ML19309D360
| ML19309D360 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 02/22/1980 |
| From: | Boyd D, Feierabend C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309D338 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-282-80-01, 50-282-80-1, 50-306-80-01, 50-306-80-1, NUDOCS 8004100290 | |
| Download: ML19309D360 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000282/1980001
Text
I..O
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-282/80-01; 50-306/80-01
Docket No. 50-282; 50-306
Licensee: Northern States Power Company
414 Nicollet Hall
Minneapolis, MN 55401
Facility Name:
Prairie Island
Inspection At: Red Wing, MN
Inspection Conducted: January 2-31, 1980
h
jet.
Inspector:
C. D. Fei rabend
.2.-22-6o
,,4W,>b
Approved By:
D. C. Boyd,
lef,
i? - 2 7. -do
Projects Section 3 a.
Inspection Summary
Inspection on January 2-31, 1980 (Report No. 50-282/80-01; 50-306/80-01)
Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of operating events, plant
operations, maintenance, security, training, radioactive waste system,
and followup of licenseereported events. The inspection involved 138
inspector-hours by one NRC inspector.
Results: Of the seven areas inspected, no apparent items of noncom-
pliance or deviations were identified in six areas; two apparent items
of noncompliance (infractions - (1) containment spray additive tank
isolated from containment spray system; (2) failure to follow an operat-
ing procedure; Paragraph 2A).
,
I
A
8 004100 2._3D
.
. _ - - _ - - _ -
_ - _ _ - = - . . - -
-
. -
_
.
-.
- _ _ _ .
-
_
-
l
- . .
DETAILS
.
1.
Persunnel Contacted
F. Tierney, Plant Manager
J. Brokaw, Plant Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance
E. Watzl, Plant Superintendent, Plant Engineering and Radiation
Protection
A. Hunstad, Staff Engineer
R. Lindsey, Superintendent, Operations
J. Nelson, Superintendent, Maintenance
,
J. Iloffman, Superintendent, Technical Engineering
D. Hendele, Superintendent, Operations Engineering
G. Miller, Engineer
G. Lenerte, Engineer
D. Schuelke, Superintendent, Radiation Protection
A. Smith, Senior Scheduling Engineer
M. Sellman, Senior Nuclear Engineer
R. Conklin, Supervisor, Security and Plant Services
G. Sundberg, Instrument Engineer
D. Cragoe, Shift Supervisor
G. Edon, Shift Supervisor
M. Balk, Shift Supervisor
i
J. Heath, Shift Supervisor
D. Walker, Shift Supervisor
2.
Operating Events
-
A.
Both Trains of Sodium Hydroxide (Caustic Addition) System Valved
i
out of Service.
On January 6,1980, an operator performing monthly verification
of safeguards system components discovered that both traina of
,
l
the caustic addition (CA) system were isolated from containment
i
spray (CS) suction piping. The operator immediately notified
the shift supervisor and opened the valves to restore the
system to service.
The inspector reviewed the plant procedures, logs and records
for equipment control to verify the documentation of the event.
The inspection discussed the event with plant managem_ent and
supervisors and the individual operators involved.
1)
Sequence of Events
Unit 2 shutdown for refueling began at about 2000, January 2,
1980.
Licensee procedure C1.3 - Unit Shutdown Procedure,
was initiated to control shutdown activities.
2-
l
. . _
, ,
,_
-
,,,
._
- . - - - _ _ ,
_ . . . . . - --
_ -
. _ . . - _ .
. . _ . -
_ - . - -
_.
.- -
-._.
--
-
,
..
4
l
On January 3, at approximately 2300, plant conditions were
i
ready to perform step 37 of procedure C1.3, which provides
}
for removal of the containment spray (CS) and safety injec-
i
tion (SI) systems from service, after the reactor coolant
!
'
system is below 200'F.
Step 37.a places the CS pump switches
'
in the " pullout-stop" position. This step was completed by
j
j
the control operator. Step 37.b requires an operator to
i
remove Safeguards Hold Cards, close and attach Secure cards
!
to caustic addition (CA) isolation valves.
l
j
Secure cards were prepared by the Lead Operator for Unit 2
,
'
for the CA and SI systems, and given to operators for com-
l
!
pleting the steps of closing manual isolation valves and
!
'
j-
positioning breakers for motor operated valves. At this
!
point the first error was committed that contributed to
the occurrence.
The Lead Operator failed to include
the numeral 2 in the valve identification number assigned
+
i
to the Secure Card, indicating that valves CA-1-2 and
]
CA-1-4 should be closed, rather than valves 2CA-1-2 and
,
i
-
'
The licensed operators proceded to complete the valving
operations and tagging, actually closing and tagging
valves CA-1-2 and CA-1-4 in Unit 1.
The operation was
completed at approximately 2330 on January 3.
The operator
y
- .
brought the Safeguards Hold Cards that had been removed
'
from valves CA-1-2 and CA-1-4 to the access control point
'
and called the control room and reported that the secure
cards had been placed.
i
,
_
At about 0600 on January 6,1980 an operator performing a -
,
monthly verification of all Safeguards Hold Cards for Unit
'
I discovered that the valves CA-1-2 and CA-1-4 were closed
,
i
and tagged with Secure Cards. He immediately called the
!
Shift Supervisor and opened the valves. The Safeguards
!
Hold Cards were replaced by 0630, returning the system to.
its proper operating condition.
l
'
2)
Causes
l
Several factors contributed to the sequence of actions
l
that allowed the event to occur.
l
a.
During unit shutdown there is much activity in the
"
control room that needs operator attention and dis-
traction can occur.
b.
Plant procedures are written to be applicable to both
units, with Unit 2 designation consistantly identified
.
-3-
,
b
m,
. - + - , , , _ . . .
-%
, -
-- _
r
.,r_..
.,
, , , , , , , , , ,
. , , _ , , ,
,
,,,,m_
. . . ,
,_ ,__,
,m
__ , ._
- - . . .
_
_ _ _ .
.
-
. _ _ _ . _ __
._
<
..
for each component by brackets ( ),
i.e., CA-1-2
'
(2CA-1-2) would identify that the identification
2CA-1-2 would apply to Unit 2.
Subsequent to the
event the licensee has directed that each procedure
be marked to delete the component identificatiou for
the "other unit" prior to using the procedure,
c.
The operator who made the error in closing and tagging
the manual isolation valves did not realize that he
had turned to the Unit I side of the plant. He did
check the valve numbers on the valves versus the Secure
Cards, (which were incorrect).
The operator's normal
work assignment is in the control room. This could
af fect the operator's ef fectiveness in manual opera-
tion of equipment unless suificient time is spent out
in the plant to maintain proficiency.
d.
Leaving the Safeguards Hold Cards at access control
was not in accordance with the licensee's procedure
SWI-0-3, Safeguards Hold Cards and Component Blocking
or Locking, which requires that the card be returned
to the Shift Supervisor when removed from a component.
The practice of leaving the cards at access control
had existed because of delays in obtaining survey and
clearance from health Physics control to remove them
from the controlled area. Although this did not con-
tribute to the valving error, adherance to the pro-
cedure should have identified the error within the
hour.
3.
Safety Significance
r
Review of the plant systems Final Safety Audit Report and NRR Safety
Evaluation Report (SER) determined that, although the CA system is
a subsystem of the containment spray (CS) system and provides scrubb-
ing actions for containment atmosphere during operation of the CS
system, it does not affect the CS system operability in performance
of its design objectives of reducing containment temperature and
'
pressure. Therefore, there was not a significant affect or hazard
to the public from a postulated loss of coolant accident.
The licensee was immediately aware of the significance of the event
in that an operation had occurred in the operating unit, and the
licensee was concerned that the incorrect valving had not been
immediately identified.
.
4-
..
_ _ _ _ .
_
_
_
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
-_=
_
_
_
..
'
4)
Actions to Prevent Recurrence
Immediately following initial investigation of the occurrence
the licensee took steps to prevent reoccurence. The licensee
is continuing to evaluate the event to determine what additional
actions may be required.
The licensee gave verbal directions, followed by a revision
to the section work instruction SWi-0-10, Use of the Operations
Manual, dated January 8.
The revision requires that for proce-
dures that are applicable to either unit, the valve and numbers
and parameters that are not applicable to the unit on which the
procedure is to be performed shall be designated by drawing a
line through them.
The licensee also gave verbal instructions, followed by a
revision to SWI-0-3, Safeguards lloid Cards and Component
,
'
Blocking or Locking, dated January 7, 1980. The revision
'
requires that installation and removal of Safeguards Hold Tags
j
shall be logged and that Jn removed lock or block and its
a
'
safeguards hold tag shall be delivered to the Shift Supervisor
immediately.
B.
Diesel Generator and Diesel Driven Cooling Water Pump Out
!
I
of Service.
On January 22, No. D2 diesel generator (D2) was operating
at approximately 2500 KW load. When an operator attempted
to adjust load the governor responded to an increase signal
but would not respond to signal to reduce load.
During
attempts to change load D2 tripped off line.
Investigation
found that the governor drive motor end bell had vibrated
i
loose and prevented the governor from responding to load
'
decrease sign =1.
The licensee declared D2 inoperable and began operability
testing of the redundant systems in accordance with Tech-
nical Specification requirements. During operability
i
testing of the No. 21 diesel driven cooling water pump
(cooling water supply for D1 diesel generator) a high
pressure hose from the jacket heater failed, making the
pump inoperable. The licensee immediately began reducing
.
load on Unit I to go to cold shutdown while repairs to D2
l
and the No. 21 diesel cooling water pump were in progress.
After the repairs to D2 were complete and the operability
testing of D2 and the No. 22 diesci cooling water pump
were complete, power reduction was terminated, and the
unit was returned to full power.
.
-5-
.-
.
.
.
-
-.
..
The licensee reported the event to the resident inspector
who observed restarting and a protion of operability
testing of D2 and the No. 22 diesel cooling water pump.
The licensee plans to submit a written report within two
weeks.
3.
plant Operations
The inspector reviewed plant operations including examination of
selected operating logs, special orders, temporary memos, jumper
and tagout logs for the month of January. Tours of the plant in-
cluded walks through the various areas of the plant to observe
operations and activities in progress; to inspect the status of
monitoring instruments, to observe for adherence to radiation
controls and fire protection rules, to check proper alignment of
selected valves and equipment controls, and to review status of
various alarmed annur.ciators with operators.
The inspector performed independent verification of the status of
selected components in the safety injection, residual heat removal
and auxilliary feedwater systems for both units on January 21 and
22.
No decrepancies were identified.
The inspector witnessed a portion of electrical switching operations
on January 5 in preparation for taking the No. 10 transformer out of
service. The operation was performed in accordance with approved
step-by-step procedures, including application and removal of appro-
priate "llold" tags. A change to the procedure was needed to permit
application of a jumper to bypass an interlock. The change was
approved in accordance with the licensee procedures and approved by
a poll of the operations committee before the step was completed.
No discrepancies were observed.
The inspector also reviewed annunciator status, recorder charts,
surveillance records, and logs to verify that plant operations were
maintained in accordance with Technical Specification requirements.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance-
The inspector reviewed several work requests (WR's) and work request
authorizations (WRA's) and verified that all required reviews and
approvals had been completed.
!
-6-
,
L
-
_
-.
- -
_
.- -
- -
..
A.
Repairs to RHR Pump Casing.
Discoveryofa" weep"intheNo.21RHRgympcasingwasde-
.
scribed in a previous inspection report.- the inspector
t
observed preparations and af ter welding and nondestructive
'
testing were completed. An operational hydro test will be
completed prior to restart of the unit.
B.
D2 Emergency Diesel Generator.
The inspector witnessed portions of the repair work in progress
on emergency diesel generator, D2.
Apparent cause of moisture
in the lube oil was failure of tubes in the lube oil cooler.
The tubes were replaced and hydro tested. Other maintenance
completed during the shutdown included replacement of one
cylinder and portions of the exhaust system.
The inspector confirmed that D2 was demonstrated to be operable
and returned to service in accordance with Technical Specifica-
tion requirements.
C.
Steam Generator Tubes
The inspector followed the licensee's program for eddy current
testing, identification of defective tubes, cutting and removing
one tube for destructive testing and explosive plugging defective
tubes.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures for removing
a defective tube and observed work in progress during eddy
<
current examination of several No. 22 steam generator tubes,
observed radiation control of the area and observed shipment
of the tube from the site.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Radioactive Waste
The inspector witnessed final preparations for shipment of the steam
generator tube removed for destructive examination. This included
securing and sealing the shipping container, attachment of the
appropriate radioactive identification labels and loading the cask
onto the exclusive use vehicle.
No items of concern were identified.
1/
IE Report No. 50-282/79-30; 50-306/79-24
l
!
-7-
l
l
_-,-~.,m.m
.
- ~
-
. , . . .-
w
-
.
_
_
_ _ _
_
_
_ _ _
.. .
<
l
6.
Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
.
The inspector reviewed the following LERs submitted by the licensee,
determined that reporting requirements had been met, and determined
that corrective actions were being implemented. (Closed)
a.
P-RO-79-28 Faulty Seismic Installation of CW System Modification
j
The inspector examined samples of similar pipe supports and
restraints being installed in Unit 2 containment during this
outage,
a
No deficiencies were found.
4
!
b.
P-RO-79-30 One Pipe Hanger Found Broken and Two Snubbers Found
Installed Incorrectly.
These items were identified during inspections required by IE
Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14.
This information will be included
in the licensee's reports of the results of the inspections in
accordance with the IEB instructions.
c.
P-RO-79-31 Missed Surveillance Test
I
d.
P-RO-79-32 D2 Diesel Generator Tripped on High Crankcase Pressure.
Repairs are complete (Paragraph 4.B above)
!
e.
P-R0-79-33 11 Turbine Driven Auxilliary Feedwater Pump Steam
Supply Valve Trip
f.
P-RO-79-24 Failure to Perform SI Pump Test SP1088 before leaving
cold shutdown.
7.
Security
The inspector conducted periodic observations of access control,
issuing badges, vehicle inspection, escorting, and communication
checks.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
i
8.
Training
l
1
}
The inspector audited a licensee's training session for new employees
and contractor personnel on January 16.
The training provided a
good orientation for new personnel and for retraining of personnel
<
already assigned.
i
l
l
!
-8-
_
_
_
_
_ .. . . ..
. _... _ _
= . . _ . ._. . ._
.
_ . .
9.
Exit Interviews
-
The inspector attended an exit interviw conducted by RIII inspector
]
W. Key on January 18, 1980.
- The inspector conducted interim interviews and conducted an exit
,
interview with Mr. Watzl at the conclusion of the inspection. The
I
inspector discussed the scope and results of the inspection and
stated that the error in valving that had occuired (Paragraph 2. A
above) was noncompliance with the intent of Technical Specification 3.3.B.1 concerning operability of the caustic addition system and
,
also noncompliance with Technical Specification 6.5.D in that the
approved procedures were not followed during the valving operations.
{
Attachment:
Preliminary Inspection Findings.
-
!
i
i
1
1
,
8
I
i
l
i
I
5
1
$
l
l
!
i
i
!
n
l
,
'
'
- 9 -'
,
,en--
,,<
.y
,w
-
-m-
,
y
,
c.,. . . -
..__,e
-
-
._.. . , , ,
.
a
+w
.