ML19319A727
| ML19319A727 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1970 |
| From: | Kelley W, Murphy C, Seidle W US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19319A724 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-70-09, 50-269-70-9, NUDOCS 7911280635 | |
| Download: ML19319A727 (21) | |
Text
th' O. S. ATOMIC ENERGY CO. MISSION REG 10N II DIVISION OF COMPLIAUCE Report of Inspection CO Report Nr, 50-269/70-9 Licensee:
Lake Power Company Oconce 1 License No. ClPR-33 Category B Date of Inspection:
September 1-4, 1970 Date of Previous Inapection:
Auguut 3-7, 1970 Sspectcd By:
kh_AY, /
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D C. E.11 rphy,I eae,kfor Inspector R
l (In Charge) f 2 fl?Q o% */ Th
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S W.D.Kelkey
.eacf5r Inspector Date (Constpdctpn) 20!70 W.C.Seidle,Sel[iorReactorInapector
-, d Reviewed Dy:
Date Note: The sections of this report relating to Table A Requirements and the fire in the primary system piping were prepared in the main by W. D. Kelley.
Proprietary Information:
None SCOPE A routine, announced inspection was made of the 2568 mit pressurized water reactor under construction near Seneca, South Carolina, known as Oconee Station No. 1.
Purposes of the inspaction:
(1) to determine the construction status and significant changes to schcdule dates; (2) to review the problem of primary piping clad fissures; (3) to review the information relating to tbc fire in the primary locp piping; (4) to review records relating to mechanical equipment and piping systems; and (S) to review test procedures.
SUMMARY
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Safety Items - Hone
f, CO ltpt. No. 50-269/70-9 '
Nonconformance Items - None Unusual Occurrences - None Statuu of Previous]v Rotorted Pro 13 cm3 1.
The licensee now plans to load test the polar crane.
(See Managccent Interviewt) 2.
A review of the records relating to the Table A !kquirc:nents ir.dicates that the licensee is properly auditing thece records.
(See Sect. ion L.)
3 The licensee is continuing his review of the main ste un pipe hanSer design. (See Management Interview.)
g Other Si gni fl cant Items, ~
1.
During the procecs of modifying the primary loop piping for the Westinghouse pumps, BEi found evidence of microfissures in the stainless steel cladding.
(See Section F.)
2.
A fire occurred in a section of the primary loop piping which was
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being cleaned. Although the licencee has not completed his investigation, available information indicates that the pi.pe was not damaged.
(See Management Interview and Section M.)
3 During the baseline inspection of the steam generator skirt, defects were found in the adapter section which joins the skirt to the vessel head.
(See Section K.)
Outstanding Items - See Exhibit A for current status of outstanding items.
Management Interview - The management interview was attended by Beam, Smith, Hampton, Curtis, and Freeze.
1.
The inspector adviccd Curtis that in reviewing the records relating to the high precsure injection pumps, he had noted that one pump curve had been mislabeled and that some data sheets were barely legible. In addition, one pump had becn repaired subsequent to its performance test; and, although the records indicated that a second test had been run, documentation of this test and the final cleaning of the pump was not in the recoids. Curtis advicexl the inspector that the cleaning records and the correct performance curve for the repaired pump were available in Charlotte and that this information would be inserted in the records, lie also stated that the nislabeled pump curve would be corrected and that new data sheets were being supplied by B&l to replace those that were ll O
s
y
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Co apt. No. W-26c;/70-9.,
barely legible. The inspector advised the licensco that these items would be reviewed during the next inspection.
(See Section G.)
The innpector nt tod that $n revie Mg the reem& repting to both
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the high prescure injection prps ad the low picssure injuetion pumps, the mill certification sheets referenced an Ingersoll-Rand (I-R) specification for the metallurgy requirements.
Although I-R had certified that the materials met their requirements, there was no way in which the inspector could verify this. Curtis stated that he would have this infonnation placed in the files and it would be available on the next inspection.
(See Section G.)
3 The status of the BW review of the ficuures in the primary coolant piping was discussed. '3eam stated that it was likely that the defective pipe would be replaced.
(See Section F.)
4 In response to the 3nspector's c:estien, Deren stated that the licensee expected to complete his review of the ma5n stetun pi. ping hanger design and that the hangers would be redesi ned if the 6
review indicated the need for stronder hangers. The inspector advised Beam that he would review this item on the next inspection.
5 Beam advised the inspectors that th licensee was evaluating the significance of the indications thL had been noted in the steam generator ukirt during the baseline tests. He stated that the results would be given the inspector upon completion of the evaluation.
(See Section K.)
6.
The inspector asked if further infonnation was available relative to the control rod drives. (During the previous inspection, the inspector had witnessed an examinaticn of some of the mechanisms; of forty mechanis:rs examined, eight had been found to be incorrectly assembled and the guide-bushings of three others were out of t olerance. )-.1/ Smith stated that the remaining thirty mechanisms had been examined but that he had not as yet been advised of the results. The inspector said that he would review this item on the next inspection.
7 The infonnation available relative to the fire in the primary system piping was discussed. Beam stated that they planned to determine the amount of heat released during the fire and to conduct tests to further support their position that the piping had not been damaged.
-.1/CO. Report No. 50-269/70-8.
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.. C0 apt. I:o. 50-269/70-9
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- tion, The inspectors agreed that based upon presently available informa The inspectors it did not appear that the pipe had been damaged.
tend to support stated that if the tecte and heat release calculationsD.ani caid tha this position, they would take no further action.
t would attempt to have this information available during the nex inspection. (See Section M.)
In response to the inspector's question, Ecan stated that the polar i l cononents crane would be tested prior to the har.dling of crit ca 8.
to the trake since the :nulifications to the crane included changes control circuit.
on the first day of the irspection Wells had adv!.aed,the inspectocthat ter. don grease had been fo i
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joint at the construction access opening.During the management interview, had not as yet completed an evaluation.Ecan told the inspec tion the significance of the tendon grease scoping throu joint.
on a future inspection.
The inspector advised Smith and Hampton tha 10.
Smith stated that c
piping nor for the max 3 mum particle size permitted.
i they would be able to provide justification for these items dur ng the next inspection.
(See Section H.)
In response to the inspector's questions, Smith stated that the hydrotest procedures would centain a list of instrumentation that 11.
He also stated that must be protected from hydrotect pressures. deviations from approval prior to conducting the specific tests.
The inspectors advised Beam and Surtis that a Compliance audit the records relating to pipe and valve nondestructive testing (See Sectio 12.
indicated that the Table A requirements had been met.
DETARS A.
Persons Contacted Duke Power Comcany (Duke)
J. C. Rogers - Project Engineer D. B. Een - Ausiutant Project Engineer J. R. Wells - Principal Field Engineer (J
co npt. no. 50-269/'/0-9 '
J. E. Smith - Plant Superintendent J. W. Ha:r.pton - Assistant Plant Superintendent J. M. Curtis - Quality Asurance Er.gineer J. L. Destertag - Echanical Engineer R. E. Blaicdell - Welding Engineer D. L. Freeze Office Engineer
_Pabcock ar:d Wilcox ComoandF?hQ W. Faaaac - Field Supervicor W. W. Spangler - imaistant Project Manager
- W. C. Buckey - I'.anager of Quality Control, Mt. Vernon
- By telephone.
l A<h:Unistration and Orcanization B.
J. W. Ececon, Assistant Field End neer, Civil, Duke Pewer Company, i
has resi gnc<i.
C.
Quality Asauranco
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No changes have been r.ade in the licenoce's quality assurance l.
progra:a since the previous inspection.
Qualitly assurance items are discucued in the individual report 2.
l sections.
D.
Constaction Progress Turbine generator croction is en schedule arel all nnjor sections 1
are in position and alignment is in progress.
in the control room and installation Electrical work is continuin6 2.
of cables is in progress in the spreading room.
The The auxiliary building structural work has been co:rpleted.
3 installation of the hot and cold laboratory walls is underway.
installed.
4 One Westinghouse pu:ap volute is be3nd 3
The pressurizer has been set in pocition.
E.
Conutruction Scheduls Erection of the turbino denerator 1.c expect,cd to be complete
, 1.
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by January 15,19'll.
Co apt. no. 50-269/70-9 i 2.
Vousel internals are ccheduled for installation during November 1970.
3 Core lending is now neh.duJ cd for car];. March 1971.
4 Installation of the Westinghouse coolant pumps is scheduled for completion in Hovember 1971.
F.
P rin.ary Coolant P.i ni n,t The replacement of the Bingham prinary coolant pops with Ntindme pumps necessitated the modification of the pr3mry coolant piping.
Four sections of pipe had been returned to the TMN Mt. Vctnon shops for the installation of reducing secticus. The licenace Imd advised g
that flesures had been 20,1970,/
i Compliance by telephone on August j
found in the cladding of one pipe section.3 H. E. Oller, Region III, i
was at the vendor's facility at the t ime ar.d submitted a ceport of his inspection to Region II (Exhibit B).
The inupector : cecived additional information during this innpection. The follcwind report contains the information available at the present L.ite.
The primary coolant pipe had been fabricated from A106, Grade C, seamless carbon steel pipe and had been clad with 18-8 stainless steel using a semiautonstic 6 uire submerged are process.
In order to control the final chemistry of the cladd$rg, the flux was doped with chromium and nickel. Two flux types wre used. The first typa was
( isigned to add 2% chromium and 1% nickel to the clad, and the second t add 16I chromium and 2% nickel. All of the p.ipe had been fabricated a i clad in the E&W Barberton shops. The pipe had been fabricated il two sizes; 36-3nch pipe is required for the line frca the pressure vessel to the stean generators and 28-inch line is required from the steam generators to the four coolant pumps and from the pump dischargas to the pressure vessel. Two of the sections of 28-inch pipe had been assembled at Barberton with elbows at one end for attachment to the steam generators and stainless steel cafe ends at the other end for attachment to the coclant pump sections. The remining sections had been sent to the Mt. Vernon shop to be sinilarly asse bled.
Eight-foot-lond sections had been cut from cach of the pump suction assemblies ar.d returned to Mt. Vernon for the att.achment of transition pieces to match the h"estinghouse pumps ' 31-inch-d$ ameter inlet.
(See Exhibit B.) Two inches of safe end material were included on each of ll-Inquiry Memorandum dated August 21, 1970, from Eegion II (Seidle) to Compliance Headquarters (O'Reilly).
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c0 npt, no. 50-269/70-9 '
the pipe sections.
Approxiaately 15 inches of each cection were not required in the new arrangement and this excess pipe was removed from the end opposite the safe end. A weld preparation was.achined onto the end frca th5 ch the excecs pipe had been removed. The Mt. Vernon shop procedure for ::.s. chin.ing the weld preparations required that the weld preparation and 1/2 inch of the adjacent interior cEdding be given a liquid penetrant test.
The penetrant tcst of one section, identified as a part of assembly SN E67, revealed numerous small indications $n the cladding extending 0 around the pipe.
A complete penetrant test of the the full 360 interior cladding revealed two additional large areas containing indications. The carbc1 steel pipe conta.ined no indications.
The cladding in the pipe was machined down 1/8 inch and was again g
penetrant tested. Nine cmall areas continued to exhibit $ndications.
These areas were ground until no indications remained. The ground area sizes were as follows:
Depth Width Length (Inchl Ench],
(Inch)
[,
1/16 1
1-3/8 1/16 1-3/8 1-1/2 1/16 3
1-3/4
- l/8 1-3/4 2-3/4 3/32 3/4 3
1/16 1-5/8 2-1/4 1/16 1-3/8 1-3/8 1/8 2
13 1/16 1-1/2 1-3/4 Urhis indication extended the depth of the cladding which is 1/4-inch thick.
The inspector was advised by Buckey that the fissuring was probably due to low delta ferrite content. E&W had made two sets of chemical analyses from four' sets of saraples. The results in percent were as follows:
Carbon Chronri um Nickel Manganese Su icca Solnhur_ Phosphorous Analysis 1 0.106 17 19 8 44 1 44 0.61 0.016 0.011 Analysis 2 0.111 16 70 8.07 1 47 0.61 0.019 0.015 Acceptance- 0.08 Max. 17 00 Min.
7 00 Criteria
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'CO Rpt. Ho. 50-269/70-9 Buskey advised that they had plotted Schaeffler diagrams from this data and had' determined t, hat the delta ferrite content was between 2 5% and 5%. He stated that it had been BSM's experience that a content lens than 5% w1 s p; me t o hot cr: M n g.
The t sts indleated
.that the material was in the austenit,ic range rather than the brittle martensitic range. This was confirmed by making two guided bend tests of namples in accordance with ASE Cection IX.
Both samples pauscd these tests. Buskey felt that the high carbon content was caused by the camples being taken from the weld metal elcae to the carbon steel base metal at which point there would be a considerable amount of dilution. - Duskey statal that BW then sent an HDT technician to the site with a calibrated magnet gauge to make faccite measurc-ments of the remaiuler of the 2Sinch piping. The technician mescured ferrite of the pipa in each o,uadrant Jn aix-inch intervals. The g
results of these touts are auxxicized below:
Pipe _St{
Test Rcsulto B-67, 0-24" Less than 5%, mostly 2 5%
B-67, 24-60" 7 5%
B-67,66-114" 10%
B-67, 120-206" 7 5% and 10%, m tly 7 5%
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A-67 Mostly 7 5%
B-45 A 7 5 - 10%
B-45 B 5 0 - 7 5%
B-40 A 5 0 - 7 5%
B-40 B 5 0 - 7 5%
B-46 A 5 0 - 7 5%
B-46 B 5 0 - Jos, costly 7 5% and greeer B-41 A 7 5 - 10%, mostly 10%
B-41 B 7 5 - 10%, mostly 10%
A-57 7 5 - 10%, mostly 7 5%
B-57 10 - 15%
- Measurements are from point of removal of eight-foot section dove to first elbow.
Samplo No.
Carben Chromi um Nickel 1
0.102 18.02 8.68 2
0.120 17 95 8 71 3
0.311 17 43 8 58 4
0.205 17 57 8.64 Buskey stated that the carbon ecntents are probably high because of contamination from the carbide burr. Two new etmples are to
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be taken using a chipping hammer.
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co npt. ::o. 30-269/70-? (
Iktallographic camples tint had been retaint 1 when the pipe us fabricated were removed from storage and analyzed. !!o rcal correlation could be obt,ained, however, aid Buskey postulated that thic ::.s pret9]y c tm:3 by t he m ple" % g t,h-fem tN
'u r face of the etainl< w nicel price to. achi:dng.
A penctrant test was then telo of the remainder of piece B-67 Ir.dications were found for the full length of the piece. These indications were sm l1 and randomly spaced. The licensee has stated 1, hat he wi31 penetrant test the re::.ainder of the pipe including the 38-inch--diaster het leg piping bet. ween the reactor vessel ara the uten generator. He nou plans to replace ihe defective secticn of pipe with a section from Unit 2 arai will either repair nry other defective arcas or rcplace the pipe where they occur. -
.I Hote: On Septenter 22, 1970, the inspe;t or rcceived a t
telephone call from W. H. Ovien, Zechanical Engineer, Duke Fouer Cor.pany. Owen otatcd that the licensee planne.d to repair the def ative pipe and to use it for Unit 1.
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The inspector aub4 Spangler ar.d Euskey if the defuctive pipe had received a dye penetrant tcat prior to its shipment to the site.
They statmd that the tcuts had been perfor:wd, but it was later deter.11ned that the teats cn this sectien had been perforced prior to stress relieving but not after. In respanse to the inspector's question, Euskey atated that MN felt that the fiscures ucre caused by i~ proper flux. At approximately the time that this pipe had bcan clad, they had become aware that none of the flux which they received
-had not been complet.ely mixed.
For this typc operation, they use either of two types of flux as required. One type is desi ned to 6
add 25 chromium and 1% nickel to the clad and the secor.d adds 4%
chromium and 2% nickel. E91':5 practice had been to take one flux sample from a 200-pour.d lot for analysis. If the analyais proved good, the lot was accepted. Af ter it was detelnined that some of the flux received was puly mixed, BSW changed their peccedure to tako senples from each of three lots. If the analyuca were correct, the three lota uere then b1crAed together to make one 600-pound lot. Buskoy further utated that t. hey had been unawaro that any:of the defective flux had been used.
Statement at ACES Gubcommittee aceting, September 10,1970, hr, 3, Lee, VP Fhgineering, Duke Power Company.
e
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CO Rpt. No. 50-259/70-9 '
G.
Hinh Pressure Injection Puro - Attachment L Followup Recon! Review (4905.05),
o The ilopectors reviewed the licunsco's quality assurance data packages for the high pressure injecticn pumps, Serial Mos 1]iP-PlA, 1HP-PlB, JJ!P-P10. Each data package contained the following:
(1) transmittal slip from E&N to the licensee; (2) QA data sheet listing applicable specifications and requirements; (3) material verification; (4) liquid penetrant test data; (5) hydrostatic test data; (6) performance test data; (7) cicanliness data; (8) ultta-sonic test data; (9) assembly records; and (10) clearance inspection records.
In revicwing these records, the inspector noted that although the material certifications appeared to be in order und had been reviewed and approved by E!M, they referenced an Ingersoll-Rand specification for chemical '.nd physical requirements. The data packages did not contain a copy of this specificaticn and the inspector could not verify that the reouiremants had been met. The inspector also noted that tany of the data sheets were barely legible ar.d the performance curve for the 1B pump had been mislabeled 1A.
In e
addition, the records indicated that the 1B pump had been repaired and a sccond performance test had been conducted. The results of this test and the final cleaning records :cre not in the 1B data package. The performance curses for the 1A and 10 pumps and the initial curve for the 1B pump indicated that the pumps met the FSAR performance requirements. Curtis advised the inspector that the cleaning records and the correct performance curve vore in the licensee's files in Charlotte. He also stated that a copy of the Ingersoll-Rand material requirements would be 01 ained and that all the missing documents would be included in the site records. The inspector will review these records during the next inspection.
H.
Low Pressure Injection Pumos - Attachment L Followuo Record Review (4905 051 The inspector reviewed the licensee's QA data packages for the low pressure injection pumps, Serial Nos. lLP-PlA, ILP-PlB, and lLP-PlC.
The data packagea contained the came items of inforn:ation as did the data packages for the high pressure pumps. The records were in order except for the Ingersoll-Rar:d material cortification requirements.
- Curtis advised the inspector that this data would be included in the data packages. The inspector will review this item during the next inspection.
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co npt. no. 50-269/'/0-9
-ll-I.
Letdown Coolers - Att achment L 1.
Fo31ewup. Record Review (4005.05)
The in:,pector audited the data p[ckages for the letdozn evolere.
The types of information contained in these packages were the same as for the injection pienps.
No discrepancies were notrd by the inspector.
2.
Followup Observations of Work (/$5.051 Tre inspector reviewed the installaticu of the letdo'.m ccclers and did not note any deviations fro:n the insta31ation dra.-zings.
'ihe coolers are located in a relatively iaolatcd area and no special protective measurcs a re required.
J.
Pressurizer Safetv Valves Followim Record Review (/@h05).
The inspector audited the licenuce's data packe.ges for pressurizer safety valves, Serial Hos. IRC-V1,1EC '!2, r.nd 1RM3 The type informaticn ecntained in these packages correapo:.dcd with that for the injection pumps. No deficiencies were not-d.
K.
Lmninations in the Steam Generat or Skirt Adanter The baseline inspection of the steam 6anerator using ultrasonics revealed defects in the adapter between the support skirt ard the vessel head. The adapter for one steam generator contained in excess of 400 indications and the coccnd contained over 200 indications. - L'hile the number of defects exceeded the number permitted, the size of the indications was snall and the problem had been referred to E!!d, Lynchburg, for disposition.
The adapters were originally ultraecnically teated at EVd, Barberton, but a different technique was used at that time. In the technique in use at Earberton, the scanning was done from inside the vessel; whereas at the site, the scrutning is donc from the outside. This item will be reviewed during the next inspection.
2.
Followun cord Review (/@i.On The inspector was shown a ecpy of a report entitled, Stea 1 Generator Vessel Fabrication Report." This esport contained
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the following inforr ation:
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. CO Rpt. No. 60-269/'/0-9
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^ on by F. A. Perrera, Mana6er, EEd Quality a.
Certif' ASIE Code, a.at the vessel complied with the Contr Section.IJI.
A copy of QC Specification 2E4-1"1, the controlling b.
specification for the vescel.
ASFE Form H-1, Manufacturer a Data Report for Nuclear t
Vescels, which was ecrtified by a representative of the c.
liartford Insurance Company.
A rubbing of the H utamp on the nameplates.
d.
EFd.
Certification of stress reports signed by J. P. Eatu _,
c.
I Variation notices with resolutions.
f.
NDT procedures for radiography, ma6netic particle, penetrant testing, and ultrasonic testing together with acceptance g.
standards.
General fabrication procedures.
h.
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List and description of all welds required.
i.
Weld data sheets including details of heat treating and j.
NDT.
Weld procedure qualification ar.d operator qualifications k.
for each type wold.
1.
General welding specifications.
Material certifications including chemical, physical, and m.
Charpy V-Notch test results.
In an audit of these records, the inspector did not note any Since the remainder of the records for the deficiencies.
steam generator will remain at the Bud Barberton shops, the inspector plans no further action on this item.
L.
Table A Reaniretrents The licenace's records were audited to determine if the UDT requiremen The inspectors were shown data packages of Table A had been met.
covered by relating to all the velves, pipe, and pumps that arcRecords re The reconis indicated Table A.
b steel Wa worth valve were reviewed in d'etail.
u
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CO Rpt. No. 50-2 9//70-9 that the valve had received the NDT teuts rcquired by Table A.
Records relating to a ll,-inch,1500-pound, gate valve were also reviewed, and it was detemined that the NDT requirements of Table A had Letn.:.ct.
Oca =rtag ad a Jw te rends rW ing to 01 ass I equipawnt had received a 100% audit by the licensee wht:re the licensco h1d made the purm.ase.
For B&W fabricatcd equipment, Curtis stated that the licenoca has audited almost 100% of the records; and for LU purchased equipment, the licensee has audited approximately 50% of the records ar.d is satisfied that the NDT requirements of Table A have been met.
It appears that the licenace No further action is is properly nuditing the vendor NDT records.
planned by the inspectors on thiu item.
M.
Fire in Primary System __
The lice L ee had notified Compliance of a fire in the primary system During this inapection, the results of the licencee's piping. -
investigation of the fire eere revieued to determine the extent of the damage, if any, to the nuclear plant ecmponents.
The licensee had not as yet completed his investigation of the fire, but the results of a preliminary investigation indicated that no I
dama.3 was done. Blaisdell had conducted a visual examiration of the piping and adjoining steam generator on August 21, 1970. TLe exterior revealed that (a) grease in bolt holes was not damaged; (b) tne aluminum type primer paint on the erterior of the equipment was rot charred;_ (c) grease en the main manhole seat was liquid; (d) ctuds for the drain cover plates had a black residue which was easily removed by wiping; and (e) no metallic surface exposed in the The examination
- area chowed any evidence of temper color from heating.
of the interior of the steam generator and piping revealed that (a) no temper color indication was found on any clad surface (temper color indications uere still present in the area of stress relieving in the 28-inch pipo); (b) grease and oil from the machining operation were still present in liquid form in the interior of the pipe; and (c) the tape used to hold a plastic barrier over the steam generator tube ' sheet was not charred and the plastic barrier was charred in only one small area. 1.dditional information relating to the fire is as follows:
(a) The fire appeared to have ignited in a bucket of
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acetone located in the steam generator. This bucket was subsequently overturned and some of the acetone upined through a four-inch nozzle to the area under the steam gener,. tor kirt.
(b) The fire melted the galvanize coating in the tucket. The posiion of the melt line indicates
_.1/Inquiry Mcmorandum dated August 21, 1970, from Region II (Seidle) to
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Ccmpliance Headquarters (O'Reilly).
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co Rpt. Ho.-504 69/70-9
-1t-that approximately two quarts of acetone were involved.
(c) Plywood steps'used to enter the steam generator manway were charred. ilells advised the -ilwpectors that the licensee planned to test the plastic barr!cr nrd th tape to dctorh the 2.
p ratures t which they vrill char. The invcsta caticn is to continue..:.d an in-house Dcke report relating to-the fire will be issued. The inspector will review this item during a subsequent inspection.
N.
Test Procedure Review The inspector advised Smith and Hampton that a review had been made of the following test precedures:
Number Title TP/1/A/200/8-A Reactor Coolant Temperature Narrow Range TP/1/A/150/5 Electrical Penetration 0-Ring Seal Leak Test TP/1/A/200/1 Reactot Internals Vent Valve Inspection TP/1/E/202/8 liigh Pr mure In/cetion Flush l.
TP/1/B/203/7 Low Pressure Injection and Core Flocd Systems Flush Smith was asked if the pickup and transport times of particles had been considered when determining the length of time that a section of pipe would be flushed. He was alco asked the basis for 45 micron mean dimension being the largest acceptable particle sise. The inspector pointed out that the inlet strainers in s<. e of the systems were sized to permit the passage of a 50 micron particle. Thus, if 45 microns woro the largest permissible size, the filters would pass particles larger than should be permitted.
3, tith stated that the 45
. micron size had been selected since it was about the minimum size that could be detected with the naked eye. He further stated that he would review the equipment involved to determine if some other size would be warranted based upon possible damage. He also advised the inspector that the flushing procedures would be reviewed to determine if the flushing times were adequate.
In response to the inspector's questions, Gmith said that instruments which must be protected from hydrotest pressures would be listed in the procedures. : He also stated that the polar er ane v.ould be tested
' for overtravel on loss of power prior to being used to lift critical assemblies.
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I co apt. !!o. 50-269/'/0-9 '
Tr;st Procedure TP/1/A/200/8-A states that the plant status
'.a not arsplicable for the test. Smith agreed with-the inspector that plant
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o'tatus should be specified since portions of the test could be conducted only uith the plant shut down, but some sections would
';. r e it e.=a were dw er_ ad te cercluet;d 4 t' the plc.nt opc rat 3:-C-in the nanagument interview.
Attachments:
Edlibito A tlam C i
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LICENSEE
-Duko Power Cominny g
_ FACII,ITY :
Oconco Station No.-l' LDOCKET & LICEUSE NOS.
50-269, CPTT Q _
- REACTOR OUTSTAlfDIN_G ITEMS _
-IDEUTIFIED ITEM CLOSED 2 66-2, 3/5/68, PC, Concreto test cylinder breaks belcw speca 6C.-3 D.S.,
6/19/68
. 68-.3, 6/19/68, BC Unauthorized revision' to Cadwold specifications.
68-4 Sumiary, 9/55/69 (38-3, 6/19/68, ljC Failure to provide concreto inspector 68-4 Sermy, 9/$5/69
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68-4, 9/25/68, M
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Failure to properly test Cadwold splices 69-1,/69-
- Surrenry, 1/6 69-8,9/9/69,'EC.
Failure'to properly qualify weld proceduros 69-9,G,11/3/69 6i)-8, 9/9/69, FC[
reilure to properly qualify woldors 69-9,G,11/3/69 lIED,-4/11/69 Procedure for repair of arc strikos not availablo 70-5, Sur:cary h/27/70
.-C(, 1/8/70-NDT of core flooding valves Memo, WCS to IIQ,.
2/2/70 3
- ! 70-1,1/6/70,NCi Welding and NDT deficisncies, CDN issued Memo, WCS to liq, 3/26/70 Bingham 69-1,-
! bin coolqnt pump discrepancies Closed; Memo,.UCS 12/9/69, E to HQ, 4/2L/70-
,70-4,.h/27/70,lic I,ov strength concretc Memo WCS to HQ' 8/7/70-IED,5/1/70-Pressure vessel safe ends Momo WCS to HQ.
8/ /70 5
70-6,5/25/70','NC, Tendon stressing discrepencies Me g g to HQ!
70-8, 8/3/70, ;NC,-
Tendons and stress gauges Closed, No-
' Response Required
'50-269/70-8 Fissures in pri' mary coolant pipe cladding *
-9/1/70 4
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"l K IDENTIP.CED Column:--S ~ safety--item; NC - noncompliance or nonconformance !
UN - unresolveT item;'IN - inquiry-item
~ iitem; lorcement Branch request; 0 - other cour;ce -of identificationTEB - Reactor In
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.and En
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.-(briefly specify)_
J Exhibit A 1
Page 1 of 2 Q-c....
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I,IC ENSES. ~ Duka _ Pouce _Compagy FACIT;ITY Oc_ onco Station No._1
- p' DOCKET & LICEUGE-NOS, W-269,_CPPR-33 REACTOR OUTSTMIDING ITEMS IDEUTIFIEb ITEM CLOSED IIEB,[7/31/70
= a.; Determination of safety systen responae to axial
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-power. imbalances.
. Availability.of incoro detectors.
b.
c.
Measurements of flow and temperature during initia L
. operation.
id. Verification of bypass flow.
j.
e.
Verification of axial peak effects on DNBR.
t'
(
f.
Data *during startup for single loop, 2 pump ol:crations.
g.
Inspection of reactor internals after completion of preoperational tests. -
(;
h.
Field test of steam generator.
- i. Low strength concrete and omitted tendons.
.j. Penetration room valves.
k.
Strain gaugo failuras.
m.
Coro flooding tank MO valve.
- n. - Reactor building spray pump performance..
o.: Condencer cooling water crossover header valve.
p.
Spcnt fuel ac udent filters.
- q. - Administrative control of NCP startup.
Flow tests lper 200/12 and 200/13 r.
- s. : Flow distribution chart.
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kr.lDENTIFiED Column: S safety. item; iry ' item; TEB - Reactor In'spection UC - noncompliance or nonconformance UN.-Lunresolvcif item; IN - inqu
- item; T6rcement. Branch. requeliT; 'O_other cource of identification
- and En
, ;(briefly specify)'
Exhibit A.
Pago 2_of 2'
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.REf0RT TO RECiON IT.
P,ABCOCK AND W1140X COMPANY MT VERNON, INDIANA ~
INSPECTION DATED AUGUST 20-21, 1970 By R. E. Oiler, Metallurgical Sgineer, CO:ITI On August 20, l')70, during the inspection of Oconee 2 primary coolant the inspector was informed by Mr. J. M. Curtis, Duke Power
- piping, Company, that a cracking problem had been found in the austenitic stainicas steel wcld clad on the ID of a 28 inch diameter spool piccc removed from one of four primary coolant pump suctions on the Oconec Unit 1.
This assenbly was identified as S-N B-67.
9 Due to the safety implications of this defect finding in the primary
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cc,olant piping, the inspector requested from the Duke Power company Vernon) action bdng taken f.
Q.V representative, a review of the B&W (Mt.
pipe and the ot'her to analyze the problen in regard to the suspect i
stainicss clad piping for the Oconec Unit.
Mr. Buskey, QC Manager, i
B6W Mt. Vernon plant, presented the following curamary of action as of August 21, 1970:
1
- Four pump sections spools identified as B-67, A-57, A-67, and
.b B-57 approxir.ately eight foot long, were cut out at the Oconec t
Vernon site due to the change of pumps and shipped to Mt.
for shortening to approximately 3 foot lengths. The modified jj, pieces contained about 4 inches of an austenitic stainicss l
steel safe end, and inconel buttered stainicss steel
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.dissinilar netal girth weld and about 2-1/2 feet of austenitic I
stainless wcld clad carbon steci piping. Af ter shortening 3
the B-67 spool and machining the ucid preparations at both ends, PT examination of the ID clad revealed numerous small l'
fissures in the cladding adjacent to the weld prep. ihis 1-l was on the carbon steel spool part.
No indications werc l
found in the carbon etect itself. Further PT examination of j
l the entire bore revealed other areas of cracking in the
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The stainicss steci cladding in the sorplus carbon
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c ladding.
l' steci spool also contains cracking.
Mr. Bu; key also stated the modified spool pieces for the othcr three assemblics e
that had bera PT cicated.
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B&W then proceeded to determine the cause of cracking by j.
making delta ferrite measurements,& chemical analysis for I
I-chromiu:a, nickel and carbon, 180 side bcnd tests and a t
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Exhibit B j
Pago 1 of 3 4-g _ __. _
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ulcroscopic study of the clad grain structure (latter study not coepicted). We test gave the following results:
a.
Delta ferrite enacent range was be*.s.en 2-1/2 and 57.
which a s Icss than reqairtd by opecification and indi-cated a potential for wold cle d hot cracking.
b.
Chemical analysis for the chr.uinn, nickel and carbon content,*tAmn compared with the schaeflec niagram, showed the n:aterial to be in the austcnitic range rather than umetensitic range. r,rittic m.rtensite vould have forced with excess are g netration. We carbon content was found to bc.1C47. and.107. for two.aaples.
c.
Side bend tests on cladding chewed no unacceptabic defects a
f.
which indicated ductility. d lack of brittle martensite.
d.
We photomicro;;raphs study to verify austenitic grain structure, lack of carter.sitic grain structure, lou ferrite, possibic other contaminaats and type of cracking, was not complete during this inspectica for review by the CO i spector.
Mr. Zuskey stated that he believed the cracking was related to i
the six wire clad technique since the cracks warc found at the j
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middic of the wide bead (2-1/2 inch). We problen is s till under study. Ec also stated that At. Vernon will probably have the Barberton Welding Reecarch Department participate in the study.
In regard to the balance of the Oconce 28" pump suction piping at the Oconce 1 site, a 3&W NDT specialist Mr. J. Russell, had been sent to take ferrite ccadutements and perform 2T inspection. We results of this field inspection were not yet availabic.
Mr. Euskey also stated that instructions to Mr. Russell would be modified peno'ng his findings at the site,
" Oa 3-24-70,. the CO inspector contacted Mr. J. M. Curtiss of Duke Pouct by telephone for' further results.
Mr. Curtiss stated that-some PT indications had been fcund in the old pipe stub of the 3-67 assembly but results were not yct complete at this time.
In regard to the modified 3-67 spool at Mt. Vernon, Mr. Buskey stated j
that all cracks had been ground out and 2T cicated. The spool J
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Exhibit B Page 2 of 3
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cladding was nou ready to be repaired by filling the cavities with manual taetal arc welding and then overciadding the entire bore of the old clad with a singic utre Type 3;3 stainless layer using auttaa tic subne ;gtd.,cc we lding. TSc new le;cr vould he PT cleared.
The CO This acsssbly had bu.n supplicd by the Larberten Works.
inspecter was told that the solvent removabic red dye PT technique is used at Mt. Vernen.
A list of the dimensions of the cavitics was given to the inspector as follous:
width Le gth
- yp_th, 1.
1/16 inen 1 inch 1-3/8 fach I
2.
1/16 inch 1-3/8 inch 1-1/2 inch i
3 '.
1/16 inch 3 inches 1-3/4 inch 4.
1/8 inch 1-3/4 inch 2-3/4 inch 5.
3/32 inch 3/4 inch 3 inch 6.
1/16 inch 1-S/8 inch 2-1/4 inch 7.
1/16 inch 1-3/8 inch 1-3/8 inch
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8.
1/8 inch 2 inches 13 inches 9.
1/16 inch 1-1/2 inch 1-3/4 inch I'
1l The CO inspector examined the ground out cavities in the spool piece and it appeared that they ucre grouped in three areas, i.e., the 1/8" x 2" x 13" circuoferentially adjacent to the weld preparation; a 6" x 6" arca (approximately) containing the deepes t cavities l
about 6" inward f rom the 2" x 13" area, and an 8" x 6" arca 6
(approximate), c,ntaining shallow cavitics, l
The inspector questioned Itr. Euskey in regard to inspection of tha 36 inch stain 1ccs clad pipe.
Mr. Buskey stated that they had not yet considered this pipe. lie stated further that they had confidence f
in the piping claddcd at Mt. Vernon as 1007. PT examination was made i
as the final inspection and the cladding was checked for p oper amount -of ferrite.as it was wclded on and chemical analysis was i
raade on the first and every fif th bead to assure the proper chrome-nickel ratio.
The CO inspector advised Mr. Curtiss of. Duke Power Ccicpany that Compliance would follow up on the final resolutions of this probicm in regard to the suspect pipe and other weld cladded piping..
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.l Exhibit B 1-Page,3 of 3 l
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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM ARR ANGEMENT - El.EVATION i
OCONEC NUCLEAR STATION k
Exhibit C i-P060 1 of 1 i..*
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