is to ensure that the 2.4 square feet asstred leakage area has not been exceaded.
Por cur confirmatory analysis, we did rot allow credit to be taken for out leakage throtsh the shield bulloing, ars tne only leakace asstyned was tnat due to inleakage. Inleakage can only occur when the annulus 1
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- i the negative pressure of 0.23 inches water gauge. By perloaican < crawing down the annulus pressure fro.n at:nospheric to a negative G.6 inches water gauge, the Toledo Zdison Company not only verifies the functional capacility of tne emergency ventilation system but also Justifies the initial lea'< age area of 2.4 square feet.
Technical Scecification 4.6.5.1.d.4 presently calls for a single eeergency ventilation system fan to draw down the annulua volume frca at escheric 5,rossure to a negative pressure of 0.25 incnes water gauge in 12 seccMs.
The 12 seconds inclMes fan startup time and instrument delay timen.
Analycis 'y the Toleco Ediscn Coreany nas shown that the emergency c
ventilation syste:2 fan recuires 25 seconds (assuming loss of offsite power) after the costularec losc-ef-coolant accident to startuo and attain the maximum capacity of 3000 cucic feat per ninute flow. The res;cnce ri.ms of emrgency ventilation systec valves snd da.q. r and v
the fan start time racuired to cctain maxi:3um ficw capacity are verified
.:y Tecnnical Scacification Surveillance Recuiraments 4.3.2.1.3 for safety featurec actuation ?!stea response tims.
Under actual loss-of-ecolant conditions, the annulus cressure does not reach at:noscheric conditions until nearly 720 sxends after tne accident occur s.
Increfore, the emergencf ventilation syste.n fans have crcle tire to reach the G000 cucic feet per minute flow before tne fans are reg:f re.1 to draw down the annulus pressure below e.tmoseneric ccnditions.
We have derarmined that the requestas c.ange will allcw the e ergency ventilation 3fstem to te testad under cenoitien that would te mere realistic following a loss-of-coolant accident. The fcur sacends recuired to draw the annulua volcce from atccseneric crancure to a nagative 0.25 incnes water gauge is based en the original assumd leaio:e area of 2.4 scuare fear, and since the total decressurication ri.m of 780 sacends cas not beon enanged, we have determined that testing the emergency ventilation syste fer a depressurization ti.m of four seconds with the fans at maximum capacity will = ore closely approxi= ate loss-of-accident corditions, ano therefore, we find the requasted change accectacle.
In addition, we note, as stated in Supolement 1 to our Safety Evaluation i
Ecport enat we have calculated the radiological accident doses using a conservativa ceprescurization ti.m of 302 seconds and cur = valuation determinad that the radiological accident doces are within the 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines.
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-e-(5) Licensing condition 2.C.(3)(j) presently sticulates that:
"Until such ti:e as final resolution is obtained regardity; the potential for and consecuences of an inadvertent closure of a deca; neat renoval cystem valve during snutdown operations, Toledo Edison Carpany shall caintain power on decay heat removal isolation valvas al 11 and Dtl 12 are shall operate ene decay heat removal train at a ti e."
ik have determined that licensing cordition 2.C.(3)(j) shculd be revised as follows:
"Until sucn tire as final resolution is octained rMardino the pctential for and consequences cf an inadvertent closure of a decay near receval system valve durino snutdown cceratices, Tolado Edison Cocpany shall c.aintain ccwr on decay heat removal isolation valves Cd 11 and al 12 and snall crorate one cecay heat receval train at a tima.
This licensa eo:x2irien shall not precluda perror-ance of acocific surveillance or precoeratienal test recuirerents related to this ecuiptent and associated instrumentation as providst in the tectnical specifications.
For thoce cericas of tire during which caly one decay near removal train is available for operation or during the time that tne stancby decay heat recoval train is ceing crought on line, an operator shall be stationed in tne control rcos and casigned to acnitor flev rates in tha decay heat rec: oval trains, so as to imediately secura tha reactor heat re:cyal cump(s) should loss of flow occur due to the inaavertant closure of C:1 11 and Cil 12."
Paragraph 2 of the revised licensing condition 2.C.(3)(j) vill allow the Toledo Edicen Comagny to perform the surveillance and pracperational testing required to assure that the safety related valves, instrmentation, and safety system will be cperable.
J Paragrach 3 of the revised licensing condition 2.C.(3)(j) states that should loss of flow occur to the decay heat removal trains due to tne inadvertent closure of decay heat remcval isclation valves CH 11 and al 12, operator action can in:aeciately secure the decay heat reacval oume(s) and tnereby provide additional asaurance that tne decay beat removal pu:ap(s) will not be damaged.
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- e have determined that Technical Specification 4.5.2.d.1 re'.cuires a change in order to verify that autcmatic isolation and interlock action of the decay heat recoval system will occur when tha reactor coolant system pressure is greater than or equal to 413 punds cer square inch gauge.
We have required the Toledo Edison Comcany to ensure that the decay beat removal relief valve will actuate prior to automatic closure of the decay heat ter.cval system isolation valves in order to minimi::e the lixelihood of exceeding the pressure limitations of.Weiix G to 10 CFR Part 50 for the first fuel cycle. The autcmatic relief value will actuate at 320 punds per catare inch gauce which is 93 pounds per sqaare inen gauge celow the auto closure serpoint of 413 pounds per sg:are inch gauge for decay heat receval isolation valves GI 11 and al 12.
The cctivatien of tne decay heat removal isolatien valve at 320 punds per square inen gauge presantl'/ pracludes the varificaricn of tr.e autcr.atic isolation and interlock action of the decay heat recoval system with reactor coolant system flow greater tnan or ecual to tne 413 punds par sg:are inch gauge as presently sticulated in Technical 3cecification 4.5.2.a.1.
In order that assurance will he provided for meeting the pressure limitations of Acpendix G for the first fuel cycle and also, that Tecnnical S ecificatien 4.5.2.d.1 can be verified cy test, we hr.ve determined that Tecnnical Seccificatien 4.5.2.d.1 < lould be enanged d
as follows:
" Verify automatic isolaticn and interlock action of the decay neat racoval system from the reactor coolant cycram when a siculated reactor coclant systa:a pressure of greater than or ecual to 413 pounds per squara inen gauge is apclied.
This change will address ccth cur concerns for meet..g Accendix G limitations and for tne functional testing required to verify that autcoatic isolation of the decay heat receval system from the reactor ecolant system will occur.
ile nave determined that the technical soecification 3.4.1, item (a) of action ::cdes 3, 4, and 5 should ce changed by revising the footnote of page 3.4 4-2 to reA1:
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- All reactor coolant otznca and decay heat receval train puces may be deanergized for up to one (1) hour to accormdate decay heat removal pump switching operations, surveillance testira, and preocerational resting provided no operations are permitted wnica could cause dilution of reactor coolant system coron corcentration.
- his char.ge will permit the Toledo Zdison Coacany to allow the interlock on either decay heat isolation valve to ' e taken out of c
service in order to perform the Channel Calibration or Channel Functional Test Surveillance r+cuirements as required in Modes 4 ard 5 to meet the surveillance recuirecents of Tactnical Specification 3.4.3.2.2 ard surveillance Eecuirecent 4.3.2.1.3.
Inis change allows the re<;uired preccerational and curveillance testing or valves TE 11 and 3112 te accure their cearability ard recuired safety functicns. In addition, ene recuested chanca to technical scecification 3.4.1 dces not enarce our conclusion in our sucporting safety evaluation to /Wenc;.?ent I to Facility Ccarati^g License, ;iiR-3, vnere we stated that the change in Tecnnical scecification 3.4.1, itaci (a) of Action ?xx!as 3, 4, and 5 doas not irclude any increase in the procacility or corsequences of accidents graviously considered in our Safety Evaluation Fecott, Su7cle.nent i to the Safety Evaluaricn Feport, and rne Final Safety Analysis Kopert.
ENIPCliECAL C_Qi3IC._ERATI_QI.
e have determinad that the amenca:ent does not authorize a change in af fluent types or teral amounta not an increase in pcvar level md will not r9sult in any significant enviremental i=act.
Having.acda enis determinatien, we hava further concluced tnat tte a:tendcent involves an action which is insignificant frcr.1 the stardocint of enviren ental irpcct ord, pursuant to 10 CU 351.5(d)(4).
that an anvirc.~r. ental i= ct statecent or regative declaration mc envircrrental itcact apcroisal need ner ce precared in Ocnnection with the iccuence of reis a:erc: ent.
C tic _w3Ici We have concitr3ed, based on the considerations di:cu; ed accve, that:
(1) because tne amerdaent does not involve a significant increase in tha pro-bability or consequences of accidents previcusly censidered er a significant decrease in any safety r.argin, it does not irr/olve a significant nazards censiceration, (2) there is reascnable assurance that the health ar.d safety of tfie puhlic will not be endangered by cperation in the procesed ranner, and (3) such activities will be cenducted in expliance wit 3 the Cemission's l
regulations and the issuance of this amenchent will not ce inimical to the l
ccmnen defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. ' Also, we raaffirm our conclusions as otherwica starod in our %for r evaluation remr t.
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