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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217M3371999-10-20020 October 1999 Forwards Notice of Docketing of License SNM-2506 Amend Application.Notice Has Been Forwarded to Ofc of Fr for Publication ML20217M1111999-10-19019 October 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-282/99-14 & 50-306/99-14 on 990920- 22.One Violation Noted & Being Treated as Ncv.Insp Focused on Testing & Maint of Heat Exchangers in High Risk Sys ML20217F4331999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards Rev 39 to Security Plan.Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Security Plan.Rev Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20217C2351999-10-0606 October 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-282/99-12 & 50-306/99-12 on 990823-0917.No Violations Noted.Insp Consisted of Selected Exam of Procedures & Representative Records,Observation of Activities & Interviews with Personnel ML20212J8811999-09-28028 September 1999 Forwards Preliminary Accident Sequence Precurson Analysis of Operational Event That Occurred at Plant,Unit 1 on 990105, for Review & Comment.Comment Requested within 30 Days of Receipt of Ltr IR 05000272/19990071999-09-28028 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-272/99-07 & 50-306/99-07 on 990721- 0831.One Potentially Safety Significant Issue Identified Dealing with Control Room Special Ventilation System.Four Addl Issues of Low Safety Significance Identified ML20212G7171999-09-24024 September 1999 Submits Semiannual Status Update on Project Plans for USAR Review Project & Conversion to Its.Conversion Package Submittal Continues to Be Targeted for Aug of 2000 ML20212G9801999-09-23023 September 1999 Refers to Resolution of Unresolved Items Identified Re Security Alarm Station Operations at Both Monitcello & Prairie Island ML20212F5121999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards Response to NRC , Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations ML20212D8401999-09-16016 September 1999 Discusses 990902 Telcon Between D Wesphal & R Bailey Re Administeration of Retake Exam at Prairie Island During Wk of 991206.NRC May Make Exam Validation Visit to Facility During Wk of 991116 ML20217H2331999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards Security Insp Repts 50-282/99-10 & 50-306/99-10 on 990809-12.Two Findings,Each of Low Risk Significance Identified & Being Treated as non-cited Violations Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20217H5661999-09-0909 September 1999 Discusses 990907 Pilot Plan Mgt Meeting Re Results to-date of Pilot Implementation of NRC Revised Reactor Oversight Process at Prairie Island & Quad Cities.Agenda & Handouts Provided by Utils Encl ML20212A9241999-09-0909 September 1999 Discusses Plans Made During 990902 Telephone Conversation to Inspect Licensed Operator Requalification Program at Prairie Island During Weeks of 991101 & 991108.Requests That Written Exams & Operating Tests Be Submitted by 991022 ML20212B0511999-09-0909 September 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-282/99-11 & 50-306/99-11 on 990816-20.One Issue of Low Safety Significance Was Identified & Being Treated as Ncb ML20211Q7641999-09-0808 September 1999 Informs That NRC Tentatively Scheduled Initial Licensing Exam for Plant Operator License Applicants During Wk of 000515,in Response to D Westphal ML20211N8631999-09-0707 September 1999 Withdraws 970814 Request for Exemption from 10CFR50,App R, Section III.G.2, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities ML20211K5911999-09-0101 September 1999 Informs That Util Reviewed Rvid Data Base,As Requested in NRC .Summary of Proposed Changes & Observed Differences Are Included in Encl Tables ML20211L0211999-09-0101 September 1999 Provides Notification That License Amends 141 & 132 & Associated License Conditions 6 & 7 Have Been Fully Implemented ML20211K5931999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards License Amend Request for License SNM-2506, Proposing Change to License Conditions 6,7 & 8 & TSs App a of License by Permitting Inclusion of Bpras & Thimble Plug Devices in Sf Assemblies Stored in TN-40 Casks ML20211Q6041999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Rev 19 to USAR for Pingp,Per 10CFR50.71(e).Rev Brings USAR up-to-date as of 990228,though Some Info Is More Recent.Attachment 1 Contains Descriptions & Summaries of SE for Changes,Tests & Experiments,Per 10CFR50.59 ML20211K2591999-08-27027 August 1999 Forwards NSP Co Fitness for Duty Program Performance Data for Six Month Period Ending 990630 ML20211D3541999-08-24024 August 1999 Discusses GL 95-07 Re Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of safety-related Power Operated Gate Valves.Forwards SE Re Response to GL 95-07 ML20211C7601999-08-19019 August 1999 Confirms NRC Intent to Meet with NSP & Ceco on 990807 in Lisle,Il to Discuss with Region III Pilot Plants,Any Observations,Feedback,Lessons Learned & Recommendations Relative to Implementation of Pilot Program ML20211B8311999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Request for Relief 8 Re Limited Exams Associated with Unit 1 Third ten-year Interval Inservice Insp Program. Licensee Requests Relief Due to Impractibility of Obtaining 100% Exam Coverage for Affected Items ML20211B5711999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Second 90-day Rept for Implementation of Voltage Based Repair Criteria at Prairie Island Unit 1.Rept Fulfills Requirements of Section 6.b of Attachment 1 to GL 95-05 ML20211C2311999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Unit 1 ISI Summary Rept,Interval 3,Period 2 Refueling Outage Dates 990425-0526,Cycle 19 971212-990526. Rept Identifies Components Examined,Exam Methods Used,Exam Number & Summarizes Results ML20211B0561999-08-18018 August 1999 Provides Addl Info on Proposed Rev to Main Steam Line Break Methodology ,in Response to NRC Staff Request Made in 990416 Telcon.Nuclear Svcs Corp Rept PIO-01-06, Analysis Rept Structural Analyses of Main Steam Check... Encl ML20211B2621999-08-17017 August 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-282/99-09 & 50-306/99-09 on 990719-22.No Violations Noted.Insp Included Review & Evaluation of Current Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicators ML20211C7371999-08-17017 August 1999 Discusses Closure of Staff Review Re Generic Implication of Part Length Control Rod Drive Mechanism Housing Leak on 980123.Enclosed NRC 980811 & 1223 Ltrs Responded to WOG Positions Re Corrective Actions ML20210T5661999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards RAI Re & Suppl ,which Requested Exemptions from TSs of Section III.G.2 of 10CFR50 App R,To Extent That Specifies Separation of Certain Redundant Safe Shutdown Circuits with fire-related Barriers ML20210R7021999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-282/99-06 & 50-306/99-06 on 990601- 0720.One NCV Occurred,Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20210P5191999-08-11011 August 1999 Discusses GL 92-01,Rev 1,Supp 1, Rv Integrity, Issued by NRC on 950519 & NSP Responses for PINGP & 951117. Staff Reviewed Info in Rvid & Released Info as Rvid Version 2.Requests Submittal of Comments Re Revised Rvid by 990901 ML20210G5061999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Reactor Licensing Action Estimates 05000282/LER-1999-007, Forwards LER 99-007-00,re Loss of CR Special Ventilation Function.One New Commitment Was Made in Rept as Indicated in Corrective Action Section Statement in Bold Italics1999-07-23023 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-007-00,re Loss of CR Special Ventilation Function.One New Commitment Was Made in Rept as Indicated in Corrective Action Section Statement in Bold Italics ML20210J4991999-07-22022 July 1999 Forwards Rev 18 to USAR for Pingp,Bringing USAR up-to-date as of 990228,though Some Info More Recent.Safety Evaluation Summaries Also Encl ML20209J0941999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards SER Finding Rev 7 to Topical Rept NSPNAD-8102, Reload Safety Evaluation Methods for Application to PI Units, Acceptable for Ref in Plant Licensing Actions ML20209H8051999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Summary of non-modification Safety Evaluation Number 515 Re Storage of Fuel Inserts,Per Insp Rept 72-0010/99-201 ML20209D4181999-07-0707 July 1999 Informs That Util Has Changed Listed TS Bases Pages Attached for NRC Use.Util Made No New Commitments in Ltr ML20209H8361999-07-0202 July 1999 Forwards Operator Licensing Exam Repts 50-282/99-301(OL) & 50-306/99-301(OL) for Tests Administered During Week of 990517-21.Two Applicants Passed All Sections of Exam & Issued Reactor Operator Licenses to Operate Pings ML20196J9681999-07-0101 July 1999 Informs That in Sept 1998,Region III Received Rev 20 to Portions of Util Emergency Plan Under 10CFR50.54(q).Based on Determination That Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Licensee Emergency Plan,No NRC Approval Required ML20209C3951999-07-0101 July 1999 Forwards Supplemental Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20209B7541999-07-0101 July 1999 Final Response to GL 98-01,Suppl 1 Re Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys.Sys Remediated as Required for Plant Operation. Contingency Plans Developed to Mitigate Impact of Y2K-induced Events at Key Rollover Dates ML20196J8941999-06-30030 June 1999 Transmits Util Comments on Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1074, Steam Generator Tube Integrity. Licensee Recommends That NRC Focus on Several Important Listed Areas Considered Principal Concerns & Contentions ML20209F0391999-06-30030 June 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-282/99-04 & 50-306/99-04 on 990407-0531.Violation Noted.Notice of Violation or Civil Penalty Will Not Be Issued,Based on NRC Listed Decision to Exercise Discretion ML20209C3011999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards Annual Rept of Corrections to NSP ECCS Evaluation Models,Iaw 10CFR50.46.Since All Analyses Remain in Compliance,No Reanalysis Is Required or Planned ML20209B5751999-06-24024 June 1999 Submits Revised Relief Request for Limited Examinations Associated with Third 10-yr ISI Examination Plan.Attached Is Unit 1 Relief Request 7,rev 1 Which Addresses Limited Examinations ML20196F3871999-06-23023 June 1999 Forwards Revised Pages 71,72 & 298 of Rev 7 to NSPNAD-8102, Prairie Island Nuclear Power Plant Reload Safety Evaluation Methods for Application to PI Units, Per Discussions with Nrc.Approved Version of Rept Will Be Issued 05000282/LER-1999-006, Forwards LER 99-006-00 Re Discovery That Manual SI Actuation Switch Had Not Been Tested on Staggered Basis During Integrated SI Test.Two New Commitments Are Indicated in Corrective Action Section Statement in Bold Italics1999-06-18018 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-006-00 Re Discovery That Manual SI Actuation Switch Had Not Been Tested on Staggered Basis During Integrated SI Test.Two New Commitments Are Indicated in Corrective Action Section Statement in Bold Italics ML20196D5501999-06-18018 June 1999 Forwards Individual Exam Results for Licensee Applicants Who Took May 1999 Initial License Exam.In Accordance with 10CFR2.790,info Considered, Proprietary. Without Encls ML20196A6741999-06-17017 June 1999 Refers to 990517-20 Meeting with Util in Welch,Minnesota Re Licensee Initiatives in Risk Area & to Establish Dialog Between SRAs & Licensee PRA Staff 1999-09-09
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217F4331999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards Rev 39 to Security Plan.Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Security Plan.Rev Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20212G7171999-09-24024 September 1999 Submits Semiannual Status Update on Project Plans for USAR Review Project & Conversion to Its.Conversion Package Submittal Continues to Be Targeted for Aug of 2000 ML20212F5121999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards Response to NRC , Preparation & Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations ML20211N8631999-09-0707 September 1999 Withdraws 970814 Request for Exemption from 10CFR50,App R, Section III.G.2, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities ML20211K5911999-09-0101 September 1999 Informs That Util Reviewed Rvid Data Base,As Requested in NRC .Summary of Proposed Changes & Observed Differences Are Included in Encl Tables ML20211L0211999-09-0101 September 1999 Provides Notification That License Amends 141 & 132 & Associated License Conditions 6 & 7 Have Been Fully Implemented ML20211Q6041999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards Rev 19 to USAR for Pingp,Per 10CFR50.71(e).Rev Brings USAR up-to-date as of 990228,though Some Info Is More Recent.Attachment 1 Contains Descriptions & Summaries of SE for Changes,Tests & Experiments,Per 10CFR50.59 ML20211K5931999-08-31031 August 1999 Forwards License Amend Request for License SNM-2506, Proposing Change to License Conditions 6,7 & 8 & TSs App a of License by Permitting Inclusion of Bpras & Thimble Plug Devices in Sf Assemblies Stored in TN-40 Casks ML20211K2591999-08-27027 August 1999 Forwards NSP Co Fitness for Duty Program Performance Data for Six Month Period Ending 990630 ML20211C2311999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Unit 1 ISI Summary Rept,Interval 3,Period 2 Refueling Outage Dates 990425-0526,Cycle 19 971212-990526. Rept Identifies Components Examined,Exam Methods Used,Exam Number & Summarizes Results ML20211B8311999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Request for Relief 8 Re Limited Exams Associated with Unit 1 Third ten-year Interval Inservice Insp Program. Licensee Requests Relief Due to Impractibility of Obtaining 100% Exam Coverage for Affected Items ML20211B5711999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Second 90-day Rept for Implementation of Voltage Based Repair Criteria at Prairie Island Unit 1.Rept Fulfills Requirements of Section 6.b of Attachment 1 to GL 95-05 ML20211B0561999-08-18018 August 1999 Provides Addl Info on Proposed Rev to Main Steam Line Break Methodology ,in Response to NRC Staff Request Made in 990416 Telcon.Nuclear Svcs Corp Rept PIO-01-06, Analysis Rept Structural Analyses of Main Steam Check... Encl ML20210G5061999-07-30030 July 1999 Responds to Administrative Ltr 99-02, Operating Reactor Licensing Action Estimates 05000282/LER-1999-007, Forwards LER 99-007-00,re Loss of CR Special Ventilation Function.One New Commitment Was Made in Rept as Indicated in Corrective Action Section Statement in Bold Italics1999-07-23023 July 1999 Forwards LER 99-007-00,re Loss of CR Special Ventilation Function.One New Commitment Was Made in Rept as Indicated in Corrective Action Section Statement in Bold Italics ML20210J4991999-07-22022 July 1999 Forwards Rev 18 to USAR for Pingp,Bringing USAR up-to-date as of 990228,though Some Info More Recent.Safety Evaluation Summaries Also Encl ML20209H8051999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Summary of non-modification Safety Evaluation Number 515 Re Storage of Fuel Inserts,Per Insp Rept 72-0010/99-201 ML20209D4181999-07-0707 July 1999 Informs That Util Has Changed Listed TS Bases Pages Attached for NRC Use.Util Made No New Commitments in Ltr ML20209C3951999-07-0101 July 1999 Forwards Supplemental Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20209B7541999-07-0101 July 1999 Final Response to GL 98-01,Suppl 1 Re Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys.Sys Remediated as Required for Plant Operation. Contingency Plans Developed to Mitigate Impact of Y2K-induced Events at Key Rollover Dates ML20196J8941999-06-30030 June 1999 Transmits Util Comments on Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1074, Steam Generator Tube Integrity. Licensee Recommends That NRC Focus on Several Important Listed Areas Considered Principal Concerns & Contentions ML20209C3011999-06-29029 June 1999 Forwards Annual Rept of Corrections to NSP ECCS Evaluation Models,Iaw 10CFR50.46.Since All Analyses Remain in Compliance,No Reanalysis Is Required or Planned ML20209B5751999-06-24024 June 1999 Submits Revised Relief Request for Limited Examinations Associated with Third 10-yr ISI Examination Plan.Attached Is Unit 1 Relief Request 7,rev 1 Which Addresses Limited Examinations ML20196F3871999-06-23023 June 1999 Forwards Revised Pages 71,72 & 298 of Rev 7 to NSPNAD-8102, Prairie Island Nuclear Power Plant Reload Safety Evaluation Methods for Application to PI Units, Per Discussions with Nrc.Approved Version of Rept Will Be Issued 05000282/LER-1999-006, Forwards LER 99-006-00 Re Discovery That Manual SI Actuation Switch Had Not Been Tested on Staggered Basis During Integrated SI Test.Two New Commitments Are Indicated in Corrective Action Section Statement in Bold Italics1999-06-18018 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-006-00 Re Discovery That Manual SI Actuation Switch Had Not Been Tested on Staggered Basis During Integrated SI Test.Two New Commitments Are Indicated in Corrective Action Section Statement in Bold Italics ML20195G4281999-06-0909 June 1999 Notifies That Amsac/Dss Mods Completed & TS 138/129 Has Been Fully Implemented 05000282/LER-1999-005, Forwards LER 99-005-00 Re Containment Inservice Purge Sys Not Isolated During Heavy Load Movement Over Fuel.Event Has Indicated That Level of Performance Expected by Mgt Has Not Yet Been Achieved1999-06-0707 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-005-00 Re Containment Inservice Purge Sys Not Isolated During Heavy Load Movement Over Fuel.Event Has Indicated That Level of Performance Expected by Mgt Has Not Yet Been Achieved ML20207F4301999-06-0101 June 1999 Forwards 1999 Unit 1 SG Insp Results,Per TS 4.12.E.1. Following Insp 84 Tubes Were Plugged for First Time ML20196L2461999-05-21021 May 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to COLR for Pingp,Unit 1 Cycle 20, IAW TS Section 6.7.A.6 ML20195C6861999-05-21021 May 1999 Forwards Rev 17 to USAR for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.Attachment 1 Contains Descriptions & Summaries of SEs for Changes,Tests & Experiments Made Under Provisions of 10CFR50.59 During Period Since Last Update ML20206U6781999-05-17017 May 1999 Forwards Revised Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures,Including Rev 15 to F3-3,rev 15 to F3-16,rev 14 to F3-22 & Table of Contents ML20206U7131999-05-17017 May 1999 Forwards Revised EOF Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, Including Table of Contents & Rev 2 to F8-10, Record Keeping in Eof. with Updating Instructions ML20206T2461999-05-17017 May 1999 Forwards Off-Site Radiation Dose Assessment for Jan-Dec 1998, Rev 0 to Annual Radiactive Effluent Rept for 980105- 990103 & Effluent & Waste Disposal Annual Rept Solid Waste & Irradiated Fuel Shipments,Jan-Dec 1998 ML20206R0401999-05-13013 May 1999 Forwards Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60, Removing Plant Organization Requirement,Imposed in Amend 141/132 That Plant Manager,Who Has Responsibility for Overall Safe Operation of Plant,Report to Corporate Officer ML20206Q0871999-05-13013 May 1999 Forwards Result of Evaluation Re Ultrasonic Exams of SG Number 22 Performed in Accordance with ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code Section Xi.Procedure Used for Evaluation Contained in WCAP-14166,submitted for Review ML20206F9381999-05-0303 May 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990304 RAI Re GL 96-05 Program at Pingp.Licensee Commitments Are Identified in Encl as Statements in Italics ML20206J3851999-05-0303 May 1999 Forwards 1998 Annual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Rept 05000282/LER-1999-004, Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Discovery of Inadequate Sp That Demonstrates Operability of SFP Special Ventilation Sys.Two New NRC Commitments Are Contained in Corrective Action Section of Rept in Bold Italics1999-05-0303 May 1999 Forwards LER 99-004-00 Re Discovery of Inadequate Sp That Demonstrates Operability of SFP Special Ventilation Sys.Two New NRC Commitments Are Contained in Corrective Action Section of Rept in Bold Italics ML20206E1761999-04-28028 April 1999 Forwards Revised TS Pages for Amends 144 & 135 to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60,respectively,to Update Controlled Manual or File ML20205S3221999-04-20020 April 1999 Forwards Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60, Changing Implementation Date for Relocation from TS to UFSAR of Requirements in TS 3.1.E & Flooding Shutdown Requirements of TS 5.1 ML20205P9891999-04-12012 April 1999 Requests Approval for Proposed Alternatives to Liquid Penetrant Requirements of N-518.4 of 1968 ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code.Results of Analysis & Summary of Tests Performed & Tests Results Are Encl ML20205Q0191999-04-12012 April 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to License DPR-42 & DPR-60, Relocating Shutdown Margin Requirements from TS to COLR 05000282/LER-1998-010, Forwards LER 98-010-01 Re Discovery That 32 App R Related MOVs Are Susceptible to Physical Damage by Fire Induced Hot Shorts.Rept Provides Addl Details on Current Plans for Completing C/As Committed to in Original LER1999-04-0808 April 1999 Forwards LER 98-010-01 Re Discovery That 32 App R Related MOVs Are Susceptible to Physical Damage by Fire Induced Hot Shorts.Rept Provides Addl Details on Current Plans for Completing C/As Committed to in Original LER ML20205P9221999-04-0101 April 1999 Submits Relief Request 8,rev 0 Which Addresses Limited Exams Associated with Unit 2 Third ten-year Interval Inservice Insp Program.Util Requests Relief Per 10CFR50.55a(q)(5)(iii) Due to Impracticality of Obtaining 100% Exam Coverage ML20205E8371999-03-31031 March 1999 Submits Four Copies of Rev 38 to Prairie Island Security Plan,Per 10CFR50.54(p).Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Security Plan.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20196K7831999-03-31031 March 1999 Forwards Decommissioning Funding Status Rept for Monticello & Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plants,Per Requirements of 10CFR50.75(f)(1) ML20205Q5051999-03-30030 March 1999 Forwards Inservice Insp Summary Rept Interval 3,Period 1 & 2 Refueling Outage Dates 981109-1229 Cycle 19,970327- 981229. Rept Identifies Components Examined,Exam Methods Used,Exam Number & Summarized Results ML20205H5731999-03-29029 March 1999 Submits Required 1998 Actual & 1999 Projected Cash Flow Statements for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant & PINGP, Units 1 & 2.Encl Contains Proprietary Info.Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(b)(1) ML20205C6561999-03-26026 March 1999 Submits Semiannual Update on Project Plans for USAR Review Project & Conversion to ITS ML20204H3371999-03-19019 March 1999 Forwards Application for Amend to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60, Removing Dates of Two NRC SERs & Correcting Date of One SER Listed in Section 2.C.4, Fire Protection 1999-09-07
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARML20065D5821990-09-19019 September 1990 Forwards Rev 25 to Security Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20059L3431990-09-13013 September 1990 Forwards Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60, Revising Tech Spec Section 6.7.A.6.b ML20064A6411990-09-0606 September 1990 Amends 900724 Certification for Financial Assurance for Decommissioning Plant,Per Reg Guide 1.159.Util Intends to Seek Rate Relief by Pursuing Rehearing & Appeal of Rate Order by Initiating New Rate Proceeding ML20059E8671990-09-0606 September 1990 Forwards Rev 24 to Security Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20028G8401990-08-29029 August 1990 Forwards Effluent & Waste Disposal Semiannual Rept for Jan- June 1990 & Revised Effluent & Waste Disposal Semiannual Rept for Second Half of 1989,which Includes Previously Omitted Fourth Quarter Analyses Results of Sr-89 & Sr-90 ML20058Q4021990-08-0202 August 1990 Informs NRC of Potentially Generic Problem Experienced W/Westinghouse DB-50 Reactor Trip Breaker.Info Being Provided Due to Potential Generic Implications of Deficiencies in Westinghouse Torquing Procedues ML20056A3371990-07-31031 July 1990 Forwards Rev 2 to, ASME Code Section XI Inservice Insp & Testing Program,Second 10-Yr Insp Interval of Operation ML20055J4441990-07-26026 July 1990 Submits Supplemental Info to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-282/89-26 & 50-306/89-26.Training of Supervisory Personnel Not Completed Until 900719 Due to Time Constraints Encountered During Feb 1990 Unit 1 Refueling Outage ML20055G3981990-06-28028 June 1990 Forwards Annual Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments for 1989 & Rev 8 to Updated SAR for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant ML20043F7341990-06-11011 June 1990 Responds to NRC 900420 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-282/90-04 & 50-306/90-04.Corrective Actions:Operations Procedure D61 Will Be Revised to More Clearly Identify Requirements for Logging Openings ML20043D5681990-06-0505 June 1990 Rev 23 to Security Plan.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20043C7731990-05-25025 May 1990 Informs That on 900425,yard Fire Hydrant Hose House 7 Declared out-of-svc Due to Const in Area,Per Tech Spec 3.14.F.2.Const in Area Will Prevent Return to Svc of Hydrant Hose House 7 Until Approx 900630 ML20043A4451990-05-0909 May 1990 Responds to NRC 900319 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-282/89-29 & 50-306/89-29.Corrective Actions:Changes Will Be Made to Review & Approval Process for Work Packages ML20043A4531990-05-0202 May 1990 Responds to NRC 900319 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-282/89-29 & 50-306/89-29.Corrective Actions:Incoming Workers Will Be Specifically Trained in Fire Prevention Practices & Permanent Workers Will Be Reminded at Meetings ML20042F8681990-04-30030 April 1990 Submits Supplemental Info on Response Time Testing of Instrumentation,In Response to Concerns Raised in Insp Repts 50-282/88-12 & 50-306/88-12.No Addl Changes to Current Response Time Testing Program Necessary ML20042E8081990-04-27027 April 1990 Forwards Radiation Environ Monitoring Program Rept 1989. ML20012E4261990-03-28028 March 1990 Forwards Inservice Insp-Exam Summary 900103-0219 Refueling Outage 13,Insp Period 2,Second Interval. Exam Plan Focused on Pressure Retaining Components & Supports of RCS & Associated Sys,Fsar Augmented Exams & Eddy Current Exam ML20012D9131990-03-22022 March 1990 Forwards Rev 0 to Core Operating Limits Rept Unit 1 - Cycle 14 & Rev 0 to Core Operating Limits Rept Unit 2 - Cycle 13. ML20012E0091990-03-21021 March 1990 Forwards Completed Questionnaire in Response to Generic Ltr 90-01, Request for Voluntary Participation in NRC Regulatory Impact Survey. ML20006G1931990-02-26026 February 1990 Forwards Rev 22 to Security Plan & Advises That Changes Do Not Decrease Effectiveness of Plant Security Plan & May Be Implemented W/O Prior NRC Review & Approval.Rev Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20012A3131990-02-26026 February 1990 Forwards Rev 0 to Effluent Semiannual Rept,Jul-Dec 1989, Supplemental Info, Amend to Effluent & Waste Disposal Semiannual Rept for First Half of 1989 & Rev 11 to Odcm. Analyses for Sr-89 & Sr-90 Will Be Included in Next Rept ML20006F8631990-02-22022 February 1990 Provides Steam Generator Tube Plugging & Sleeving Info,Per Tech Spec 4.12.E.1.Following Recent Inservice insp,15 Tubes Plugged for First Time & 37 Tubes W/New Indications Sleeved ML20042E1871990-02-19019 February 1990 Forwards Response to NRC 900118 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-282/89-30 & 50-306/89-30.Response Withheld (Ref 10CFR73) ML20006E8031990-02-16016 February 1990 Forwards Request for Relief from Schedule Requirements of NRC Bulletin 89-002, Stress Corrosion Cracking of High Hardness Type 410 Stainless Steel Internal Preloaded Bolting in Anchor/Darling Valves. ML20011E4991990-02-0606 February 1990 Discusses Liability & Funding Requirements Re NRC Decommissioning Funding Rules & Verifies Understanding of Rules.Ltr from NRC Explaining Liability & Requirements of Rule Requested ML20006B9291990-01-29029 January 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-13, Svc Water Sys Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment. Procedure Will Be Developed to Periodically Inspect Emergency Intake Crib Located in River ML20006B9041990-01-29029 January 1990 Responds to NRC Bulletin 89-003, Potential Loss of Required Shutdown Margin During Refueling Operations. Refueling Boron Concentration Will Be Calculated W/Provisions for One Shuffle Alteration ML20006B9951990-01-0303 January 1990 Suppls Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-282/89-14 & 50-306/89-15 Re Containment Airlock Local Leak Rate Testing.Corrective Actions:Changes to Local Leak Rate Testing Procedures Approved on 891229 ML20005E4881989-12-28028 December 1989 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-10 Re motor-operated Valve Testing & Surveillance.Listed Actions Will Be Performed in Order to Meet Recommendations of Generic Ltr ML20011D6941989-12-15015 December 1989 Forwards Addendum 1 to Sacm Diesel Generator Qualification Rept & Diesel Generator Set Qualification Rept. ML19351A5281989-12-13013 December 1989 Forwards Supplemental Response to NRC Bulletin 88-009, Thimble Tube Thinning in Westinghouse Reactors. Thimble Tube Insp Program Will Be Formalized by 901231 ML20005G4861989-12-11011 December 1989 Updates Response to Insp Repts 50-282/86-07 & 50-306/86-07 Provided by 860819 Ltr.Listed Actions Taken as Result of Task Force Evaluation,Inlcluding Implementation of Work Control Process for Substation Maint ML19332F3621989-12-0101 December 1989 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-21 Re Implementation Status of USI Requirements at Facilities.Pra to Address USI A-17, Sys Interactions in Nuclear Power Plants Will Be Completed in Feb 1993 ML19332E9371989-12-0101 December 1989 Forwards Executed Amend 9 to Indemnity Agreement B-60, Reflecting Changes to 10CFR140 ML20006E3301989-11-20020 November 1989 Forwards Fee in Amount of $25,000,in Response to 891019 Notice of Violation & Civil Penalty Re Commercial Grade Procurement,Per Insp Repts 50-282/88-201 & 50-306/88-201. Responses to Violations Also Encl ML19332D1761989-11-17017 November 1989 Forwards Application for Amends to Licenses DPR-42 & DPR-60, Deleting cycle-specific Core Operating Limits from Tech Specs & Creating New Core Operating Limits Rept,Per Generic Ltr 88-16 ML19332C8341989-11-13013 November 1989 Responds to NRC 891012 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-282/89-23 & 50-306/89-23.Corrective Actions:Procedure Changes Implemented to Require Placement of Yellow Tags on Fire Detection Panel Bypass Switches in Bypass Position ML19324C4031989-11-0606 November 1989 Responds to NRC Bulletin 88-010,Suppl 1, Nonconforming Molded-Case Circuit Breakers. Supply Breaker to Unit 2 Feedwater Isolation Valve Replaced W/Qualified & Traceable Replacement Circuit Breaker ML19332B6131989-11-0606 November 1989 Forwards Rev 4 to Safeguards Contingency Plan & Implementing Procedures,Per Generic Ltr 89-07.Rev Withheld ML19324B3321989-10-13013 October 1989 Submits Supplemental Info in Response to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-282/88-16 & 50-306/88-16.Corrective Actions: Air Test Connections Will Be Added to Allow Pressurization of Containment Spray Piping Between Stated Motor Valves ML20246L5061989-08-31031 August 1989 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-12, Operator Licensing Exams ML20246K2361989-08-28028 August 1989 Forwards, Effluent & Waste Disposal Semiannual Rept for Jan-June 1989, Revised Repts for 1988,1987 & 1985 & Revised Offsite Dose Calculation Manual ML20246L3771989-08-23023 August 1989 Forwards Supplemental Response to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-282/88-16 & 50-306/88-16. in Future,Outboard Check Valves Will Be Tested W/Upstream Vent & Motor Valves MV-32103 & 32105 Repositioned ML20245L1911989-08-14014 August 1989 Submits Supplemental Info Re NRC Audit of Westinghouse Median Signal Select Signal Validation.Operability of Median Signal Select Function Will Be Demonstrated by Verifying That Failed Channel Not Selected for Use in Level Control ML19332C8431989-08-11011 August 1989 Responds to NRC 890713 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-282/89-18 & 50-306/89-18.Corrective Actions:All Personnel Involved in Event Counseled on Importance of Following Procedures & Work Requests as Written ML20246F4341989-08-11011 August 1989 Forwards Comments on SALP 8 Repts 50-282/89-01 & 50-306/89-01 Per 890629 Request.Addl Room Adjacent to Emergency Offsite Facility Ctr Classroom to Be Designated ML20247Q8181989-07-31031 July 1989 Provides Supplemental Info in Response to 890612 Request Re NRC Bulletin 79-14, Consideration of Torsional Moments (Tms) Piping Mods. Future Mods Will Reflect Tms Where Calculations of Stresses Due to Occasional Loads Performed ML20247H9111989-07-24024 July 1989 Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 89-08, Erosion/Corrosion- Induced Pipe Wall Thinning. Administrative Procedure, Defining Erosion/Corrosion Monitoring Activities,Issued on 890220 & NUMARC Recommendations Adopted ML19332F3501989-07-20020 July 1989 Responds to NRC 890620 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-282/89-17 & 50-306/89-17.Corrective Actions:New Monthly Sampling Procedures Prepared Which Will Require Monthly Independent Samples Be Taken from Fuel Oil Storage Tank ML20247D1851989-07-12012 July 1989 Provides Addl Info Re Molded Case Circuit Breaker Replacement,Per Insp Repts 50-282/88-201 & 50-306/88-201. Util Has Concluded That Replacement Breakers from Bud Ferguson Co Suitable for safety-related Purposes 1990-09-06
[Table view] |
Text
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% NSED NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY M I N N E A PO L.l e. M I N N E S OTA 5 5401 June 10, 1980 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT Docket No. 50-282 License No. DPR-42 50-306 DPR-60 Supplemental Information - License Amendment Request dated January 31, 1980 l
Attachment 1 provides additional information related to the Prairie Island l
NGP Fuel Storage Facility modification. The following analyses are covered:
(A) Makeup Water System (B) Structural (C) Chemistry / Radiochemistry (D) Radiological (E) Materials / Processes (F) Rack Disposal This attachment is intended to address these areas of interest e'xpressed by NRC Staff members at the March 19 meeting of NRC, NSP, and NSC personnel.
Should you have any additional questions please contact this office.
h.
L 0 Mayer, PE Manager of Nuclear Support Services LOM/ JAG /jh cc J G Keppler G Charnoff MPCA J W Ferman l
l 8 006170 k%h 8 i
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ i
.. o Attachment 1 June 10, 1980 PRAIRIE ISLANC NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT Docket No. 50-282 License No. DPR-42 50-306 DPR-60 Supplemental Information Related to January 31, 1980 License Amendment Request SPENT FUEL STORAGE CAPACITY MODIFICATION s
L. ., _ - -
.- e A. ' Makeup Water Systems _
he following systems may be used for makeup to the spent fuel pool (s):
(1) CVCS holdup tanks (2) CVCS blender (3) RWST (4) Reactor makeup _
'(5) Demineralized water (6) Fire protection CVCS Holdup Tanks Figure A-1 shows the CVCS holdup tank supply path to the spent fuel trans fer canal. This system is Class I and is permanently piped. He 4 121 Recirc pump has a nonsafeguards power supply. % e pump is rated in excess of 300 gym. Lineup may be made in less than 10 minutes since the pump and all related valves are in.the gas stripper feed pump room and the pump control switch is just outside this room. Existing procedures cover this option.
CVCS Blender Figure A-2 shows an alternate flow path that can be used. Valves VC-15-59 and SF-14-4 would need to be opened and the blender flow adjusted (in the control room) for manual makeup. Blended flow at up to 100 gpm is possible. H is flow path can be lined up in less than 10 minutes.
H is flow path is Class I up to SF-14-4. Existing procedures cover this option.
RWST Figure A-3 illustrates the flow pths from either unit's RWST to the spent fuel pool. This system is permanently piped but is not Class I.
Design flow of 80 gpm at 180 ft pressure could be provided by the refueling water purification pump. To lineup this flow path would involve
- opening 3 valves, closing 1 valve, verifying 1 valve closed, and starting the refueling water purification pump. This lineup may be achieved in less than 10 minutes. Existing procedures cover this option.
Reactor Makeup Storage Tanks Figure A-4 illustrates the flow paths from either unit's reactor makeup
" storage _ tanks to the spent fuel pool. The system is permanently piped, 4 but is not Class I. He reactor makeup pumps have nonsafeguards power supplies. Each reactor makeup water pump is capable of supplying water-at 80 gpa'at 83 psi pressure. Only 1 valve needs to be opened to supply water to the spent fuel pool. H is lineup can be made in less than 10 minutes. - Existing procedures cover this option.
" I_
Desi*eralizid Witar-There are 4 demineralized water (non Class I) hose statious~near the .
spent fuel pools, as shown on Figure A-5. Each hose station is rated at approximately 20 spa. To supply water to the spent fuel pool, a domineralized water hose is simply connected and the supply valve opened. Such an operation would take less than 10 minutes. Note also 1xt Figure 4 of Exhibit A that demineralized water can be supplied to the discharge side of the SFP demineralizer.
Fire Protection i
There are 2 fire hose stations near the spent fuel pools, as shown on ,
Figure A-3. This system is not- Class I.
Fire protection headee pressure (100 psig nominal) can be maintained
-by any of the following:
. Diesel fire water pump i
, . Motor driven fire water pump li Jockey firewater pump (30 gpm)
Motor driven cooling water pumps Diesel cooling water pumps Screen wash pump l The fire water and screen wash pumps are rated at 2000 gpm and the cool-
] .ing water pumps are rated at 13000 gym. The diesel fire water pump
] and/or diesel cooling water pumps could be expected to maintain header pressure for the event of a loss of offsite power.
Use of the fire protection system would involve removing the fire hose from the rack and opening the nozzle and shutoff valves. This operation would take less than 10 minutes. The hose stations are rated at
. approximately 95 spa. The minimum pressure at the highest elevation l hose station is approximately 65 psig. Thus this system would assure
, water to the-spent fuel pools.
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[14C so-Cs [ vc_ so- soa CVCS Holdup Tanks 21 121 11
, ] [2VC3-1 ][ vc 3-5 ]l vc 3-1 121 CVCS Holdup Tank Recire Pump ,, 3,7
=
N W vc 2-4 I
8# 9-' )[ Transfer
- Canal i SF9-5 m
, l 1
l FIGURE A-1 Spent Fuel Pool Water Supplies
Spent Fuel Cooling Heat Exchangers 122 121 K' X se is-r M Y Reactor Makeup
" h Spent Fuel Cooling Purification Loop m
=
" "' ~
y To RWST M I To CVCS Holdup Tanks vc-u-62
't 17 g3r E-s g 59 t-1
)[vc is-59 neactor Makeup Fev'- u s Pumps discharge
] % _
rew-u.c , @ ,
- Boric Acid Transfer Boric Acid FCV - 8 80 Pumps discharge Blender Spent Fuel Pools
] % P cu- not U
To Charging Pumps FIGURE A-2 Spent Fuel Pool Water Supplies
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From Spent Fuel Cooling Pumps S]4*'l -,
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y $FI4-IS r,
5# '7 X 2 s F12. -I X sr 22 -l
$F.1 3 g &
SF-t-S X sr '+-itj iZ RWST Purification Pumps 1Z
] 3 Spent Fuel 122 121 SFP Demina ralizer Cooling ; pg, H:at Exchangers gr l4.g7
'r H 8
X 21 11 X3F'd-8 S F. 2 -2. X SF-tr-(. X 25F t" -l RWST RWST Y
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x A :
! KFr+-f Sr14-18' M
Sr-8-1 X s p g.r.y -2 o .
- 1 #2 Spent Fuel Pools FIGURE A-3 Spent Fuel Fool Water Supplies
Unit 1 Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tanks 11 12 r
-Spent Fuel Cooling Heat Exchangers M11- 12 Reactor Makeup Ptmps To BA Blender U 122 121 & Radwaste To ~
PRT (Unit 1)
A a b
" k br "["[ y ev dsn4 CJ-A ssG sr -i v -9 f
y XM B A Blendedi % gg ggg X I hictor eup k k To BA B1}mider J
Y X
f & Radwaste To PRT (Unit 2)
Unit 2 4- fI Reactor Makeup Water i -
Storage Tanks E h '21 22
- 1 #2 22 0
Spent Fuel Pools Reactor Makeup Ptaps l
PRT = Pressuriser Relief Tank FIGURE A-4 Spent Fuel Pool Water Supplies
/
Unit 1 Containment N=
g DE-34-13
_ i EO !
qDE-34-53
- 2 SPENT FUEL POOL Receiving Area I
- 1
_, SPENT FUEL POOL
-7 Storage Area NEW FUEL POOL
_ DE-34-25 s0 i
g DE-34-47 FIGURE A-5 Legend ,
Fuel Handling Building E Demin Water Hose Station g Fire Protection Hose Sta.
B. Structural Evaluation Additional studies conducted in the structural area include::
(1) Straight drop of fuel assembly (2) Inclined drop of a fuel assembly (3) Overturning analysis (4) SSE response spectrum (5)' Rack. sliding analysis (6)- Seismic effects
- 1. Straight Drop of a Fuel Assembly If a fuel assembly is dropped straight through an individual cell, it will impact on the two bars which are welded to the sides of the tube near its bottom end. During the normal condition the fuel assembly rests on these two bars. If the fluid drag is neglected, the energy with which the fuel assembly will impact these bars will be about 192 in-kip. If elasto plastic behavior is assumed, it can be predicted that' plastic hinges will form in the two bars at a maximum load of about 17 kips. The bars will bend and will cause the supporting tube walls to cave . in (locally near the bottom end). But, since the tubes are separately attached to the rack structure, the local plastic deformation of the tube is not likely to alter the center distances between adjacent tubes. The two tube walls which are at right angles to the impacted bars are prevented from bulging outward in this region by the lower grid structure and the tube to grid shims.
The kinetic energy of the dropping fuel assembly will be partially absorbed by the crushing or collapsing of the fuel assembly itself, followed by the plastic bending of the fuel assembly support bars and the bending of the lower end of tube walls. The fuel assembly, with its remaining kinetic energy, will impact on one rack base assembly beam causing it to bend and twist locally. This may bend the storage tubes and change the center to center distance between the adjacent tubes. This was investigated by an analysis summarized below:
The bottom edge of the tubes are welded to the bottom grid which is welded to the base assembly beams. The maximum combined bending moment that can be transmitted to the tube due to the twisting and bending of the base assembly beam is 82 inch kips. The maximum lateral deflection of the tube due to this moment is 0.00015 inch. The lateral deflection of the adjacent tubes is likely to be less and in the same direction.
However, to provide added margin of safety from critically consideration, it can be assumed that the adjacent tubes would remain stationary.
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This deflection of the tube wall would have no effect on the calculated value of k,gg.
- 2. Inclined Drop on the Rack i
To be conservative and to maximize the plastic deformation, only the vertical impact of the fuel bundle was analyzed assuming a -point load instead of a finite impact _ area equal to the bottom dimensions of the fuel bundle. Inclined drop was considered less critical from the following considerations:
- The fuel bundle has small lateral stif fness and during an inclined
' drop, it is likely to bend, absorbing a significant amount of energy,-
thus reducing the impact energy. In other words, it will be a sof ter
-impact.
- An inclined drop undet water will have a larger drag force on the . .
bundle, and, consequently, a smaller impact.
Local. bending or buckling of the laterally impacted tube walls due to .the horizontal component of the impact force cannot be propagated without stretching or crushing'the tube walls in tha horizontal direction, thereby absorbing mere energy than has been considered in the present analysis.
- The upper grid structure and shims fill the space between tubes and maintain the rack pitch. ,An inclined fuel assembly drop would have to deflect this grid structure pluc the tube 'to affect k,gg.
Since the fuel .is located below the top of the tube, the falling spent
- . fuel assembly does not change the results of the previous analysis of ,
! the spent fuel assembly drop accident.
- 3. Overturning Anlavais The original overturning analyses considered the rack either fully loaded or empty. Additional analyses have been performed assuming various partially loaded rack conditione, noted below. The minimum factor of safety is'18.4.
Factor of Safety Loading Condition Against Overturning Fully Loaded Rack 84 3 Rows Loaded on One Side 21.9 2 Rows Loaded on Ona Side 18.4 1 Row Loaded on One Side 18.7 Empty Rack 25 The fuel rack overturning analysis was performed assuming the following sequence:
~
- 1. .The coefficient of friction is 0.2
{ 2. An earthquake-starts the rack sliding L 3. When the rack rssches its maximum velocity, the rack base is .
stopped (essentially infinite friction)
The overturning potential of the rack is determined at this 4.
point ,
The above described case envelopes all other potential cases for overturn-ing. The impact analysis described in. Exhibit C of the January 31, 1980
~
ilicense amendment request 'is based on the velocity in step 3 above and bounds the l case where the ' friction coefficient may vary from 0.2 to 0.75.
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- 4. SSE Rasponse Spectrum i 1
)
The SSE response spectrum for horizontal motion was developed by l multiplying the OBE ' design response spectrum valves by 2 while the time-history v.ts generated from this spectram using NSC's proprietary computer program NSCTH._ The OBE design response spectrum was obtained from Referance '14 of the ' January 31, 1981 Exhibit C rep' ort " Revised Earthquake Analysis for Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.")
That reference did not include a SSE time-history representing the behavior of .the spent fuel pool floor but recommended using two times OBE response for computing SSE values. Since this reference did not contain a time-history for Prairie Island, the time-history of floor motion compatible with the SSE response spectrum curve (i.e. , twice the OBE spectrum values) was synthesized in order to perform nonlinear time-history sliding analysis.
- 5. Rack Sliding Analysis For welded steel structures, USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.61 recommends a damping value of 2% for OBE motion and 4% for SSE motion. Thus, the damping value used is considered conservative. Also, additional damping which would result from fluid drag force and floor friction force was ignored, adding further conservatism.
- 6. Seismic Effects The mathematical model used in the analysis as shown in Exhibit C Figure 3.4-5 (January 31, 1980 License Amendment Request.1 does not separate the fuel and the rack. In performing the seismic response J. analysis, the mass of each fuel _ assembly and the water inside the storage tube was assumed to move in unison with the tube itself. Even though there is a small gap between the fuel assembly and the storage tube, such a representation is judged to be adequate from the following considerations:
a) The gap is small and is filled with water. Movement of the fuel assembly within such a small spnces is resisted by the water that must be squeezed around the fuel. l efore the gap can be closed, b) The movement of the assemblies . . side the storage tubes is random i and the probability for all the assemblies stored in a rack to move i in unison is low. Thus, during a seismic event, even if the 1
assemblies " rattle" inside the tubes, the additional load due to such rattling is not likely to be more than what has been computed
^
assuming that all the assemblies move in phase, which by itself is a conservative assumption. Local stresses near the vicinity of the
' impact area can be higher, which may cause local yielding of the
- tube walls near the top; but, this part of the tube is neither required for maintaining the structural integrity of the rack nor is it likely that the local yielding will propagate to the region of active fuel.
c)' Due to lateral flexibility of the tube wall and the fuel assembly, the actual _ impact between them is likely to be soft and inconsequential.
d) In the analysis, NSC assumed that all the fuel bundles would be in phase with the rack structure, thereby maximizing the seismic loads on the rack structure. Two analyses were performed to evaluate the maximum seismic stresses in the rack structure. In the report these are identified as configuration I analysis and configuration II analysis. Configuration II represents the extreme condition in which the rack is assumed to be tilted on one leh and subjected to the upper bound loads determined from the maximum friction coefficient. In other words, even if there is any dynamic amplification (for a sliding type rack this is likely to be small, if any) due to the interaction of fuel bundles and the rack structure, the total seismic loads cannot exceed those for which configuration II was analyzed. Dynamic interaction between the fuel bundles and the rack structure, however, may produce local stresses at the upper part of the tube, as described abova .
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- o. r C. Chemistry / Radiochemistry Analyses A SFP chemistry surveillance program has been in ef fect at Prairie Island _ Nuclear Generating Plant since the initial filling of the spent fuel pools. This chemistry program currently involves weekly sampling of- the following parameters -
Chlorides pH Fluorides SFP Ion Exchanger DF Boron Tritium It should be noted that this is far beyond Technical Specification requirements. Chlorides and fluorides are controlled to limit corrosion an a prudent operating practice. If a preestablished limit is exceeded, the SFP deminc ralizer would be used to reduce the halide ion level.
Boron is controlled at approximately 2000 ppm to assure there would be no reduction in the t, 'ueling pool and RCS concentration during refueling fuel handling oper.ttions. The boron provides additional shutdown margin for which credit is not taken in the criticality safety analyses.
If the concentration is below a preestablished limit, boric acid would be added.
pH is monitored to assure pH is,in agreement with the value expected for the boric acid concentration. If the pH is not in line with that expected, investigative and corrective action would be initiated.
SFP Ion Exchanger decontamination factor (DF) is monitored to determine the ef fectiveness of the ion exchanger at removing impurities. The inlet value of activity also is a representative value of SFP activity.
If the DF is unacceptable, the ion exchanger resin would be changed.
Tritium is monitored to determine if there is any anomalous behavior.
Investigative action would be initiated if unusual behavior is noted.
Radionuclide activities are determined using a Germanium (lithium drift) semiconductor detector with 4096 channel analyzer. A computer program provides spectrum separation, nuclide identification, and activity determinatiou.
Exhibit C, Section 3.6.2 reported that " cesium will be the main fission product contaminant in the spent fuel s torage pool". Exhibit A, Section5.3.3reportyg4the actj3jty levels of the major nuclides. It may be noted that Cs and Cs were detected before the refueling outage. However, levels were lees than MDA (gjgimum degg9 table activity) after the outage. It ig7]elievedghat the Cs and Cs levels 5
were obscured by the Sb and Co the activity of which rose by a factor of 10 after the retueling. A larf34 nereasy3jnactivityofa nuclide with gamma energies above the Cs and Cs gamma energies can reduce the ef fectiveness of the program at distinguishing ;
these nuclides because of the increased background. In addition, the j fuel leakage for Prairie Island has consistently been lower than the 1%
assumed in the POOLRAD calculations reported in Table 3.6-1, Exhibit C, j thus the ' increase in activity would be expected to be less than that l reported.
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- D. Radiological Analysis An analysis was conducted to deter- e the radiological impact if boiling of the SFP water occurs due to a loss of cooling f w tion. his evaluation included the operation of the SFP ventilation system and consideration of the ability of the system to handle gases and humidity.
If loss of the cooling function should occur in the spent fuel pool (SFP),
makeup water would be added to maintain the water _ level above the fuel elements. In this , event, boiling could occur with potential release of small drop Based on an assumed air concentration of10mg/m}etsofsolutionspray.
for the aerosol resulting from release of the spray, doses at the exclusion area boundary were estimated. The external wholebodydoses_grtheradionu91 ides with the largest releases, ranged from 6x10 rem to 9x10 rem for eight-hour exposures.
Dosesgo the whge body due to inhalation for eight hours ranged from 8x10 to 8x10 gem while doses to other ogans due to inhalation, ranged from 1x10 rem to the liver to 5x10 rem to the thyroid.
De estimated doses are listed in Table D-1. De doses are far below 10 CFR 100 limits of 300 rem to the thyroid and 25 rem to the whole body.
As indicated in the FSAR, (Section 5.5.4) the filter system on the emergency spent fuel pool (SFP) ventilation system contains a heater at the inlet to the HEPA and charcoal filter train to reduce the relative humidity in the filters to 70%, with 100% saturated air entering the system. Thus, the filter design is water-resistant. His resistance applies to both the HEPA filters and the charcoal beds.
Discussion of Loss of Cooling Accident in t'ae Spent Fuel Pool h e Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) water is maintained at a temperature of about 115 F cooled by plant component cooling water. If this heat exchanger cannot function, a backup exchanger is provided to maintain the SFP water at a temperature below 140 F. In the very unlikely event that both exchangers are inoperative, the SFP water could overheat and ' boil.
In this case, water (using the fire protection system, if necessary) is added to the pool to make up water lost by evaporation, in order to maintain the pool level above the fuel. Even with makeup water added, boiling could continue with a potential loss of radionuclides from the SFP.
It was assumed that all of the noble gas radionuclides would be released from any failed fuel as a result of the temperature increase, and would volatilize from the pool water because of low solubility of these f elements in water. Itwasalsoassumedtyty iodine, which was probably originally present as iodide in the water , would become oxidized by oxygen and would ha released as molecular iodine. It was assumed that urganic iodide and hypiodite would not be present in the pool water.
Non-volatile radionuclides were assumed to become airborne as a result of small droplets of solution being produced as a spray when bubbles burst at the_ surface of the pool water. A similar phenomenon is ' thought to be resp g ible for producing airborne droplets of salt spray from the oceans. It was assumed that the concentration of the radionuclides in the aerosol droplets would be the same as in the pool water. It was also assumed that the boiling would continue for eight hours before I
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n restoration of cooling. (Doses can readily be adjusted for other times). It was also assumed that the concentration of radionuclides in the pool. water at the beginning of boiling would remain constant during the period of boiling.
Boiling would also tend to. release corrosion product oxide (crud) from j the fuel surfaces. Thus, radiocobalt concentrations in the pool-water would probably tend to .. increase idsen boiling occurs. For this study, relatively high concentrations of cobalt-58 and cogg}t-58 and cobalt-60 found in-the SFP water after a refueling operation were used in the
- i. calculations. These values are about 10 times greater than those obtained from concentration' measurements made sometime af ter refueling (3) ,
2 and 10 to ggg times greater than values reported in a survey of SFP facilities 4
3
, The concentratton of airs'rne droplets was pggumed to be 10 mg/m. based-on studies at Oak Ridge. 2ional Laboratory This air loading corresponds to a fog and is, therefore, a very conservative assumption.
It was assumed that the water in the spray would evaporate upon er.tering the ventilation system heater, leaving a solid aerosol to be filtered.
Doses to the maximum individual at the exclusion boundary were calculated using models and dose. conversion factors from Regulatory Guides 1.25
! and 1.109. These models were basically the same as used. in the Prairie l Island FSAR. The digpersiog factor at the exclusion area bcundary was
! taken to be 6.54x10 sec/m as reported ig the Prairie Island FSAR. A decontamination factor (DF) of 10 was assumed for particulates i
-released to the environment. A DF of 20 (charcoal efficiency of 95%)
t was assumed for iodine, and a DF of one was assumed.for noble gases.
- These DF's were based on information in the FSAR.
Based on the assumed airborne concentration of 10 mg/m3 in the SFP 3 facility and a flow rate through the ventilation system of 5000 ft / min (FSAR), the amounts of particulate radionuclides released to the envirggment per_ggcond were estimated. These values ranged from
- i. 2x10 to 5x10. Ci/ ec. The volatile iodine average rate was
- estimated to the 5x10 9 Ci/sec8and the n ble gas average release rate was estimated to be 1x10 Ci/sec, Calculated eight-hour doses for the dominant radionuclides in these releases are shown in Table 1.
- The values shown are all far smaller than the limiting values from 10 CFR 100 of 25 rem to 'the whole body and 300 rem to the thyroid. Thus, doses from the postulated accident scenario would be well within
- - acceptable limits even for the conservative conditions assumed.
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. TABLE D-1 Calculated Eight-Hour Doses to the Maximum Individual of the Public Due to Loss of Cooling of Spent Fuel Pool Concentration External Camma Whole Body Inhalation Dose (rea)
Radionuclide (InCi/ml)
Pool " Dose (rem) Body Other Organ
-4 -18 8x10
-16 1x10-15 (liver)
Cs-137 1x10 6x10
-4 -7 8x10
-6 ~3 (thyroid) 1-131 2x10 9x10 5x10
-2 -15 8x10
-16 4x10~13 (lung)
Co-58' 2x10 2x10
-3 -15 1x10
-15 5x10-13 (lung)
Co-60 4x10 1x10
~
~9 Xe-133 2x10 1x10 - -
- s. Cs-137, I-131,'Xe-133, concentrations were calculated by Nuclear Services Corporation's POOLRAD computer code. Co-58 and Co-60 were based on Prairie Island SFP measureaents made after refueling (Spent Fuel Storage License Amendment Request dated January 31, 1980).
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REFERENCES:
- 1. Cubicciotti, D. Tanecki, J., Strain, R., Greenberg, S., Neimark, L.,
and Johnson, C., The Nature of Fission-Product Deposits Inside Light-Water-Reactor Fuel Rods, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, CA; November 1976.
- 2. Junge, C. E., Air Chemistry and Radioactivity, Academic Press, NY; 1963, p 156.
- 3. Spent Fuel Storage License Amendment Request, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Northern States Power Co. , Minneapolis, MN; January 31, 1980.
4 Johnson, A.B. , Jr. , BNWL-2256, Behavior of Spent Nuclear Fuel in Water Pool Storage, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories; September 1977.
- 5. ORNL 4451, Siting of Fuel Reprocessing Plants and Waste Management Facilities, Oak Ridge National Laboratory; July 1970.
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E. Materials / Processes The proposed feel racks are fabricated entirely of 304 stainless steel with the exception of the adjusting bolts of the rack feet. These bolts are '
1 made from 17-41 PH stainless' steel. These are the materials used in the present Prairie Island fuel racks, and these materials are used in spent. fuel racks in many other plants.
- The metallic parts of the fuel assembly are fabricated from zircaloy, stainless steel and inconel. Fuel composed of these materials has been stored in stainless steel fuel racks for many years with no evidence of
-galvanic corrosion. We find no reason to expect galvanic corrosion of the fuel or fuel rack, if the proposed fuel racks are installed.
The materials involved are essentially similar to those involved in the previous 1977 rerack at the Prairie Island Generating Plant.
The 17-4 pH steel used in the adjusting bolts will be heat treated at 1150F in accordance with ASTM A564. This high heat treatment temperature is selected to preclude cracking that is observed if too low a temperature is used.
The Boraflex sheet to be used in the racks is being purchased in accordance with a thickness specification of 0.125+ .011 inches. The boron-10 in the Boraflex sheet is also controlled by specification to be .04 ge/cm 2 at a 95% confidence level. The Boraflex sheet is to be sandwiched between the stainless steel in the tubes as shown in Figure 3.3-1 of Exhibit C ff the January 31, 1980 license amendment request. There is
- no interference such that bending of the steel sheet would be expected '
to occur even though some Boraflex shrinkage may be expected with expos ure. The fuel tubes will be vented to eliminate the problem of bulging due to offgassing or hydrostatic pressure.
The fuel storage tubes consist of two concentric stainless steel tubes with the Boraflex located in the annulus formed by these tubes.
The annulus region is vented at both the top and bottom of the neutron absorber region. Venting is provided by an open space approximately one inch by 1/8 inch in each of the four corners of the tube. The Boraflex is not attached to either of the stainless steel tubes. It is captured in the annulus and is supported on a stainless teel strip at the bottom of the annulus.
The pressure exerted on-the Boraflex by the stainless steel tubes is minimal, and shrinkage of the Boraflex will not produce stress in the storage tubes or rack structure. Testing performed to date on the Boraflex material indicates that shrinkage during use in the fuel pool will be less than 1%. Since the testing to date has included a high neutron flux which does not occur in spent fuel storage, actual shrinkage
-in the fuel pool is expected to be significantly less. Boraflex
- shrinkage of 1% will not have any effect on the acceptability of ,
the proposed spent fuel rack design. l 4 -
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F. Rack Disposal NSP intends. to dispose of the modules currently in the spent fuel pools by shipping them as LSA material to a low level radwaste disposal facility. For the purpose of construction planning and radiation exposure calculations it was assumed that the modules will be shipped in wooden boxes which meet LSA packaging requirements. In' light of national concerns with low level radioactive material' storage, NSP will continue to evaluate other alternatives, e.g. , electropolishing.
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