ML19317G985
| ML19317G985 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 02/01/1978 |
| From: | Mattimoe J SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| To: | Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8004020645 | |
| Download: ML19317G985 (19) | |
Text
, -)
/.,,
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
/
DISTRIBUTION FOR INCOMING MATERIAL 50-312 OLlal(79 REC: REID R W ORG: MATTIMOE J J DOCDATE: 01 r;2. NRC SACRAMENTO MUN UTILITY DISTRIC DATE RCVD: 02/02/78 DOCTYPE: LETTER NOTARIZED: NO COPIES RECEIVED SURJECT:
LTR 1 ENCL 40 RE5PONSE TO NRC"S 01/18/78 REQUEST, CONSISTING OF ADDL INFO AND SCHEDULE FOR COMPLETION OF THE FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS COMMITMENTS AND MODIFICATIONS.
W/ATT DRAWINGS.
PLANT NAME: RANCHO SECO (SMUD)
REVIEWER INITIAL:
XJM DISTRIEUTOR INITIAL:
- DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MATERIAL IS AS FOLLOWS ******************
FIRE PROTECTION INFORMATION (AFTER ISSUANCE OF OL).
(DISTRIBUTION CODE AGO6)
FOR ACTION:
BRANrW FWTCC CEID**W/3 ENCL INTERNAL:
n FILE **W/E NRC PDR**W/ ENCL
' ' ~
c_utL DELD**LTR ONLY BENAROYA**W/2 ENCL EISENHUT**W/ENCI BUTLER **W/5 ENCL WAMBACH**W/ ENCL R.
MURANKA**W/ ENCL HANAUER**W/ ENCL EXTERNAL:
LPDR'S SACRAMENTO, CA -- REGION V**W/ ENCL TIC **W/ ENCL NSIC**W/ ENCL ACRS CAT B**W/16 ENCL DISTRIBUTION:
LTR 38 ENCL 37 CONTROL NBR:
c c. 3 SIZE: 1P+12P+5P co*********************************
THE END 8004020{VS F
,)
emuuo SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT O 6201 S Street, Box 15830, sacramento, california 95813; (916) 452-3211 February 1,1978
<,]
Q'f
/\\
fg]
f~
h **** r<m,,,,d, f978A Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation R,g* ia'wr Attention: Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief 9A Operating Reactors, Branch 4 7
^@
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission q.
Washington, D. C.
20555
/ M Docket No. 50-312 Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No.1
Dear Mr. Reid:
Please refer to your letter of January 18, 1978 wherein you requested that the District furnish the NRC with additional information regarding our Fire Hazard Analysis and completion dates for the modifi-cations proposed by the District as a result of the Fire Hazard Analysis.
Enclosed with this letter are forty (40) copies of our response to your request for information and a schedule for completion of Fire Hazard Analysis commitments and modifications.
Sincerely yours,
'))utLY.
J.'
. Mattimoe Assistant General Manager and Chief Engineer Enclosures pS 8
i
C
<}
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAC UTILITY DISTRICT RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR GENERATING 4
STATION, UNIT NO. 1 RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION REQUEST FOR INFORMATION REGARDING ENCLOSURE 1 0F NRC TO SMUD LETTER DATED JANUARY 18, 1978 TITLED REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 4
i 1
t 1
FEBRUARY 1,1978
,_ _+_
.m-
.------.y
5
{
\\
NRC REQUEST FOR INFORMATION 1.
NRC REQUEST:
We understand _ that your radio communication system does not have the capability for commynication between the inside of the reactor building and the outside of the reactor building.
It is our position that you should have this capability.
RESPONSE
The District will install the necessary equipment to insure that it is possible to have radio comunication between the inside of the reactor building and the outside of the reactor building.
This modification will be completed by the end of the second refueling outage.
2.
NRC REQUEST:
i The response to Item PF-1 in your letter dated August 1,1977, is unaccep-table because the proposed SCFM air compressor is inadequate.
Our position is that the air compressor should be large enough to provide a continuous supply of refills for eight men for six hours.
RESPONSE
The District has onsite sixteen MSA 30-minute air packs plus twenty-six spare 30-minute hottles.
In addition, the District proposes to purchase a 5 CFM compressor capable of charging six bottles per hour.
The Sacramento Mutual Aid Fire Departments have a total of nine compressors ranging in capacity from 5 to 12 CFM. Any three of these compressors could be onsite within one hour.
In evaluating the total system capability, the following assumptions were made:
A.
The District's compressor would start recharging bottles one half hour after start of usage.
B.
The Mutal Aid Fire Departments would furnish only their smallest compressor to the site and it would start charging bottles at the rate of six per hour, two hours after start of consumption.
C.
Bottles would be consumed at the rate of two per man per hour. This allows 20 minutes useful time per bottle plus 10 minutes to change each bottle.
Based on these assumptions, we can furnish eight men a continuous air supply for 6-3/4 hours.
The compressor will be ordered within two months of receipt of the NRC's acceptance of this response.
O.
n s 3.
N_RC REQUEST _:
~
~
~
~
Certain areas of the plant containing safety related cables and/or equipment do not have smoke detectors.
It is our position that all areas containing safety related cables and/or equipment and areas adjacent to such areas that are not safety related but present a hazard to safety related areas should be provided with smoke detectors.
RESPONSE
The District proposes to install smok detectors in all fire areas that have (1) combustibles, and (2) equipment and/or cables required for safe shutdown and cooldown, except for the turbine building (Fire Area 71),
the diesel generator rooms (Fire Areas 37 and 38), and the reactor yard area (Fire Area 69).
The District proposes to complete the proposed modification by the end of the second refueling.
The alternative to smoke detectors in these particular fire areas is listed below:
A.
Turbine Building (Fire Aree 71):
The atmosphere of the turbine building, its openess, the air movement in the building, and the large amount of welding that takes place in the building would all contribute to either a smoke detector initiating false alarms or not functioning when it should.
Therefore, the District proposes that its existing design be accepted as an alterna-tive to adding smoke detectors in the building.
This system consists of the following:
(1) Rate of rise heat detectors in the vicinity of all significant pumps or tanks containing lubricating oil.
The detectors are all located in fire zones on the ground floor.
Operation of the detectors will initiate a water deluge of the tank or pump in the fire alarm zone and initiate an alarm in the control room.
For significant fires, a rate of rise detector will operate approximately as fast as a ~ smoke detector.
(2) Also, on the ground floor and on the mezzanine level, there is a wet-pipe sprinkler system that covers the entire floor area.
Activation of this systeminitiates an alarm in the control room.
(3) Fixed temperature detectors are used'in the turbine generator bearing enclosures.
These detectors will ini.tiate a CO2 discharge and alarm in the control room.
The system is designed to initially give a high temperature alarm and a high-high temperature alann and discharge.
This system is located on the turbine deck.
On the ground floor, the only items required for safe shutdown and cooldown is the nuclear service raw water piping to Diesel Generator "A".
However, the rate of rise detectors, which are in close proximity to the storage tanks and pumps containing lubricating oil, which is the major combustible in the building, and the wet-pipe sprinkler system,. provide sufficient early warning to allow both automatic and manual suppression at a fires incipient stages and prevent the fire from making the nuclear service raw water so hot that it cannot effectively cool the diesel engine.
O
'8
- . The main steam line piping is the only equipment required for safe
.J shutdown and cooldown on the mezzanine level of the turbine building.
The only combustibles on this floor are cable and, as indicated in the Fire Hazard Analysis, even if all this cable is consumed in a fire the maximum building temperature would be 300 F.
A cable tray fire on this floor without any suppression will not affect the pressure integrity of the main steam line system.
Even though detection and alann in the control room of a fire to prevent damage to equipment required for safe shutdown and cooldown is not required in'this area, the. wet-pipe sprinkler system performs this function.
The equipment and/or cabling on the turbine deck required for safe shutdown and cooldown consists of Station Service Transformers X43A and X43B.
The only source of combustibles on this level is from a turbine lube oil leak in the turbine-generator bearing housings.
As indicated in the Fire Hazard Analysis, there is no credible fire that can damage either station service transformer.
Even though early detection of a fire to protect the transformers is not required, the heat detectors located in the bearing areas to activate the CO2 system and alann in the control room provide this requirement.
Heat detectors have been used in the turb'ne generators due to the high air flow rates that can be encountered and the damp atmosphere, which would make smoke detectors highly unreliable.
Therefore, smoke detectors are not needed in the turbine building to insure early warning of a fire before damage occurs to equipment require ( for safe shutdown and cooldown.
B.
D_iesel Generator Rooms (Fire Areas 37 and 38):
Both diesel generator rooms are equipped with fixed temperature heat activated detectors to automatically initiate the C02 into the room and an alarm in the control room.
The initial design of the CO2 system for the diesel generator rooms included smoke detectors so that at the incipient poi'nt of the fire an alarm would be given and a quick response initiated.
However, during operation of the j
diesel generator exhaust and supply fans and operation of the diesel generator, it was determined that the smoke detectors were not reliable for the following reasons:
(1) The high volume of turbulent air flow in th: diesel generator room due to the supply and exhaust fan for the room caused the detector to malfunction and go into a trip state.
This is unacceptable because the detectors initiate an automatic dis-charge of the CO2 system which would make the diesel generator inopera tive.
Therefore, the District installed in these rooms fixed temperature heat actuated detectors.
(2) Combustion fumes from the diesel also could cause the smoke detector to false trip.
r
(~.
, Due to the rapid heatup of the engine exhaust manifold, rate of rise detectors were also deemed inadvisable.
Each diesel generator room is equipped with a room high temperature alarm.
This alarm is set at 125 F.
Therefore, it is the District's position that the high room temperature alarm and the heat detectors will provide sufficient warning that a fire exists in the diesel generatcr rooms.
C.
Reactor Yard (Fire Area 69):
The reactor yard area (Fire Area 69) is located outside with the major combustibles being cable and cable trays. The District does not consider it practical to install smoke detectors in this area.
However, some means, if at all practical, will be developed and installed to provide an alarm in the control room for a cable tray fire.
This modification will be completed by the end of the second refueling.
A fire in a fire area that does not contain any equipment and/or cable required for safe shutdown and cooldown will not pose a hazard to any fire area that contains equipment and/or cable required for safe shutdown and cooldown.
Therefore, the District proposes not to install any smoke detectors in areas that do not cnntain equipment and/or cables required for safe shutdown.
4.
NRC REQUEST:
The present means of detecting failures of the east and west nuclear service battery room ventilation systems does not detect loss of flow for failures of disconnection between the blade and the motor.
This could result in a hydrogen buildup in the room without any prior notification to operators.
It is our position that air flow measuring devices be installed in these ventilation ducts to provide an alarm in the control room on loss of ventilation flow.
RESPONSE
The District will install pitot tubes with differential pressure switches in the battery room exhaust ducts to give alann on loss of air flow.
The switch contacts will be paralleled with the existing alarm contacts on the exhaust fan motor starter to provde alarm in the control room.
This work will be complete by the end of the second refueling outage.
5.
NRC REQUEST:
01 The response to PF-ll in your letter dated August 1,1977, is unaccep-table because the concern is not only for routine hydrant maintenance, but also for situations where hydrants are damaged by vehicles or mechanical failure.
Certain of these failures would cause the loss
p T,
\\
of all water suppression capability in the turbine building or auxiliary building.
It is our position that:
(1) the vaives in the lines feeding i
these buildings from the main loop)be locked open or control room elec-trical supervision be provided,'(2 curb valves be installed on the hydrants whose failure could cause the loss of su auxiliary building or the turbine building, and (ppression water to the
- 3) a moderate energy line break analysis be done for fire protection piping for safety related areas where the primary and backup suppression is fed from a common ' pipe to assure that sufficient water can be supplied to the water suppression systems under such conditions. APCS Branch Technical Position 3-1 should be used to determine the crack size to be assumed.
RESPONSE
Regarding NRC Position (1) of this item, we can state that at the present time, all valves in the fire water supply system are electrically super-vised with alarms in the control room. This includes yard main sectionalizing valves and all valves on laterals or risers which could impair water supply to suppression systems.
NRC Position (2) of this item requests that " curb valves be installed on hydrants whose failure could cause loss of suppression water to the auxiliary building or the turbine building." The District will proceed with installing a valve on the lateral for Hydrant No. 3 which is adjacent to the lateral supplying water to the auxiliary building. The District will attempt to complete this work by the second revueling outage, however, equipment availability may affect this completion date.
The District does not propose to install curb valves on the hydrants adjacent to the laterals supplying the turbine building. As indicated by the Fire Hazard Analysis for Fire Area 71 (Turbine Building) and our response to NRC Question 29b (Item 77), a design basis fire for the turbine building does not adversely affect the ability to safely shutdown or cooldown the plant.
Therefore, it is the District's interpretation that loss of fire suppression water to the turbine building does not present a safety related consideration and noncompliance with the stated NRC position does not affect the public health and safety, and does not adversely influence the environment.
NRC Position (3) requests an analysis be made for moderate energy line breaks in the fire system.
This analysis will be submitted by March 1,1978.
6.
NRC REQUEST:
It is our position that Class A water or Halon 1211 portable extinguishers be provided in the control room.
RESPONSE
Halon extinguishers will be provided for the control room by the second refueling outage.
l
'3
~
I
)
7.
NRC REQUEST:
It.is our position that hose stations be provided in the reactor building.
These hoses.should be capable of reaching all significant cable concen-trations and areas where oil fires may occur.
Available sources of water such as service water may be utilized if analysis shows that the additional usage will not affect safety.
Valves to operate the hoses should be located such that fires inside containment will not preclude access to the valve.
RESPONSE
The District proposes to furnish sufficient hose, to be supplied from the miscellaneous water system, to reach all areas of the reactor building containing combustibles.
The miscellaneous water system is supplied from a 30,000-gallon tank and a pump rated for 300 gpm at 225 feet of head. The reactor building miscellaneous water is controlled by a normally closed valve on the outside of the containment.
Fires inside the reactor building will not jeopardize access to this valve.
The hoses will be stored on hose carts in locations designed to assure that no one fire could cause the loss of sufficient hose to impair the ability to deliver water to any location containing combustibles.
The hose carts will be of a size that will permit, with reasonable effort, moving the hose up and down the stairwells as required.
The hose carts will be equipped with suitable fog / straight stream nozzles and fittings necessary to interconnect hoses or connect hoses to any of the twelve miscellaneous water outlets distributed throughout the building.
. ~ ~
This equipment will be installed by the second refueling outage -
equipment delivery permitting.
8.
NRC REQUEST:
It is our position that fixed emergency lighting consisting of sealed beam units with an eight-hour battery for each be provided for access lighting to safety related areas to protect against complete loss of lighting during fires.
i l
l c
n
, RESPONSE:
The District proposes to install fixed emergency lighting consisting of sealed beam units with an eight-hour battery to provide access lighting to areas containing cable and/or equipment required for safe shutdown and cooldown to protect against complete loss of lighting during fires.
This equipment will be installed by the end of the second refueling outage.
9.
NRC REQUEST:
It is our position that the doors between the listed fire areas be upgraded as indicated:
Fire Areas 27 and 29 - three hour rated door Fire Areas 27 and 28 - three hour rated door Fire Areas 28 and 29 1/2 hour rated door Fire Areas 36 and 34 1/2 hour rated door Fire Areas 58 and 50 1/2 hour rated door
RESPONSE
Doors having the requested ratings will be installed by the second refueling outage if equipment delivery permits.
10.
NRC REQUEST:
To complete the fire protection organization description which you have submitted please provide a revised onsite fire protection organizational chart to include the onsite Fire Protection Engineer, Safety Technician and Quality Assurance Engineers, and a description of the functional responsibilities of the Fire Protection Engineer and QA Engineer and the qualification requirements for the Safety Technician position.
RESPONSE
In compliance with your request for a fire protection organizational chart:
Manager of Nuclear Operations Safety Technician Fire Protection Engineer Quality Assurance Engineer Operating Staff
Line of responsibility to report to the Manager of Nuclear Operations for performance evaluations and audits..
n The Fire Protection Engineer is a member of the Generation Engineering Department who shall have the functional responsibility for (1) Design; (2) Review of the Fire Protection Inspection and Testing Program; and (3) Review of the Fire Protectio'n Training Program and Implementing Procedures.
This Engineer will not be permanently assigned to the site.
The Quality Assurance Engineer is responsible for auditing the Fire Protection Program for compliance to the Rancho Seco Technical Specifica tions.
The qualifications of the Safety Technician require formalized Industrial Fire Protection Training at a recognized organization, refresher training and liaison with the Sacramento Fire Departments to observe the latest firefighting equipment and techniques.
11.
NRC REQUEST:
In a number of areas in your Fire Hazard Analysis the solution to protecting redundant safe shutdown equipment within a specific fire area was the use of thermal barriers. Do.you presently have information to substantiate that these barriers are qualified to perform the required study.
If so, provide us the information and if not qualification testing will be required to show the barriers are adequate.
RESPONSE
Fire testing of thermal barriers is nearing completion and the results will be submitted by March 1,1978.
12.
NRC REQUEST:
Related to Section III.B.2 of the Fire Hazard Analysis, on what basis was the determination made that " sufficient spatial separation exists" to prevent fire spread within a fire area, and thus permit division of the area into zones.
(Fire Area 68 and Response to NRC Question 25)?
Has division of the Reactor Building into " Zones" considered both horizontal and vertical extension of fire damage between zones due to heat and radiant energy?
Has the analysis included consideration of a pressurized oil leak because of broken piping or oil pump casing, or bearing leakage? Will the oil catch basin protect the area from such a pressurized leak?
RESPONSE
Due to the detailed analysis required, the District proposes to submit
-by February 17, 1978 the justification for dividing the reactor building into zones and an analysis showing the effects of both horizontal and vertical extension of the fire damage between zones due to heat and
(
radiant energy.
l l
w
-y,.--
=
Q Q^
.i
- , The Fire ' Hazard Analysis in the: reactor building zones con'taining reactor coolant pump motors was performed assuming complete combustion of. all combustibles in the fire area zones, including the oil in-the reactor coolant motor.
This approach was taken to be in agreement with the definition of a design basis fire detailed in Branch Technical Position 9.'5.1.
However, the analysis also indicates that a. fire.
involving the oil in the reactor coolant pump motors is not credible' due to the oil catch basins.
The oil catch basins will protect against any typ.e of credible oil leak including, but not limited to, a pressurized oil leak because of broken piping, or oil pump casing, or bearing leaka'ge.
Refer to the attached Drawings M-887 and M-888 for detailed information on the oil catch basin.
j 13.
NRC REQUEST:
i Related.to Section IV.B.2-Note 5 of the Fire Hazard Analysis, this item refers only to " Water Buildup." Was water spray from leaks or operation considered in the analysis as well?
l
RESPONSE
For-each area in the Fire Hazard Analysis,Section IV,B, there is a section called " Inadvertent Operation or Pipe Rupture." This section discusses the affect on equipment required for safe shutdown and cooldown due to inadvertent operation or pipe rupture of the fire water and CO2 flooding _ system. Therefore, the District's analysis has con-sidered water spray from leaks or operation.
i 14.
NRC REQUEST:
In your response to Question 26b regarding Panel HlSS you state that a fire in this panel could cause loss of all auxiliary feedwater pumps from the control room but that these pumps could be operated locally.
How much time is available to place these pumps into operation, and how much time would be required for an operator to do so?
RESPONSE
A fire in HISS could cause the loss of both main feedwater pumps and control from the control room of both auxiliary feedwater pumps.
One j
of the auxiliary feedwater pumps must be operating within 20 minutes i
from the time both feedwater pumps become inoperative.
The time required for the operator to place the pumps in operation from the 4160V switchgear is less than 10 minutes. To insure that local-operation can be obtained quickly, the District proposes to install isolation switches at the 4160V switchgear for both pumps to isolate the local control circuit from Panel HISS...This would insure operability of either motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
The isolation switches will be installed by the end of the second refueling.
l 4
p i
15.
NRC REQUEST:
After the modifications, will fire dampers be located in all ventilation duct penetrations of fire barriers and will there be fire doors in all doorway penetrations of fire barriers? Identify the areas where fire doors or dampers are not to be installed and what criteria are used for not adding these to fire barrier penetrations.
RESPONSE
This question requests specific information regarding installation of fire rated doors and fire dampers in ducts.
In accordance with a telecon between Vern Rooney and Ron Lawrence on January 25, 1978, it is our under-standing that this specific information is no longer required by your reviewers and that the general criteria used in preparation of the Fire Hazard Analysis including " proposed modifications" will be sufficient.
Our criteria is as follows:
A.
Fire area boundaries were drawn based on general wall construction without consideration of. wall penetration fire rating and without cons 4eration to location of safety related equipment.
It is our opinion that the walls presented a meaningful barrier to fire spread and if required by the safety analysis, the penetra-tions could be upgraded.
These boundaries were not eliminated or modified for those cases where the safety analysis showed the boundary to be unnecessary.
B.
Where the analysis showed that the spreading of a fire througa a fire area boundary via a undampered duct would not involve adoitional safety systems, there was no need to upgrade the penetration.
Where the spread of fire through a fire area boundary via a duct woula involve additional safety equipment, it was proposed that fire 1
dampers be installed to prevent that spread.
For example, Drawing E-742, Sheet 2, in the Appendix of the analysis shows that the spread of a fire from Fire Area 2 to Fire Area 14 would increase the involvement from Channel B only circuits to Channels B and D circuits.
Accordingly, the analysisSection IV.B.2, Area 2, shows a proposal to add dampers between Fire Areas 2 and 14.
Similarly, Drawing E-742, Sheet 2, shows that all of the safety related circuits in Fire Area 2 are also in Fire Area 3.
Therefore, spreading of the fire from Fire Area 2 to Fire Area 3 would not alter the impact of the fire on safety systems.
Therefore, no dampers have been proposed for the ducts penetrating the fire boundary between Areas 2 and 3.
C.
Exceptions to this criteria were in a conservative direction based primarily on the magnitude of the fire possible.
For example, Drawing E-742, Sheet 2 and Drawing E-745, Sheet 2, show that Fire Areas 11 and 12 contain no safety related systems; however, the analysisSection IV.B.2, Area 11, shows a proposal to install a damper in the 14" x 18" wall ventilation opening.
gs
. 16.
NRC REQUEST:
The detailed ir. formation on the parts of the oil collection system for the reactor coolant pumps is not sufficient to determine whether oil leaks from piping, lift pump, oil cooler and flange connections, etc.,
will collect oil from leaks in these components.
Provide a sketch or marked up drawings showing the catch system relative to these and other i
pump features where oil may leak.
RESP 0NSE:
Attached are detailed drawings showing the oil catch basin relative l
to the oil lift pumps, oil cooler, and all other accessories associated with the reactor coolant pump motor oil lubrication system. As indi-cated by the drawings, the oil catch basin is capable of catching oil from anycredible reactor coolant pump motor oil leak.
17.
NRC REQUEST:
Fire brigade requirements do not require physical examinations to perform strenuous activity. The fire brigade members' qualification requirements should include the satisfactory completion of physical examination for performing strenuous activity.
RESPONSE
Physical exams are given to each fire brigade member prior to employment at Rancho Seco.
The members will have filed with their training records a certification by a physician that they will be able to perform strenuous activities according to the requirements stated within the Fire Hazard Analysis Report.
This documentation will be complete within two months after NRC acceptance of this reply.
18.
NRC REQUEST:
Your firefighting procedures should be supplemented in order to establish the necessary strategies for fighting fires in all safety related areas and areas presenting a hazard to safety related equipment.
These strategies should identify for each area:
combustibles; methods of fighting fires; access and egress routes; vital heat sensitive components and equipment; system and equipment location; toxic hazards; ventilation and smoke removal equipment operations.
In addition, the, validity of _the preplanning strategies should be tested by appropriate full-dress drills to check the logic of the strategy, the adequacy of the equipment, personnel understanding and to uncover unforeseen problems.
(
. RESPONSE:
A program is being developed for the Fire. Protection Training Course that will describe the necessary strategies to be used for fighting fires at Rancho Seco.
The training program will identify each area, combustibles, methods of fighting fires, access and egress routes, vital heat sensitive components and equipment, system and equipment location, toxic hazards, and ventilation and smoke removal equipment.
Every type of room identified in the Fire Hazard Analysis will be the subject of the quarterly drills.
The strategy to attack each type of fire will be discussed during classroom lectures and be put to an appropriate test during the drill.
These procedures will be
- omplete within three months after NRC acceptance GT this reply.
l
-, - - ~ -
PROPOSED SCHEDULE FOR COMPLETION OF ALL FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS COMMITMENTS AND MODIFICATIONS Item Description Completion Date(7)
Notes 1
Installation of Additional Smoke Detectnrs and/or Relocating Existing End of Second Refueling 1 A&lB -
Detectors 2
Installation of Thermal Barriers on Required Conduit End of Second Refueling lA 3
Rerouting of Required Class 2 Instrumentation Circuits End of Third Refueling 1A 4
Rerouting of Required Class 1 Electrical Circuits End of Third Refueling 1A 6
Fire Stops in the Reactor Building Necessary to Provide the Zone Boundaries See Note 6 1A 6
Upgrade Fire Stops on Electrical Penetrations End of Third Refueling lA&lB 7
Install Fire Dampers End of Third Refueling lA 8
Modification of Fire Doors End of Second Refueling lA 9
Alarming of Fire Doors End of Third Refueling 1A 10 Addition of Auxiliary Building Fire Hose Stations or Modification of End of Second Refueling 1A Fire Hose Length 11 Upgrade Expansion Joints Betwen the Auxiliary Bui.lding and the Reactor End of Second Refueling lA Building
'12 Upgrade Electrical Penetrations to Prevent Water Damage End of Second Refueling 1A 13 Remove Suspended Ceiling in Computer Room End of Second Refueling 1A
~
14 Check and Pack all Cable Penetrations in Fire Areas 18 and 19 as Required End of Second Refueling lA to Minimize Air In-Leakage 15 Install a Temperature Detector - Reactor Building Purge Unit A-536 End of Second Refueling 1A
,16 Install Temperature Detectors for Alarm and Automatic Damper Actuation at End of Second Refueling lA Charcoal Filters 4
Item Description Completicn Date(7)
~
N!tes 17 Install 6" of Fire Resistant Concrete to East Wall of Fire Areas 37 and 38 End of Second Refueling lA with a Three-Hour Fire Rating 18 Provide for Tripping of the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Pumps by Actuation of the Contiguous CO2 System for Fire Areas 37 and 36, End of Seco.d Refueling lA 19 Install Trapped Floor Drain with Quench Pit for Fire Areas 37 and 38 End of Second Refueling lA 20 Insulate all Silver Soldered Pipe within Fire Areas 58, 50, 49 and 48 with End of Second Refueling 1A Calcium Silicate Insulation and Stainless Steel Jacket with Thickness as Required to Resist the Effects of the Design Basis Fire I
Relocate Fill and Vent Connections on Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank T887B End of Second Refueling 1A&lB 22 Replace the Transformer Adjacent to the Emergency Air Lock with a Dry End of Second Refueling lA Type Transformer 23 Reroute the "B" Fuel Oil Pipe Line to Remain Underground Until it is Inside End of Second Refueling 1A the Diesel Generator Room.
24 Add Pressure Sensor Alanns in Hydrogen Piping End of Second Refueling 1A 25 Provide Sufficient Emergency Breathing Apparatus End of Second Refueling 1B&lC 26 Move Emergency Ventilation Equipment Ductwork End of Second Refueling IB e7 Radio Communication Inside - Outside Reactor Building End of Second Refueling 1C 28 Loss of Battery Room Exhaust Fan Alarm End of Second Refueling IC 29 Curb Valves on Hydrants. Associated with Auxiliary Building End of Second Refueling IC G
i
__ Item-Description Completion Datd7)
Notes 30 Moderate Line Break Analysis March 1,1978 1C 31 Halon Extinguishers in Control Room End of Second Refueling IC 32 Hose Station in Reactor Building End of Second Refueling IC 33 Fixed Emergency Sealed Beam Battery Access Lights End of Second Refueling 1C 34 Upgrade Fire Doors Per NRC Request End of Second Refueling IC
~ '5
(
Report on Fire Test of Thennal Barriers March 1,1978 1C 36 Justification of Reactor Building Zones February 17, 1978 1C 37 Fire Brigade Physical Requirements See Note 3 1C 38 Firefighting Procedures See Note 4 1C 39 Procedure for Isolating H2ES From Local Diesel Control Station End of Second Refueling 5
NOTES:
l A - Indicates that the commitment or proposed modification was made by the District in the District's August 1,1977 submittal of the Fire Hazard Analysis 18 - Indicates that the coninitment or proposed modification was made in the District's August 1,1977 letter to the NRC.
i
.'C - Indicates that the commitment or proposed modification was made in the February 1,1978 letter to the NRC.
1 2 - Deleted
)
3 - The proposed modification will be completed within two months after acceptance of it by the NRC.
j 4 -- The proposed modification will be completed within three months after acceptance of it by the NRC.
l 5 - Verbal commitment made by the District to the NRC.
l 6 - 50% complete by end of second refueling and 100% complete by end of third refueling.
7 - The District's current schedule is to have the end of the second refueling by December 1978 and the end of the third refueling by December 1979.
These dates are subject to delays which could result from unplanned outages, i
=
==
\\
y I
~
AG=
~
~
1 A
O. gonouser NO. OF PAGES _
./
REASON:
O PAGE ILLEGIBLE:
O HARD COPY FILED AT:
PDR CF OTHER O BETTER COPY REQUESTED ON
/
/
j$PAGE TOO LARGE TO FILM:
HARD COPY FILED AT:
PDR OTHER FILMED ON APERTURE CARD NO. I kM2OMP l
l
1 i
l l
DOCUV---
PAGE 3J__EJ A\\ O. -go~<
,/
.NO. OF PAGES REASON:
O PAGE ILLEGIBLE:
O HARD COPY FILED AT:
PDR CF OTHER O BETTER COPY REQUESTED ON
/
/
f PAGE TOO LARGE TO FILM:
d9 y-DC=ruo^t eon OTHER
% FILMED ON APERTURE CARD NO.Y Abh((
t
--