ML19317F397
| ML19317F397 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee |
| Issue date: | 07/17/1972 |
| From: | US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19317F395 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001140646 | |
| Download: ML19317F397 (15) | |
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t SUP'PLEMENT-NO. 2 TO j-
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- SAFETY EVALUATIONL
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BY THE s
. DIRECTORATE OF LICENSING U.--S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMiISSION ~
4 IN THE IfATTER OF DUKE POWER-COMPANY
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OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION
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. TABLE OF CONTENTS:
-1.0f Introduction
.2.0
- Facility Description 3.0 Site and Environment-J 4.0 '.
Reactor Design 5.0
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6.0-Reactor. Building;and Claes I (Seismic). Structures 7.0 '
Engineered Safety Features
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. Instrumentation, Control and Power Systems 9.0 Control of Radioactive. Effluents 10.0-Auxiliary Systems 11.0 Analysis of Radiological Consequences from Design Basis Accidents
- .12.0 Conduct of Operations 13.0'-
Technical Specifications-
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5 14.0
-Report of. Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
~ ~ 15 ~. 0 Common Defense.and Security-16.0
- Financial Qualifications-
'17.0-Financial Protection and Indemnity Requirements 18.0-
. Conclusions n
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APPENDICI
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INTRODUCTION...
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The Duke Power Company -(applicant) by' application date d a.-license and as subsequently amended, requeste November 28, 1966,-
ctors, identified
-to' construct and operate.three pressurized water rea i
in Oconee County, as Units 1, 2,: and 3 at its oconee Nuclear Stat on The Atomic Energy Commission reported.the results-South Carolina.
Safety Evaluation dated J-j '
.of. its review prior to construction in a i Safety _
Following a public hearing before an Atom c August 4,!1967.
t 29-30, 1967
' and Licensing Board in Walhalla, South Carolina on Augus i
i issued the Director of Reactor L cens ng and September. 12, 1967, PPR-33, 34, and 35 for Units l',
. Provisional Construction Permits C
~.2, and 3,' respectively, on November 6,1967.
d t 7, the On June 2,- 1969, the applicant filed, as' Amen men Chapter Final Safety Analysis Report required by Section 50.34(b) o iig 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations as a prerequisite to o an operating license for each unit.
i Report, The. regulatory staff's review of the' Final Safety Analys s
' s' amended, considered all three units of the Oconee N l i warranted' a
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' However, Unit 1-was the only unit whose state of comp et on h t time and the Safety
. issuance of an operating license at t a 29, 1970.
? Evaluation' Report for Unit l' was' published December l
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l In'the course of this'early review of the material submitted, we
..heldia number of meetings'with representatives of the applicant;;the
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" nuclear steam supplier, the Babcock 'and Wilcox Company, and the
' designer of1the' reactor containment building, the Bechtel Corporation;
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1to discuss the plant design and construction and the proposed operation. ALchronology of our review is presented in Appendix A of
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the. original Safety Evaluation Report.
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.In addition', the. Commission's Advisory Committee'on Reactor Safeguards ihas also considered this project and had met with.both the applicant and the regulatory staff to discuss it.
The report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, dated September 23, 1970, is included as Appendix B to the original Safety Evaluation Report.
Also included as' Appendices to the original regulatory staff Safety.
4 Evaluation Report are reports by our consultants on meteorology,
-hydrology, ecologicsi-(Fish and Wildlife) considerations and seismic design.and'a staff financial analysis.
- Since the original regulatory staff's. review, a supplemental review
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Lof the plants' emergency core cooling systems,was performed in accordance w'ith 'the ~ criteria described in an Interim Policy Statement issued on June 25, 1971,1and published in the FEDERAL REGISTER on IJunel29' 1971-(36 F.R. 12247). The' safety evaluation based.upon this
'eview'wasiissued March 24, 1972, as Supplement 1 to the original r
Safety / Evaluation-Report'.'
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Also since the origina1' regulatory staff's review another supplemental
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review of: the Oconee Nuclear Station,. Units 2 and 3, was performed.
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The: safety evaluation' based upon this review is contained in this
- supplement l(Supplement-2). The Commission's Advisory Committee.on 1 Reactor Safeguards gave further consideration to this project through meetings with' both 'the applicant l and the regulatory staf f.
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,Although.all'three units'at the Oconee Nuclear Station are essentially identical this supplemental review of. Units 2 and 3 was prompted by several-factors.
1.
-Since the original review the Atomic-Energy Commission's criteria
-and policies have been evolving as a consequence of improved technology, licensing experience and light water reactor power
. plant. construction, tests and operating experience.
2.
Oconee Unit No. 1-is the prototype plant of its generation of Babcock and Wilcox. reactor systems.
3.
Failure of internal components during. hot functional tests in Oconae Unit I resulted in design and fabrication modifications -
- to all three units.
4.
"Although essentially identical the three units have some
-differences:resulting from shared systems.
The safety;. evaluation contained in this report-is based on a s
freview dealing with.the above four factors..For completeness, in areas s
en where.previousreviewsand~cvaluationsare-consideredadequake,they
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areireference'd in-.the, original Safety Evaluation Report.
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4-issuing an operating Our' technical safety review with respect to
~ 1icense for Units 2 and 3 has been based on the applicant's
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fFinal Safety Analysis Report (Amendment.7) and subsequent Amendments 8 through 32. inclusive (Amendments 1 through 6 were related to the construction pe W.c review), all of which are available for
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-review at the Atomic Energy Commission's Public Document Room at i--
1717 H Street,' Washington, D. LC.
f this supplement.
. Subsequent chronology'is contained in Appendix A o summarized in subsequent sections
- Based on-our evaluation of the plant,
. of~this supplement, we har* concluded that Units 2 and 3 of the
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'Oconee Nuclear' Station-can be operated, as described in the subsequent sections,.without undue risk to the health and' safety of the public.
Subsequent. to' issuance of an operating license, the units will be
' required to operate in accordance with the terms of the license and the Commission's regulations under the-surveillance of the Commis
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regulatory staff.;
Urhe format of.this supplement is the-same as the original Safety Evalua ion Report for ease of reference.
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2.0 FACILITY DESCRIPT10NJ
- -TheLapplication'for an operating' license for Units 2 and-3 requests Our evaluation-a-licensed core. thermal power level of 2568 megawatts.
of th'e cugineered' safety features and our accident analyses'have ibeen performed for this power level; further, our analyses included the 16 megawatts of reactor coolant' pump heat. in the reactor coolant
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system'in addition to the 2568 megawatts from the reactor core.
.The proposed licenses would authorize operation at core power levels up to and including 2568 megawatts assuming that operating experience in Unit.1 establishes that' operating at this icvel can be done safely.
(Unit 1 will operate initially at 2452 MWt and then 2568 MWt after the regulatory staff has been assured that the core can be operated safely at that icvel.)
Unita 2 and 3 are two of three reactors to be operated at the Oconee Nuclear Station.
In all esscntial respects they are identical to Unit 1, the protorype of this generation of Babcock and Wilcox reactor. When Unit 2 becomes operational it will share a number of auxiliary systems with Unit 1.
When Unit 3 becomes operational all three units will share some auxiliary systems although the degree of independence for Unit 3 is greater than for Unit 2 primarily because Unit 1 and Unit 2 share a control room, certain radwaste processing systems and fuel handling facility. However, the engineered safety feature components except for portions of the hydrogen purge systems, will not be shared between the units.
Further general description of the plant is presented on pages 3, 4, and 5 of the original Safety Evaluation Report.
3.0 SITE AND ENVIRONMENT-With only a few exceptions the Oconee Station Site and Environment Evaluation is contained in the original Safety Evaluation Report j
(pages 5-10). The exceptions are discussed below. In addition a
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complete. environmental study was. performed since the original review in accordance vith the National Environmental Protec Act"and the: Atomic Energy's Environmental Statement was published i
For this review in the FEDERAL' REGISTERn April 1,s 1972.
(Supplement No.L 2): the applicant was requested to update informa
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h on :the site meteorology, effect of heated water discharge on t e rtation
. climatology,' population statistics, site boundaries, transpo h
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accidents and hazardous industries in the vicinity of t e s L4.0' REACTOR DESIGN _
Our original review and evaluation of the Oconee Unit's reactors 1
- was considered to be adequate bearing in mind, however, that Unit
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Since this review _
.is' a prototype for this generation of B&W system.
startedicertain events have reouired re-review'in specific areas of
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Specifically. Oconee Uriit 1 suffered damage the reactor design.
caused by failure of instrument guide tubes in the reactor vessel'-
and experienced other vibrational problems with the vessel internals Also control rod drive mechanisms.
.particularly the thermal shield.
were damaged during-testing due to a " dry trip" (insufficient water
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More recently defects (cracks) in the, hydraulic snubber regions.).
l rod drive swere discovered in-the drive motor tubes for the contro
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' mechanisms.. i Specifically, the applicant vas requested to provide information
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on his plans for: vibration monitoring and the' detection of. loose i
He was also requested to describe L.,
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the proceduren for preventing control rod damage due to dry trip _.
Our original evaluation-is contained on pages 11-19 of the original Safety Evaluation Report.
Our evaluation in the areas mentioned above is discussed below. A minor change in the original Safety Evaluation Report is that-Duke Power Company no longer plans.to share fuel between Unit 1 and Unit 3.
5.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM ~
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Our original review of the Oconee reactor coolant systems and evaluation is contained on pages 20-32 of the original Safety Evaluation Report and was supplemented in the areas of the proposed Appendix H, 10 CFR Part 50, Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Requirements; Appendix G, 10 CFR Part 50, Fracture Toughness Requirements; Safety Guide 14, Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Integrity and the adequacy of the preoperational vibration program as executed in Unit 1.
The applicant was requested to provide additional information in these areas and a meeting was held to discuss them between the
, regulatory staff, the applicant and.B&W.
In addition the applicant was requested to describe any design modifications, operational limits and/or additional test procedures that may result from experience gained during hot functional testing in Oconee Unit 1 (particularly with regard to the internal failures).
Our evaluation of these areas is contained below.
- 6.0
. REACTOR BUILDING'AND CLASS I (SEISMIC) STRUCTURES The applicant was requested to provide information regarding the
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' extent to which experience with Oconee Unit 1 will affect the
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.' design.and operation.of Units 2 and 3.
He was also requested to provide information regarding the extent to which Units 2 and 3
' will be.affected by the current-Appendix A.to-10 CFR Part 50,
, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and the extent to which Units 2 and 3 will be compatibl.e with the intent of current and' proposed AEC Safety Guides. The reason for requesting this information is the fact that Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 was revised in July 1971.and many of the Safety Guides-had not been issued at the time of the original review.
Our original safety evaluation is contained'on pages 33-38 of-the original Savety' Evaluation Report. In addition we have had the benefit of being able'to evaluate the containment leakage tests and
. structural acceptance tests performed on Unit 1 since our original review.
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' ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES-Our.originsi evaluation of the engineered safety features of the
.0conee Units is contained on pages' 39-48 of the original Safety Evaluation Report.and the Supplement No. l'to the report issued-March'24,.1972. lHowever, further consideration in this_ supplemental evaluation was given to Safety Guide No.1, Net Positive Suction Head -
for Emergency Core Cooling and Containment Heat Removal System: Pumps; E4 4
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- the design.of the' safeguards systems:for the' ability to detect failures dusingl operation; and. field.run-piping.in the safeguards system.
The applicantivas requested to provide additional information in
'the' above areas and our' evaluation is discussed -below.
'As. pointed.out.in our original Safety Evaluation Report (page 45)
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the: control"of combustible gas remains a backfit situation for the.
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Oconee' Units (all three units)..To meet Safety Guide No. 7, i
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' Control 1of' Combustible Gas Concentrations In Containment Following-k:
aLLoss-of-Coolant Accident will require equipment and features which are not' currently in'the Oconee plant design.
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INSTRUMENTATION, CONTROL AND POWER SYSTEMS With the: exception of some: minor-areas which required up grading in'the technical specifications cur review of the Oconee Instrumentation
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jand Control. Systems is contained on pages 49-54 of the original
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Safety Evaluation' Report. The applicant ~is committed to correct the "separa' tion of redundant' instrument and control cables" problem that
-occurred in Unit'l'and has taken measures to assure-that such a-problem will not-reoccur in Units 2 and 3.
Also the applicant has taken
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redesign. measures to assure that a fire of the type which occurred in
.the: control rod d' rive system transfer panel of Unit -1 cannot reoccur lin=any'ofthhthreeunits.-
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Careful. consideration has been given to the periodic testing of
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-;these systems.and components' required to assure, reliable and redundant safety system and reactor. trip action'and these considerations
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Thave been-factored into the technica1' specifications for all three
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units;Lin'particular new requirements.for performing discharge tests Lon the stations batteries and for checking out the -125 VDC. system
. isolation diodes and their.monitore.
As was the' case'for. thel. Instrumentation and Controls Systems, our I
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- re-review of-the: Electrical Power Systems has resulted in an up-grading of_the: technical ~ specifications for all three units.
.Specifically, the applicant lis. committed to performing periodic
. discharge tests on the batteries.in the 125 VDC switchyard and Keowee systems and-to perform periodic checks'on the control.
- circuitry for th'e 230 KV switchyard. Because a* portion:of the 230
- switchyard is part of the distribution system for the onsite power system ~(Keowee hydro units), the batteries of the 125 VDC switching, station' power system will have the same test requirements as the Keowee. batteries and will. meet the applicable failure criteria.
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- 9a0 CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS
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- Our original' evaluatiion of. the applicant's' radiation protection -
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, ' measures isicontained on pages 55--58 of. the original Safety
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. 1 Evaluation Report. LThe-technical specifications have_been:up-
,gradeditoiconform to proposed Appendix-I requirements.
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10ur' original evaluation of radioactive waste management was.
supplemented as discussed below.
.The applicant was requested to provide additional information to
, show that -the radiation monitoring device -to be installed in
.the unit vents will'have the-requiredJsensitivity for measuring the. anticipated levels either for a continuous or instantaneous.
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, release and to discuss-iodine plate out.
The applicant was also
_ requested to verify'that the charccul.to be used in the radiation monitors for iodine is' impregnated to assure the collection of both elemental and nonelemental forms of-iodine and to provide information as to'the tequency at which the charcoal will be changed and tested.
In. addition,- the technical specifications will be revised to meet the intent of." low as practicable" with regard to full utilization of waste processing equipment. The technical specifiestions will be revised to meet the intent of Safety Guide 21, Measuring and Reporting of Eifluents from Nuclear Power Plants and to specify the reporting
.of all planned and; unplanned releases of radioactivity.
10.0 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS Our safety evaluation -is presented on pages 59 of our original
. Safety Evaluation Report. :In' addition re-evaluation of the calculated
" potential radiological dose from the refueling accident using revised. assumptions for the retention of iodine in the pool water has removed the Technical. Specification. limitation on handling of Lirradiate'dLfuel in the fuelistorage pool..
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. 11.0 ANALYSIS OF RADIOLOGICAL' CONSEQUENCES'FROM DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS
- Our original safety evaluation contained in our original Safety
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Evaluation Report (page 67-70) and the Suppleme.nt No. 1 to th s report, dated March 24,.1972, is considered to be adequate.
It should be noted that the applicant performed loss-of-coolant accident analysis for both pressurized pins and a mixture of pressurized and non-pressurized pins in the core. The results of botharalysis are reported ini the Supplement No.1 to the. original Safety Evaluation Report.
'12.0 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS.-
.With'some exceptions our original evaluation of the. applicant's conduct of operations on pages 70-75 of our original Safety
~ Evaluation Report is adequate. The. exceptions are in the area discussed below. The applicant has been requested to provide additional information with regard.to reactor operation shift complements, qualification of shift employees and emergency procedures.
The technical specifications have been upgraded with regard to review committees, procedures and shift personnel, particularly during the initialifuel loading, startup and. initial power operations.
- 13.,0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS The-technical specifications for Oconee Units 2 and.'3 are upgraded
< versions of the technical specifications for Unit 1 which have been
' upgrade'd since-os.( original review and evaluation.
It is our intent
---to have~one' set of technical' specifications for all three Units with applicable differences -between the three Units clearly' designated in 7
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