ML19317G686
| ML19317G686 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 05/04/1972 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19317G673 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-312-72-01, 50-312-72-1, NUDOCS 8003250780 | |
| Download: ML19317G686 (17) | |
See also: IR 05000312/1972001
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U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
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DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE
REGION V
CO Inspection Report No.
050-0312/72-01
Subject:
Sacramento Municipal Utility District
Rancho Seco Unit No. 1
License No. (s) CPPR-56
Location: Clay Station
Priority
Sacramento County, California
Category
A-2
Type of Licensee:
963 Mwe (2772 Mwt) PWR, B & W
Type of Inspection:
Construction, Routine Unannounced & Special Announced
Dates of Inspection: March 9, 20-24, 31 and April 6,1972
Dates of Previous Inspection: December 13-17, 1971 & January 7,1972
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Principal Inspector:
R. T. Dodds, eac or Inspector
'(Date)
Accompanying Inspectors:
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A. D. Johnson, Reactor Inspector
(Date)
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C. C. Williams, Reactor Inspector
'(Date)
Other Accompanying Personnsl:
W. E. Vetter, Senior Reactor Inspector, CO:III
11. S . Pia zza , GAO
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Reviewed by:
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G. S. Spenter, Senior Reactor Inspector
(Date)
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Proprietary Information: None
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8003250 M C
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SECTION I
Enforcement Action
A.
The radiographs of the containment vessel liner show indications of defects
that exceed the limits of the code specified in the PSAR and FSAR.
(Paragraph 19.)
B.
Nonconforming pipe flanges that had been tagged not to be used for Class I
systems were intermingled with similar type flanges for Class I systems
in nonconformance with the control of material requirements contained in
the QA program described in the FSAR.
(Paragraph 13.)
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Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Matters
A.
The manufacturing tests of the 125-volt DC system battery chargers have
been examined by source inspectors and Bechtel QA to assure that the test
data is in accordance with the limits established in the specifiestions.
Acceptance limits are now being included in test procedures that relate to
inservice performance. These corrective actions were verified during the
inspection by examining the amended battery charger test reports and test
plans for the vital buses in the saintained A-C systems.
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B.
The construction activitie: examined during the current inspection were
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found to be covered by inspection planning and/or quality control
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instructions. Also, it was confirmed that construction schedules were
being used in conjunction with schedules of Class I QA activities to
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improve coordination between Bechtel QA Management and Construction
Management.
C.
Conseco's QC manual for field erected tanks was found to have been revised
to include the necessary documented instructions for quality activities
such as inspector's duties, nondestructive testing, and the reporting
and resolution of identified conditions adverse to quality.
D.
The records examined showed that Bechtel Management Inspection was
performing welding innpections in accordance with QA inspection planning.
In addition, Conseco was performing their own audits and were maintaining
records of these audits.
E.
It was verified that Conseco is now providing the necessary inspection of
fabrication operations, including the non-destructive examinations. The
completed operations are now being recorded on "as built" drawings. The
visual inspections of weld fit ups, welding and disbursal of weld rods
are being recorded on checklists that have been defined in the Conseco
QC manual. The Conseco inspector, including the nondestructive inspector,
are being identified.
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Unresolved Items
A.
Line indications have been discovered on radiographs of stainless steel
welding which have been " routinely accepted by the industry" as a
"high-low" condition according to SMUD and Bechtel. However, the
indications have in fact been shown by the licensee to be potentially
defective welds with fissures in the root pass. About 75% of the welds
having the "high-low" indication that have been destructively examined
have been found to contain fissures. Radiographs of approximately 20%
(63 of 375) of the stainless steel welds made to date show the "high-low"
indication.
(Paragraph 15.)
B.
The containment vessel liner contains areas that are locally out of plumb
with the limits specified in the FSAR.
(Paragraph 12.a.)
C.
The containment vessel liner has bulges that exceed the inward displacement
analyzed in the FSAR.
(Paragraph 12.b.)
Status of Previously Reported Unresolved Items
A.
Disposition of the thin wall valves discovered at Rancho Seco has not yet
been resolved.
B.
Additional documentation has been obtained to justify the acceptability of
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the use of non-normalized SA516 steel for one of the shell rings in the
generator. The information relating to this condition has been supplied
to the DRL in response to an FSAR question. The nonconformance report
has been amended to show the cause of the contract variation.
Persons Contacted
The following personnel were contacted during the inspection.
SMUD
Chief Engineer
J. Mattimoe
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D. Raasch
Project Engineer
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V. McMahon
Quality Assurance Director
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W. Friedrich
Quality Assurance Engineer
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J. diltz
Resident Engineer
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L. Kielman
Senior Mechanical Engineer
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R. Rodriquez
Plant Superintendent
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P. Oubre'
Asst.- Superintendent Nuclear Plant Operations
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Bechtel Corporation (Engineering and Construction Management)
W. Stinchfield
Project Manager
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C. Blum-
Office Engineer
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W.'Chapla
Project Quality Assurance Engineer
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W. Taylor
QA Engineer
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J. Wait
Senior QA Technician
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D. Martz
. QA Engineer (Electrical)
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R. Hunter
QA Engineer
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A. Cappelletti
QC Inspector (Welding)
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S. E. Tucker
QC Engineer (Welding)
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Bechtel Corporation (Construction)
J. Vander Knyff
Project Superintendent
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B. Boyd
Welding Supervisor
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W. Bagley
Welding Inspector
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Conseco (a Division of Chamberlain Manufacturing Corporation)
H. Hollowell
Foreman
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QC Services Incorporated
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W. M. Adams
QC Inspector for Conseco
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State of California - Division of Industrial Safety
A. Snyder
Supervising Engineer
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N. Burgess
Engineer
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C. Pembrook
Inspector
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Management Interview
The results of the inspection were discussed with Messrs. Mattimoe, McMahon,
Rodriguez and other members of the SMUD and Bechtel staffs-at the conclusion
of the inspection. The inspectors acknowledged the corrective action taken
by the licensee on the items of noncompliance and .tnderstanding that were
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-identified during the previous inspection. Pertinent responses to inspection
findings were as follows.
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A.
A report will be submitted to CO with copies to CO:V on the problem of
fissures in the root. pass of stainless steel welds.
(Paragraph 15.)
B.
The radiographs of the containment vessel liner that were examined by the
inspectors will be re-evaluated for compliance with the code and'acceptabi-
lity of the welding for its intended service. SMUD will then respond in
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writing to the Commission as appropriate for this situation.
(Paragraph 19.)
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C.
The significance of the bulging (inward displacement) and the out of
plumbness of the containment vessel liner plate will be evaluated. SMUD
will report the results of these evaluations as appropriate to CO in
accordance with the new proposed 10CFR50.55 reporting requirements.
(Paragraph 12.)
D.
- The nonconforming pipe flanges in the welding shop will be segregated
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from the Class I flanges and dispositioned in accordance with QA procedures
for nonconforming material.
(Paragraph 13.)
E.
Grinding operations of carbon steel and stainless steel fittings will be
segregated to eliminate the potential for contamination of stainless
steel end preparations with carbon steel particles.
(Paragraph 14.)
SECTION II
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Additional Subiects Inspected, Not Identified in Section V
Where No Deficiencies or Unresolved Items Were Identified
1.
Status of Construction
The project construction status was estimated to be 65% complete as of
March 23, 1972. The construction schedule has slipped about five months
with completion of construction expected to be April 1973. The reactor
vessel and two ' steam generators were moved into the containment building
and.placed on their support structures in March 1972.
2.
Annual Followup QA Inspection
a.
Quality Assurance Audit Schedule (1971 - 1972)
b.
Audits by Bechtel and SMUD QA groups.
(Audits No. 106 - 266 for
period of January 1971 - March 1972)
c.
Quality Assurance Manual
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d.
Nonconforming Reports (examined n'450 reports)
e.
Site Procurement
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.(1) Procurement Document Control QA Procedures
(2) Procurement and inspection records for five orderi from
four different suppliers
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(3) Material Certifications
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(4) Nonconforming Report No. 1472
(5) Configuration Change Document No. 357-M140
f.
Construction Surveillance
(1) Construction Inspection QA Procedures
(2) Construction Inspection Data Report for Diesel Generators
(3) Nonconforming Reports on Diesel Generators
g.
SMUD and Bechtel Management and Engineering Organizations
h.
Bechtel Construction Organization
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QCl No. 22, 'Trocedure for Quality Assurance Audit of Start-Up Test
Procedures, Test Results and Data Sheets"
3.
Design of Steam Safety and Relief Valve Header
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Turkey Point occurrence examined by SMUD and determined not te be a
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problem at Rancho Seco because of a different steam exhaust design.
(Report from Bechtel to SMUD dated 2-16-72; File No. 6292 M-21.01A and
6292 A3.01.11)
4.
WD-50 Undervoltage Relays
This relay will not be used at Rancho Seco.
5.
Cracks in Stems of Velan Valves at Oconee
Stecs of the valves at Oconee were a special ordered heat treated
material. This material has not been used in the SMUD valves.
6.
Class I Field Erected Tanks
a.
Contractors QA manual including procedures for weld repairs,
control of weld filler material, calibration of welding machines,
radiography, liquid penetrant, magnetic particle visual and
hydrotest examinations.
b.
Contractors (Conseco) production planning travel sheets.
c.
Weld filler metal control log sheet for February and March 19 A'.
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d.
Weld metal control tickets issued during February and March 1972.
e.
As-built drawings showing NDT, weld repair, welder, material heat
number and date.
~f.
List of qualified welders on the job.
g.
Bechtel construction inspection data sheets.
7.
Reactor Vessel
a.
Receiving inspection results.
b.
Installation inspection procedures and results.
c.
Weight certification of one of the test weights.
d.
Equipment load test procedures and results.
8.
Other Class 1 Components
a.
High Pres.nure Iniection Pumps (P238 A and B)
(1) Source inspection data sheet verifying proper documentation
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at vendor prior to shipment.
(2) Installation inspection data reports.
(Field inspection
checklists and grout reports.)
(3) Equipment rotation data.
b.
Decay Heat Removal Heat Exchanger (DHC 7A and B)
(1) Source inspection data.
(2) Material certification (chemical and physical).
(3) LOT data.
(4) Installation inspection data including grout reports.
c.
Isolation Valves from Letdown Cooler (Mu-V-2A and B) (HV22007
and 22008)
(1) Material certifications.
(2) NDT ' da ta .
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(3)- Operating test data.
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(4) Document deficiencies identified by Bechtel QA personnel
at site.
d.
Pressurizer
(l? Receiving inspection data.
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(2) Observed temporary storage (no surveillance requirements).
e.
Control Rod Drives
Observed provisions for storage of drives.
9.
Operations Staff
a.
Organization charts.
b.
Personnel assigned to organization positions.
c.
Personnel experience and qualification summaries.
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10.
Operations Personnel Training
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Training program content, personnel attendance, letters of completion,
examination results, and resumes of instructors where pertinent for
the following training activities.
a.
Observation of nuclear plant operation.
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b.
Basic reactor phsycis and engineering.
c.
Babcock and Wilcox PWR technology course.
d.
Babcock and Wilcox PWR simulator course,
e.
Specialist courses,
f.
Other training activities related to waste handling, health
physics, emergencies, and plan'c systens.
11.
Tours
a.
Reactor Vessel - Observed handling and placement on March 9,1972.
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b.
Containment building - Observed reactor vessel in place with openings
protected.
c.
Field erected tanks - Observed construction and QC inspection activities
in progress.
d.
Material storage areas - Observed proper storage practices and
procedures in effect.
Details of Subjects Discussed in Section I
12.
Containment vessel Liner
a.
Plumb Criteria for Liner
Section 5.6.3.4.A.2 of the FSAR states that the liner plate is to
be erected to be plumb within 1/400 of height under consideration
with a 2-inch allowance for local "out-of-roundness".
This is
equivalent to 0.3 inch for a 10-foot plate.
Contrary to the above requirement, portions of the liner plate are
out of plumb as typically illustrated by the following table.
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Lift No.
Azmith
Elevation
Out of Plumb
RB-A-13
15 00
63.5'
15/16" outwards
RB-A-13
1650
63.5'
2.5" outwards
RB-A-13
1800
63.5'
13/16" outwards
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RB-A-17
15 00
103.5'
1" outwards
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RB-A-17
1600
103.5'
3/4" outwards
RB-A-17
1800
103.5 '
l.25" outwards
RB-A-17
2000
103.5'
7/8" outwards
RB-A-17
2100
103.5'
5/8" outwards
RB-A-17
2400
103.5'
7/8" outwards
RB-A-17
2500
103.5'
7/8" outwards
The out-of-plumb nonconformances have been dispositioned on
Nonconforming Reports as. acceptable by the Engineering Review Board
in accordance with the following instructions and technical justifica-
tion:
"Ihe integrity of the containment liner will not be affected
provided that the minimum wall thickness of the containment
building is maintained at 3' - 9" with a spreader. The slope of
the outside face of the reactor building shall not exceed the
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A.C.I. requirements for variation from plumb for mass concrete
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b.
Inward Deflection of Liner Plate
Sections 5.6.3.4.4.A.3. and .4 of the FSAR state the following with
regard to the. inward deflection of the liner plate:
"A 15-foot long template curved to the required radius does
not show deviations of more than '3/4-inch when placed against
the completed surface of the shell within a single plate section
and not closer than 12 inches of any welded seam. When placed
across one or more welded seams, the deviation does not exceed
1 inch. The effect of change in plate thickness or of weld
reinforcement is excluded when determining deviations.
"The maximum inward deflection of the liner plate between the
stiffeners _(spaced at 15 inches) is 1/8 inch relative to a
15-inch straight edge. Nelson studs are added to the liner if
this tolerance is exceeded and in the judgment of the engineer
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it is not advisable to attempt to force the liner back into
the specified tolerance."
Contrary to these requirements the liner plate contains inward
deflections that exceed the limits specified above as illustrated
by the following examples:
Inward Deflection
Length of
Plate No.
Between Liner Anchors
Deflection
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60"
9/32"
30"
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58"
3/16"
60"
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60"
13/32"
60"
5/16"
54"
3/8"
53"
4J-Pent. 19A
t to 9/16"
15"
64K-Equip. Hatch
7/32"
96"
The above inward deflection nonconformances which occurred after
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concrete pours have been dispositioned on nonconforming reports as
acceptable by the Engineering Review Board in accordance with the
following instructions and technical justification: "The integrity
of. the containment liner plate system as a leak tight membrane will not
be affected by these bulges. See PSAR supplement 2 Appendix 5L.
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Analysis of the liner plate indicates adequate strength to prevent
the plate from bulging inward due-to concrete loads alone. Any
corrective action at this time would do more harm than good."
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An. examination by the inspector of PSAR supplement 2 Appendix SL
disclosed that the maximum inward deflection analyzed for an
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anchorage sp. ing of 15 inches was 0.125 inch. Therefore, the
deflections in question still appear to exceed the limits in the
PSAR supplement as well as the FSAR.
c.
Radiography of Containment Liner Welds
See Section III, paragraph 19.
13.
Control of Material
SMUD's QA Procedure No.17 and their FSAR require that all nonconforming
material shall be segregated from acceptable material, documented on a
nonconforming report, and dispositioned by proper authority.
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Contrary to the above requirement, pipe flanges bearing a white tag with
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words "Do Not Use on llN1(Class I)" were observed on March 24* to be
intermingled with similar *ype Class I pipe flanges on a wooden pallet
in the welding shop. When questioned, Mr. Burke, Welding Engineer, stated
that he had tagged the flanges because it had been learned that they had
not been properly tested. However, they were acceptable for Class II
systems. He stated that a Nonconformance Report luid not been prepared.
The inspector observed that the tag used was not of the type required by
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the QA Manual for nonconforming material.
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14.
Sta'inless Steel Pipe End Preparation
During the tour of the Welding Shop it was observed that carbon steel and
stainless steel pipe fittings were lying on the same grinding table. When
questioned, Mr. Frank Pangburn stated that the ends of the pipe fittings
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were prepared for welding on this bench but that the welders used
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different grinding tools for each type of material. The inspector
observed that there were only two portable grinding wheels on the bench
and both were being used on stainless steel.
Mr. Pangburn was sure the
' welders would change tools before grinding the carbon steel fittings
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since they knew better than to contaminate stainless steel with carbon
steel particles.
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on April 6, 1972.
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Fissures Discovered in Stainless Steel Welds
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The licensee has discovered a line indication on radiographs of stainless
steel welding that has been " routinely accepted by the industry" as a
"high-low" condition. This indication has in fact been shown by SNmD-
- Bechtel to be a potentially defective weld with fissures in the root pass.
Examination disclosed that the filler metal was not properly fusing and
the filler metal had tended ~ to roll over onto the base metal and create
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the fissures. In all but two of the velds examined, the fissures were
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found to be less than 15 mils in depth (most about 5 mils) and about 0.5
mil wide. Other than the line indication on the radiograph, they were
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only detectable by microscopic examination.
About 75% ~ of the welds exhibiting the "high-low" indication (16 out of 21)
that have been destructively examined have been found to contain the
fissures. Radiogrsphs of about 20% (63 of 375) of the stainless steel
welds performed to date showed the "high-low" indication. All of these
welds in significant systems will be replaced according to Mr. McMahon.
Microscopic examination of 26 welds with " clean" radiographs showed them
to be free of defects, leading the licensee to conclude that the potential
for the condition can be detected by radiography. While still under inves-
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cigation by Bechtel (San Francisco Office) the apparent cause of the
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problem appears to be low level oxygen contamination in the purge gas
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(which is not detectable with the normal oxygen analyzer) and/or veld
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technique combined with mismatch of pipe ends.
The inspector attended a meeting between the licensee and the State of
California Division of Industrial Safety on March 31, 1972 at which the
pipe joint welding problem was discussed as follows:
a.
The State was shown the photomicrographs of the Bechtel SF investi-
gation of field welds and also laboratory welds wherein welds were
specifically made for destructive testing. Laboratory welds have
been made by Bechtel SF personnel with varying changes in critical
welding parameters,
b.
SHUD presented their results of cutting pipe welds where radio-
graphs show no linear indications on the film. Results were that no
fissures were found via the photomicrographic process on these
welds. SMUD's photomicrographic work was done by Aerojet in
Sacramento ,
c.
The State was advised that Bechtel was still conducting additional
laboratory work and that SMUD would keep them advised of the status
and results.
d.
SNUD advised that all ASNE Code stamped pipe joint welds which show
linear lines at the root of the. weld bead will be repaired.
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SECTION III
Prepared by C. C. Williams
Additional Subjects Inspected. Not Identified in Section I,
Where No Deficiencies or Unresolved Items Were Found
16. - Other Class I Structures - Condensate Storage Tank No. 385
(Radiography) - (28 Radiographs Reviewed)
a.
Review of QC System
(1) Identification of NDT procedures
(2) Identification of NDT results
(3) Radiographic quality
(4) Evaluation of weld quality
(5) Correlation of records to welds
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b.
Follow-up Record Review
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(1) Radiographic quality
(2) Evaluation of weld quality (RT)
(3) Correlation af records to welds (RT)
17.
Other Class I Structures - Reactor Ccolant Storage Tank No. 5930
(Radiography) - (24 Radiographs Reviewed)
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a.
Review of QC System
(1) Identification of NDT procedures
(2) Identification of NDT results
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(3) Evaluation of weld quality
(4) Radiographic quality
(5) Correlation of records to welds
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b.
Follow-up Record Review
(1) Radiographic quality
(2) Correlation of records to welds
18. Other Class I Piping - Associated Pipe and Engineering Corporation
(Radiography) - (66 Radiographs Reviewed)
a.
Review of QC System
(1) Qualification of NDT techniques
(2) Identification of weld location
(3) Identification of NDT results
(4) Radiographic quality
(5) Evaluation of weld quality
(6) Correlation of records to welds
b.
Follow-up Record Review
(1) Radiographic quality
(2) Evaluation of weld quality
Details of Subiects Discussed in Section I
19. Containment Liner (Weld) Radiography (Refer to CO Report No. 50-312/70-6,
dated October 20, 1970)
The Rancho Seco Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 5.6.3.4.5. A, 2,
states that the techniques for radiographic examination of the containment
liner welds was in accordance with the ASME Code,Section VIII,
Paragraph W-51.
Moreover, the criterion for the acceptance of contain-
ment liner weld radiography was changed by reference in the Rancho Seco
Configuration Change Document dated March 19, 1970, from Paragraph W-52,
Section VIII, of the ASME code to Paragraph W-51, except that the
maximum length of slag inclusions was reduced from 0.25 inches to 0.125
inches. The radiographic coverage was limited to spot radiography as
specified in Section 5.6.3.4.5, A of the FSAR.
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The licensee responded to DRL in Section 5.J.10.23 of Addendum 5 to the
PSAR .that seam weld porosity would be controlled as follows:
"All liner
. plate seams will be 100 percent vacuum box soap bubble tested to check
for weld porosity. The seams will also be checked by 10% radiographic
inspection. The criterion for radiographic acceptance of welds will be
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in accordance with paragraph UW-51 Section VIII of the ASME Code, except
. that the maximum acceptable length of slag inclusion will not exceed
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0.125 inch whereas the code allows 0.250 inch."
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As stated in CO Report No. 50-312/70-6, Section D, the density require-
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ments of Paragraph UW-51(c)(3) were not met for a large number of the
radiographs. Nonconformance Report (NCR) No. 365, dated October 26,
1970, states " Radiographic film does not meet the requirements of
Paragraph UW-51 of Section VIII of the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code."
However, NCR No. 365 also states that the subject nonconforming radio-
graphs are acceptable in that. . .".All radiographs have the penetrameter
image details, and the weld zone of each radiograph is interpretable
to the extent we are assured that the proper welding has been performed
and that an adequate level of welding quality has been attained." Further,
a Bechtel Corporation memorandum, dated November 13, 1970, states that
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weld areas identifiable to film Nos. 644 and 704 were radiographed, using
techniques which resulted in the production of acceptable radiographs,
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i.e., these two retakes met all of the technical requirements of
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Paragraph UW-51 with respect to density requirements. On the basis of
the above results, Mr. B. Boyd, Bechtel management representative,
expressed the opinion that, had the density requirements been met for
other density nonconforming radiography, no additional assurance would
have been provided in terms of " defect detectability" and, therefore,
the remaining density nonconforming film would be acceptable as far as
defect detection is concerned. The inspector examined both the original
film and the code acceptable retakes and noted that the deviation from
film density requirements in the original film did not result in the
masking or omission of any of the defee,ts and details identified in the
acceptable film in this case.
With recognition of the film density deficiencies, discussed above, the
CO inspector evaluated 25 containment liner radiographs. The results
of the review and the identity of the film are as follows:
Nine of ten randomly selected radiographs of the knuckle to ring No. 1,
seams 4-A', 4-B, 4-C, and vertical seam No. 59, contain defect indications -
in excess of dimensions allowed by the code. Four of 14 randomly selected
radiographs of the top ring to the dome contain defects, indications or
adverse conditions unacceptable to the code.
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Film Identity
Weld Location
Film No.
Interpretation
Knuckle -
109
Unacceptable linear porosity - linear
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Ring No. 1
indications which could be cracks.
110
Unacceptable linear porosity - linear
indications which could be cracks.
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111
Unacceptable linear indications, gross
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porosity, linear porosity.
112
Unacceptable indications of transverse
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cracking, porosity, undercut masking
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viewability, and excessive roughness.
Vertical (Cone)
59 (5-6)
Unacceptable porosity linear indications,
artifacts, inadequate water wash, and
excessive weld roughness.
59 (6-7)
Unacceptable linear indications, aligned
porosity, excessive weld roughness, and
size of porosity.
Vertical 4-A Girth
184
Unacceptable. Slag inclusion, linear
indication, indications of crater cracking,
and porosity.
Seam 4-B
221
Unacceptable porosity, linear indications,
and excessive weld roughness.
Seam 4-C
'222
Unacceptable. slag inclusion.
227
Acceptable - noted artifacts and excessive
weld roughness.
Top Ring to Dome
RF238-TOR 40
Acceptable
RF239-TOR 40
Undercut masking viewability.
RF240-TOR 40
Acceptable.
RF241-TOR 4c
Acceptable
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Weld Location
Film No.
Interpretation
RF242-TOR-40
Acceptable.
RF243-TOR-40
Excessive weld splatter masking viewability,
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RF247-TOR-7
Excessive porosity masked area of interest.
RF246-TOR-7
Original was rejected.
Tracer B
Unacceptable porosity, artifacts, and
shim masking viewability.
Tracer A
Rejected (concur).
RF248-TOR-7
Acceptable.
RF249-TOR-4
Acceptable.
RF250-TOR-4
Acceptable.
(Misplaced penetrameter.)
F585
Unacceptable porosity.
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F609
Unacceptable - nonfusion and porosity.
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F612
Acceptable.
F613
Acceptable.
-
The radiograph reader sheets, the radiographic procedures, and the weld
procedures for the above radiographs were unavailable at the site.
Radiographic summary sheets were available.
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