ML19318A700
| ML19318A700 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 05/02/1980 |
| From: | Westerman T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19318A692 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-80-06, 50-313-80-6, 50-368-80-06, 50-368-80-6, NUDOCS 8006240046 | |
| Download: ML19318A700 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000313/1980006
Text
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION IV
Report No. 50-313/80-06
License No. DPR-51
50-368/80-06
Licensee: Arkansas Power and Light Company
P. O. Box 551
Little Rock, Arkansas 72203
Facility Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Units 1 and 2
Inspection at: ANO Site, Russellville, Arkansas
Inspection Conducted: March 22 - April 21, 1980
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Inspectors:
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W. D. Johnson, Senior / Resident Inspector
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"L. J. Callan, Resident Inspector
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'R. Smith, Reactor Inspector
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Approved:
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T. F. Westerman, Chief, Reactor Projects Section
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Inspection Summary
Inspection conducted during period of March 22 - April 21, 1980
(Report No. 50-313/80-06)
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection including Emergency
Planning Drills, Surveillance Observation, Follow-up on IE Circulars,
Follow-up on Licensee Event Reports, Operational Safety Verification,
and Organization and Administration. The inspection involved 77 inspector
hours on site by three NRC inspectors.
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Results: Within the six areas inspected, three items items of noncompliance
were identified (infraction - control of high radiation areas, paragraph 7.B.
3.h; infraction - control of combustibles, paragraph 7.B.3.d; and infraction -
use of radiation survey instrument in high radiation areas, paragraph 4).
Inspection conducted during period of March 22 - April 21, 1980
(Report No. 50-368/80-06)
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Areas Inspected: Routine, annotaced inspection including Emergency Planning
Drills, Transient Test Witnessing, Follow-up on IE Circulars, Operational
Safety Verification, Organization and Administration, Core Thermal Power,
and Maintenance. The inspection involved 105 inspector hours on site by
three NRC inspectors.
Results: Within the seven areas inspected, three items of noncompliance
were ident'.fied (infraction - control of high radiation areas, paragraph 7.B.3.h;
infraction - control of combustibles, paragraph 7.B.3.d; and infraction -
missing seismic support brackets, paragraph 7.B.3.a).
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DETAILS SECTION
1.
Persons Contacted
J. P. O'Hanlon, ANO General Manager
G, H. Miller, Engineering & Technical Support Manager
B. A. Baker, Operations Superintendent
T. N. Cogburn, Plant Analysis Superintendent
E. C. Ewing, Plant Engineering Superintendent
P. Jones, Naintenance Superintendent
F. Foster, Operations and Maintenance Manager
J. McWilliams,. Assistant Operations Superintendent
J. Albers, Planning and Scheduling Supervisor
D. D. Snellings, Technical Analysis Superintendent
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L. Schempp, Manager of Nuclear Quality Contrel'
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M. Bishop, Acting Plant Administrative Manager
R. Tucker, Assistant Naintenance Superintendent
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L. Bell, Assistant Operations Superintendent
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G. Fiser, Radiochemistry Supervisor-
V. Pettus,' Assistant Maintenance Superintendent
R. Slocum, Quality Control Inspector
I. Mosquito, Health Physics Planning & Scheduling Coordinator
D. Wagner, Assistant HP Supervisor
G. Halverson, Assistant HP Supervisor
J. Ray, Quality Control Engineer
J. Burch,. Burns Security Supervisor
J. Lamb, Safety and Fire Protection Coordinator
B. Scott, Burns Training / Operations Supervisor
H. Hollis, Security Coordinator
D. Ballington, Computer Support Supervisor
D. Lomax, Nuclear Engineer
C.-Shively, Plant Performance Supervisor
T. Green, Tranining Coordinator
R. Green, Assistant HP Supervisor
The inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including operators,
technicians and administrative personnel.
2.
Emerzency Plannina Drill (Units 1 and 2)
The inspector observed the performance of a scheduled emergency drill
on March 26, 1980. During this exercise the inspector determine the
following items:
The licensee organization respended in accordance with approved
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procedures.and plans.
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The response was coordinated, orderly and timely.
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The licensee used designated persons to evaluate the organ-
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izations response.
A critique was held shortly following the drill.
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The results of the drill were documented for review by licensee
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management.
The licensee identified corrective actions far observed
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deficiencies.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
3.
~ Transient Test Witnessing (Unit 2)
During this inspection, the inspector witnessed the performance of the
Loss of Offsite Power Test (2.800.01, Appendix BB).
The following
items were verified by the inspector during the performance of this
test:
Latest procedure revision in use
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Minimum crew requirements met
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Test prerequisites and initial conditions met
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Test equipment calibrated
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Procedure is adequate
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Crew actions correct and timely
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Adequate test coordination
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Test data assembled for analysis
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' Acceptance criteria met (preliminary)
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Licensee's preliminary evaluation is adequate
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Surveillance Observation (Unit 1)
During this inspection period, the inspector observed the performance
of the monthly surveillance test of the "B" Containment Spray Pump.
This
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test was performed in accordance with Supplement 5 of Operating Procedure
1104.05 on April 16, 1980. No discrepancies were identified by the
inspector in the performance of the test, but the Waste Control Operator
was obser ed to enter several high radiation areas without using a
radiation survey instrument.
Section 7.4.2 of the licensee's Radiation
Protection Manual, Procedure 1602.35 requires that " Individuals must use
appropriate portable radiation, survey instruments or have Health
Physics coverage while in high radiation areas." This is an apparent item
of noncompliance.
(313/80-06-03)
Other surveillance tests observed in part during this inspection period
included a test of the Hydrogen Purge System performed in accordance
with Procedare 1104.33, Supplement 1, on April 14, 1980, and a test of the
Reactor Protective System Channel A performed in accordance with Procedure
1104.39 on April 18, 1980. No items of noncompliance or deviations were
identified during the conduct of these tests.
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5.
Follow-up on IE Circulars (Units 1 and 2)
A.
IE Circular 79-04; Loose Locking Nut on Limitorque Valve Operators
The licensee has staked the locking nuts of Limitorque valve operators
in ANO-1 and ANO-2 as recommended in this circular.
B.
IE Circular 79-05, Moisture Leakage in Stranded Wire Connectors
The licensee has identified pressure transmitters and temperature
elements in ANO-1 which are required to operate during a Loss of
Coolant Accident or a Main Steam Line Break Accident which are subject
to potential moisture leakage via stranded wire conductors.
This
item is addressed in Engineering Action Request (EAR)80-385.
This
item will remain open pending completion of a design change in-
corporating appropriate corrective action.
(303/80-06-04)
The licensee has determined that LOCA qualified splices and feed-
throughs with solid conductors have been installed on all class 1E
devices and equipment inside the containment of ANO-2 and that
there is no potential for moisture leakage into the devices.
C.
IE Circular 79-08, Attempted Extortion
This circular was issued for information, and no licensee action was
requested.
D.
IE Circulars 79-09 and 79-15, Self Contained Breathing Apparatus
Problems
-The licensee does not use the types of self-contained breathing
apparatus described in these circulars. MSA SCBA's are used at ANO.
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E.
IE Circular 79-12, Potential Diesel Generator Turbocharger Problem
The licensee has modified Operating Procedure 1104.36 to incorporate the
recommendations of this circular. The design modification being
prepared by the engine vendor has not yet been received by the licensee.
F.
IE Circular 79-13, Diesel Fire Pump Starting Contactors
The diesel fire pump engine at ANO is a Cummins Model NT 380-1F.
Therefore, the problem described in this circular is not applicable
at ANO.
G.
IE Circular 79-17, Contact Problem in SB-12 Switches
The licensee has determined that no General Electric Company
Metalclad Circuit Breakers vere shipped to ANO-1 or ANO-2 during the
period from August 1, 1978 to July 1, 1979. Thus, the contact problem
described in this curcular does not apply to ANO.
H.
IE Circular 79-19, Loose Locking Devices on Ingersoll-Rand Pump
Impellers
The licensee's corrective action on the problem described in this
circular included installation of a tab washer on the impeller lock
nuts for the Low Pressure Safety Injection and the Containment
Spray Pumps.
I.
IE Circular 79-20, GTE Sylvania Relays
The licensee has determined that the type of relays described in this
circular are not installed at ANO.
J.
IE Circular 79-21, Prevention of Unplanned Releases of Radioactivity
The licensee is taking appropriate action in response to this
circular.
K.
IE Circular 79-22, Stroke Times for Power Operated Relief Valves
The licensee nas conducted a review as recommended by this circular
and-concluded that additional surveillance testing of the ANO-1
PORV is not necessary.
ANO-2 does not have a pressurizer PORV.
L.
IE Circular 79-23, Gould Motor Starters and Contactors
This circular reported that certain NEMA Size 3 starters and
contractors manufactured and distributed between June 1, 1978 and
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August 30, 1979 contained potential defects.
The licensee has
confirmed that the Size 3 FVR Combination Motor Starters purchased from
Gould were not manufactured within the above time frame.
M.
IE Circular 79-15, Shock Arrestor Strut Assembly Interference
The licensee has determined that ne Bergen Patterson strut assemblies
are installed at ANO-1 or ANO-2.
N.
IE Circular 80-04, Securing of Threaded Locking Devices
The licensee has taken appropriate action in response to the
recommendations of this circular.
6.
Licensee Event Reports (LER's) (Unit 1)
The inspector reviewed certain LER's to verify the following items:
Appropriate corrective action had been taken.
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The event did not involve operation of the facility in a manner
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which constituted an unreviewed safety question as defined in
The event did not involve continued operations in violation
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of regulatory requirements or license conditions.
Reporting requirements were met.
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The.LER's included in this review are listed below:
313/78-05-03-L
313/78-06-03-L
313/79-05-03-L
313/79-11-01-T
313/79-12-03-L
313/79-13-03-L
313/79-14-99-X
313/79-15-99-X
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313/79-16-03-L
313/79-17-03-L'
313/79-18-03-L
313/79-19-03-L
313/79-20-04-L
313/79-21-03-L
313/79-22-03-L
313/79-23-03-L
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313/79-24-03-L
313/80-04-03-L
313/80-05-03-L
313/80-07-01-T
.No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Operational Safety Verification (Units 1 and 2)
The inspectors performed certain activities to ascertain that the
facility is being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory
requirements and that the licensee's management control system is
effectively discharging its reponsibilities for continued safe operation.
The inspectors activities and findings in this regard are described in the
following paragraphs.
-A.
Certain inspection activities were performed frequently (several times
_per week).
(1) Control room observations were made which normally included
the following items:
a.
Verification of licensee adherence to selected Limiting
Conditions for Operation (LCO).
b.
Observation of instrumentation and recorder traces for
abnormalities.
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c.
- Verification of proper control room and shif t manning.
d.
Verification of. operator adherence to approved operating
procedures.
(2)
Selected logs and operating records were reviewed to obtain
information on plant operations, detect trends, determine
compliance with regulatory requirements and assess the effectiveness
of communications provided by the logs and records.
B.
Certain inspection activities were performed on a weekly basis.
(1) The operability of selected emergency safeguards features
systems was verified by noting valve positions, breaker positions,
instrumentation availability and general condition of major system
components. Systems selected for review during this inspection
were both trains of Unit 2 Emergency Feedwater, air start systems
for both Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generators, and the Unit I
train B Containment Spray System.
(2) The licensee's equipment control was reviewed for proper
implementation by performance of the following inspection
activities:
a.
Review of tag out records to determine that the licensee has
complied with LCO with respect to removal of equipment from
service,
b.
Independently verifying the proper return to service of
selected safety-related components or systems.
c.
Independent verification of proper conduct of selected
safety-related tagouts currently in effect.
(3) The inspectors conducted tours of accessible areas of the
facility to assess equipment conditions, plant conditions,
radiological controls, security, safety, and adherence to
regulatory requirements. During these tours, the inspectors
made observations in-the following categories:
General plant / equipment conditions including operability of
a.
standby equipment -
During a tour of the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building on April 16,
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1980, the inspector noted that the seismic support brackets
were missing from the motor operators for 2CV-5672-1 and
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These valves are in the Containment Spray Pump
recirculation' lines. These valves are normally open, but
would receive a signal to close after a loss of coolant
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accident upon initiation of the Recirculation. Actuation Signal.
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Small pipe isometric drawings 2DCB-11-1 and 2DCE-13-1
indicate that these valves should be provided with seismic
restraints for the valve operators.
The licensee's failure
to maintain these seismic retraints in accordance with the
applicable design drawings is an apparent item of non-
compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, which
requires that activitics affecting quality shall be
prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or
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drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and
shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions,
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procedures, or drawings.
(368/80-06-03)
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b.
Maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need
of maintenance, and the appropriate priority had been
assigned.
c.
Fire hazards.
d.
Control of ignition sources and flammable materials - On
April 1,1980, the inspector noted the presence of two
open buckets of oil in the Unit 1 intake structure by
the Service Water pump motors. On April 2, 1980, the
inspector noted the presence of two safety cans of oil
in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building outside the steam driven
emergency feedwater pump room and an oxygen bottle and an
acetylene bottle in the Unit I lower south piping penetration
room, elevation 335. The storage of these materials in these
safety-related areas is contrary to Procedure 1053.01,
Control of Combustibles, and is an apparent item of
noncompliance.
(313/80-06-02; 368/80-06-02)
Conduct of' activities in progress in accordance with the
e.
licensee's administrative controls and approved procedures.
f.
Condition of the interior of selected electrical and control
cabinets.
g.
Physical Security -
The inspector verified that the security plan is
being implemented by observing:
(1) The security organization is properly manned and that
security personnel are capable of performing their
assigned functions.
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(2) Protected area barriers are not degraded.
(3) Isolation zones are clear.
(4) Persons and packages are checked prior to entry
into the protected area.
(5) Vehicles are properly authorized, searched, and
escorted or controlled within the protected area.
(6) Persons within the protected area display photo
identification badges.
Persons requiring escort are
properly escorted.
(7) One training lecture provided to physical security
personnel.
h.
Radiation Protection Controls - During a plant tour on
April 2, 1980, the inspector noted that door 226 was
unlocked with no positive access control.
This door
provides access to the Unit 2 2P36B room which was a
posted high radiation area with accessible whole body
radiation of 1000 millirems per hour.
Door 137
was also unlocked (propped open) with no positive access
control.
This door provides access to the Unit 1 P36B room
which was a posted high radiation area with accessible whole
body radiation in excess of 300 millirems per hour.
The inspector also observed that the Seal Return Cooler
Room (elevation 369') had no door, but wes a posted
The radiation field in the doorway to
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this room was measured at 300 millirems per hour. During
a tour of the Unit 2 reactor auxiliary building, the inspector
noted on April 9, that door 436 to the Unit 2 spent
fuel demineralizer (2F 3A&B) was unlocked and open.
This
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area was a posted high radiation area with accessible whole-
body radiation in excess of 6000 millirems per hour. Addi-
.tionally, during a tour of the Unit 2 reactor auxiliary
building on April 11, the inspector noted that door 217 to
the ion exchange area was unlocked and open.
This area
was a posted high radiation area with accessible whole-
body radiation in excess of 100 millirems per hour. The
above doors and areas were required by 10 CFR_Part 20.203(c)
to be ".
. equipped with a control device which shall
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energize a conspicuous visible or audible alarm signal in
such a manner that the individual entering the high radiation
area and the licensee or a supervisor of the activity are
made aware of the entry; or .
. Maintained locked except
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during periods when access to the area is required, with
positive control over each individual entry." The above
doors and areas were not equipped with an alarm system and
positive entry control did not exist.
This is an apparent
item of noncompliance (313/80-06-01; 368/80-06-01)
1.
Plant housekeeping-
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Radioactive waste system
(4) The inspectors reviewed the licensee's trouble tickets
to verify the operability of this problem identification
system.
(5) The inspectors conducted discussions with operators
and other plant personnel and observed several shif t
turnovers.
C.
Certain inspection activities were performed once during this
reporting period.
(1) ESF System 0 3. ability Verification - The inspector verified
the operability of the Unit 2 Emergency Feedwater System
by performing a' system walkdown.
The inspector also
compared the system lineup procedure, 2106.06 Attachment A,
to plant drawings and the as-built configuration.
The inspector
noted several apparent minor discrepancies in the lineup
procedure.
These were pointed out to the Unit 2 Assistant
Operations Superintendent.
(0 pen item 368/80-06-04)
(2) The inspector verified that c selected portion of containment
isolation lineup was correct.
Containment penetrations inspected
were:
Penetration No.
System
Firewater
Instrument air supply
Chilled water
Component Cooling Water
Component Ccoling Water
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Containment Test Connection
Steam Generator Blowdown
Emergency Feedwater
Steam Generator Blowdown
Main Feedwater
Main Feedwater
The inspector checked that motor operated valves were not
mechanically blocked and power was available.
The piping
between containment and the isolation valves were visibly
inspected for leakage or leakage paths.
The inspector noted
that although in-line manual isolation velves had positive
administrative controls covering them (e.s., valves shut,
capped, and locked as appropriate), there were numerous
instances of 1/2" - 3/4" ID test connections between containment
and isolation valves which had no positive administrative control.
In most cases the test connections were not capped and their
isolation valves had no locking devices.
The inspector noted,
however, that all observed test connection isolation valves
were shut and that these valves appeared on an existing valve
- lineup checklist. Discussion with a licensee representative
indicates that it is the licensee's intention to cap all such
test connections when not in use (open item 368/80-06-05)
(3) The inspector verified that plant conditions, equipment status
and operating parameter, fulfill the following LCO's.
Unit 1
3.1.9.1
Dissolved gases in reactor coolant
3.1.6.7
RCS leak detectors
3 .1. 5 .1
RCS chemistry
3.1.4.1
RCS activity
Unit 2
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3.1.2.1
Eoron injection flow path
3.1.2.7
Borated water sources
3.4.1
RCS operation
(4) The inspector reviewed the licensee's Jumper and Bypass
logs and no conflicts with Technical Specifications were
identified; but it was not apparent that the licensee was
actively pursuing correction to conditions requiring
jumpers or bypasses.
(Open item 313/80-06-05; 368/80-06-06)
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(5) The inspector witnessed a radioactive liquid release and
verified the following items:
The release (ILR80-123 on April 14, 1980) was
a.
conducted in accordance with approved procedures.
b.
The required release approvals were obtained.
The required samples were taken and analyzed.
c.
d.
The effluent release control instrument was
operable and in'use during the release.
The inspector also reviewed a sample of the liquid and
gaseous effluent records for January 1980.
(6) The inspector verified the implementation of the licensee's
radiation protection controls by:
Observing portions of an area survey performed by health
a.
physics personnel.
b.
Examining randomly selected radiation protection
instruments that are in use and verifying operability
and adherence to calibration frequency.
c.
Verifying by observation and review that the
requirements of one current RWP were being followed.
d.
Verifying compliance with requirements of 10 CFR 20
regarding posting.
Observing that licensee's procedures are being followed.
e.
During a review of current radiation work permits (RWP)
the inspector noted a number of instances of Bechtel
workers not complying with the licensee's procedures governing
RWP use.
Examples include cases of Bechtel workers signing
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RWP's for other workers, and Bechtel workers entering controlled
areas to perform maintenance under an incorrect RWP. These
discrepancies appear to reflect inadequate management controls
on the part of the licensee over its subcontractors' compliance
with established radiological control procedures.
This item
will remain unresolved pending inspector verification of
adequate licensee controls over RWP activities (313/80-06-06;
368/80-06-07)
8.
Organization and Administration (Units 1 and 2)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's onsite and offsite organizations
to verify conformance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications.
The scope'of this review included personnel qualifications, personnel
reassignments. No apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were
identified.
9.
Core Thermal Power (Unit 2)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's methods for accurately determining
the reactor core thermal power.
This was accomplished by:
Examining calorimetric calculations for both the secondary and
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primary systems.
Verifying that instrur.ents from which the calorimetric data was obtained
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were in current calibration.
Verifying that analytical techniques used by the licensee were correct.
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Verifying that heat credits and loss such as steam generator
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blowdown and added pump heat were properly accounted for.
Verifying that the nuclear instrument calibrations were correct
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to the calorimetric data
Verifying that the frequency of calorimetric performance was
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in accordance with the Technical Specification.
The inspector further obtained plant records and performed an
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independent calorimetric calculation.
The Secondary Calorimetric Data Sheet Appendix B-1 of Procedure 2103.16 states
that the computer point for the B steam generator feed flow is F1030.
This
point should be F1129.
Step 4 on this data sheet also states "the steam
header pressure constant @
Deg. F" instead of PSIG.
The licensee
atated he would process procedure changes to correct these typographical
This item will remain open until this action is complete (Open
errors.
Item 368/80-06-08)
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No apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
Maintenance (Unit 2)
The inspector observed portions of the following maintenance activities:
Repair of pressurizer spray valves 2CV-4651 and 2CV-4652
a.
b.
Repair of pressurizer code safety valve 2PSV-4633
c.
Re- val and repair of
'B' Reactor Coolant punp seal
d.
Repair of failed weld on suction piping to 'B'
charging pump.
The inspector determined through personal observation and review of records
where appropriate that:
These activities were not violating limiting conditions for operations.
a.
b.
Redundant components were operable.
Required administrative approvals and tagouts were obtained prior to
c.
initiating the work.
d.
Approved procedures were being used, if appropriate.
The procedures used were adequate to control the activity.
e.
f.
Activities were being accomplished qualified personnel.
g.
Replacessat parts and materials being used were properly certified.
h.
Radiological controls were proper and that they are being properly
implemented.
The inspector noted that none of the maintenance activities observed
required that Quality Control personnel verify specific steps. The
inspector observed many critical steps in the reassembly of the
reactor coolant pump seal that could have benefitted from independent
s
Quality Control personnel verification.
11.
Exit Interview
The inspectors met with Mr. J. P. O'Hanlon (Plant General Manager) and
other members of the AP&L staff at the end of various segments of this
inspection. At these meetings, the inspectors summarized the scope
of the inspection and the findings.
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