ML19319A722
| ML19319A722 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 11/09/1970 |
| From: | Murphy C US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19319A716 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-70-10, NUDOCS 7911280622 | |
| Download: ML19319A722 (25) | |
Text
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O U. 3. ATOKtC IGlERGY CO:"USS LON ltEGION II DIVISION OF CO:/.PIJANCE
" g rt of 3ru p ution CO Rcport I:o. '0-269/70-10 1,1 cena ce :
Duke Pov.er Cc::Tany Ococce 1 I,icense ro. CITR-33 Cat ego ry B
pt o be-r 28 - Cet obe r 2, 19'io Date of Innpoetion-i j
lhte of Previous Inupaction:
L e pt e,i c e 1-4, 1970
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Inapeettd By:
C. E.. : rp5/
ictor Inapector Catd (In Charge)-
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_E./S 1@r --~.
U -~ b13 U. Pot ;*povs, Rea,r'dd Inupector ("otalluygf Date
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'N Revi.e ed Ey:
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Gl 7 W. C. Col.dle, daior Reactor Inspector Dat'e Note: The nection of this report relating to the pt tr.ary pipe ficsurea waa prepared.in the r.:iin by U. Fotapova.
Propriotary Infor:r.ation:
None SCOPE A routine, announced inzpect lon was msde of the 2568 Met preocurizcd water reactor under construction nectr Seneca, South Carolina, knovn as Oconee Staticn No. 1.
Purpoacs of the inspection were:
(1) to determine the conutruction status and significant changes to schedule dates; (2) to review the problem of primary piping clad fiscures; (3) to review the problem of welding atructural steel; ar.d (4) to review progress in the lnctallation of electrical ar.d instru;r.cntation systems.
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29nas SM o
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.CC Rpt. No. 50-;?69/70-10,
SUMMARY
"afr_t,L Le g - Hone I
Monconforrance Items - Hone Unusual Occurrences _ - Hono Status o f Previously Reported Proble ;c_ -
1.
The main uteam pipe han6ers are being redesigned.
(300 Section G.)
2.
The licenace and Eabcock and Wilcox Co:r.pany (!EI) are ecnLinuing their investigation of the ficaures in the prir.ary pipe chdding.
(See Mana6cmont Interview ar.d Section J.)
The liccnoco has not as yet deter.ained a reso]ution of the steam 3
generator skirt adaptor defect problem.
(See Managment Interview. )
4 The licensco has conpleted his evaluntion of the control red drive bearing and torque tube alignment problem, but has not as yet issued a report.
(See Management Interview.)
5 The licenace has not perfoir.ed a lead test on the polar crane.
(See Management Interview.)
Other Sirnificant Items -
1.
The licensee has experienced considerable difficulty in welding A36 structural steel. This problem now appears to be recolved.
(See Section F.)
2.
The inspector was advised that a fuel transfer tCe was damaged during installation.
(See Section E.)
Outstr.nding Items, -- See Exhibit A for current status of outstanding items.
Management Interview - The management intersiew was held on October 2, 1970, and was attended by Rogers, Wells and Hunnicutt.
1.
The probicms acuociated with the welding of A36 structural steel were discusced. Wells statul that since revising the welding
. procedures they were no longer experiencing proble;.s with welding this material.
In response to the inspector's questions, Wells stated that the licensee planned to retest all the welds in the
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turbine building stccl that had not been tested using the revised I,
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i CO Rpt. No. 50-269/70-10 ultrasonic test procedure.
In addition, the licensee plans to test, on an audit basis, welds adjacent to repaired welds to verify that they had not been adversely aff :ted by the repair operations.
(See Section F.)
2.
The main steam pipe hangers were discussed. The inspector stated that he had been advised by Miller that the hangers were being redesigned to cnsure that they could withstard the applied loads without exceeding code recuirements. The inspector advised Rogers that he would review this item during the next inspection.
(See Section G.)
3 The baseline inspection program was briefly discusscd.
In response to the inspector's question, Wells stated that the licensee had not as yet determined what would be done about the indications tl,u}t had been previously found in t.he steam generator skirt sdapter..l/ The j
inspector will review this iter ~ the aexc inspection.
4 The inspector advised Wells thm ue hydrostatic test procedures which had been reviewed specified a test pressure of 150% of the system design pressure. This method of determining the test preocure 4
does not correspond with the method specified in the Nuclear Power Piping Code, USAS B317 This code relates the test pressure to both the design pressure and temperature. The inspector was advised that the proccdures would be revised to ensure that the code rcquirements would be met.
(See Section L.)
5 The problem of the primary piping clad rissures.as discussed in detail.
The inspector advised P.ogers that E&W had presented insufficient data to demonstrate conclusively that the causes of the fissures in the cladding had been detemined. Eud had also not been able to F resent data that would give assurance that the piping for Units 2 and 3 would not also contain fissures. The inspector pointed out that techniques and procedures would need to be developed to determine that the cladding in the pipe being repaired at the site was not ground down below the minimum one-eighth-inch thickness permitted. Because of the complexity of the clad fissure problemi the innpector asked Rogers if the '.censee had considered reporting the matter to the AEC.
Roders stated that this was heing considered but made no commitment.
(See Section J.)
_1/CO Report No. 50-269/70-8
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.,CO Rpt. No. 50-269/70-10,
6.
In response to the inspector's question, Wells ut,ated that the licensee had completed the inspection of the control rod drive mechanisms and that an in-house report had been preparcd conce... ng the pdde bearing. Uc further et ricd "=t he nr. der-tcrd tM.t no problem existed, but that he had not cs yet rcceived a copy of the report. He expected the rcport to be available for the inspector's review during the next inspection.
7 Wells advised the inspector that the polar crane test had not been performed but that the crane would be tested prior to handling the core internals in Hovember 1970, 8.
The inspector advised Wellu that he had observed safeguards systems cabics looped outside the cable trays. He pointed out that this routing made the cables susceptible to mechanical cht nge Wells agreed that this was contrary to the licensee's installation practices and that he would followup on ihis item. The inspector reminded Wells that the FSAR placed limitations on the quanti' > of cable that could be placed in a cable tray and he advised Wells that the tray fill would be reviewcd on future inspections.
(See Section H.)
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DRi'ATIS A.
Persons _ Cont s tr_d Duke Power Conaany (Dukel J. C. Rogers - Project Engincer D. G. Beam - Assistant Project Engineer J. R. Wells - Principal Field Engineer G. L. Hunnicutt - Senior Field Engineer C. B. Aycock - Field Engineer, Electrical G. W. Grier - Field Engineer, Hondestructive Testing J. E. Smith - Plant Superintendent J. W. Hampton - Assistant Plant Superintendent J. M. Curtis - Engincering QC Supervisor J. L. L. Ostertag - Mechanical Engineer Babcock'and Wilcox Comrany (E&W1 W. H. Spangler - Assistant Project Engineer H. L. Holmbrecht - Engineer Department, Earberten D. F. Levstek - Materials Engineering, Akron G. A. Walton - Hondestructive Testing, Mt. Vernon
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t 00 Upt. l'o. $0-269/70-10
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B.
Administration and Organization The licensee is in the process of reorganizing the Oconee quality a rol wetion. The nmi< structive test imit #
beh g cpgrrded to a
have equal rank with the civil, cechanical cnd electrical engineering units. Grier has been promoted from Assistant Field EnE neer to i
Field Engineer (NDT).
J. T. Moore, S :pervisor Technician (Welding),
is being made Supervisor (NDT) for the day shift and A. R. Thornton, HDT Technician (Radiography), is being promoted to Supervisor (NDT) for the night ubift.
In anticipation of the start of construction at the McGuire Nuclear Station next year and the transfer of scme personnel to that site, Hunnicutt has been promoted co the position of Senior Field Engineer. In this position, he is assaning the responsibility for the administration of the QC section. Wells will retain responsibility for all technical r 'tters.
T. E. Touchstone, l
Assistant Superintendent, Construction, is being transferred into the organization and will assume the dutico of Field Engineer (Civil).
C.
Qun]i.ty Assurance 1.
Curtis advised the inspector that the licensee had instituted a procedure for certifying that vendor quality assurance records had been audited by the licensee and found to meet applicable code and contract requirements. When an audit has been completed, the cognizant Duke QA engineer prepares a Form QA-6, " Quality Assurance Records Final Certification." (See Exhibit B.) This certification is sent under cover letter to C. E. Watkins, Assistant Vice President, Construction, Duke. The inspector was shown copies of the certifications for the following items:
a.
Steam Generators lA and 1B b.
Pressurizer c.
Core Flood Check Valves and Oatlet Valves d.
Decay Heat Ieolation Valves e.
Low Pressure Injection Valves f.
Pressurizer Power Actuated Isolation Valve g.
Pressurizer Safety Valves The inspector was told that the licensee would soon have certifications for all items of Class I equipment.
2.
Curtis advised the inspector that the mill certification rcquirements for the HP and LP injection pumps had been roccived and found to agree with the certification records supp'ied with the pumps. He stated that the HP-1B pump performance curve ard the cleaning record
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had not been received as yet but were expected prior to the next inspection. The inspector advised Curtis that these items would be reviewed during a future inspecticn.
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.C0 Hpt. No. 50-2 '/ 70-10,
3 Changes to the licensee's QC organization are discussed in Section B.
4 Other qun] My
- rcmo n item are di.,cm
- -d _n the ndividual rupcut auctions.
D.
-Cosatruction Progress _
1.
Turbine-conorator. erection continues on schedule.
2.
The emergency feeder cable from the Keowee !!ydro Station has boon installed and given a high potential test.
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3 Repairs to the primary pipe cladding are in progress.
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Three West.inghouse Electric Corporation (W) pump volutes have been installed.
5 All the tendons have been installed and but tonhcaded.
Approximately 80/2 have been strcused and greased.
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E.
Construction Schedule 1.
Vessel internals are scheduled for installation in late Hovember 1970.
2.
The internals for the first coolant pump are scheduled for shipment on Octobcc 28, 1970, and for the last pump one month later.
- 3. -Core loading will probably be in April 1971.
4 Tendon installation is expected to be completed during October 1970.
F.
Structural Steel _ Welding After upgrading his ultrasonic test procedure in April 1970, the licensee began detecting a significant number of cracks in the welds made on ASTM A36 structural steel members. The turbine building steel, the pressurizer support and the main steam pipe hangers were fabricated from this catorial. Wells advised the inspector that_ the licensee had attempted to determine the cause of the cracking but initially was unsuccessful. The weld procedure used in making the welds had been properly qualified according to ASMS,Section IX, for
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- the P-1 series of steels using SA53, Grade B pipe and E7018 electrode.j C0 Report No. 50-269/70-1 m
I co apt. no.. ';o-269/70-10 The weldors who had worked on these structures had been properly qualified to this procedure. In an attempt to detemine the cause mder of the cracks, ' c]da were ' mde by the welding nuperva sor closely controlled conditions. Cracks were found in these welds.
The steel manufacturer was requested to send representatives to the site in July, but Wells stated that they provided very little help. A revised welding procedure was developed by the end of August, however, that has proven successful. This revision requires that the rolled surface in the weld area be grour.d down approximately In 1/16 inch to remove mill scale and surface-hardened material.
addition, the weld area is preheated to approxLr.ately 200 F using strip heaters. Since acdifying the weld procedure, the rate of defective welds has dropped from approximately 50% to about 5%.
j Wells stated that the licensee planned to retest all accessible j
welds that had been mado prior to time thst the UI procedure had I
been revised. Some welds have been embedded in concrete and cannot be tested. In response to the inspector's questicn, he stated that they would also test some of the welds adjacent to repaired welds to ascertain whether or not the repair operations had an adverse effect on the adjacent welds. He stated that a sufficient number would be tested to determine if there was an effect but unless defects were noted that they would not retest all of these welds.
The inspector reviewed the UT procedure changes with Grier. Grier stated that the original procedure had met ccdc requirements but because they had been obtaining inconsistent results, the procedure was upgraded. The significant changes were as follows:
1.
The ultrasonic test instrument now must be calibrated each time a defect is noted as well as prior to use each day. A Mare Island Test Block is used as the calibration standard.
2.
The crystal that had been used in the test instrument has been replaced with a Branson crystal. The licensee stated that the Branson crystal gives a more columnatcd sound beam and made the location of defects easier.
3 Welds are now inspected from both sides of the plate in order to pick up indications that because of their orientation could be missed when inspecting from only one side.
Grier stated that they uced only the UT in locating defects in the welds. The licensee has the capability for making magnetic particle tests and has uscd this method on the main steam line and on carbon g
stcol plate. Magnetic particle tests have not been used on the structural steel because of the difficulty in working in high locations. The licensee has used liquid penetrant tests on the structural steel welds only to determine when the defect revealed by UT has been removed.
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i CO Rpt. No. 50-269/70-10 'The inupector reviewed the UT procedures which discunccd equipment requirements, personnel proficiency standards test met, hods and acceptance stand a do.
The recticn relating to equir lent dj.
_c m1 the instrtm.ent controls, method and intervals fur en tibration, the couplant to be used and the type crystal. The procedure requires that the UT technician demonstrate his proficiency in UT.
The licensee presently has two U" techn3cians.
One of the tecni,lans has been certifhd to SNT Les el II, the cecond has passed all his tests for Level 1I but had lacked t he requi red experit nee at the thne of the test. Ile has now ccepleted the orperiance rcquirements and Wella stated that the licanaec plans to upgw.de him in the near future. The procedure also descrjbed ahear ave sc annind techniques and the acceptance standants to be followed. The inspector did not note any deficiencies in this proccdure.
The inspector also reviewed i
I the liquid penetrant test procedure and the magmtic particle test procedure. Both of those procedurcs meet the requirements of the AST!i Code,Section VIII, and USAS Code B317 These proculures were found to contain the same type information as the UT procedure.
The inspector did not note any deficiencies in either procedure.
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The inspector was advised by Grier that only approved procedures had been used in making repairs to the welds. The repairs initially had not been successful but after the procedures were revised to require preheating the weld area, no further problems were experienced.
In response to the inspector's question, Grier stated that improper electrude control could have contributed to the welding problem, but he stated that the problem was so universal that he did not believe that this could have been a significant fr.ctor since only on rare occasion had his inspectors found the elect e ovens to be below required temperature. In a previous audit, the inspector had reviewed the procedures and records relative to receiving and storage of the pressurizer supports. No deficiencies had been nottd in this audit. The same procedures are used in handling all structural material. An audit of the mill certifications for the pressurizer support structure indicated that the material met both the chemi. cal and physical requirements of A36 steel. In discussing the problems associated with the A36 material during the management interview, Wells stated that all accessible welds made prior to the UT procedure revision would be ultrasonically tested agair He also stated that welds adjacent to repaired welds would be tested on an audit basis
_1/CO Report.No. 50-269/70-7
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'c0 npt. No. 50-269/70-10 -
to ensure that the repair procedure did not affect the adjacent weld. lie further stated that he uould advise the inspector if
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nny furt her pent'-
further action on this,it a'r.
G.
?'ain Steam Pine Hanmru - Atta, h:unt G During a previous inapection,-
the inq ctor.; ' cel qu:stioud the adequacy of the main stcan pipe hanger design. 0:.tertag sdsi: ed the incpector that Charlott o enginwrbg id ru_md t hu dwi gn and had found that a majorit3 of the 1in ero 7 at ' il F31el Code s
rcquirements. Some of the hangara are found to 1:e 'iore heavily loaded than originally calculated, hev ever, ul the hyr desi,;n f
1:as revised by the additien of steuts bett :en the t cp nd Lettoa j
plates in addition to the six bolts pr m utly m d.
The boltu. ire now cc:.;puted at zero loading nd are considered backup t o the stre ts.
Reviotd drawings are at the site. The ins':ector will reviuw the installation of the struts during a future inspection.
H.
Inectrical - Attachnt I
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1.
Keowee - Oconce r,mergency Power hderJ205.04,,0s,J6],
The inspector reviewed the installation of the 13.S kv uderground feeder from the Kecwce Hydro Station. The cables received for this fecder were as specified and did not require special handling. A cable otorage yant has been set up by the licensee and all cafc-guards cable is stored in this area until used. Ingging is left on the cable reels until the cable is pulled. Eoth ends of the cable are sealed to prevent the entrance of r.oisture. The emergency feeder consists of two groups of three single conductor 25 kv cables.
For the dreater part of the dictance from the hydro station to the Oconee Station 1, the cable is directly buried in selected backfill. The inspector observed the installation of the upper group of three cabics in the trench. The separation of the cables was maintaincd at one foot or gecater, while the backfill was placed by hand until the cable was ccupletely covered. The backfill seen by the inspector consisted almost exclusively of fines and contained no natorial that aculd damage the cables.
In addition, the electricians removed any lumpy material from the backfill as it was being placed. The licensee's civil engineers had established grade stakes to ascure the vertical scparaticn of the cable. The inspector 'a3 chown a copy of a repor:,
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-.3./CO Report I!o. 50-269/70-8
i C0 Hpt. No. 50-269/70-10
- of a high potential test made on this cable. The report stated that the cable had been tested at 36 kv and that the 1ert: age currentn of the nd i vid u c.1 c a.bl e : were within prescribed limits. Ho deficiencies in the irwtallation were noted by the inspector.
t 2.
Sarcruacds Systees Cables The inspector reviewed the insta.11ation of the ucfognards systema cables ;;1th Aycock.
Only a few cables had been placed in the cable trays at the time. The inspector obscred that two of the cables were looped cat of the traya and,;are not protteted j
from physical damage. He pointed these out to Aycock v.ho stated that he had already asked that they be corrected.
In discussing l
the installation of cablcs with Aycock, the inspector advised h.im that a close inspection riould be mde to assure that the provisions of the FStJ1 relating to cable routing and tray fill limits were obcerved.
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I.
Fire in
'imary System Piping The inopator.vas shown a copy of an in-house Duke rijmart issued as a result of the fire in the pr$ mary loop piping.
This report indicated that the tape used to hold a plastic barrier over the steam generator tube sheet would begin to show signs of damages at 150 F and would char and lose its adhesive characteristics at 3000F. The tape in the steam generater had chown no signs of charring. Calculations indicated that approxicately 75,000 btu had been released by the acetone fire and a censiderable portion of this was exterior to the steam Sonciator. Since the results of
' this investigation (together with the 2rformation previously available) tends to support the licenaccis contention that the severity of the fire was insufficient to cause damage to the equipment, the inspector plans no further action.
J.
Primary Pine Cladding Fissures 1.
Scoce of Inspection A summary of the Oconee 1 primary loop cladding fissure history is contatned in CO Report No. 50-269/70-9 The purpose of this site visit was to review E#d analysis and resolution of the problem; opecifically, the cause of cracking, cxtent of the cracking, adequacy of repair and preventative measures taken (j
to assure aEainst future recurrence.
C0 Report No. 50-269/70-9 I
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i C0Rpt.No.50-269/70-10 The information obtained during the site visit was insufficient to prev 5de satisfactory ant ' 're to the nbove and, as a result, r.eeting,;as arrant;td at list., Mt. iuracn, pl at for Cetcher 15 ato obtain additional information related to the cladding de ficiencies. This section of the report su:rc.arizes the results of both the site visit and the necting at Mt. Vernon.
2.
Remilts of Oconee Site Visit (Sento:+er 28 19701 2
a.
Review of the Probl em Cladding fissures hcd been detected in two Oconce 128-inch main locp pipe segaents which nake up spool aseemblies B67 j
and B57 In addition, cladding cracks were detected in three main loop elbc':s.
Two of the elbows are components of the above spool assemblies; the third is identified as E40.
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The straight seDr;ents arc ASTM A106 Grade C pipe, clad with 18-8 stainless steel using a six-wire sub:r.orged are process.
The elbows are hot formed and weld fabricated from dete-clad (with A240 type 304) ASTM A516 Grade 70 plate.
All spool piece components were manufactured and clad at the B&W, Earberton, facility. The B67 spool assembly was fabricated at Barberton and shipped directly to the Oconee site. The B57 compcnents were shipped t6 M if Mt. Vernon, plant where they were assembled to form the spool piece before shipment to Oconee.
b.
PNd Presentation Hebr.brecht smrr.arized the results of BWs evaluatien of the cladding problem. Main points of the presentation are given below.
(1) The defective cladding was produced in 1968 during a period when EEW was having difficulties obtaining satisfactory flux. Segregation of the flux powder, which was responsible for nonhomogeneous weld deposit and 1cw ferrite, was identified by E&W as the cause of cracking.
(2)
Based on visual and metallographic examination, the l
cracks were described as solidification or hot cracks.
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. C0 Rpt. Ho. 50-269/70,
Visual estimate of delta ferrito contents (single metallographic specimen) was placed at less than 2T.
(3) Cide bed touts cn the T67 pipe cladding showm1 good ductility. This was interpreted as evidence that there was no procces breakdown (excessive alloying, martensite forrntion) which would cause a general deterioration of the cladding ductility.
(4) The probable reason that cracking of the E67 spool piece (shipped from Earberten) clcddind was not detected during shop PT was attributed to prcduction acqueace wh-was used at Earberton at that time.
According to 1 S peceedure, PT was ccr. ducted before stress relief t atnent. It was theorized that the I
fiscares before the stress relief treatment were too tight to give meaningful Pf indications. The fabrication ccquence has since been changed to rcquire that PT be conducted after st'ess relief.
I (5) The B57 assembly was shipped from Mt. Vernon. The Mt.
Vernon procedures had always required that Pr be conducted after stress relief. The fissure indicattors were apparently overlooked or considered irrelevant.
A general pink coloration resulting from insufficient cleaning which would mask the relatively light indications was suggested as a possibility. Fissuring of B57 assembly was c.uch lighter than observed on the B67 spwl.
(6) Defects in the dete-clad elbows were attributed to the hot faming cperation. They were apparently overlooked r
during PT because of the rough surface condition.
The FNd proposed repair which was currently being implemented included machining one-eighth-inch layer of cladding from the eight-foot-long section of B67 pipe now at Mt. Vernon, manually repairing any additional defects remaining and submerged arc recladding the entire I.D.
After this operation, a new section would be welded to the pipe, the entire assembly stress relieved and PT cleared, and a stainless steel pump adapter section would be wolded to this assembly before shipment back to the Oconee site. The 'B57 spool and deto-clad elbow defects would be removed at the Oconce site by manual grinding. The amount of cladding removed by grinding would be limited to one-ci hth6 inch and the remaining cladding thickness would be verificd b
by the use of a calibrated eddy-current tester.
It was
'noted that 100% of the E67 spool elbow surface would have to be ground to remove all ir.dications.
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' CO Ppt. Ho. 50-269/70-10.~
c.
Discussion of the PNd Presentation Scveral questicns,cre -aiced vrith a et to i n fo.
dion presented by lielmbrecht and other data obtained previously.
These are summarized below.
(1) Reforcncing previously-supplicd data on the chemical analysis of cladding samples taken by IEW t chnician at, the Deonce site (CO Report Mo. 50-269/? -9), the insp'ector inquired whether the unusually high carben contents of the cladding (.1 to.2%) could Le indicative of proccca breakdown or some for.a of we3d deposit contrenination and.shuthor additional s:mples had been taken.
Hebriorecht said that the high carbon could be attributed to sample conteninaticn with carbido drill used in snspling.
/sidit,ional samples had been Laken, but dat.a was not availe.ble.
(2) Again re'arencing previous data which indicated neasured
,i ferrite values of the B67 pipo generally in the range of 7 5 to 10% and never less than 2 5%, the inspector questioned the basis for attributing the cracking to low ferrite.
lielmbrecht replied-that the field measurements were probably not very accurate, that there could exist localized ferrite segregation not reflected in the magnagage measurements and that metallographic examinaticn of a sample had shown only about 2% ferrite.
-(3) The inspector inquired as to how many metallographic samples had been taken, what procedure was used to estimate the ferri t,e contents, whether photomicrographs of typical areas were made ar.d were available for review and whether any metallographic specimens had been prepared from the deto clad elbows.
Helmbrecht caid that the data was based on a visual estimate of one sample, no photomicrographs were taken and no meta 31ographic samples had been taken from the elbow cladding.
(4) Since tuo separate cladding processes were used in the E67 assembly and both cracked, the inspector inquired
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whethor possible contributing factors common to both pieces such as heat treatment irregularities or possible cladding contraination had been considertd.
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CO Report No. 50 -2(.9/70-10 Helmbrecht replied that heat treatment reconis had not been checked.
(5) The inspector asked on what basis were the cracks in the dete-clad elbows attributed to the hot forming cperation.
Holmbrecht said that visual appearance of the cladding surface and knowledge of the for::dng operation indicated this to be the case.
Aa a part of the general discussion of the cladding cracks,
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BMI was asktd what chandes had been made in the QC procedures or metheds to assure against future recurrence of the problem, j
what was the basis for assuring that simHar problems did not e).ist in Oconee 2 and 3 piping or other componcats including the reactor vessel, steam generators and pressurizer and how applicable was the eddy-current tester in determining the residual cladding thickness after grinding.
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Because iVhl was not preparcd to discuss all of the above questions and could not supply satisfactory information to the specifie questions regarding cladding fissures, a second meeting was arranged at the B!Zi, Mt. Vernon, plant.
3 Results of Mt. Vernon Meeting (October 15,1c'LO).
On October 15, U. Potapovs met with Duke and E#hl representatives at the BMi pressure vessel plant in Mt. Vernon, Indiana, for additional discussions concerning tM Cconee 1 cladding fissures.
The meeting attendees included the follcwing:
W. H. Spangler, Assistant Project Managar, FEi, Lynchburg D. F. Levstek, Materials Engineer, B91, Akron F. A. Perrera, NhD QC Manager, Efbl, Barbarten N. C. Jessen, Direc' e of Technology, BP., Earberton H. L. Helmbrecht, Fugineering Development, Brid, Earberton H. F. Dobel, NPGD QA Manager, E&W, Lynchburg C. D. Thompson, NPGD Resident Inspector, Eldi, Mt. Vernen W. C. Euskey, QC Manager, Brdi, Mt. Vernon R. N. Bottorf, Fagineering Manager, E&i, Mt. Vernon
. J. R. Wells, Principal Field Engineer, Duke R. E. Miller, End neering Department, Duke i
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.CO Rpt.!!o. 50-269/70-10,
a.
Scope of Meeting At the start of the meeting, Bel representatives stated that king prohlc:s they were prepared to discus only the a related to the weld deposited cladding (straight pipe) at this time and additional work was being done to etaluate cracking 'of the deto-clad fittings. A separate meeting at the Oconec site was suggested for discussion of the deto-clad problems. The week of October 26 was cuggested by E&W and Duke for this meeting.
(This date was subsequently changed to Novcaber 10 at the request of EW.)
b.
Qurer/try of F?M Presentation and Dij1cedon_
i (1) The history of the weld deposittA cladding problems l
was reviewed. The cracking meci anism was described as intergranular microficsuring or typical hot-shortness cracking. Helmbrecht produced several photomicrographs taken from samples of the E67 pipe cladding which support the description. He indicated that four samples had been examined. The cause of cracking was attributed 7
to localized chemical segregation resulting in areas of low ferrite contents in the deposit. 'Ihe chemical segregation, in turn, was attributcd to nonhomo6cneous flux purchased and used for a period in May 1968. Since that time, the flux blending and sampling techniques used by the supplier had been changed at the insistence of 59 and further recurrcnces of flux deficiencies have not been encountered.
Because of the localized nature of the chemical ecgregation and the inherent inaccuracies of the standard ferrite measuring techniques (magna-gage or severn gage), the crack-sensitive condition would not necessarily be indicated by forrite measurements. The field measure-mente taken on the B67 pipe which indicated ferrite in the 5% or acceptable range could, therefore, not be considercd indicative of proper chemical balance of the deposit. It was noted that the ferrite and chemical checks taken during prcduction cladding are mainly for ' indication of a major process breakdown and would not necessarily indicate the development of a
-crack-sensitive condition. Dye penetrant testing (after strese relief) was identified as the only practical positive means of assuring that hot cracking was not
(
occurring.
It was noted that with the proper controls on the welding process and flux a crack-sensitive condition shou 3d not deve]op.
O
(
CO Upt. No.
. 50-269/70-10
, liclmbrecht said that he had visually esti photomicrographs to be kss than U.
demonstrated that ferrite as measured by gage on come areas of the sample was less than 2 5%
The photomicrographs are attached as Exhibit this report.
C of characterintics of hot-shortness cracking, but aT does not appear possible fcom visual exam ents photomi crographs.
of the j
(2)
Carbon analysca of four additional wc1d metal sa The reported values were.096,.093,.092 an mples wed.
previously-analyzed camples which sho
.115%.
a the range of.1 to.2% were contaminated by the drill uscd in the sampling procedure.
carbide (3) had been conducted of the Barberton pla v ew records by a team of nine QC engineers and NDT techni i cation c ans.
The results of the review showed that PT exami brought about by unauthorized modificat on of a y traveler sheet.
omit an interstage stress relief cycle before thCp e shop examination.
e PT initialed by a shop employee although a similaTh by a QC engineer. action on a different production order was r
by the shop man as justification to modify the oThis zed sequence on spool B67 peration taken to assure against future actions of this natMea ure.
Review of furnace records had shown that the had roccivcd a satisfactory stress relief treatment assembly evidence of furnace excursions or other unusual o No was indicatcd.
ccurrences had been subjectcd to PT examination (b ng relief) and no rejectable defects were recoru '
f I
(,
, CO Rpt. tio. 50-269/70-10.(8) A report will be submitted by Ef!d cu marizing the cladding problem. Tha inspector was asked whether any aspects of the problem were not sufficiently covered.
He noted that, as a part of the cynrall faGure nnalyes, a more detailed chemical eceposition o1 defective areas including elements such as manganese and silicon. in addition to the C, Cr, Ni, would be useful for localized ferrite analysis by emperical fonnulas (Schaeffler diagram).
A more comprehensive metallographic review including the comparison of delta forcite distribution in Good and crack-sensitive areas would aluo scrve the saae purpose.
K.
Fuel Transfer Tube Bean advised the inspector that une of the fuel transfer tubes had i
been damaged during insta31ation.
A weldor had inadvertently struck an arc on an expansion joint convolute. The licensee ordered a replacement expansion joint but has received a January deliver date.
If he is not able to improve this date, it will have an adverse effect upon his core loading schcdule.
I M.
Test Procedu res -- Aity._chment M The inspector discussed the hydrostatic test procedures and the flushi.g proccdures with Smith and liampton. The inspector was told by Smith that the flushing times specified in the procedures issued to date had been reviewed to ensure that each flush cycle was sufficiently long to pick up any particles in the system and flush them out. Ik also stated that a review was being mde of all components to ensure that particles smaller than 45 microns would not cause damage. The inspector pointed out that the hydrotest procedures which he had reviewed specified test pressures of 150% of design, whereas the FSAR specified that the test pressure would be as required by ANSI B317 This code states that the test prescare be not less than 1.25 times the design pressure multiplied by the lowest ratio of the allowable stress intensity value for the test temperature to the allowable stress intensity value for the design temperature. According to the design ter.perature and material, the test pressure required by B317 could be greater or less than 105% of design pressure. IIampton stated that he would review the procedures and would verify that the requirements of B31 7 were met in every case.
L.
Pressurizer Safety Valves - AttachmentJ Followun Record Review (4905 05)
(
The inspector audited the licensee's data packages for pressurizer safety. valves, Serial Nos. IRC-V4A and IRC-V4B. No deficiencies were noted.
Attachments:
Exhibits A through C l
l 1
LIC EllSEF.
Duke Power Cenpany-y
-q F
c Oconce Station no. 1
-j FACILITY D O C K E T l'.: LICEliSE HOS.
50-269,.CP?R-33 e
4 1
REACTOR OUTSTANDING ITEMS ITEM l
CI,0 SED IDENTIFIED'\\;
(
lt 2, 3/5/68,.
- Concrete " test" cylinder breaks below specs -
.68-3, D.5.,
~
6/19/63 IJC,j
~.2.. 68-3, 6/19/69, Unauthorized revision to Cadweld specifications 68 h,au=ary, l
~.
9/25/69 s
[-
E-68 4,'Gucnacy, 3
68-3, 6/19/68',
. Failure to provide concrete inspector 9/25/67 NC
[..
h.
68 h, 9/25/68.
Failure t'o properly test Cad' veld splices 69-1,Su;;. mary,
~
1/6/69
[
lE.
h e5..
69-8, 9/9/69 (+
Failnre to properly qualify veld procedures 69-9,G,11/3/69
.NC Failure to properly qualify veldors 69-9, G,11/3/69 6.
693,'9/9/69,'.
g Procedure for repair of are strikes not available 70-5; G= mary,-
- (.{'bB,h/11/69-h/2T/70
.HDT of core ficoding valves Memo, WCS to HQ c 8..'CDN,1/8[(0 2/2/70 l.
9 70-1, 1/6/TO,
- Welding ~and HDT deficiencies, CDN issued' Memo, WCS to HQf
~
3/26/i0^
_ HC -
10.
Bingham 69-l', -
Main coolant. pump discrepancies, J!cno, WCS to HQ; h/21/70 12/9/69, E Memo, WCS to HQ
.11. 7 70-h,' h/27/70','-
Lov strength concrete s
8/7/70
],
E
- 12. 'IEB,L5/1/70~
Pressure vessel safe ends Memo,.KCS to HQ 8/5/70 13.,70-6,S/25/70;,.
Tendon; stressing discrerancies Memo, WCS to HQ NC
'8/7/70 I
th'.:70-8,8/3/70,>
Tendons and stress gages-Memo, WCs to HQ 10/3/70
.NC 15 TO 9/1/70,2 Fissures l'n primary coolant pipe: cladding Q
l Dete'rminatilon of cafety 'systen response to axial
- 16. 'IEB, 9/11/70 [
a.
.M "pcver. imbalances b.
-Avail' ability of 'in--core [.det'ectors L
~
iJ l p_
+
,7 i ~~l!IItCfDFMi7150 Column: S -. carety item; Try item; IEB,- Reactor Inancetion liC- - noncompliance or nonconformance
- item: UN - unrcholveif. item: IN --inqu lj
- - ;[
~ nndDEniTrcement Erancly requcliC;' O. other cource of IdcrL41(icationg, f
V
((br1 cfly(. spec i.fy);
rig 11(>J4, 1.,_,.i.
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> J: i LIC EUSEF.
Duke Power Compnny L J ;_
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- J E
- FACILITY Oconce Station No. 1 l
w-P-
DOCKET & I ICFRSE.J10S. 50-2@, cPf k-33_
s RFACTOR OUTSTANDING 1TEMS
~
' TDFA"FIFIED J !
ITEM-CI 0SFD L
Measurencnts of flow and temperature during c.
initial' operation 4
o d.
Verification 'of bypass flov
- c., ' Verification of axial peak cffects on DNBR i:
f.' Data during startup for sin 6 e loop, two pump l
f.
J operations l
g.
Inspection of reactor internals -after completion f
of preoperational tests.
I' h.c Field test of'steem cencrator.
l 4
- i. Lov' strength concrete and~ caitted tendons Memo, WC3 to ilQ,,
10/8/70 i-(
i
- j. Penetration room valves k.
Strain gau6e. failures Meno, WCS'to HQ,l
'10/8/70 l
I 1.
lip' and LP injection systen startup times m.
Core flooding tank MO valve
'e p
- p t
1 n. -- Reactor building spray pump performance t
}
Condenser cooling water crossover header valve-
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l p.
Spent fuel accident filters
- q. ' Administrative controlio( MCP startup Flow tests;per 200/12'and 200/13 r.
i Flow dintribution-chart f
a s
a N For IDW flPl*ED Column:-S w safety. item 3 NC
. noncompliance or nonconformance
~
i
~ item; UN'- unresolvcFitem; IN, inquTry i tem; 1EB -- Reactor Inspection T.~g.[l'y
- and EnTorcement;Eranch requaliT; -O'.- other cource of identification
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LICFliSEE
_Du e Pmcr ('ompany k
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FAC11.1TY..0conee Staticn no. 1
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e 9'
DCCK.in' & LIC".IISE 110S. 50-269 ; ci a-B
' REACTOR 00TSTA NDIllG ITEl(S_
l
.g CLOSED
.~ IDE.NTIFIED-. :--.-- -- -. g- --ITEM- -
'_ (17
.70-2,-2/19/70, Vcador' UDT. records for safeguards systems ~ cables
- UN 18.-
70 h,'3/23/70, verification of separation of transducer tubing UN 19
.70-h*8/3/70',,
Control rod' drive guide hushings and torque tubes UN i.
n-
- 20. - 70i-l} ;8/3/70,.
Completion of. IIP facilities '
- tril..
.t W.
l 21.
'(0 %', 8/3/70, Completion of HP procedures is '
Uli f -
~
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22.
70-8,8/3/70, Completion of HP personnel training
'UN-23 70-8,8/3/70,,
Crane -load test
(-
UN 24.
70-8,.8/3/70, _
Verify that test procedures are properly revised and
-g approved uhen changes are required
- 25. ~70-8,'8/3/70, verify that analysis of containment is made
~
.UN- -
26.
'70-8, 8/3/70,.
Approved.(991 handling procedhres Tjsh.
M*
27. 70 %v..8/3/70; Mainstea(/^ pipe, hangers yu x
- f' 1
28.
70-9, 9/1/70,-
Steam generator skirt adapter. indications UN i 4 '
Q4
. =
29.~70-)[9/1/70, HP injection pump QC records UN,:
30 1
70-9,9/1/70i-Basis for particle size in fluching procedures l U,J.N,,
[
- 31..-:70-9, L 9/1/70,.
Protection.of-instrumentation dubing hydro test
' ~
~
UN' 32;. 70_-10,9/28/70, Fuel transfer tube expansion joint' replacement
~
un V
33 170 0,9/28/70, Routing of iables exterior to cable trays
{:
un.
~
-t 1.I ITFor 11TF31Yf7f50 Column: S - safety' item;. NC - noncompliance 'or nonconformance
@ku 01 tem; UN '- unresolveiT item;HIN -fingulYy'~ i tem; TEB - Reactor Inspection
'and Eniorecment. Branch requc~sT; ~O - other cource of identification ^
' ~
~
"" A
- - };
- c" '(brief.ly-specify) -
wei_ __
3_.of 4 s.
-.y.
,_ v.,._c
.....,,..,__. 4..
- 6. p. r w.-
,... + -
- ( $ '
^
Lv Y
I LICEllSEE Duke Power conj 3ny FACILITY Oconee Station 'Io.
s DOCKET & LICEU3E HOS. _50-269, ci?R-33 REACTOR OUTSTANDING ITEMS IDEUTIFIED l ITEM CLOSED tio.1, Installation of additional environmental monitoring 3h.
DRL Ept.
'(/2h /70, U_,N,,
aluipment 33 DEL Ept. No. 1, Vent valve replacement test T/24/70,UN
- 36. DHL Ppt'. No. 1, :itron$ motion necclero:neter installation 7/2h/70', UN, 37 DRL Rpt. No. 1, ' Penetration roca flow indication and adjustment 7/2h/70,UN,
'38.
DHL Ept. No. 1, Instrumentation bypass keys 7/2h/70,UN 39 DRL Ept. No. 3, ruternals vibration test 9/15/70,Uri, h0.
1;RL Rpt. No. 3, Core flooding tank valves i
9/15/70,!g, i
~~P6r TtiENTIFIED Column:~s - cafety item; HC - noncompliance ir noiicTEGnE.nce item: UU - unresolved item: IN - inquiry item; ~IEE - itcactor Inanection and EnT6rcement tranch request; ~O - other cource72 identi fication 3
(brj eri:/ speeify) 77-p
-- n,
.a.
u--
FORil Ojb6 DUKE POWER C0!1 patly OCOlEE l-3 NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM QUALITY ASSURA!!CE RECORDS F lilAL CERTIF iCAT10N DATE 9/21/70 1 - Uni t liuh.ber Oconce I Component Steam Generator (S&W) 2 - Componen t i dent i f i cation Numbe r _620-0003-S _l-i B 3 - S t a t us o f Vendo r Ce r't i f i c a t i on _ Des i gn ce r t i f i ca t. i on 11/20/69 to ASME Section lil-A.
Fabrication certification on record.
16 - Status of Duke QA Record Rcview An audit of the records was made l
at Barberton, Ohio 5 - Location of 0A Records Bcw Barberton works
(
6 - Status of Table "A" NDT Not applicable 7 - S tatus of Vendor Audi ting ludi ting _and survei11ance were ferformed _
by Duke Power 8 - Remarks finne
)Q' fr 7 fn
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Qu61ity Assurance Enginecring
/
bhibit B Page 1 of 1 JMC:Je 9/15/70 i
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Kallings Exhibit C Page 2 of 2 l