ML19312C875

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Unusual Event 270/75-16:on 750919,instrument Air Lines to HPI Valves Inadvertently Isolated.Caused by Error in Tracing Filtered Water Sys for Isolation Valves.Procedures Defined to Assure Proper Identification of Air Sys Valves
ML19312C875
Person / Time
Site: Oconee Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/31/1975
From:
DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19312C870 List:
References
RO-270-75-16, NUDOCS 8001130044
Download: ML19312C875 (1)


Text

__

O DUKE POWER COMPAh7 i

OCONEE UNIT 2 i

f I

UE-270/75-16 Report No.:

October 31, 1975

_ Report Date:_

Event DatcJ September 19, 1975 j

Oconea Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina Facility:

isolation of instrument air lines to Inadvertent Identification of Event:

high presaure injection valves Unit at full power I

Conditions Prior to Event:

Description of Event:_

l the chemistry personnel were attempting to iso ateBecause On September 19, 1975, filtered water supply to the Chemistry Lab to make faucet repairs.

isolation of the close proximity and similarity of the lin es, air supply line valves.

valves were inadvertently closed instead of filtered water h

This isolated the control air supply to valves 2HP-6 and 2HP-31, t e 1etdown isolation valve and the reactor coolant pump seal l

l l

This sequence of events allowed the pressurizer icv respectively.

l h

l The error was immediately noticed letdown storage tank level to decrease.

to normal.

and the air supply valves were reopened, returning all systems Designation of Apparent Cause of Event:_

)

l filtered This event was apparently caused by personnel error in tracing theThe close p water system to find an isolation valve.

4 of the valves contributed to this error.

1 Analysis of Event _:_

flow This incident resulted in isolation of Reactor Coolant System letdown The air supply while increasing the rate of makeup flow to the system.

lished before valves were immediately reopened and letdown flow was reestab

[

limits. No safety the pressurizer level exceeded Technical Specification-It is concluded that the J

limits were exceeded as a result of this incident.

l health and safety of the public was not affected.

j f

I Corrective Action:

l rned have been identified by " white-The Instrument Air System val n

8"#**

In tagging" them in the open pos th t all Instrument Air

' l d

addition, procedures are being deff their operation is assigned l

and h l

System valves are properly identifieThis acti n is expected to be completed by to cognizant personnel.

January 1, 1976.

8 0 0113 00$(/

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