ML19309B753
| ML19309B753 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/29/1980 |
| From: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19309B751 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8004070142 | |
| Download: ML19309B753 (21) | |
Text
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J UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of Docket Nos. 50-295 COMMONWEALTH EDIS0N COMPANY and 50-304 (Zion Station, Unit Nos. I and 2)
CONFIRMATORY ORDER I.
The Commonwealth Edison Conpany (the licensee) is the holder of Operating License Nos. DPR-39 and DPR-48 (the licenses) which authorize operation of the Zion Station, Unit Nos. I and 2 located in Zion, Illinois, at steady state reactor core power levels not in excess of 3250 megawatts thennal (rated power).
II.
Due to the relatively high population density surrounding the Zion site as compared to other nuclear power plant sites, the Zion site is believed to present a disproportionately high contribution to the total societal risk from reactor accidents. The NRC Staff (the Staff) has currently under way two separate efforts to address the potential problens posed by this relatively high population density. One of the efforts involves the development, revision, and review of emergency plans.
This effort is scheduled to be completed by January 1,1981.
The other effort is a review of the Zion facilities to determine what additional procedural measures and/or design changes can and should 9
80104070 M L-
. be imple'nented that will further reduce the probability of a severe reactor accident and/or reduce the consequences of such an accident.
Since design changes that may be decided upon may take one to two years to completely install, the Staff has identified a number of extraordinary interim measures that should be accomplished both by the licensees and the Staff. These measures will s'ignificantly increase the level of safety at the Zion Station and thereby further reduce the probability of a severe reactor accident.
Included among these actions are natters dealing with modes of operations, shift manning levels, enhanced training of operators, and special containment and low pressure interf ace tests designed to add to the level of safety of operation of the facility. All requirements shall be implemented at the time intervals specified in this Order.
The Licensee, in a letter dated February 22, 1980, has agreed to undertake the actions listed in Appendix A to this Order.
It is desirable to confirm the Licensee's connitment by Order.
III.
Accordingly, pursuant to the Atomic Energy'Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR Parts 2 and 50, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, EFFECTIVE IMMEDI ATELY, THAT:
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.~.The licensee perform the actions stated in Appendix A to this Order.
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.The aforementioned actions shall be performed in accordance with
.the schedule set forth in' Appendix A or, in the alternative, the licensee shall place and maintain the effected unit or units in a cold shutdown condition within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> pending completion of those actions.
1 IV.
Any person who has an interest affected by this Order may request a hearing within twenty (20) days of the date of the Order.
Any request for a hearing will not stay the effectiveness of this Order.
Any request for a hearing shall be addressed to Harold R. Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C.
20555.
If a hearing is requested by a person who has an interest affected by this Order, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and place of any such hearing.
In -light of the licensee's expressed willingness to undertake the actions ordered, if a hearing is held concerning this Order, the issue to be considered at the hearing shall be:
Whether the licensee should perform the actions in Appendix A to this Order in accordance with the schedule stated therein.
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. Operation of Unit Nos. I and 2 on terms consistent with this Order is not stayed by the pendency of any proceedings on the Order.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Effective Date: February 29, 1980 Bethesda, Maryland 1
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a APPENDIX A A.
The licensee shall:
1.
Maintain reactor power level as necessary such that calculated fuel peak clad temperature does not exceed 2050*F under large break LOCA conditions per the 10 CFR 50 Appendix K analysis submitted on October 22, 1979.
2.
Revise' plant operating procedures as necessary to require a base load mode type of operation only, without load following except for power reductions required to maintain system load for grid stability, required for maintenance (e.g., containment entry, main feed pump repairs, etc.) or as required by Technical Specifications.
3.
Conduct a low pressure gross leak test of containment prior to any start up from cold shutdown conditions as indicated in Annex 1.
If other means can be ~found to verify containment integrity, the licensee may propose such proceduren to the Commission for its review and approval.
- 4.. Maintain at least two senior reactor operators (SR0s), one of whom may be the shift supervisor, in the control room at all times during power operations or hot shutdown, except that the shif t supervisor shall be allowed to leave the innediate vicinity of the control room as duties may require, provided he is available to respond to an emergency by returning to the control room within ten minutes.
The shift or watch supervisor's office is considered part of the control room.
5.
Conduct testing to assure that the LPI/RHR check valves are in fact installed correctly and functioning as pressure isolation barriers when the plant is at pressure and producing power.
Verification of valve operability shall be performed prior to plant restart if shutdown at the time of issuance of the Order and thereafter whenever RCS pressure has decreased to within 100 psig of RHR system design pressure.
6.
Submit not later than March 1,1980 the results of a review of possible permanent plant modifications and procedures. to further reduce j
the potential of a severe reactor accident and resultant radiation j
releases.
7.
Require that all reactor operators and senior reactor operators conduct simulator training and in-plant walk-through of the following emergency procedures. Due to the licensee's large operating staff the
. in-plant walk-throughs shall be completed prior to the next reactor startup following issuance of the Order, or within sixty days of the date of issuance, whichever occurs first. Those reactor operators and senior reactor operators idio have not received simulator training within the past four months on these items shall be given such simulator training within 90 days of the date of the Order:
a.
Plant or reactor startups.to ' include a range wherein reactivity feedback from nuclear heat addition is noticeable and heat up rate is established b.
Manual control of steam generator level and/or feedwater during startup and shutdown c.
Any significant (10%) power change using manual rod control d.
Loss of Coolant (i) including significant PWR steam generator leaks (ii) inside and outside containment (iii) large and small, including leak rate determination (iv) saturated reactor coolant response (PWR) e.
Loss of core coolant flow / natural circulation f.
Loss of all feedwater (normal and emergency) 9 Station blackout h.
Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) 1.
Stuck open relief valve on secondary side j.
Intersystem LOCA B.
The licensee shall implement the following measures within 30 days of the date of the Order:
1.
A vendor representative will be stationed on site for engineering con-sultation at Zion _ Unit 1 and Unit 2 on plant operations and maintenance to increase plant safety.
The representative shall be from the NSSS vendor, architect / engineering or start up engineering finn.
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- 2. 'To ensure control room habitability under accident conditions, the
. licensee shall reexamine ventilation intakes, location of potential plant leakage (ingress and egress), and control room filter capabilities, and submit the results of this review to the NRC.
3.
Emergency action levels shall be revised to require notification of the NRC for all events in the emergency classes described in NUREG-0610. September 1979.
The licensee shall comply with 'he NRC's " INTERIM POSITION FOR CON-t 4.
TAINMENT PURGE AND VENT VALVE OPERATION PENDING RESOLUTION OF
. ISOLATION VALVE OPERABILITY", as contained in the October 1979 letter to the -licensee. The licensee committed to this position in its December 14, 1979 letter to the NRC.
5.
Plant personnel shall be trained or retrained in the following areas, within thirty days, or prior to startup if required by the Lessons Learned implementation schedule.. Plant personnel shall also be re-trained in the following areas within thirty days of.the time that there are significant changes to the procedures or requirements.
applicable to these areas:
Containment and Degraded Core Sampling Degraded Core - Training Emergency Power for Pressurizer Heaters. and Decay Heat Removal Containment Isolation Containnent Purge / Purge Valve Operation Subcooling Meter Operation Technical Support Center Onsite Operational Support Center Near-Site Emergency Operations Center Emergency Preparedness Plan In-Plant Area Airborne Radioiodine Monitors 6.
The licensee shall perform diesel generator testing in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.108 with a corresponding change in the allowable outage time stipulated in the Limiting Conditions of Operation as follows:
Numbers of DG Failures Test Interval (Days)
Allowable In Prior 100 Tests
( R.G. 1.108)
Outage Time 0 or 1 30 As Is 2
14 As Is 3
7 As Is 4
3 32 hr.
5 3
8 hr.
6 or more 3
None*
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- Plant must achieve hot ' shutdown with 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following-30 hours. -
. 7.
Requirements -regarding reactor operator qualifications shall be revised to incorporate the following for applications submitted after June 1,1980 except for training classes in session at time of issuance of this Order:
- a. - The following experience shall be required-for senior operator applicants:
Applicants for senior operator licensee shall have.4 years _of responsible power plant experience. Responsible power plant experience shall be that obtained as a control room operator (fossil or nuclear), field operator (nuclear) or as a power plant staff engineer involved in the day-to-day activities of the facility, commencing with the final year of construction.
A maximum of two years' power plant experience may be fulfilled by academic or related technical training, on a one-for-one time basis.
Two years shall be nuclear power plant experience. At least six months of the nuclear power plant experience shall be at the plant for which the applicant seeks a license.
b.
The hot training programs shall be modified so that the training concdntrates on the responsibilities and functions of the operator, rather than the senior operator. All individuals who satisfactorily conplete.this hot training program will be allowed to apply for an operator license. At least three months experience as a licensed operator is necessary before applying for a senior operator license.
c.
The three month continuous on-the-job training for hot operator applicants shall be as an extra person on shift in the control room. The hot senior operator applicants will have three months continuous on-the-job training as an extra person on shift in training.
d.
In addition to the presently approved training prograns, all replacement applicants shall participate in simulator training p rograms.
e.
Training center and facility instructors who teach systems, Lintegrated response, and transient and simulator courses shall demonstrate their competence to the NRC by successful completion of an SR0 written examination.
Instructors shall be enrolled in appropriate requalification programs to assure that they are cognizant of current operating history, problems and changes to procedures and administrative limitations.
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8.
Requirements regarding reactor operator qualifications shall be revised such that all. operator licensees shall participate in periodic retraining and recertification on a full scope simulator representative of Zion Units 1 and 2.. The frequency of training will be on an annual basis..
LC. Within 60 days of the date of the' Order, the licensee shall:
l.. Review the steady state steam generator operating level to determine the optimum steady state level for the purpose of maximizing dryout time with due consideration for overfilling.
The results of this study shall be provided to the NRC.
-2.
Evaluate possible co-impregnation of the charcoal in the plant's air effluent filtration systens with KI and I2 and an amine such as TEDA (triethylene-diamine) to improve.the iodine removal capabili-ty of these systens.
The results of this review shall be submitted to the NRC.
3.
Evaluate effects on plant systems stability if power is reduced as much as 50%, treating power as a parameter.
(For example,- the effects ~on the feedwater flow automatic control).
- 4. ' Submit a schedule to implement the ATWS instrument modification justified in accordance with the Westinghouse analytical results contained in the letter from T. N. Anderson to S. H. Hanauer in NS-TMA-2182 dated December 30, 1979.
5.
Establish an on-site group whose function shall be to examine plant operating characteristics, NRC bulletins, Licensing Information Service advisories and other appropriate sources which may indicate areas.for improving plant safety.
Where useful improvements can be achieved, the group shall also develop and report detailed
. recommendations for revised procedures, equipment modifications or other improvements to offsite management.
D.
The following measures shall be implemented within 90 days of the date of the Order:
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I 4 l' The licensee shall establish the on-site emergency preparedness manning levels on each shift as contained in Table'1 attached to this. Appendi x.
- 2. 'The licensee shall establish' a temporary on-site inter-disciplinary review-group consisting of, as a minimum, representatives from the NSSS vendor, the architect-engineer and the plant maintenance and operations' staffs..This group shall review and concur in all existing plant emergency procedures. This group shall also review and concur in changes to emergency procedures.
Emergency changes may be approved in accordance with current licensee requirements, but shall be sub-sequently submitted for approval by the review ' group.
E.
The following measures shall be completed within 120 days of the date of the Order:
1.
The licensee shall examine key plant system vulnerability areas and possible operator dependent areas with the intent of maximizing the reliability in the subject areas.
Specifically, the licensee shall:
Verify that the sump for ESF recirculation is free of debris a.
and determine if flow test verification was initially performed.
If not performed, explore means to verify. Review existing procedures and training on recirculation alignment and RWST refill.
b.
Review administrative check and verification procedures for assuring that the two single failure points (manual) valves in AFWS supply line are in the correct position.
Impose an administrative order requiring expeditious sh tdown c.
whenever an independent train of the auxiliary feedv er system e
and any one of the following are inoperable:
All
.xup sources of offsite power, one of the two diesel generators supplying power to the other independent train or either of the other trains of the auxiliary feedwater system.
.d.
Develop station blackout procedures addressing:
i.-
grid dispatcher actions ii.
reactor operator actions iii.
diesel generator repairs Assure that DC-powered lighting is available at the steam-turbine e.
driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
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f.
Review causes for, and procedures.and operator training required to diminish, the'overall number of reactor and main feedwater trips.
g.
Develop or review procedures to restore main feedwater progtly after a trip and.to mitigate the consequences of an ATWS event (e.g. emergency boration and CVCS control).
h.
Review administrative controls on the manual valve (s) whose misalignment could fail all ECCS.
- 2.. A review of control room emergency procedures shall be conducted for
~ the purpose of improving these procedures from a human factors engineering standpoint.
Improvements which can be attained by modifying procedures shall be implemented within the 120 days. Control room displays shall also be reviewed for.the purpee of _ identifying improvements which will increase the operators' ability to assess plant conditions.
A report will be submitted to the NRC to eascribe the igrovements recomended and the schedule for their implementation.
F.
Within six months of date of the Order, the licensee shall:
1.
Conduct "a review of past Licensee Event Reports (LERs) at Zion Units 1 and 2.
These LERs shall be reviewed to identify
' design inadequacies (comon mode failures, systems interactions,-
etc.), procedural and training inadequacies, and man-machine / human factor inadequacies. Recommendations shall be submitted for correc-tion of the base cause of the subject LERs.
Immediate. corrections of deficiencies will be made when possible, with the required noti-fications to be made to the NRC.
2.
Meet meteorological acceptance criteria for emergency preparedness contained in Annex 2 to this Appendix, pending necessary equipment deliveries and installation (including computer hardware and software mcdificatioris). During the interim period while modifications are being completed, real time forecasting will be available and provided by a consultant.
3.
Conduct a study to determine and document the method by which its plants comply with current safety rules and regulations, in particular those contained in 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50, 4.
Evaluate the reliability and failure modes of selected systems /com-
.ponents as follows:
8-a.
Failure-Mode Effects Analysis: Examine the Jfailure modes (random failures and consequences of outages in support systems) of the-active components on the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
Assess the acceptability of these failure modes.
- b.. Implement Failure Mode Effects Analysis for minor departures '
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from operating, maintenance and emergency procedures.
c.
Explore ways to improve the reliability of those components with a particularly high failure rate as delineated in NUREG/CR-1205.
5.
Attain ' full compliance with NRC letters concerning AFWS reliability improvements.
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Annex 1 Commonwealth Edison shall ensure that there is no gross containment leakage arior to any startup from cold shutdown conditions by performing.the following actions:
1.
Ensure-that containment penetration and weld channel pressurization system leakage is within Technical Specification limits.
The function of. the containment penetration and weld channel press-urization system is to prevent leakage of containnent air through penetrations and liner walls under all conditions by supplying air above the containment post accident design pressure to the positive pressure zones incorporated in the penetration and weld channel design.
The system also provides a means of continuously monitoring the-leakage status of the containment.
The containment purge valves and airlock door seals are included in this system.
2.
Perform local leak tests or containment isolation valves not included in the following categories:
Those valves continuously pressurized and monitored for leakage a.
by the penetration pressurization system.
b.
Those valves which, under post-accident containment isolation conditions, are expected to be maintained continually at a pressure equal to or greater than the containment post-accident This includes valves under isolation valve seal water pressure.
and those in systems required for post-accident service if such systens operate at pressure above containment post-accident pressure.
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Table 1
. STAFFING REQUIREMENTS CEC 0/ ZION STATION FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCIES Unit (s).
. Additional Position Title Operating Within Majnr' Functional Area Major Tasks or Expertise 1 or 2 l' & 2
.One Hour
Plant Operations. and ' Assessment. of Shift Supervisor (SRO) 1 I
Op rational Aspects Shift Foreman (SRO) 12-12
-Control Room Operators
.26 36 Equipment Operator /
Attendant 3
4 Em.ergency: Direction and Control Designated Sr. Official 12 12-
. (Emergency Coordinator)
Shif t Supervisor or-Designated Facility 4
Manager
, Notification / Communication 6.-fy 1icensee, notify 12 12 1
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state local and Federal 15 personnel & maintain l
communication
' Radiological Accident Assessment Command Center (CC).
15 and Support of Operational Director Senior Manager Accident Assessment 3 CC Offsite Dose Senior Health Physics
'15
' Assessment (HP) Expertise 42 Offsite Surveys 22 Onsite (out-of-plant)
In-plant surveys Chem /Radchem Sampling Rad / Chem Technicians 2
2 3
Radiochemistry Analysis Chemist 1
Plant System Engineering,' Repair Technical Support Shift Technical Advisor 12J 12y 1
?
and Corrective Actions Core Electrical 1-Mechanical-1.
Repair and Corrective Mechanical Maintenance /
Actions Rad Waste Operators 12 12 2
Electrical Maintenance /
Instrument and Control 4
(I&C) Technician' 12 12 2
cTablell[(Cdntinued) z.-
Unit (s).
Additional.
Position Title Operating Within-
' Maj'r Functional Area Major Tasks or Expertise:
1 or 2 1 & 2 One Hour 4~
'Pr5tectivei ctions (In-Plant)'
. Radiation Protection:
Rad / Chem Technicians 22 22 4.
A a.
Access Control-b.
HCT Coverage for repair & corrective actions c.
Personnel Monitoring d.
Dosimetry Fire Brigade Local Firefighting per Technical Support Specifications 22 22 Local R;scue Operations and First Aid Support Site Access Control and Security, firefighting Security Personnel All per P;rsonnel Accountability communications, personnel Security Plan accountability.
Total 10 13
'25 -
a tiinimumi 9
12
, Notes:
1 The minimum number refers only for the case of shift shortage, caused by a sudden sickness or home emergency.
2 May.be provided by shift personnel assigned other functions.
3 Overall-direction.of facility response to be assumed by Command Center director when all: centers are fully?
'mannal.
Director of minute-to-minute facility operations remains with senior manager in onsite technical support center or control room.
During the weekdays, management, technical support, health physics, chemist, and maintenance personnel are 4
available on-site.
5 Command Center function.
6 0ne of the control room operators may be provided by the other Zion unit or the center desk.
For'a multi-unit site this function may be filled by a Shift Supervisor or Foreman, provided all other qualification 7
requirements are met.
1
Annex 2 0
METEOROLOGICALCRITkRIAFORENERGENCY'PREPAREONESS AT OPERATING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 1.
Primary Meteorological Measurements Program a.
Position: All sites with operating nuclear power plants shall have an adequate operational meteorological measurements program to produce real-time and record historical local meteorological data.
b.
Puroese: To allow a detemination of the dispersion of radio-i active material due to accidental and routine radioactive ---
releases to the atmosphere by the plant.
c.
Acceptance Criteria:
(1) The meteorological measurements program snall include measurements and calculations of the following parameters:
(a) Wind direction and speed at a minimum of two levels (see Regulatory Guide 1.23) one of which is representative of the 10-meter level:
(b) Standard deviation of wind direction fluctuations (sityna theta) at all measured levels; (c) Ver.ical temperature difference for at least one layer; (d) knoient temperature (10 meters);
(e) Dew point temoerature (10 meters);
-(f) Precipitation near ground level; and I'
(g) Pasouill stability class used for diffusion estimates.
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(2) The remaining acceptance criteria stated in Revision 1, Section 2.3.3 of NUREG-75/087, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, apply.
(3) A quality assurance program shall be established consistent with the appitcable provisions of Appendix 8 to 10 CFR Part 50. The acceptance criteria stated in Revision 1.
Section 17.2 of NUREG-75/087 apply.
(4) The meteorological measurements system and associated controlled environment housing for the equipment shall be connected to a power system which is supplied from redundant power sources.
2.
Backup Meteorological Measurements Program a.
Position: All sites with operating nuclear power plants shall i
J have a viable backuo system and/or procedures to obtain resl-time local meteorological dita.
b.
Purpose:
To provide meteorological information wnen the primary system is out of service, thus providing assurance that basic meteorological information is available during and innediatel f following an accidental airborne radioactivity release.
c.
Acceptance Criteria:
( *. ) An indecencent system ind/or procedures shall de established for obtaining measurements of wind direct:cn anc soeed reortsentative of the 13-meter level and 3 seven category (A-G) estimator of atmospheric stability ' '6 ~, wind fluctuations, etc. ).
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NOTE: An independent system is defined as a system installed and maintained by the licensee specifically for the surpose of providing redundant site-specific meteorological information.
An independent procedure is defined as a procedure whereby meteorological information can be obtained from an existing well-eaintained meteorciogical installation capable of providing information representative of the site environs.
(2) The systems and/or procedures shall provide information representative of the site environs, and should include data f rom multiple locations when necessary.
(3) The system and/or procedure shall provide information in a real-time mode in the event necessary parameters from the primary system are not avafiable. Changeover, from the primary system to the backup system shall occur within five minutes.
This information should be presented in place of the lost record as outlined in Enclosure 1.
(a) The remaining acceptance criteria stated in Revision 1, Section 2.3.3, of NUREG-75/087, acoly.
(5) A quality assurance program shall be established consistent with the appif cable provisions of Appendix S to 10 CFR Part 50.
The acceptance criteria stated in Revision 1, Section 17.2 of NUREG-75/087, apply.
(6) The meteorological measurements and associated controlled environmental housing system for the ecuipment shall be connected to a power system which is supplied from redundant power sources.
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3.
Real-time Predictions of Atmospheric Effluent Transport and Diffusion a.
Position: All licensees with operating nuclear power plants shall have a demonstrated system for making real-time, site specific, estimates and predictions of atmospheric effluent transport and diffusion during and immediately following an accidental airborne radioactivity release from the nuclear power plant.
b.
Puroose: To provide an input to the assessment of the consequences of accidental radioactive releases to the atmosphere. To aid in the implementation of emergency preparedness decisions.
c.
Acceota.nce Criteria:
(1) Real-time, site specific atmospheric transport and diffusion models shall be developed and used wnen accidental airborne radioactive releases occur. Two classes of models should be developed; Class A - a model and calculational capability which can produce initial transport and diffusion estimates within fifteen minutes following classification of an incident, and Class B - a model and calculational capability which can produce refined estimates for thw duration of the release.
The models shall incorporate the following features:
(a) Site area topography, local meteorological anomaltes (as at coastal locations) and available local meteorologi-cal me'asurements; (b) Variations in time and space of the parameters affecting transport and diffusion, including forecasts of chang:ng meteorological conditions, for model Class 3 enly; 24
(c) Inforination from all local meteorological measuring systees used in making the transport and diffusion esti-mates shall be identified. The licensee shall make arrangements to transmit data from these systems at 30-minute intervals duf ng an incident.
(2) The transport and diffusion es,timates shall include current and forecast plume position, dimensions and radioactivity concentrations at 30-minute intervals as a minimum. Forecast capability up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in the future is required in three-hour increments. Such estimates shall be included as a portion of the information accessible for remote interrogation.
(3) A determination shall be made of the accuracy and conservatism of the models in estimating atmospheric transport and diffusion to distances out to 80 km (50 miles).
4.
Remote Interrogation of the Atmospheric Measurement and Prediction Systems a.
Position: All systems producing meteorological data and effiuent transport and diffusion estimates at sites with operating nuclear power plants shall have the capability of being remotely interrogated.
b.
Puroose: To provide simultaneous real-time meteorological data and transport and diffusion estimates in the site vicinity to the Itcensee, emergency response organizations and the NRC staff, on demand, curing emergency situations.
c.
Acceotance Criterda:
(1) The meteorological system shall have *he capability of Deing l
remotely interrogated simultaneously by the licensee, emergency reponse organization and the NRC.
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J (2) The meteorological data and effluent transport and diffusion estimates shall be in the format indicated in Enclosure 1.
(3) The systems shall have a dial-up connection for a 300 8AUD ' '
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ASCII teminal of 80 columns via' telephone lines (e.g., output format of RS232C in FSX) and a functional back-up consnunica-t %ns link (e.g., radio or satellite).
(4) The system shall have the capability of recalling 15-minute averages of meteorological parameters from at least the previous 12-hour period.
(5) The resolution-of-the data-sham-aeet -the-system specifica-tions of accuracy given in Section C.4 of Regulatory Guide 1.23.
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