ML19308E257
| ML19308E257 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 04/03/1978 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19308E253 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-07763, TAC-7763, NUDOCS 8003240805 | |
| Download: ML19308E257 (3) | |
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 14 TO LICENSE NO. DPR-72 FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, ET AL CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT DOCKET N0. 50-302 Introduction By letter dated November 8,1977, and December 14, 1977, Florida Power Corporation (FPC) proposed changes to the Crystal River Unit No. 3 (CR-3) Technical Specifications.
The proposed changes would (1) revise reactor internals vent valve surveillance requirements and (2) indicate a plant staff reorganization.
Evaluation 1.
By letter dated November 8,1977, FPC proposed a change to the surveillance testing of reactor internals vent valves to better define the force needed to fully open the internals vent valves and to delete the require.nent to measure the opening force of the valves.
The present Technical Specification requires manual actuation of the vent valves to verify that the valve begins to open from the fully closed position with a force equivalent to 515 psid and is fully open with a force equivalent to 130 psid.
The proposed change would requira the vent valves to be open at the force equivalent to 1.0 psid.
FPC has shown that this change increases the calculated peak cladding temperature (PCT) during the limiting Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) by less than 3 F.
This is not con-sidered a significant increase and does not cause the limiting LOCA PCT to exceed any of the 10 CFR 50.46 criteria, nor does this change affect which LOCA break is limiting.
FPC's analyses, presented as justification for this proposed change, have been reviewed by the staff and found to be acceptable.
Based on this information ar.d the continued surveillance requirements on the reactor internals vent valves, I
we find this change to be acceptable.
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. FPC also proposed to extend the surveillance interval for these vent valves from 18 to 24 months. Inis would allow this surveillance to be performed at the first refueling outage currently scheduled to begin no earlier than November 1978.
Since the head must be removed from the reactor vessel for this surveillance, it is the intent of the Technical Specifications to require that the surveillance be performed during' refueling outages which nomally, followinc the first, are less than 18 months apart. We, therefore, agree that a 24-month surveillance interval (plus the 25", allowed by Technical Specification 4.0.2) is appropriate to allow performance during the first refueling outage.
However, the 18 month interval in the Technical Specifications should remain applicable to subsequent refueling outages.
After discussions with the staff, FPC has, therefore, agreed that it will be sufficient to add a footnote to Technical Specification 4.4.10.1.b allowing the first surveillance interval to be 24 months.
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management level between the Compliance Engineer and the Plant Manager and between the Chemical / Radiation Protection Engineer and the Plant Manager. This change is not contrary to established NRC colicy.
However, the statement made by FPC in their submittal, that the Compliance Engineer has direct access to the Nuclear Plant Manager on "any pr6blems",
should be shown on Figure 6.2-2 by a dotted line (plus a footnote describing its meaning) from the Compliance Engineer to the Plant Manager.
This has been discussed with FPC and they have agreed to this modifica-tion.
In addition, FPC indicated that they do not consider the compliance function a formal part of the Quality Assurance (QA) program.
The Compliance Engineer does have Quality Assurance / Quality Control functions as described in Section 1.7.6.7.2 of the current QA program.
This has been discussed with FPC and they agree that the Compliance Engineer does have a formal role in the existing QA Program.
The licensee has also proposed that the Technical Specifications be altered to reflect changed position titles.
We have reviewed these changes and conclude that the plant staff organization arrangement maintains acceptable lines of authority, includes the necessary areas of expertise, and is acceptable.
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The list of members of the Plant Review ' Committee (PRC) would also be changed to reflect the proposed changes in the plant staff organization.
We find that the PRC will continue to be composed of persons repre-senting the various disciplines required for effective review of plant operations. This change is also consistent with the Standard Technical Specifications in this area.
We have concluded, therefore, that this change is acceptable.
FPC has been requested to amend Section 1.7 of the Final Safety Analysis Report to modify the QA program description to be consistent with the changes made to the plant staff organization.
Environmental Consideration We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact.
Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated:
April 3,1978
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