ML19309H765
| ML19309H765 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1980 |
| From: | Seyfrit K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Gary R TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8005190692 | |
| Download: ML19309H765 (1) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES v uc,#'o, NSIC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 9
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May 8, 1980 In Reply Refer To:
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RIV Docket Nos.
50-445/IE Information Notice No. 80-20 50-446/IE Information Notice No. 80-20 Texas Utilities Generating Company ATTN:
Mr. R. J. Gary, Executive Vice President and General Manager 2001 Bryan Tower Dallas, Texas 75201 Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Information Notice provides early not.ification of an event that may have safety significance. Accordingly, you shoula review the Information Notice for possible applicability to your facility.
No specific action or response is requested at this time; however, contingent upon the results of further staff evaluation, a Bulletin or Circular recom-mending or requesting specific licensee actions may be issued.
If you have questions regarding this matter, please contact me.
Sincerely, m
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Karl V. Seyfrit
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Enclosures:
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IE Information Notice No. 80-20 2.
List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices d
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SSINS No.:
6870 UNITED STATES Accession No.:
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8002280671 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 IE Information Notice No. 80-20 Date:
May 8, 1980 Page 1 of 3 LOSS OF DECAY HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY AT DAVIS-BESSE UNIT I WHILE IN A REFUELING MODE Description of Circumstances:
On April 19, 1980, decay heat removal capability was lost at Davis-Besse Unit 1 for approximately two and one-half hours. At the time of the event, the unit was in a refueling mode (e.g., RCS temperature was 90 F; decay heat was being removed by Decay Heat Loop No. 2; the vessel head was detensioned with bolts in
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place; the reactor coolant level was slightly below the vessel head flanges; and the manway covers on top of the once through steam generators were removed).
(See Enclosure A, Status of Davis-Besse 1 Prior to Loss of Power to Busses E-2 and F-2 for additional details regarding this event.)
i Since the plant was in a refueling mode, many systems or components were out of service for maintenance or testing purposes.
In addition, other systems and comr;onents were deactivated to preclude their inadvertent actuation while in a refueling mode.
Systems and components that were not in service or deactivated induded:
Containment Spray System; High Pressure Injection System; Source Range Channel 2; Decay Heat Loop No. 1; Station Battery IP and 1N; Emergency Diesel-Generator No. 1; 4.16 KV Essential Switchgear Bus C1; and 13.8 KV Switchgear Bus A (this bus was energized but not aligned).
9 In brief, the event was due to the tripping of a non-safeguards feeder breaker in 13.8 KV Switchgear Bus B. Because of the extensive maintenance and testing activities being conducted at the time, Channels 1 and 3 of the Reactor Protee-tion System (RPS) and Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) were being ener-gized from only one source, the source emanating from the tripped breaker.
Since the SFAS logic used at Davis-Besse is a two-out-of a
which the loss (or actuation) of any of all four output channels (i.e., Ch loss of power to Channels 1 and 3 bis Channels 2 and 4.
The actuation of S DUPLICATE DOCUMENT Decay Heat Loop No. 2, the operating Entire document Previously entered into system under.
Since the initiating event was a loss were actuated (i.e., Level 1 - High Ra bb-q ANO tion; Level 3 - Low Pressure Injectio m
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