ML19309D685
| ML19309D685 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 04/02/1980 |
| From: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Dunn C DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8004110131 | |
| Download: ML19309D685 (1) | |
Text
Th p mCEro 4
gg UNITED STATES y
g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION D
j REGION I 04 g
631 PARK AVENUE 4,*****,e KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANf A 19406 April 2, 1980 Docket No. 50-334 Duquesne Light Company ATTN:
Mr. C. N. Dunn Vice President Operations Division 435 Sixth Avenue Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219 Gentlemen:
The enclosed IE Information Notice No. 80-13, " General Electric Type SBM Control Switches - Defective CAM Followers," is forwarded to you for information.
No written response is required.
If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.
Sincerely, L
Boyce H. Grier
' Director
Enclosures:
1.
IE Information Notice No. 80-13 2.
List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices CONTACT:
S. D. Ebneter (215-337-5296) cc w/encis:
F. Bissert, Technical Assistant Nuclear R. Washabaugh, QA Manager J. Werling, Station Superintendent G. Moore, General Superintendent, Power Stations Department J. J. Carey, Director of Nuclear Operations R. Martin, Nuclear Engineer J. Sieber, Superintendent of Licensing and Compliance, BVPS l
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ENCLOSURE 1 SSINS No.: 6870 Accession No.:
UNITED STATES 8002280650 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION nq 0nnO T#
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0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT lasu G WASHINGTON, D.C.
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IE Information Notice No. 80-13 Date:
April 2, 1980 Page 1 of 1 GENERAL ELECTRIC TYPE SBM CONTROL SWITCHES DEFECTIVE CAM FOLLOWERS Description of Circumstances:
This Information Notice alerts licensees and holders of construction permits of a potential defect in the cam followers of General Electric (GE) Type SBM control switches.
Based on preliminary information, it appears that the defect is limited to switches manufactured prior to 1976 with cam followers of polycarbonate material, such as Lexan.
In brief, the problem is initiated by exposing such polycarbonate material to hydrocarbons.
Such exposure leads to severe cracking having a rock salt appearance which ultimately could progress to mechanical fail,ure.
It has been determined that such exposure has occurred during fabrication and could occur while performing maintenance (e.g. cleaning the contacts).
On February 22 and March 10, 1980 we were informed that SBM switches with defective cam followers had been found at Diablo Canyon Unit 1 and at the Cooper Station, respectively.
Although the information was preliminary and sketchy, the problem is a long-standing one for which GE has issued " Service Information Letters" to its BWR customers.
The problems associated with such switches, however, are not restricted to GE customers as evidenced by the Diablo Canyon case.
Furthermore, these switches have a broad range of application.
For example, the defective switches at the Cooper Station were used principally as hand control switches, most of which were located in the control room.
In contrast, those at Diablo Canyon Unit 1 were used as auxiliary contacts on the 4KV and 12KV "Magna Blast" circuit breakers, with three SBM switches used per breaker: (1) a breaker mounted auxiliary switch, (2) a cell mounted auxiliary switch, and (3) a cell interlock switch.
This information is provided as notification of a possibly significant matter that is still under review by the NRC staff.
It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facilities.
No specific action or response is requested at this time.
If you have questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
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ENCLOSURE 2 IE Information Notice No. 80-13 Date:
April 2, 1980 Page 1 of 1 RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES Information Subject Date Issued to Notice No.
Issued 80-02 8X8R Water Rod Lower 1/25/80 All BWR Facilities with End Plug Wear an Operating License (OL) or Construction Permit (CP) 80-03 Main Turbine Electro-1/31/80 All Power Reactor Faci-hydraulic Control System lities with an OL or CP 80-04 BWR Fuel Exposure in Excess 2/4/80 All BWR Facilities with of Limits an OL or CP 80-05 Chloride Contamination of 2/8/80 All Power Reactor Faci-Safety Related Piping and lities with an OL or CP Components and applicants for a CP 80-06 Notification of Signif-2/27/80 All Power Reactor Faci-icant Events lities with an OL and applican; for OL 80-07 Pump Fatigue Cracking 2/29/80 All Powe r Reactor Faci-lities with an OL or CP 80-08 The States Company Sliding 3/7/80 All Powe-Reactor Faci-Link Electrical Terminal lities with an OL or CP Block 80-09 Possible Occupational Health 3/7/80 All Power Reactor Faci-Hazard Associated with Closed lities with an OL or CP Cooling Systems for Operating Power Plants 80-10 Partial Loss of Non-Nuclear 3/7/80 All Power Reactor Faci-Instrument System Power Sup-lities with an OL or CP ply During Operation 80-11 Generic Problems With ASCO 3/14/80 All Power Reactor Facil-Valves in Nuclear Applica-ities with an OL or CP, tions including Fire Pro-Fuel Fabrication and tection Systems Processing Facilities 80-12 Instrument Failure Causes 3/31/80 All Power Reactor Faci-Opening of PORV and Block lities with an OL or CP Valve
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