ML19309A045

Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Lack of Subcompartment Pressure Analysis,Cold Leg Break at Pump Suction Analysis Considering Stored Energy in Steam Generator & Hydrogen Purge Sys.Initial FSAR Filing Deficient in These Areas

ML19309A045
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	04/20/1973
From:	Tedesco R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:	Deyoung R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
NUDOCS 8003240879
Download: ML19309A045 (6)

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APR 2 01973 Docket No. 50-302

2. C. DeYoung, Assistant Director for Pressurized Water Reactors, L REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CRYSTAL RIVER, UNIT 3 Plant Name: Crystal River, Unit 3 Licensing Stage: OL Docket No. 50-302 Responsible Branch & Project Manager: FWR #4: 3. Buckley Requested Completion Date: May IS, 1973 Applicant's Response Date: June 18, 1973 Descripcica of Respense:

Request for Additional Informatica Review Status: Avaiting Infernation The enclosed request for additional infor=ation. for the Crystal River, Unit 3, operating licenan review has been prepared by the Centainment Systems Branch after having reviewed the applicable portions of the FSAR.

The l'3AR was deficient in a number of i::portant areas.

A neering vas held cith the applicant cc April 4, 1973, to discuss the significant e-resolved arcae. Questions covering the mjer nrana have been prepare:! in advar.ec of the May 13. 1973, target date for the accend round of queetions to allev additional tine for the applicant to addrens these areas.

The question arens, as raflected by the enclosure, include the lack of subconpart:::..ut pressure analysis, analysis of a cold leg break at the pusp suction considering stored enersy in the etcan generator, and information regarding the hydrogen purge system.

We are continuing our review in the areas of contaixnent isolation systems, steam generator and feedwater line failures, and the remeter building spray systems. This final portion of the review will be completed by the,May 18 target'date.

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. REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

CRYSTAL RIVER, UNIT 3 DOCKET NO. 50-302

.5.1 -Discuss how the instrument lines penetrating the primary reactor. containment conform to regulatory position E2 of the supplement to Safety Guide 11.

5.2 Discuss the need for continuous =onitoring of the containment atmosphere for hydrogen during normal plant operation.

Hydrogen may be released from the reactor coolant system due to small leakage.

6.1 erovice a 'oreakdown or tne static elevation head, the friction head loss in the suction piping, the vapor pressure of the fluid and the reactor building pressure, in feet of water, utilized in the post-accident NpSH calculations reported in Table 6-llA for the reactor building spray system pumps.

In addition, provide the sump temperature that was utilized in the vapor pressure determination and discuss the relationship of this sump temperature to the sump temperature provided in Figure 14-61, the time building spray is initiated and the time suction is switched from the barated water storage tank to the reactor building su=p.

6.2. Determine the reduction in available building pressure utill:ed in the'NPSH calculation of Table 6-llA considering =aximu=

containment safeguards (e.g. 3 air cooler and 2 spray systems).

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2-14.1 For the evaluation of-containment response following a design basis LOCA, it'is not apparent that the internal vent ' valves will preclude steam venting through the steam generators for a cold leg, pump suction break. We will need the'results of your reactor building pressure transient analyses for a

-spectrum of cold leg breaks.

Include the effect of post--

blowdown energy sources, such as core stored energy and decay heat, primary system metal stored energy, and steam generator stored energy.

The analyses should be extended through the initial blowdown, reflood, and post-reflood phases of the postulated accidents.

14.2 Previde a dctailed descripilon of the core reflood codel that is used following primary coolant system blowdown, include the asstmr-ions used to develop the model, e.g.,

the hydraulic codeling of the primary coolant system, the -'sistances of components (primary coolant pump, steam generator, piping, reactor cor, and internal vent valves), the method to co=pute boiloff of the reflooding water and energy sources (core stored energy, decay heat, thick and thin metal stored energy, and steam generator stored energy.

14.3 For a cold leg break resulting in the highest' calculated containment pressure, provide data in the form of tables of mass release rate to the containment and enthalpy of the mass released throughout the blowdown and reflood phases of the accident. -Inch de a graph of core inlet velocity as a function

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of.. time for'the reflood phase of th'e accident.

14.4 The.FSAR indicates that the 8.5 ft hot leg' break results in

. the highest reactor building pressure..The analyses for a spectrum of hot leg breaks should be' reanalyzed utilizing applicable methods and assumptions used in the cold leg break.

14.5 Provide a description of the analytical methods, computer programs and general parameters' utilized in the hot leg rupture analyses if they differ from that presented in the FSAR.

14.6 For a hot-leg break resulting in-the nighest calculated containment pressure, provide tables of mass release rate to the containment and onthalpy of the = ass released as functions of time through-i out the blowdown and reflood phases of the accident.

14.7 If the-heat sink film coefficients given in Table 14-40 of the FSAR'are utilized in the reanalysis of the contain=ent pressure, then provide justification for the condensing film coefficients from the Reactor-Building atmosphere to the steel heat sinks and for heat transfer to unpainted. concrete surfaces.

14.8 Analyze'the reactor cavity and the steam generator compartments for the pressure response considering a homogeneous steam-water-air mixture with appropriate correlations for sonic flow through

.the vents.

A vent discharge coefficient of 0.5 should be used, and reactor blowdown calculations should assu=e a discharge A range of break siz's should be considered coefficient of.1.0.

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14.9 : Describe:the analytical model,_ including assu=ptions and appropriate bases, used inLealculating the subcompartment-pressure. response.

'14.10 Provide a flow diagram showing the free volu=e and.the vent area of all_subcompartments and compartment subdivisions, and the flow interconnections considered in the subcompartment pressure analysis.

In addition, provide justification for the selection of the subdivisions of each compartment.

14.11 Provide the mass and energy blowdown rates as functions of time and. location used in each subcompartment analysis.

14.12 Discuss the results of analyses used to justify that the uteak locaulvas selected cesult in the highest calculated

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subcompartment pressures.

Include a description of the correlations us>d for deternining subcooled blowdown rates.

14.13 Provide the =ethod and results of analysis of tha jet forces which can impinge on the reactor cavity and steam generator structures.

14.14 Discuss how the reactor coolant system blowdown analyses for the loss-of-coolant accidents were modified to assure a conservative calculation of the mass and energy releases to the containment for the containment and subcompartment pressure transient analyses (e.g. =axi=um emergency core cooling should be assumed and =aximum cladding surface fi1= coefficients should be utilized).

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5-14.15. Provide the continuous purging rate and duration utilizedLin

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arriving at lthe whole body 'and thyroid. dose calcuations in the FSAR Table 14B-2.1 for the MHA Safety Guide 7 case.

14.16 Figure'14B-5.8 of the FSAR indicates that an air compressor will be rented in the event that purging is necessary.

Provide justification as to the availability and capacity of the required air compressor.

14.17 The installed equipment and piping of the combustible gas control system should-be designed to Class I seismic requrements, quality Group B standards and should provide necessary capacity considering a single active failure.

Identify and justify any deviations from these requirements.

14.18 Describe the provisions made to ensure mixing of hydrogen with the containment subcompartments.

Consider the long-ters (i.e. several days following the rupture) evolution of hydrogen resulting from radiolysis in the core.

Show that sufficient mixing sculd occur within each compartment to preclude high local concentrations of hydrogen in excess of the recommended limits specified.in Safety Guide 7.

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