ML19317D304
| ML19317D304 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1971 |
| From: | Long F, Swan W, Varela J US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19317D299 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-270-71-04, 50-270-71-4, 50-287-71-04, 50-287-71-4, NUDOCS 7911270455 | |
| Download: ML19317D304 (9) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
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(+l DIVISION CF COMPLI ANCE e
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S'.'I T E S18 Q
g 230 PE AcHT R EE STREET, NORTHWEST
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TaLaPoos. 1264537 AT LANT A. GECRGI A 30303 CONSTRUCTION INSPECTION REPORT COMDLI A' ICE REPORT NO. :
50-270, 287/71-4 DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE 2 & 3 Seneca, South Carolina License Nos. :
CPPR-34, 35 Docket Nos.:
50-270, 287 Category: A Type of Licensee: Three Unit, PWR 256S ht B&W Type of Inspection: Routine, Announced Dates of Inspection: June 29-July 2,19 71 Dates of Previous Inspection: March 11-12, 1971 Inspected By:
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W. 3. Qan, KEactor Inspector (Constructien)
Date (In Charge)
Accc=panying Inspector:
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. M. Varela, Reactor Inspector Date (Construction)
Other Accompanying Personnel: None Revieued 5y:
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V. L. Brownlee, Principal Reactor Inspector Date (Construetion)
ML-
- dw F. J. Long, Senior RYactor Inspecter (Cons truction) 2iate/
Proprietary Information: None i911270kJ6
Duke 50-270, 287/71-4 2
SECTION I ENFORCEMENT ACTION A.
Nonconformance with NSSS supplier's instructions, flame cutting of feedwater header support lugs in a manner which could compromise the integrity of s team generator (SG) 2B in Unit No. 2, and nonconformance with the NSSS supplier's requirement that the installing contractor (Duke) expand the details of installation procedures which were outlined in the supplier's installation manual.
(See Section II, Paragraphs 4 and 5, and Section III, Paragraph 6.)
LICENSEE ACTION ON PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED ENFORCEMENT MATTERS A.
Reference Duke letter to Compliance dated April 22, 1971, in response to AEC letter of April 7,1971:
1.
Deficiencies in document control:
this item remains open.
(See Section II, Paragraph 6.)
B.
Reference Duke letter of June 18, 1971, in respcase to AEC letter of
>by 25, 19 71:
1.
Control of discrepant materials -- Closed.
2.
Lack of written procedures -- Closed.
3.
Receiving inspection deficiency -- This iten remains open.
4 Revision of welding procedures -- This iten remains cpen.
5.
Control of weld filler =etal -- Closed.
/See Section II, Paragraph 6.)
UNRESOLVED ITE'iS A.
Possible casting f' aw in Unit 2 main coolant system pt=p casting --
To be evaluated by licensee.
(See Section III, Paragraph 2.)
B.
Radiographs of portions of the Unit 2 core injection and core ficoding system piping may not be per code -- To be evaluated by licensee.
(See Sectica III, Paragraph 3).
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Duke 50-270, 287/71-4 3
C.
Unit 2 post-tension system buttonhead testing gauge required re-calib ra tion.
(See Section III, Paragraph 4)
STATUS OF PREVIOUSLY REPORTED UNRESOLVED ITEMS - None (Not covered by this inspection scope)
DESIGN CHANGES - None ITNUSUAL OCCURRENCES - None PERSONS CONTACTED Duke Power Company R. L. Dick - Project Manager J. C. Rogers - Project Engineer, Oconeo and :tdjuire D. G. Beam - Assis tant Project Engineer, Oconee G. L. Hunnicutt - Principal Field Engineer R. E. Blaisdell - Field Engineer, Welding and NDT D. L. Freeze - Field Engineer, Civil Babcock and Wilcox Comoany W. Faase MANAGE:IENT INTERVIEW Duke representatives were Rogers, Seam, Hunnicut, and Dick.
Varela succarized deficiencies pertaining to flate cutting for placement of a SG header in Unit No. 2.
Duke representatives acknowledged the deficiency.
(See Section III)
Swan discussed his exaninatien of the manuals and drawings pertaining to placement of the NSSS equipment and reported the folicwing deficiencies:
A.
B&W installation procedure requirements and warnings against cutting and are strikes on the coded vessel were violated.
B.
A review of the drawings and procedures for unloading, transporting and placement of NSSS equipment disclosed no evidence of approval by authoritative. persons.
- er-
Duke 50-270, 287/ 71-4 4
C.
Failure to expand on the outline procedures in the B&W manual for Duke's operations in placing and installing NSSS equipment, as required by B&W.
l D.
Apparent failure to instruct Duke workmen in adequate detail ahead of critical operations, and to provide adequate supervision and QC surveillance during critical operations.
E.
Failure to provide copies of written procedures to workmen or their direct supervisor.
Rogers acknowledged the errors of procedure in placing tha ring headvt on the SG.
He said the header had been removed and would not be re-installed until a procedure had been approved and until any possible damage to the SG had been corrected.
Hunnicutt acknculedged the deficiencies in ins truction and surveillance in placement of the SG header but made no commitment for Duke to extend 36W's outline procedures for placement of NSSS equipment in Unit No, 3.
Rogers and Hunnicutt stated that the drawings of Reliance Trucking Company and the procedural requirements of the B&W manual had been reviewed and verbal approvals had been given to the drawings.
-~
Duke 50-2 70, 287/71-4 5
SECTION 11 Prepared By:
W. B. Swan, Reactor Inspector (Cons truc tion)
ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS INSPECTED, NOT IDENTIFIED IN SECTION I, WHERE NO DEFICIENCIES OR UNRESOLVED ITEMS WERE FOUND 1.
Containnent Liner, Unit No. 3.
2.
Class I Concrete Placements adjacent to and in Unit No. 3 containment; reactor pedestal and shield walls.
3.
Condenser coolant water intake s tructure, piping and pumps.
DETAILS OF SUBJECTS DISCUSSED IN SECTION I 4.
Nonconformance with NSFS supplier instructions in installation of feedwater headers on SG 2B in Unit No. 2:
The inspuctor found that workmen had rested the support lugs of the headers on the support brackets of the SG and had then flame cut slots in the eight lugs.
This cutting resulted in gouging of the vessel lugs plus heating and spattering the coded SG vessel with colten metal.
The inspector notified the licensee and the NSSS supplier representative.
After the work was inspected by these representatives, a " hold" was placed on the work and the licensee's principal field eagineer stated that the headers would be removed, the lugs repaired, and the SG vessel checked by NDT for possible damage.
5.
Failure of licensee, as installing contractor, to meet NSSS vendor's requirement for preparing detailed procedures for installation of vendor's equinment for review by vendor's site representative:
A significant excerpt from 3&W Specification FS- -2, Procedures By Erection Contractor (Duke), second paragraph, supports the contention of Compliance that Duke has been obligated by their own contrart documents to provide more detailed written procedures for their working forces:
" Prior to handling any B&W supplied equipment, the Erecting Contractor is requested to review the content of this Manual and to make available to the B&W Site Representative for review, any written procedures, plans,
drawings, etc., indicating how the requirements of this manual will be met."
A
Duke 50-270, 287/71-4 6
This paragraph was brought to the attention of Hunnicutt and Faase duting the inspection and to Duke management at the exit interview, with the cbservation that adherence to this item could have obviated the improper procedures found by Varela on the installation of the SG ring header.
In connection with procedure deficiencies found by Varela in installation of the header rings, Swan found that Duke failed.to provide adequate review of drawings and procedures, f ailed to extend outline procedures in the B&W manual, f ailed to instruct workmen ahead of these critical operations, f ailed to provide detailed written instructions to installing crew, and f ailed to have craf t supervisor and QC surveillance present daring flame cutting for steam generator header positiening.
The vessel vendor's representative had not been requested to be present during this work.
6.
Followup of previous enforcement items :
a.
Reference Duke letter to Compliance dated April 22, 1971, in response to AEC letter of April 7,1971:
Deficiencies in document control -- Duke was in process of revising their site procedure for document control and in building a document control room. The revised procedure and the new control room will be inspected at next site visit.
b.
Reference Duke letter to Co=pliance dated June 18, 1971, in response to AEC lector of May 25, 1971:
(1)
Control of discrepant materials -- E uke was implementing a new Procedure, "F.1.P. No. 62, to stop and hold "ork.
(2)
Detailed written procedures -- Procedure F.2.P. No. 57, Leveling of Reactor Vessel and Steam Generator Sole Plates, was in process of approval and will be available for equipment placement in Unit No. 3.
(3)
Receiving inspection dccumentation deficiency -- Duke Engineering reserves the right to accept vendor supplied items and to retain the backup documentation in the Charlotte office.
Compliance will continue to press for copies to be supplied to receiving inspectors and storage maintenance personnel onsite.
l e
Duke 50-270, 287/71-4 7
i (4) Revision of welding procedures -- Duke has been revising procedures, but had seventeen more to process.
(5)
Control of weld filler metal -- A revised procedure was in process of approval.
~
Duke 50-270, 287/71-4 8
SECTION III Prepared By:
J. M. Varela Reactor Inspector (Construction)
ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS INSPECTED, NOT IDENTIFIED IN SECTION I, WHERS 50 DEFICIENCIES OR UNRESOLVED ITEMS WERE FOUND 1.
Unit No. 3 Containment liner, welding and fitup, crane support attachments, and welding material control.
DETAILS OF SUBJECTS DISCUSSED IN SECTION I 2.
Main Coolant System Piping and Components The f abrication of piping had been completed.
Inspection and audit was perfor=ed on the following field weld joints comprising the loop from the reactor vessel to the SG:
Joint Location:
WJ-4-1 First joint - Discharge of RPV WJ-31-1 First joint - Suction of "A" pump WJ-2-1 Tirst joint - Discharge of "A" pum9 WJ-5-1 First joint - Suction of SG Radiographic examination of the above weldnents disclosed a dine-sized flaw in the punp casting adjacent to field weld No. WJ-31-1.
No other discrepancies were observed. The casting flaw will be evaluated by the licensee and corrected. This iten is designated unresolved, and will be examined on the next inspection.
3.
High Pressure Core Injection and Core Flood Sys tens Piping The inspector observed fabrication in progress.
No deviations from the requirements of USAS B31.7 were observed; however, two radiographs of the weldncats selected apparently varied from code requirements in that the penetra:eter slit and the 2T hole were not visible.
Hunnicutt, Moore and Thornton agreed with the inspector and radiographs D02F:51A (1-2) and D02F:54A (2-3) will be reshot a This item is designated unresolved, and will be examined on the next inspection.
q Duke 50-170, 287/71-4 9
s 4.
Post-Tension System Installation (See Exhibit A, Photo No. 4)
The current activity was the button-heading of the tendon wires. The inspector checked the G0, NO-GO button-head gauges being used by one crew and found that the 0.390" dimension was 0.385".
It was also observed that the gauges were roughly drilled cut of mild steel and not "ca rb u rized. " As a result, Hunnicutt ordered the purchase of new gauges which will be precisely manuf actured cf heat-treatable steel and hardened to prevent wear.
The inspector made a 360' inspection of the tendon gallery and the hanging untensioned tendon wires.
No other deficiencies were ]bs irved.
The button-head gauges will be examined on the next inspection.
5.
Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW)
Inspection of this system was undertaken only because this relatively less critical piping appeared discrepant and was used to evaluate the quality levels of QC and the techanical supervision.
This inspection disclosed that the field weld of systems 48, 49 and 50 had excessive reinf o rcement. Without exception, all welding codes specify 1/16" maximum reinforcement on pipe or plate thicknesses up to 1/2".
The inspector measured the reinforcements and found them to be f rom 1/8" to 3/16" for the 3/8" wall of the pipe.
Hunnicutt stated that the weldments would be ground to the acceptable limit.
This item is designated unresolved, and will be examined on the next inspection.
6.
SG and Main Feedwater Header (See Exhibit A, Photos Nos. 1, 2 & 3, and Exhibit B.)
The inspector observed the complete disregard by the workmen of the warnings clearly painted on the vessel which stated "D0 NOT STRIKE AN ARC OD WELD ON THIS VESSEL." The workmen set the headers such that
.the support lugs (>%-130) rested on the vessel support brackets (MK-150),
af ter which they flame cut the slot in the lugs.resulting in gouging the vessel lugs and heating and spattering.the vessel with molten netal. All of the eight lugs were cut with resultant splatter and heat.to.the vessel. The Co=pliance inspector immediately reported the. foregoing to B&W.(Faasse).and Duke (Hunnicutt).
After Faasse and Hunnicutt. inspected the. damage, Hunnicutt s tated that a "nold" would be placed on the work,.the headers would be removed, the lugs would be repaired, and NDT would be performed on the vessel. This item will be examined on the next inspection.
Attachments:
Exhibita A and 3 (one _ ;t -- 00:HQ cy only) i