ML19308C558
| ML19308C558 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/07/1979 |
| From: | Mallay J, Rockwell W BABCOCK & WILCOX CO., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001280587 | |
| Download: ML19308C558 (76) | |
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-==~-~~~~~---~~~~~~~~-~~~~x PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND x
3EPOS* TION of BABCOCK & ~4:LCOX by JAMES FRANCIS MALLAY, held at the offices of 3abcock & Wilcox, Old Forest Road, Lynchburg, Virginia 24505, on the 7th day of July, 1979, comunencing at 8: 15 a.m.,
before Stanley Rudharg, Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public of the State of New York.
[
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BENJAMLN REPORTING SERVICE CERTFtED SHORTHAND REPCR'ERS FIVE BEEKM.LN STREET
.vEw Yons..NEw YORK 10038 (2121 374 1138 8001280 l
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2 F O_ R _ _S A_ B_ C _C C_ K_ _& _.~4_C L C _O X_ :
aa 4
MORGAN, LEWIS & SOCK!US, ESQS.
Attorneys for Babcock & Uilcox 5
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, 0.0.
20038 BY:
GECRGE L.
EDGAR, ESQ.
of Counsel t
S 9
E2R,gE},ggggj((fgy:
10 WINTEROP A.
ROCKWELL, ESQ.
Associate Chief Counsel 11 12 U
AL_ S_ C _ P _R_E S EN_ T_ :
14 RONALD M.
ZYTCHISCN 15 16 17 oao 18 19 3) 21 24 25 E ENJAMIN R EPORTING EENCE L
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h e
1 n
3 3
(Resu== of Ja=es Francis Mallay was 4
marked Mallay Deposition Exhibit 107 for identifi=ation, this date.)
0 JAMES F RA NC : S MA LLA Y, having O
been duly sworn by Winthrop A.
Rockwell, Esq.,
t was called as a witness and testified as follows:
8 DIRECT EXAMINATION 9
BY MR. ROCKwELL:
10 Q
would you state your full name?
11 A
James Francis Mallay.
12 Q
Would you state your current e=ployer7 A
My current employer is sabcock & Wilcox in g
Lyncyburg, Virginia.
Q What is your current business address?
la, A
Box 1260, Lynchburg, Virginia.
16 Q
And your current position with 3abcock &
17 wilcox?
18 A
Program manager, 3BR.
19 Q
Mr. Mallay, you were manager of Licensing 00 for asw from 1971 t,hrough April of 1975, is that 61 correct?
A That is correct.
Q And that is included on your restes which 1
you brought wich you here today, and which it,aresently I
04
(
before you, marked as Mallay Deposition Exhibit No. 107, I
3 BEN ! AMIN R EPORTING S ERVICE t
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Mallay 4
is that co rect?
3 A
That is correct.
Q Did you prepare this resume?
a A
Yes, I did.
6 Q
- s it accurate and complete to the best 7
of your knowledge?
O A
To the best of my knowledge, it is accurate and 9
complete.
10 Q
At the time you were manager of Licensing, 11 Mr. Mallay, is it t the best of your understanding or was is to the best of your understanding organized generally along the lines that the department or section.of Licensing are organi=ed now?
. 14 A
Yes, the organi=ation then and now was very 15 similar.
16 there a Q
During that period of time
- 17 procedure within the Licensing Department for the Hl handling of safety questions?
l l
19 A
There was an understanding at that time as to 1
how licensing questions were to be handled.
I do not gg recall a specific' approved written procedure.
Q My question was directed to safety ques-v tions, not licensing questions.
Did you intend it 23 MR. EDGAR:
You mean safety concerns?
"4 MR. ROCIWE*L:
Safety concerns, yes.
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25 S ENJAMIN R EFCRTING SERVICE b
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2 Mallay 5
3 A
Yes, : interpreted the question to be both safety 4
and licensing questions.
I interpret that to be safety questions addressed by the NRC to 3&W.
.o Q
Okay.
You indicate that there was a procedure within the Licensing Department to handle safety concerns raised by the NRC which were addressed 8
to 3&W7 9
A There was an understanding as to how to handle 10 those.
There was not an approved written procedure to 11 my knowledge.
12 Q
But the issue we are addressing now is g
safety concerns raised by the NRC and addressed to B&W, is that correct?
A Yes.
15 Q
And the understanding as to how those would 16 he handled was what?
17 A
If they were addressed directly to S&W as a 5*8 generic question, they would be responded to by the 19 appropriate engineering unit working through the 20 responsible licensing engineer, and the answer would 21 de signed off by the manager of Licensing, who at that
-)_,
time was myself.
Q How about safety questions or safety concerns raised within 3&W or from one of your operating 24 utilitiest was there a paocedure for handling those 25 B ENJAMIN R EPC R* LNG S Envics l
1 2
Mallay 6
3 kinds of questions?
A During the very last portion of the time that :
4 was manager of licensing, there was a written peccedure a
for handling safety questions arising within 3&W.
Q You say that was toward the end?
4 A
Yes.
8 Q
Can you give me your best estimate as to 9
the time that procedure was implemented?
10 A
- t was probably implemented in mid-1974.
11 Q
And what gave rise to that procedure coming 13 into existence and being put into place at 3&W?
A To the best of my recollection it was partly a g
result of the NRC proposed regulation Part 21.
Q And can you t 11 me what the procedure was 15 that was implemented and put into place in 19747 Can 16 you describe its elements to me as best you recall?
l
A
- have not looked at the procedure in a few 18 years, but to the best of my recollection in the 19 sequence of events it would be for the person who 20 identified a potential safety problem vocid prepa~e a summary of that problem in writing and send it directly 37 s
to me.
I would review this written testimony, and after my review would sit down with the originator to 23 determine further details of what he identified as the 24 potential safety problem.
05 1
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2 Mallay 7
3 If it appeared that the problem affected operating sactors and was indeed a significant safety problem, 4
I would advise the utility involved to in turn advise a
the NRC.
If the safety problem involved an ongoing 6
licensing matter, that is one involving a plant not 7
yet in operation but in the licensing process, I would 8
prepare or have prepared.a detailed written descrip-9 tion of the safety problem for presentation to the 10 involved utilities.
11 since the utilities are the owners and operators of the plants, it was then thei: responsibility to yg determine whether direct reporting to.the NRC was appropriate.
14 During that period, namely mid-1974 to early 1975, 15 1 believe there were two such significant safety items 16 reported to the NRC through our utility customers.
17 (Continued on following page.)
18 19 20 21
\\M Ni esee
=
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Mallay a
3R 2 le 3
Q That would be that the utilities initiated the report rather than yourself?
4 A
I initiated the report, but they actually a
reported it to the NRC.
6 Q
Who raised the safety concerns that you 7
are referring to?
8 A
one was raised within Fuel Engineering Dep,artment 9
and related to the heat capacity of the fuel assemblies.
10 Q
so one came from within the B&W organization?
11 A
Yes.
gg Q
Did the other.one ceme also from within?
A Yes.
I am trying to think what the other one was, and I cannot recall the exact topi.e.
I can 14 sinply recall having had discussions with the NRC 15 on the second one, but I can't recall the topic.
But 16 it, too, was identified within B&W and was reported as II a result of our initiative.
18 Q
once you implemented, or once that 19 procedure was drawn up, was it brought to the attention of the organization here in Lynchburg gg by way of notification that such a procedure had
}
been devised and was now intended to function?
l A
This particular procedure was reviewed in detail with our management, namely our division i
24 vice-president, his superior, who was the vice-25 president of the Nuclear Division, and his superior, EENJAMIN R EPCRTING S ERVICE
1
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Mallay 9
3 who is Grcup vice President.
They were all briefed 4
in detail by myself on the procedures.
5 Q
Were the rank and file of employees within the Nuclear Power Generating Division briefed 6
so that cey would understand how to take advantage of the procedure that had been devised, should they 8
identify a safety concern?
9 A'
The managenc.. within this division was 10 briefed,Jersonally by myself, that is, dcwn to the 11 unit manager level.
Every employee then, receives 12 the procedure itself.
Whether they were in turn 13 briefed by the unit managers, I cannot say.
14 Q
Mr. Mallay, to the best of your under-
- h* F****d"** *h** Y " h"**
3"**
15 described, was there any magic requirement that the 16 1
process of bringing a safety concern to your attention l~
had to be recorded on a particular form 7 18 MR. EDGAR:
What do you mean by " magic"?
19 MR. ROCKWELL Strike the word " magic."
20 A
- do not recall a particular form being required.
21
- simply had to be in writing, was my recollection.
gg Q
Had you received a report in writing from someone within the organi=ation in whatever form, n,a assuming it was addressed to you, would you have OS regarded that as the initiation of the procedure 05 l
EENJAMIN REPCRTING SEMviCE I
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Mallay to 3
which had been set up?
A Yes, I would.
4 Q
And it was generally understood that you a
were the person, as manager of the Licensing Section, 6
to whom these. concerns would be addressed?
7 A
Yes.
Maybe I will add at that point, just to 8
clarify why I say "yes,"
that I had received during 9
the period of time from mid-1974 to early 1975 possibly 10 8 to 12 written communications regarding possible 11 safety problems.
ig After a detailed review, most of them were regarded as not significant safety problens.
la, Q
But I take 1: the fundamental underlying 14 purpose of the procedure that had been devised was to 15 1
have a central place to which safety concerns could be l
16 referred, even reviewed for the process you have just II described, to sort out essentially the wheat from the 1
18 chaff?
19 A
Not only central, but relatively independent gg of the ongoing engineering work, so that an independent l
assessment could be made of possible safety problems.
Q You indicated that the procedure which at i
i least you followed was to sit down with the person 23 initiating the concern and talk to them about it?
24 A
Yes, that is correct.
\\
v3 q
Did you do that in most every case.
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Mallay 11 3
A Ch, yes.
4 Q
Did you feel that was an important part 5
of the assessment of a safety concern in this process?
6 A
very much so.
And during this discussion, of 7
course, it would be.not just the originator and my-g self, but other independent technical people who were familiar with the topic, in order to determine 9
the possible impact on other plants.
10 Q
And would those other people that you 11 would bring or have involved in the process be.
la Lrought in at your initiative or at someone else's U
initiative?
14 A
At my initiative.
15 Q
At that time, if in your judgment the
- ***** ****h*d "h"*****
th **h ld th*** ""* th"* 7 "
16 felt required a report to the NRC, how would you handle it at that point?
18 A
I would notify directly the utilities involved.
19 Q
And then what would happen?
l A
My recesmendation would be for them to in turn I
al 1
report it to the NRC.
I l
22 (Continued on Page 12.)
i 23 24 05 dENJAMIN R EPC R'M N G S ERVICE
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2 Mallay 12 3
Q Was there a particular defined threshold sa/EW 4
at that point which had to be reached before a =atter 5
in y u mind sh uld be
- c uld be reported to the 6
A Not a quantitative criterion, no.
t Q
How would you make that judgment?
What 8
factor would you take into account in making that 9
judgment?
10 A
The factors involved would be whether or not it 11 would affect the normal operation of a reactor or 12 whether it would adversely affect the functioning of g3 any safety-related system in the plant during its normal operation or during any accident situation.
14 Also whether or not the discovery would affect the la.
bases for any of the safety analysis performed.
16 MR. EDGAR:
By that you mean whether it 17 affected the validity of the safety analysis?
l 18 THE WITNESS:
Correct.- Whether it would 19 affect the validity of the safety analysis in 20 a non-conservative way.
21 (There was discussion off the record.)
C/
Q Mr. Mallay, with reference to the three 33 underlying factors which you took into account in making your judg=ent as to whether a particular matter might be reportable tc the NRC, can you tell se where, 25 B ENJAMIN REPCRTING service l
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Mallay 13 3.2 in your mind, these factors came from.
dere those factors which you had formulated in your own judgment 4
or were they factors which you had in mind by refer-o ence to some standard or by reference to NRC require-6 ment?
7 A
These particular factors were based primarily 8
on my own judgment, plus my experience in having 9 worked with the NRC for several years, in understanding 10 the requirements for safety of =uclear power plants.
11 Q
At that time was there a particular specific 73 reporting requirement for safety concerns to the NRC7 A
No, I don't believe there was any regulation requir'ing this.
14 Q
Then is my understanding correct that, 15 with the advent of Part 21, there was formalized a 16 procedure?
1 '
A Yes.
18 Q
And some definitions?
19 A Right.
20 g
As to what safety concerns should be reported?
y A
That is correct.
't I believe that was after :
m left th&t position.
23 Q
- s my understanding correct that the first 24 adcption of Part 21 was in 1973 or-was the first 25 l
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Mallay 14 i
3.3 3
adoption of Part 21 earlier than that to your knowledge?
4 To ny knowledge it was earlier than 1978, but A
I cannot recall the date.
o Q
Did you reduce this procedure that you 6
have described to me to writing in the sense of it 7
being a relatively fixed procedure within the organi-8 zation, before you left the position of nanager of 9
Licensing?
10 A
Yes, it had been reduced to writing.
As :
11 recall, it was about two pages long and was posted in the buiiding here, 13 Q
Do you know whether you have a copy of g
tLat procedure today?
A
- am sure I do not, myself.
15 Q
Could you see if you could find for your-16 self a copy of the procedure as it was then formu-I lated under your management of the Licensing 18 D ep artment?
19 A
okay.
l gg Q
And provide us a copy?
A
- will attempt to do that.
y Q
Thank you.
You indicated, Mr. Mallay, that yon had a briefing ---once the procedure that you had i
been describing had been adopted, you had a briefing 24 within 3&W down tc the unit manager level?
23 l
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Mallay 15 3
A Yes, that was my recollection.
2 Would that have included Mr. Dunn, if he 4
were a unit manage at that time?
o A
If he were a unit manager, it would have included him.
I don't recall whether he was manager of ECCS I
analysis at that time or not.
My recollection was 8
that he was not.
9 g
At the time you developed this procedure, 10 Mr. Mallay, did you also develop a tracking procedurs 11 as part of the procedure for seeing to it that the concerns which were brought to your attention were 13 given timely attention and ultimately resolved?
A The procedure believe specified the time in 14 which I had to act, and the procedure was subject to 15 internal Q.A.
audit.
16 Q
What is your recollection of the time dead-II line that you imposed on yourself by this procedure?
18 A
In the order of two weeks.
19 Q
And was it your practice to exercise the gg control over resolution of these issues personally or to delegate that to someone within your section?
3
. ' ~.
A
- would usually delegate the investigation to someone, but the de. termination and final decision and 23 discussion with the originator were all handled 24 personally.
25 BENJAMIN R EPCRTING SERVICE
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Mallay 16 3
Q Was Mr. Kane in the department, the section, excuse me, when you were th e re ?
4 A
Yes, I believe so.
O Q
Did he become involved in this process at 6
all to your recollection?
7 A
- do not recall that he was involved in any of 8
these.
9 Q
Are you familiar with the esporting 10 requirements of Part 21 as they are today?
11 A
vaguely.
13 Q
Are you familiar with the in-house pro-cedure as it is today for the handling and tracking of safety concerns?
14 A
No, I am not.
15 (Continued on following page.)
)
16 17 18 l
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Mallay RC 4 3
Q Would reporting ef safety concerns on 4
the procedures which you established and during the 5
time when you were manager of the Licensing section, 6
always have been through utilities rather than directly by S&W, or would there have been occasions
~
when S&W would have contacted the NRC directly or, g
as it was known at that time, the AEC?
9 A
My recollection is that the procedure permitted me to report directly to the NRC, depending on the 11 level of the safety concern and how generic it would be.
10 Q
I take it that to the extent it was generic, 13 it might be more likely that a&W would make the report 14
- sther than asking each individual utility to make the 15 report?
4 A
That is true, although I think it depended more 16 on the severity of the sidety problem.
Obviously, if it g
was a very significant problem that might affect 18 operation today, I would have the obligation to actually 19 call the NRC on my own directly, even if it involved 20 only a single plant.
'l Q
And that would be simply because of the w
urgency of time?
23 A
Yes, because of the urgency of time.
34 Q
Mr. Mallay, showing you what has previously been marked Womack Deposition Exhibit 23, are you 3.3 S EN.JAMIN REPcR LNG S ERVICE
1 wallay 18 3
familiar with that document?
A I have not seen the document, and I do not recall 4
the topic.
3 Q
Would you take a soment, please, and 6
read it, and let me ask you while you are reading it 7
to read also what has previously been marked as 8
Cunn Deposition Exhibit 36.
9 Mr. Mallay, have you now had a chance to read 10 what has previously been narked as womack Deposition 11 Exhibit 23 and also what has previously been marked g,
as Ounn Deposition Exhibit 367 A
Yes, I have read these two exhibits.
Q For the record, they are memoranda from 14 Bert Dunn to Jim Taylor, dated February 9 and 15 February 16,-1978, respectively, is that correct?
16 A
That is correct.
17 Q
Having had a chance to look at these 18 memoranda, Mr. Mallay, would yoe say that is the 19 kind of concern that you had in mind when you set 20 "P th* P****d**** th'* 7*" # d *** "P 1" I'747 MR. EDGAR:
I object to the manner in which the question was presented.
It is
~
no.
presented hypothetically, and Mr. Mallay has 03 not had a chance to review the memos for more
' t than two minutes.
He does not have the contexu.
25 i
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Mallay 19 3
He does not understand the circumstances prevailing at the time.
Onere is a lack of foundation for this q@e of question.
3
\\
You are asking him a hypothetical question 6
~
in the abstract for a situation of which he 7
has no real knowledge.
8 MR. ROCKWELL:
Let me try to rephrase 9
the question.
10 Q
Mr. Mallay, had you received in 1974 11 and early 1975, when you were manager of the 13 Licensing Section and when the procedure that you already described to us was in effect, had you received these two memoranda, woul'd you have processed them 14 in accordance with the procedure that you described 15 to us?
16 A
Had I received this memo of February 9 from 17 Mr. Dunn at that point in time, I believe would 18 have proceeded with the procedure I have described 19 to you.
20 Q
3ased on your review of either or both of the memoranda which you have before you, do they strike you as the kind of safety cencern that was 22 intended to be encompassed by the procedures that 23 were established in 19747 44 A
My initial reaction to the memo of February 9 25 from Mr. cunn to Mr. Taylor is that it certainly SENJAMIN R EFCRTING S ERVICE
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Mallay 20 3
falls within the procedure as 2 had intended it to be used.
4 Q
With respect to the February 16 memorandum,
.a which is identified as Exhibit 36, had you been 6
familiar with that memorandum before you read it a s
moment ago?
8 A
No, I had not seen it before, nor had I heard j
9 of the topic.
10 Q
setore today?
11 A
Before today.
MR. EDGAR:
And you are not familiar with j
go any of the circumstances surrounding the topic?
g THE WITNESS:
That is correct, I am nor 14 familiar with any of the circumstances surrounding 15 this topic at all.
16 Q
Mr. Mallay, let me ask you to review 1~'
Exhibits 24, 33 and 37, having the question in mind 18 whether you had seen the documents before or whether 19 you had been aware of the concern or issues raised 20 in the documents before today.
MR. EDGAR Please note our continuing g
objection to this line of questioning.
en MR. RCCKWELL:
What is the objection to-23 this question?
'~4 MR. EDGAA:
Essentia*17 the same objection, n.o SENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
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Mallay 21 3
There is a lack of foundation to the question, and it is essentially the same as the previous 4
objection I stated.
O MR. RCCIWELL:
The question is whether 6
he has ever seen the documents before.
Is I
there any objection to that?
8 MR. EDGAR:
No, there is no objection 9
to that, j
10 Q
Please address that question, Mr. Mallay, 11 A
In looking at the documents, I do not believe I have seen them before, 13 Q
To the best of your knowledge, had the g
issues and concerns raised in those documents come 14 to your attention before today?
15 A
I will need to review them first.
16 Q
Please take whatever time is necessary.
U A
The only thing with which I am familiar that 13 was discussed in these three exhibits is the fact that 19 a trassient occurred at the Davis-Besse plant.
I was not familiar with any of the details at that 20 transient nor any actions taken subsequent to that transient.
.nn.
(Continued on Page 2I.)
23 T
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Q hr. Ma. lay, your resume indicates that you rc/ow 4
have been p cira= manager for 33R which, I understand, stands f o r 3 c.rn Severi Reactors,since August of 1977, is that correct?
l A
That is correct.
7 Q
Have you been living in Germany since 8
that period of time?
9 A
No, I have been living here.
l 4
g g3,
,7 10 1
11 A
Lynchburg.
12 Q
And working out of the Nuclear Power g
Generating civision?
A Yes, I work within NPGD.
Q Referring you to whet has been previously
)
15 marked as Dunn Deposition Exhibit 38, could you review it and tell me whether you have seen that document 17 before.
18 A
I have not seen the document before.
19 Q
Have you ever heard of a concern raised by 20 Mr. Novak, as octlined in the document before today, 21 and let us make it, rather, before March 28, 19797 2.
A Prior to March 28, 1979, I was not familiar with 3
such a subject.
Q 3efore March 28, 1979 had you become aware 24 of what is now known as the Michaelson report?
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23 Mallay 5.0 3
A 7: Lor to that time : had not heard of the so-4 called Michaelson report.
Q You do understand what : am referring to, 3
in referring to the.41chaelson report?
6 A
- have not personally reviewed the Michaelson reports however, I have been involved in discussions 8
where this report was referred to, and I believe 9
have a general understanding of its content.
10 Q
specifically, Mr. Mallay, had you ever 11 been aware before March 28, 1979 of a concern that 12 operators in responding to a transient involving a 13 small break LocA might terminate high pressure injec-tion prematurely based upon a focus on pressurize level alone?
15 A
No.
In my considerations of the small break 16 analyses, it was always my understanding that the cperators were to keep the high pressure injection 18 on at all times.
It was clearly recognised -on my 19 part that this was because the pressurizar could go 20 solid for ce tain spectra of small breaks, and it was not of any concern to me that this take place.
The 31
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a importance always in the discussions : have had on s.
small breaks was to maintain high pressure injection.
Q To your understanding, Mr. Mallay, has 24 there evs: been a concern within the B&W organisation 3
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Mallay 24 5.3 3
about going solid under such conditions?
4 A
There was never any concern in the discussions that I had.
It was wall understood that this would 3
1 occur.
We did not have all the characteri=ations of 6
the valve response under such conditions, but that 7
did not concern us from a safety standpoint.
8 Q
Mr. Mallay, referring you to what has 9
previously been marked as Rogers Exhibit 16, which is 10 apparently a draft revision of operator procedure 11 2102-1.3, relating to pressuriser operation, and 12 within that procedure : refer you to Section 2, entitled " Limits and Precautions," and specifically g
Section 2.1.8 which states:
"The pressurizer reactor coolant system 15 must not he filled with coolant to solid conditions 16 (400 inches) at any time except as required for 17 system hydrostatic tests."
18 Have you seen that operator instruction 19 before?
20 A
- have not seen this operator instruction before.
31 Q
Are you familiar generally with the fact s
that such an instruction was in existence before?
A
- am not familiar with any of the operating 23 instructions to any of our operating plants.
- However, 24
- am familiar with the philosophy that during normal 25 S ENJAMIN R EPCRTING SEMVICE
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Mallay 23 J
5.4 3
ope..
on such a requirement be understood, and :
emphasise, "during normal operation."
4 Q
Does the operating procedure to which we 3
are referring, and specifically the section to which 6
we are referring, Section 2.1.fr, limit by its terms 7
the inscription to normal operation?
8 A
I could not answer that question without knowing 9
the context in which this procedure is normally used.
10 xR. zDcAx:
He is not familiar with 11 operating procedures, he said.
His answer was 12 based on his understanding.
Q Would it be possible for you to review the g
procedure which we have before us as Rogers Deposition Exhibit 16, and.then provide an answer to the question?
15 A
I suspect not, because I would have to know what 16 other operating procedures it went with, and the normal instructions that the operator would have to 18 have under other than normal operating conditions.
19 M2. ROCKWELLs Off the record.
gg (Discussion held off the record, following which a brief recess was taken.)
ny
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Q Mr. Mallay, referring you to what has previously been marked as Lind Deposition Exhibit 59, 4
and let me advise you that this has previously been a
identified in the record as a set of 3&W procedures 6
which are usea here at the B&W Department of Training 7
program, and do I correctly identify it as a document 8
entitled, " Operations Manual for Nuclear Power Plant 9
Simulator"?
10 A
Yes.
11 Q
Referring you within that document to Section 1202, operator P=ocedure 12026, and specifically 77 to Section 5.2.5, could you take a moment to look at it.
(Handing.)
14 MR. EDGAA:
Would you look at the whole 15 procedure.
Take your time.
16 A
Yes, I have read certain excerpts from this 17 Section OP 12026.
18 Q
In reference to section 5.2.5, do you 19 have that before you?
A I'**
I h"'* 1* D*f ** ***
20 Q
Have you ever seen that procedure
\\-
before you reviewed it today?
22 A
No, I have not seen any portion of this procedure.
U Q
If an operator were faced with a situation l
24 25 S ENJAMIN R EPORTING service 1
1
1 Mallay 27 3
where reactor coolant pressure was tending in one direction and pressuri:er level was tending in the 5
opposite direction, :nn you tell me your interpretation 6
of how that procedure should be applied.
7 A
My preliminary reading of this particular g
excerpt does not appear to cover that particular case.
However, my knowledge of response to small break 9
analyses, as I have indicated to you before, indicates 10 that one would continue to leave the high-pressure 11 injection flow on in the event of any decrease'in 12 pressure.
13 Q
In your work on small break analyses, 14 Mr. Mallay, did you have occasion at any time to 15 review operating and emergency procedures in light of the research and work you were doing with respect 16 to small breaks?
A I do not have any recollection of reviewing 18 procedures regarding operator response to small 19 break analyses during any of my previous work experience.
21 Q
During your work in the Engineering 22 Department at 3sw in the va:Lous positions that you 23 have held, to your knowledge has there ever been a i
procedure that design engineers should be reviewing i
3 operating instruculons or emergency instructions EENJAMIN REPORTING SE.WICE
i l
l 1
0 Mallay IS 3
currently in use at the time that they are doing their 4
work in light of the design questions which they are 5
addressing and which they are working on?
6 A
z'd have to have that question repeated, please.
7 (Last pending question read. )
8 A
To my knowledge, NPGD has always had a procedure 9
wherein the design engineer responsible for the area 10 having t d
with that operating procedure would review it and approve it prior to its being placed into use.
g Q
Is that review of operating or emergency procedures by a design engineer written down anywhere 13 in terms of B&W's internal procedures?
14 A
believe it is in a written procedure, yes.
15 Q
Which one?
16 A
I would have no idea.
I have not seen that 17 procedure for close to to years.
ig Q
As a practical matter, do you know whether design engineers have in fact, as a matter of gg routine, reviewed operating and emergency procedures in light of their design work?
21 A
Yes.
It is my recollection that it was a normal nn
~~
part of our operating work to review all of these 03 pecce'dures and sign off on then prior to their being 04 put into use, and in fact, I have personally reviewed 25 3ENJAMIN R EPCRTING SERVICE
l l
1 n
~
Mallay 29 3
nany procedures, but none involving s=all break 4
analyses.
5 Q
can you tell me in somewhat nome detail 6
the review and signing off on an emergency how or operating p cce, dure is accomplished by a design i
engineer?
3 A
My experience would be for the engineer most 9
familiar with that particular procedure or the 10 analyses on which that procedure was involved to do 11 a detailed review of the procedure in light of the 10 analysis that he had done for that plat t or for l
13 a similar plant.
After his review, if he had any questions, he 14 would review it with the person who prepared the la_
procedure.
Following that review and any changes 16 to the procedure as a result of that review, the 17 responsible engineer would present the result to 18 his unit manager, and it would be the unit manage:
19 who would sign off on the procedure if he wars 3
satisfied.
21 Q
When you say the unit manager would sign s
33 off on the procedure, do you mean that in a literal sense, in the sense that the unit manager would make
.,3 a record that the procedure in question had been reviewed by a particular design engineer and that 25 E ENJAMIN R EPCRTNG S ERVICE
l 1
n
~
Mallay 30 i
3 it was satisfactory to that unit?
4 A
It is my recollection that the procedure had 5
a cover sheet on it that he would personally sign.
6 I do not believe the unit manager kept any record of such a review or the sign-off.
g Q
What would happen to the sign-off sheet, do you know?
A
- do not know what happened to it.
It went 10 into what was then called the Nuclear Service 11 Department and, I presume, put in a file, but :
l'
~
don't know that for a fact.
13 Q
To whom in the Nuclear Service Department 14 would a procedure which had been reviewed and signed 15 off on by an engineer or an engineering unit be 16 A
I believe at the time that I was reviewing such i.
s procedure, it was the manager responsible for prepara-18 tion of operation procedures, and it would be sent to him.
20 (Continued on Page 31.)
21 s
w Me mee 24 05 SENJAMIN R EPCRTING SEMVICE
1 2
Mallay 31 7.1 3
Q Showing you what has been previously narked
- '9w as Willse eposition Exhibit 2, this has been earlier 4
identified as an organization chart for the Nuclear a
Service Department and this, I believe, is intended to reflect the Nuclear Service Department as it I
existed in 1978.
(Handing.)
8 Are you able to identify where in the 9
Nuclear Service Department, according to that chart, 10 the manager in charge of the functions which you have 11 just described would be, and the function being the 12-receipt of the procedures which have been reviewed and
- 7"*d
- DY
'h* *"' "*** "7 U*P*****"*
13 MR. EDGAR:
If you know.
A Yes.
I am not currently familiar with their 15 organization nor would it have been necessary for me 16 to be familiar with their organization at that time 17 because it was clearly identified on the cover sheet 18 to whom the procedure was to be returned.
19 Q
was that a standnad form that was used, 20 to you: recollection?
A
- Yes, believe it was.
gy Q
Would you have a recollection of whers, functionally, in the Nuclear Service Department the U
coordination of operating and energency procedure 24 review would occurt 25 E ENJAMIN R EPCRTING SERVICE I
l 1
n 22 Mallay 7.2 3
A
- a= not familiar with that -- with their current 4
organication.
Q Would it be helpful to look at an organi-O cation chart for the Nnalear Service Department for 1974 or 19757 7
l i
A
- suspect not for the purpose of my trying to j
8 answer this type of question.
9 Q
Do you remember any names of people who l
10 served the function in any years past and the function l
11 I refer to it that which you have just described?
12 A
No, I do not.
g Q
Mr. Mallay, to your knowledge, was the possibility of voiding in the core of the NSSS system a predicted result of the design of that system adopted by S&W, and let us refer to the type of NOSS 16 system in place at TM: 27 17 A
- do not recall any analyses that predicted that 18 voiding would occur in any portion of the core as a 19 result of any accident.
20 Q
wou.d it then be a fair statement to say 21 that there also would not hav'e been any analyses predicting that as a consequence of voiding, pres-l
~ suri=e: level in certain accident circumstances could 23 increase while reactor coolant inventory was decreasing, 24 thereby creating a departure in the normal relationship 25 S ENJAMIN R EFCRTING SERVICE
l l
1 l
2
.Mallay 33 7.3 3
that pressurizer level bears to inventory in the core?
4 A
- don't believe that would necessarily be &
logical conclusion.
a Q
Why not?
A My technical expertise does not extend to,the 7
actual analyses of small breaks, but it is ny under-8 standing that it is certainly not sessary to create 9
any voiding in the core for such a phenomenen to occur 10 whereby the pressure would be decreasing whereas the 11 pressurica level would be s tab le or increasing.
12 Q
what other circumstances could lead to tha t situation?
g.
A
- don't know.
I don't have any knowledge to answer that.
15 Q
Was the possibility of a variation from 16 the normal relationship between the pressuriner level 17 and water inventory in the core known or understood l
18 before September of 19777 19 Ma. zcGAA:
Do we have a foundation for 20 the normal relationship?
gy Q
Would it be fair to say that pressuriser s
level normally correlates or tends in the same direc-tion as water inventory in the core?
23 A
- don't have sufficient knowledge to answer that 24 for all conditions, j
25 1
l B ENJAMIN R EPCRTING S ERVICE
1 2
Mallay 34 7.4 3
Q could you address the question with respect 4
to whether pressurice: level normally in most circum-stances co :alates or tends in the same direction as a
water inventory in the core?
6 A
Yes, under most conditions that would ocent.
A Q
Do you know whether there had been any S
prediction or any understanding that there would be a 9
departure from that normal relationship between 10 pressuricer level and water inventory in the core by 11 the Engineering Depart =ent here at 3&W before September t
12 19777 A
Yes, I can =ecall both Mr. Parks and Mr. Dunn g
discussing a situation in which there was anomalous behavior of pressurize level and pressure during la, certain small breaks, specifically in the cold leg.
16 I do not know -- I do not recall any of the 17 details of such discussion nor do I have the precise 18 technical knowledge to understand it, huu I did work 19 closely with both of those gentlemen and could recall 20 them discussing such a situation.
n1 Q
Do you know when that discussion would
~
l have taken place?
1 A
Yes, it would have been during the preparations 23 for the ECOS hearings that occurred in -- in 1972 or 24 19737 In approximately that time period.
25 E ENJAMIN REPCRTING SERVICE
1 2
Mallay 35 7.5 3
Q You used the term in your answer a soment ago of " anomalous behavior."
Can you tell se what 4
you mean by that?
3 A
- n the context of the previouc question, na=ely 6
where pressuriser level did not precisely correlate 7
with water pressure in the reactor coolant system.
8 Q
Do you know whether their perception went 9
far or extended to an understanding that where the so 10 pressurize: level could be growing higher or even 11 solid and reactor coolant inventory could be going 13 substantially low?
A No,
- cannot recall that.
g Q
When you say you cannot recall that, you canno recall that their analysis extended to that 15 kind of situation?
16 A
Correct.
I do not have any idea how far the analysis extended, nor do I have an understanding of 18 their u'nderstanding of how far this situation might 19 pertain.
l l
20 MR. EDGAR:
You just do not resall anything.
about the cases?
n.,
y THE W'TNESS:
That is right.
1 nn 1
(Continued on following page. )
23 24 l
25 SENJAMIN R EFCENG SEMvict
1 0
Mallay 36 R:SLc 3
Q could you define for us, Mr. Mallay, your area of expertise.
4 A
- am an engineering manager.
O Q
Could you elaborate.
6 A
My primary expertise has been for several years 7
that of managing people and mansging programs, and 8
has not been involved for several years in the de-9 tailed engineering analysis or design of specific 10 systems.
11 Q
At one time you were a working hands-on engineer, is th at correct?
13 A
That is correct.
My primary expertise is in transient analysis, heat transfer and reactor physics.
14 Q
When you say that one of your areas of 15 expertise has been transient analysis, can you be 16 more specific with respect to what you mean by 17 an expertise focusing on transient analysis?
18 A
- was the person who developed most of the 19 methods and computer codes used at 3sw for transient 1
- 17'i8' With the exception of loss of coolant 00 accident.
1
(
Q Was your work involved in transient nn analysis with respect to transients that actually 23 occurred in the field and in analy ing them for what they had to tell a design engineer about the way a a:
S ENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE L
1 2
Mallay 37 3
system was responding in actual operation?
4 A
The analyses
- performed were primarily for 3
the purpose of the safety analysis reports submitted 6
to the NRC.
They were rarely assogiated with realistic situations or actual occurrences.
Q Did your work involve, however, analyzing g
realistic or actual situations?
9 A
I may have performed a few benchmark cases, but 10 that would have been very rare.
11 Q
To your understanding, at tne time you 1"
were doing that work, was there anyone doing 13 transient analysis not in a hypothetical sense, but 14 in an actual sense, addressing actual transients 15 that were occurring in opeation, and asking what does this mean and how did it happen?
g A
I cannot recall anyone doing that type o f wo rk either at S&W or any other place.
18 Q
When you were doing transient analysis --
19 MR. EDGAR:
Can I get a clarification' 00 of what time frame we are talking aboat?
~ ~
21 MR. RCCKWELL:
I am just about to ask a 20 time question.
23 MR. EDGAR:
Is it 'at a time like 1965 through 19717 34 MR. ROCIWELL:
I as about to proceed to S EN.JAMIN R EPC R*!NG SERVICE
1 2
~
Mallay 38 define the question of tine.
3 Q
When were you doing the transient 4
analyses?
o A
These analyses were performed from 1961 to 1969.
6 Q
And your previous answer was in reference
~.
to that time frane?
9 A
Yes, my p'revious answer was in reference to that 9
time frame.
10 Q
Since that time period of 1969, do you 11 know whether there has been anyone at asw charged with transient analyses not in a theoretical sense, g
but in the sense of a transient analysis of actual 13 operating transients?
14 A
My only recollections are people in the technical 15 staff section of NPGD who are following certain tests 16 being done at Idaho, in particular semi-scale tests 17 and lost 18 Q
How about transients occurring in utilities 19 involving NSSS systems manufactured by B&W7 A
To my knowledge, there is no one particularly charged with that particular responsibility.
~~
Q You indicated the transient analysis of nn small breaks was not within your area, is that 23 cc : set?
t
.3 A
That is co :ect.
I have never personally l
25 EENJAMIN R EPCRTING G ERVICE
1 2
Mallay 39 3
performed an analysis of a small break.
4 Q
Who has done that work within the NPGD 5
organization?
6 A
Primarily that work has been done by Charlie Parks and Bert Dunn, and people who currently work for Sert Dunn, of course.
g Q
Was there anyone else, to your knowledga?
A As I mentioned before, there are some people 10 within our technical staff sagtion who I believe 11 performed some benchmark cases they would be Joe 1
Cudlin and the people working for him.
13 Q
What department is the technical staff 14 section that you described?
13 A
The technical staff is within the Engineering D*P********
16 Q
Do you know, Mr. Mallay, whether before March 28, 1979 34W had ever advised any of its 13 operating utilities of the pos.ibi.ity that pressurize:
19 level and water inventory in the core could be subject to, as you put it earlier, anomilous behavior, or in lay terms, a departure from the normal relationship w
22 which they bear in operation?
23 A
- have no knowledge of information being passed along to our operating reactors specifically 3 4
[
i on this subjecu.
.a S EN.iAMIN REPCRDN3 SERVICE
O 1
2 3
Mallay 40 Q
Do you know whether such information was 4
passed to the NRC before March 28, 19797 3
A
- believe a topical report was submitted to the 6
NRC indicating such behavior.
7 Q
Which topical report would that have 8
been2 9
A I don't recall, but it was the -- my recollection 10 is it was in the 101-series.
In other words, it would be 101-something.
11 Q
Do you recall the title of the report g
or generally what the report was addressed to?
A I believe the topical report was on small break 14 analyses.
It is a report, believe, that has been 15 updated on several occasions.
16 II (Continued on Page 41.)
18 19 s.
f 3
21 s
22 03 24 25 E ENJAMIN R EPORWNG SERVICE
1 2
Mallay 41 9.1 3
Q Are you familiar, Mr. Mallay, with the c' ' - c 4
process by which criteria for containment isolation vere established in the design of TM: 27 0
A
- may have some recollection of certain portions o f how that criteria came about.
I am sure : could 7
not sketch for you the entire history of how it came 8
about.
9 Q
Would that have occurred when you were 10 manager of the Licensing sections in other words, from 11 1971 to 19757 13 A
I am not sure, although it is my recollection 7-that it probably occurred while I was manager of Safety Analysis.
Q That would have been from 1969 to 19717 A
Yes, during the construction permit stage, is my 16 recollection.
17 Q
Can you tell me what recollection you do 18 have of the process by which the criteria were estab-19 11shed, namely the criteria for containment isolation?
20 A
I will tell you the best to my recollection, and 31
- have not reviewed this in many years, so it may not be entirely correct, but my recollection is that we t
I had a single set point at to psi for the initiation 23 of containment spray and containment isolation.
24 Ouring the construction permit review of that set point 25 EENJAMIN R EPCRTING SERVICE l
1 2
~
Mallay 4
9.
3 by the NRC, which was then the AZC, it was determined that there may be certain situations in which contain-4 ment isolation would be, appropriate and yettte 10 psi i
3 set point would not be reached.
The NRC, therefore, 6
I believe, recommended that containment isolation 7
occur upon initiation of any ICCS action.
It is my t
recollection that Burns & Roe, who had been respon-9 sible for this system, and the utility, which I guess 10 was some combination of Met Ed and Jersey Central at I
11 that time, determined that it would be preferable to 13 simply change the set point to 4 psi from 10 psi for the purpose of containment isolation rather than add g
an additional signal to the reactor protection system.
Again, I point out that this system was the 15 responsibility of the. architect-engineer and of course 16 the construction permit is the responsibility of the utility, and the only part that 3&W played in all of 18 this was the supply of certain pressure-temperature l
19 relationships as a result of transients occurring 20 inside containment; therefore, 3&w was not involved in the decision making but simply supplying some og
~
unput, and the only reason : have any recollection at all is because I was involved in the licensing process om m
I in my position as manager of Safety Analysis.
24 Q
At that same time, it is my recollection 25 SENJAMIN R EPO R*IN G S ERVICE
1 o
Mallay 43 3
that they not only changed the set point from to pst 4
to 4 psi for the purpose of containment isolation I
but increased the set point for containment spray o
from to psi to 30 psi.
I cannot recall any othe discussions on that subject.
I think that is the i
full extent of my knowledge at this point.
8 Q
What was the basis for the initial set 9
point of to psis what factors were taken into account 10 in a :iving at that figure?
i 11 A
It is.1y recollection that that set point a;ose 12 from the judgment on the part o f the arctdtect - engineer 1
for our first plant, namely the ccones plant and the g
architect-engineer in that case was Duke Power company, the utility, based on a spectrum of LOCAS lo, from.5 square foot to the largest potential rupture.
16 They wanted to keep the set point as high as possible l'
and yet have it adequate to avoid sp urious. actuation 18 for that spectrum of breaks, but again even in that 19 asw only supplied temperature-pressure relation-caso 20 ships.
The decision was that of Duke Power Company.
i 31
)
Would
.5 square foot to the largest poten-
.(
t
(
tial rupture include small breaks?
s-on A
No, it would not.
1 Q
Do you know whether the selection of the 24 to psi figure which you have mentioned took any account 25 E EN LAMIN R EPCRTING 5Envict
i i
1 i
l n
Mallay 44 3
of the possible effects of small breaks?
4 A
No, it did not.
Q Do you know whether the 4 psi figure that o
was ultimately identified at fM: 2 took any account 6
of the potential effects of small breaks?
7 A
I believe it did in the context of what we then 8
considered to be small breaks which was probably in 9
the order of.05 square foot.
10 g
now did the 4 psi set point take any 11 account of small breaks on the orde of.05 square 12 foot?
A Again, I don't know how the decision was made.
g3 Al' that 3&W did was supply ths pressure-temperature relatienship in containment for that size break.
Q And the selection of the figure was made 16 by whom?
17 A
- believe it was made by the architect-engineer 18 in conjunction with the utility.
19 Q
would anyone from asw have been a-partici-26 pant in the discussions or the analysis for the selec-
~~
og tion of the 4 psi
- figure itself?
~
A Probably, and if so, it would have been Mr. Parks, but don't have that recoilection; that would be l
23 hypothetical on my part to make that speculation.
24
)
l 2
l B EN.JAMIN R EPCRTINri SEavtCE l
I
1 2
Mallay 45 R:90ic 3
Q Do you know whether in the selection of 4
containment isolation criteria for TM: 2 any con-3 sideration was given to containment isolation based 6
upon radiation?
A I do not recall that being one of the parameters considered at that time.
g Q
You indicated that there was some con-sideration given to actuating containment isolation
'10 on initiation of any ECCS action, is that correct?
11 A
The NRC made that suggestion.
I Q
Was that suggestion made based on a 13 particular requirement that the NRC had in mind, or 14 simply that they thought you ought to look at this 15 as a basis for possible containment isolation?
A
- cannot say the basis for which the NRC made g
that recommendation.
Bowever, it is a fact thet one of our competitors had that as part of his design 18 at that time, i
19 l
Q Do you know why ECOS actuation as a basis 20 for containment isolation was rejected?
21 A
I do not know, but as I indicated before, or at l
[
1 22 least implied before, I believe that it was based on 23 the judgment of the architect-engineer that they did not want to add an additional signal in the engineering 74 25 sENJAMIN REPCR ING S ERVICE
1 2
Mallay 46 3
safeguard and protection system logic.
4 Q
Do you have any understanding why an 5
architect-engiaeer might be relucta'nt to add an 6
additional signal?
A only'the reliability; in other words, the more signals one has, the more spurious actuations you are subject to.
9 Q
Do you have any understanding of what 10 costs would be involved in adding an additional con-11 tainment isolation criterion?
10 A
No, I have no idea of the cost, and I don't 13 recall any discussion of cost at that time.
14 Q
You indicated earlier that there was an
- h*
- P 1"* f * * "*"i""*** 1* 1**i "
15 as high as possible to avoid spurious actuations.
What is the concern in that regard?
17 A
The concern was not in regard to the isolation 18 function, I don't believe, but more in regard to the 19 spray function which has chemical effects on many of l
20 the components within containment.
(
21 Q
Sus containment isolation and the spray
- n fune
- Lon are separable?
A They a=e se,a=a,1e no..
At tha:,oint en =ime.
,3 they were a single signal.
Q That is simply a question of electronics 25 BCNJAMIN R CPCRT NG SERVICC
1 n
Ma11ay 464 3
or wiring now?
A Yes, as far as I understand.
4 MR. EOGAR:
Off the record.
3 (Discussion held off the record.)
,o i
(Continued on Page 47.)
8 9
10 t
11 l
l 10 2
13 14 a
15 16 17 18 19 m
al
(
(
O 23 04 25 BENJAMIN R EPCRTING SERvict
i
\\
l n
Mallay 47 s:/ow 3
Q Mr. Mallay, were you involved in the 13 ' t.
4 phaparation of the PSAR for TM* 27 A
- do not recall specifically preparing the TM* 2 o
PSAR, but
- presume from my responsibilities of that period of time must have prepared at least a portion of it.
8 Q
Would that preparation begin with a 9
standard PSAR, which would have general applicability 10 to the kind of design in use?
11 A
It would have begun with the next previous PSAR.
12 Q
And then that is reviewed and revised in I
g the process of creating the PSAR for TM 27 A
Yes, and in particular, the TM 2 would have been more than just reviewed because we were at that time applying for a higher alternate power level than 16 the previous plant, which : guess was Duke Power, c-17 TM:
1, so there would have been a significant effort 18 of upgrading, not just simply a review and mino:
19
, vision, 20 MR. EDGAR:
Off the record.
21 (There was discussion off the record.)
Q Mr. Mallay, were you involved in the B&W's o
work directed toward acquisition of a construction permit from the NRC for TM: 27 n.
eT A
Yes, I was.
25 B ENJAMIN R EPCRTING SERVICE i
l l
l l
1 2
48 Mallay 11.2 3
Q Can you describe what your involvenent was?
4 A
Prinarily that of presenting the results of transient analyses to the NRC and ACRS and describing 3
\\
i the bases for these analyses.
Q Had you done any transient analyses 6
specifically with reference to TM 2 in preparation 8
for granting of *. hat construction permit, do you know?
9 A
As : indicated before, I cannot recall performin's 10 any analyses specifically for TM: 2, but : suspect :
11 did, knowing my responsibilities at that point in 12 time.
g Q
Were you involved at all with the prepara-tion of the safety evaluation report?
l 14 A
That is a report prepared by the NRC.
la, MR. EDGAR:
What is your answer?
16 THE WITNESS:
No.
Excuse me.
17 Q
Maybe you can tell me a little bit about 18 what you understand of the preparation of the safaty 19 evaluation report and what its function and purpose is.
20 A
My understanding is that the safety evaluation 31 report is prepared by the NRC staff to summarize their safety review of a plant in preparation for the presentation to the ARCS.
I believe it may also provide a basis for the 24
~
or the issuance of either the onstruction permit 25 operating license, depending on the plant's status at S ENJAMIN REPCRTING S ERVICE
1 2
Mallay 49 3
that point.
Q
- s the SER made available fc comments 4
before it is finalized?
O A.
I don't believe so.
6 Q
Does the NRC ask questicas or require 7
additional information in the process of preparation 8
of its safety evaluation report or does it work simply 9
from the documents that it has before it?
10 A
curing the time period that we are talking about, 11 namely 1965 to 1972, it is my recollection that the NRC 13 never requested any assistance in the preparation of their safety evaluation report.
After that time there was some indication 14 that the questions they were asking were the basis for 15 what t, hey were preparing from the SER, but that was 16 only implication.
To my knowledge this report was 17 always prepared by them in secret, based on the infor-18 mation they had supplied to them at that point in time.
19 They have always tried in my experience to keep the l
20 preparation of this report very close and very secret h
within their shop, and not let it be known that they were preparing such a report or what was going into it in any way.
l U
t Q
Why would that be true, to your under-24 I
standing?
25 EENJAMIN R EPCRTING S ERVICE l
l
1 2
Mallay 50 3
A So that it would be completely their judgment.
4 In other words, it would be a product solely of' thei:
review and, therefore, represents an independent 0
safety review of the plant.
Q Were you involved at all in the preparation s
of the FSAR for TM: 2?
8 A
I am quite sure I was not.
9 Q
Were you involved in the work undertaken 10 to prepare for obtaining the operating license at 11 TM: 2?
12 A
- d n't know.
- : knew the date on which it received its ACRS review for the operating license, g
I might be able to answer that question.
But I do not recall specifically whether I was involved in helping 15 them obtain the operating license.
We had quite a 16 few plants going through the time period during v.ich 17 was manager of Licensing, and : cannot specifically 10 recall TMI 2.
19 Q
xx. Mallay, are you familiar with the NRC l
20 Bulletin 79-057 A
Yes, I have read that bulletin.
31 1
s Q
Am I cc :eet that among its recommendations or requirements is the requirement to have an automatic 23 reactor trip in connection with a turbine trip?
24 A
- cannot recall whether that was in that bulletin 25 SENJAMIN R EPCRTING SERVICE
1 1
i 1
2 Mallay 50-a 3
or any subsequent one, r.amely 79-05-A or maybe even one subsequent to that.
My recollection is not clear 4
1 on that point.
3 Q
Okay.
Well, are you familiar that there 6
was a requirement in one of these bulletins from the 7
NRC that there would be as automatic reactor trip 8
upon turbine trip?
9 x
don't believe it was that explicit.
10 (Continued on following page.)
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
~
AQ
=as 24 l
B S ENJAMIN R EPCRTING SEnvicz
l 1
i 1
l Mallay 51 l
2 l
l 8.12
- C 3
Q Would I be more accurate in referring to it 4
as an " anticipatory reactor scram"?
A That would be =cre in conjunction with =y a
recollection, yes.
Q
- n conjunction with loss of feed, turbine 4
trip, or a significant reduction in steam generatar 8
level?
9 A
Yes, that is closer to my recollection.
10 Q
And as I check my notes : see also, :
11 believe, the NRC was asking for a review as to whether such an anticipatory scram was appropriate?
g3 A
Yes, that would be my recollection alse.
Q Do you have an opinion'as to whether such 14 an anticipatory scram under the conditions : indicated 15 is appropriate?
16 A
I believe the reactor trips supplied with the l~
TM 2 plant are adequate, and that this additional 18 trip does not' add any additional safety measures.
19 Q
Is it fair to say that in a situation 3
where you have a loss of feedwater, the likelihood of ultimately having a reactor trip, given the design 3
s of the system, is extremely high?
A If one loses all feedwater while operating 23 at or near full power, I would anticipate a reactor n.
trip to oc....
a-"
Q And we are referring at the moment to SENJAMIN R EPORT NG S ERVICE
1 2
Mallay 52
'3.2 3
loss of all feedwater from the pri=ary feedwater systems we are not talking with reference to the 4
a A
- Yes, I am talking about the main feedwater 6
supply.
7 Q
And the chances, when you have a loss 8
of all feed on the secondary side of that, leading 9
to a reactor trip or scram is very high, is it not?
j 10 A
That is correct.
11 Q
Approaching 10 0 p ercent?
A That is correct.
go Q
In those circumstances, why not have an anticipatory scram or trip on the primary side?
14 A
one has to look at what one is trying to 15 protect, namely the reactor core.
One is looking for 16 limits on fuel melting, defects in the clad, or 17 unacceptably high reactor coolant pressure.
If the 18 trip system already protects these limits and others 19
.similar to that, there is no reason to add additional
- iP* *h"* "*"10 **d"**
- h* #*1i"Dili"7 "h* Fl****
00 Q
The anticipatory scram would give an
~
(
additional protection in the sense of giving additional nn time, is that correct?
23 A
It may add time in the order of three to four seconds.
In my opinion, if that-is the case, that
~
n-3 would not be of significance to me unless it also S ENJAMIN R EPCRTING S ERVICE 1
1 i
I
1 3
Mallay 53 3
prevented some major transient occurring that 4
exercised systems unnseessarily, in terms of pressure or temperature.
.a Q
Does that time interval that you have referred to -- three or four seconds -- have any 7
effect on the margins built into the system, safety 8
margins?
9 A
Safety margins are those which are provided by 10 the reactor trip system, which protect against tempera-11 ture and pressure. amd other eff ects, that protect the 13 reactor coolant system and its core.
I don't know that the safety margins themselves would be affected g
by this difference in time.
Q if you view the amount of water in the 15 steam generator as a safety margin, the water available 16 in the steam generator at a particular point in time as a safety margin -- let me ask you, did you view 18 it as such?
19 A
Not necessarily.
20 Q
The water in the steam generator is essentially the mechanism by which your heat, sink 3
(
operates, is that correct?
A That is correct.
23 Q
And the capacity of your heat sink repre-24 sents a safety margin to some extent, doesn't it?
l 25 l
l S ENJAMIN R EPC R*1N G S ERVICE i
~ _ _ - -.. _ _,,
1 2
~
Mallay 54 3
A It depends on what one means by the safety 4
margin.
Again ! rsgard the safety margin as those limits needed to protect the core and its reactor
.o coolant system.
6 The philosophy in setting up any reactor i
pro ection system is to maintain these safety margins, 8
recognizing the kind of water inventory one has on 9
both the primary and secondary side and other charac-10 teristics of the plant.
11 I don't look at water inventory in any particular 13 part of the plant as a safety margin per se.
Q Water inventory in the steam generator, 1.,2 where you have total loss of feed, relates directly, doesn't it, to the amount of heat that can be rencved 15 from the core in the ensuing seconds or minutes?
16 A
Yes, that is true.
1I Q
Wou14 the three or four seconds' margin 18 that we are talking about have any effect on the 19 water inventory in the steam generator?
A Yes, it certainly would because one would have 20 to remove heat during that time period.
y~
(.
Q To the extent that the 3&W design leads, m
in the setting of a total loss of feed, leads to a 23 boiling dry of the steam generater, would it be fair 24 to say that the design on the pri=ary side, where 25 the set point for the POR7 is at something around S ENJAMIN R EPCRTIN G SEnvicE
h e
i 1
2 Mallay 55 3
is that correct?
2300 pounds 4
A don't recall the set point.
- is 2300 or 3
2350.
6 Q
Would it be fair to say in these circum-7 stances that the design essentially looks to the PORV g
as a backup heat sink conceptually?
MR. EDGAR:
Do you understand the 9
question?
10 THE WITNESS:
I am not sure.
11 MR. EDGAR:
Ask for clarification.
12 (Witness conferred with counsel.)
A Yes, I really don't quite understand the question, 1
14 so I will have tc ask for a clarification.
15 Q
Where you have a total loss of feed, 16 and where the steam generator boils dry, you then 17 have 2 loss of heat sink, cc rect, assuming auxiliary 1g feed comes into play?
A That is co::ect.
That would be true of any gg plant.
Q At that point, in terms of the design on 01
\\-
the primary side, where do you go for heat sink?
m A
Well, heat sink I will define as something 23 which creates a decrease in t6mperature.
There is
-3 4 no heat sink a: that point of any significance.
One 25 can relieve pressure by opening valves
- PCRV, S ENJAMIN R EPCRTING SEnvicz
1 2
Mallay 56 3
safety valves and so on -- but depending on what is 4
going on in the core, that won't necessarily reduce temperature, a
Q Well, clearly the pressure that.-ises in the primary system is a direct function of the 7
heat generated?
8 A
Yes, it is.
9 Q
Conceptually speaking, you are talking 10 about a heat sink.
11 A
Well, okay.
It is a relief of energy in any 13 event.
Q Yes.
1 g
A An energy sink.
Q Okay, and given the 3&W design, the 15 next energy sink available after the loss of the 16 steam generator as an energy sink would be the PORV, 17 is that correct?
18 A
That is correct.
And to ny knowledge, probably 19 correct if any.
gg Q
- s there a definition, a commonly accepted definition in the nuclear power plant gy s
industry of what is known as safety equipment?
A Yes, there is.
23 Q
can you tell ne what it is?
04 A
I cannot cite you the definitica, but : can l
n-o E EN.JAMI N R EFC ANG SEavtcE t
l 1
2 Mallay 57 3
cite you the reference.
4 l
Q Yes.
1 5
A Yes, I think : understand that.
6 Q
Cite me the reference and give ne your 7
understanding, g
A The reference would be any safety Class 1,
2 or 3 equipment, as defincd by ANS* Standard 18.2 9
and ANSI 18.2A.
My understanding would be that equipment which is required to safely permit the 11 plant to be safely shut down and maintained in a safe 12 shutdown condition.
13 Q
In the case of a total less of feed, is 14 the PCRV necessary to bring the plant to a safe 15 shutdown condition, in your view?
16 A
No, it is not.
Q What is necessary?
g A
The safety valves and probably the auxiliary feedwater system.
19 Q
We define total loss of feed as including
(
l 20 the auxiliary feed, as well as main feed.
- 1 A
- see.
(
en Q
What would be necessary to bring the l
l 23 plant to a safe shutdown condition?
24 A
Safety valves, and high-pressure infection 1
n.
system, and eventually low-pressure injection system.
.3 1
l SENs MIN R EPCRTING SERVICE 1
1 1
o Mallay 58 Q
Would the safety valves be reached on a primary side without the PORV opening?
A Yes.
5 Q
They would?
6 A
Yes.
Q The code safety valves would lift on the 8
primary side without any opening of the PORV?
9 A
Yes.
10 Q
And theraf re,the PCRV would never become involved, would never come into action in such g
a circumstance?
12 A
well, the set points for the safety valves, of 13 course, are at least 100 psi above the PORV.
I 14 assumed your question was based on the fact that the 15 PORV did not open.
16 Q
No.
17 A
Not that it was not actuated.
18 MR. EDGAR:
That was my understanding.
TEZ WITNESS:
I thought it was quite j
gg clear from your question.
20
)
Q Let me restate it.
You indicated that i
21 b
the code safeties are necessary when you have a total
~
nn
~~
loss of main and auxiliary feed?
23 A
Yes, they are.
24 Q
Tc bring the plant to safe shutdown i
25 condition?
d EN.JAMIN R EPCRTING SEMvicE
i 1
2 Mallay 59 3
A Yes, they are.
They are the design function.
4 The PCRV is not a design function.
It is not a safety class piece of equipment.
a Q
But would the code safeties come into O
play and lift from their seats without the PORV ever 7
having come into play in those circumstances?
8 A
okay.
That is a different question.
9 Q
Consider that a clarification of the 10 question.
i 11 A
If the PORV actuated as designed, the safety i
13 valves would not be expected to open.
Q Or if the safety valves did open and the g
PORV functioned as designed, it also would have 9pened?
15 A
That is :orrect.
16
,1 At a point earlier in time?
1"'
A Prior to when-the safety valves opened, that B
is correct.
19 Q
aecause of the relative set points on gg the code safeties and the PORV?
j A
That is correct.
n, l
.s Q
So would it be accurate to say that to the extent the code safeties are necessary for a n,
safe plant shutdown, and to the extent that the code n.
.9 safeties and the PORV functioned as designed and as e
I j
3ENJAMIN R EPCRTING S ERVICE l
1 n
~
Mallay 60 3
intended, that the PORV would necessarily come into 4
play, would necessarily lift?
5 A
Yes, it would.
6 Q
Would it also be fair to say that to the extent a PCRV now functions, one has a small break 8
LOCA, that it malfunctions open?
9 A
If it is actuated and malfunctions in the open condition and the block valve associated with it 10 I
also not closed, yes,. we would have a small break.
g Q
Now, the definition of safety equipment, as I understani it, is a definition created by the NRC7 13 A
No, it was created by the industry.
14 Q
Has t1
- . AC adopted it by reference, 15 the industry definition?
16 A
No, I don't believe they have.
17 Q
It is just an industry standard?
ig A
Yes.
There is a tacit acceptance of it by virtue of the fact that almost all FSAR's submitted g
by all four major reactor vendors in the United States 20 l
use this system.
21 Q
so if I understand correctly, wt have an
~~
l a situation, assuming the primary side of a plant is "J
l functioning as intended, and assuming a total loss t
l OR of the main and auxiliary feed, there is a situation 25 where, in crder to bring the plant to a safe shutdown f
S ENJAMIN R EPC RD NG SERVICE
1 Mallay 61
~
3 condition, the PCRV will necessarily lift from its 4
seat?
a A
It is not necessary that it open, bu~
l O
actuates properly, it will open.
Q My question is, assuming that all valves 8
function as intended, and assume the code safeties 9
are necessary to bring the plant to a safe shutdown e ndition where there is total loss of feed, then the 10 PORV's will necessarily havs opened by the time the g
code safeties come into play?
A That is correct.
13 Q
And it is also fair to state, is it, j
14 that the code safety valves represent a penetration 15 of the reactor vessels that is its function, correct?
16 A
Yes.
17 Q
And that a failure of it in the open 13 position would establish a small break LOCA?
A Yes, the failure of a code safety valve in the gg open position.
Q The PORV in the open position..would
-i 21 l
establish a small break L3CA7 i
s.
nn A
Yes, under the conditions : specified,sarlier.
~
23 Q
Yes, and yet it is my understanding that n%
at least under the industry standards to which we have i
25 had reference earlier, this PCRV which, at least i
S EN.JAMIN R EPCRTING SERVICE l
l
1
\\
2 Mallay 62 3
under these circu=s ances mus: necessarily come into 4
play if t'he primary systems are functioning as designed, is not regarded as being within the class of safety o
equipment?
A That is correct because it does not have to open.
7 It is not a safety function that it opens.
8 Q
understand that it does not have to 9
open, but the normal expectatien would be that it 10 would open?
11 A
Yes, that is correct.
12 Q
Does it raise a question in your mind where you have a system that must necessarily come g
into play, assuming that it is functioning as intended in the safe shutdown of the plant, that it is not 15 defined as part of the safety system?
16 A
No, as long as it can be isolated, l~
Would it be fair to say that the analysis Q
M which leads to the conclusion.-bu:the'POR7 is not a 19 part of safety system instruments, the PoRv from 20 the perspective that it is not necessary for it to
- function, i.e.,
it is not necessary for it to open 3
,(
for safe plant shutdown, is that correct?
nn.
A That is correct.
It does not have to actuate 23 into the open condition in order for safe operation it or shutdown.
e#
Q 3ut the definition apparently does S EN.JAMIN REPCRTING SERVICE l
1 n
Mallay 63 3
not proceed from the perspective that when PCRV is 4
called into play that a failure of the PORV in the 5
open position and/or failure of operators to block 6
that valve, should it remain in an open position, is not taken in,to account?
A Yes, it is taken into account.
The safety g
analysis --
Q I am referring now to the perspective 10 of the definition in the industry standards.
11 A
Yes, I an using the same perspective; that the 1~*
perspective is that one has to assume an initiating 13 event and a single failure.
14 Q
So we are bounded?
15 A
Yes.
Q Is that correct, by the assumption yg of a single falure?
1,4 A
Yes.
18 MR. EDGAR:
The initial conditions you 19 are giving are conditions representative of a 1
20 single failure, total loss of f eed?
21 THE WITNESS:
The context of the question
,s 22 is that we have a failure, namely the loss of 23 main feedwater, and a single failure, namely less of the auxiliary feedwater.
It is there-34 fore assumed that the PCRV is isolable,
,.3 f
i i
l
{
S ENJAMIN R EPCRTING SEMVICE
)
i 1
Mallay 64 3
Q To the best of your understanding, has 4
a transient analysis and various other kinds of analyses 5
with regard to safety systems generally proceeded ver the years, at least up to now, on a single 6
failure mode, in a single-mode framework?
a A
That is true,but it goes beyond that.
It goes 8
to the extent of assuming consequential failures as 9
a consequence of the accident.
10 In other words, if it creates conditions where 11 other failures occur, then these consequential failures 12 must also be assumed.
It is also assumed that if it t
l D
makes the ace.ident worse, there is loss of powe::,
for example, so it is not simply a single failure, 14 but it is in the context of this single failure la_
conceptually.
16 Q
conceptually it is these consequen=es l~
which necessarily follow?
I 18 A
Yes.
1 1
9 From the single failure?
19 l
20 A
cc reet.
21 Q
And does not incorporate consequences s
which may follow but don't necessarily follow?
n_7 A
That is correct.
Simply because most people view that type of scenario as involving so many combinations as to not be trackable.
)
r.e 25 B EN ! MIN R EPCRTING 5EMvicE
1 1
0 Mallay 65 3
(A brief recess was taken.)
~
4 MR. EOGAR:
Jim is a little concerned 5
about some of the level of questioning, in that the inference might be drawn that he is 6
current and up-to-date as an expert, and he e
may want to make a statement addressing that 8
point.
I mean you are taking a guy that has j
9 Esen away from this stuff for a while and i
10 asking him questions where his knowledge is j
11 rather limited and tangential.
12 MR. ROCK'4 ELL:
Mr. Mallay seems to have D
a perfectly clear conceptual grasp of the i
14 subject.
15 MR. EDGAR:
I am not belittling his 16 ability at all, but he has advised me he would like to say a few words in that respect, if 1 4 that would be proper, for this record.
18 1
Q Mr. Mallay, you are welcome to make any 19 statement you wish.
A Yes.
I believe some of the questioning here ~
- 1
(
is in regard to this specific transient, namely, 22 small breaks and loss of feedwater, with the impli-23 cation that : have current knowledge of such 34 transients.
I cannot claim such current knowledge, l
although in the past I had dealt with many of these o.
3 SENJAMIN R EPCRTIN G S ERVICE
1 a
Mallay 66
~
3 areas.
Although fully stand behind all of the 4
answers I have given you, I do want the answers 5
properly in the context of my non-familiarity with 6
current t e chno lo gy '.
7 Q
For the record, my questions really were directed to conceptual issues relating to fundamental g
design, rather than specific transients.
9 Mr. Mallay, with respect to operating and 10 emergency procedures in use at the operating utilities, 11 is it your understanding that those procedures do 1~*
go through a review process, so that they reflect U
3&W thinking with respect to the appropriate use of 14 its design on the NSS side of the system?
15 A
- am not familiar with how procedures and so n are prepared for the utility, but to the best of
~
16 my understanding, the procedures themselves are pre-pared by the utility.
18 B&W makes certain recommendations on the 19 operation of its equipment in order to protect its 0
warranties.
However, procedures regarding operation
l of the plant its, elf are supplied to the utility only s
22 upon its request, and it is my understanding that i
23 these procedures then are actually written by the i
utility based on 3&W input.
_+
i l
Q Sut the input p =vided by 3&W,to your 1
t I
SENJAMIN REPCRTING Scavicz
1 67 Mallay 3
understanding, w.
.d represent the current best 4
thinking of B&W at the ti=e the input is prov'ided?
3 A
- would certainly hope so.
6 Q
Mr. Mallay, have you made any statement 7
since March 28, 1979 relating to your knowledge or understanding of any of the events surrounding TM: 2 g
or related to your knowledge or understanding of any 9
of the events surrounding the Dunn memorandum, and 10 when I say "a statement," : mean anything that you 11 have reduced to writing or anything which has been 1"
reduced to writing by snucne else based on what ycu
~
O said?
14 A
one further clarification.
All these exhibits 15 that you have shown me I had not had any prior knowledge of, so we can take that completely out of 16 the question.
1.
i Q
?Lne.
18 A
There is at least one piece of information that 19 has been reduced to writing based on my knowledge "O
of the TM: 2 accident and the safety design of OMI 2,
~
'l and that is a report that : prepared for 33R, Babcock
-s l
22 3 own soveri reactor.
l 23 Q
And what was the substance of that report?
A The substance of the report was to summarize l
34
- T"**"* *' ******* *
- F* * ***
" " Y ' **
25 E EN.JAMI N REPC A NG SERVICE p
e y
o w
1 n
~
~
Mallay 68 3
the events occurred, and to point out the design 4
philosophy of TMI 2 with regard to the Muelheim-5 Kaerlich plant being built by saR.
6 Q
When was that report written?
A
- prepared the report and had it published 4
on May 12th of this year.
Q How long is it?
9 A
It is approximately 300 pages.
10 Q
Did you write the entire report?
11 A
Yes, I did.
12 (There was discussion off the record.)
D MR. RCCKWELL:
Could we have a 237 of 14 that, please?
MR. EDGAR:
We will produce it.
15 (There was discussion off the record.)
Q Are there any other statements, as I have 17 defined the term " statement," that you have made since 18 the TMI 2 accident of March 28, 1979?
19 A
Yes, I believe so, within the context of your 20. question.
I have conducted two meetings that come 21 to mind as Chairman of the Nuclear Power Plant s
'~~
23 Standards Committee, in which I have indicated certain actions I thought we:e appropriate within the standards
- 3 organi=ation to be taken as a result of the TM
- 2 accident.
I have not made any statements in these 25 S ENJAMIN R EPCRTING SERVICE
1 2
Mallay 69 3
meetings regarding the course of the accident itself 4
or its cause or anything in that regard, only state-5 ments in ragard to what'is in the public literature 6
and what might be the impact of the accident.
Q Was your summary of actions that might be appropriate reduced to writing in some way?
g A
Yes, there are minutes of both meetings.
9 Q
Could we have minutes of those, too?
i 10 A
Yes.
j 11 Q
Anything else, Mr. Mallay?
1" A
External to B&W or internal?
U Q
Either.
14 A
Yes, there is one other piece of information.
15
- prepared a memo to Russ Ball, again recommending certain actions be taken by B&W as a result of the g
TM 2 accident.
17 Q
Mr. Ball is the head of the technical --
18 This was in the context o' MR. EDGAR:
19
)
the Tec:hnical Review Committee report?
20 THE WITNESS:
Yes.
21 MR. ROCKWELL:
Could we have a copy of
~
22 that, as well?
MR. EDGAR:
Off the record.
i 23
(;here was discussion off the record.)
,4 l
Q Mr. Ball is head of the Technical Review 25 group?
E EN.,1AMI N REPCRTING SEnvict
i 1
~
Mallaf 70 l
3 A
That is correct.
4 Q
I would like to clarify the previous I
5 request that I nade for the final product of the 6
Technical Review group.
We asked for the report.
7 We are interested in seeing all of the working papers g
from which the report was drafted.
While we had been off the record, I have been given the under-9 standing that at least the present intention or present structure of the report will include as an 11 appendix all of the working papers submitted to the 10 Technical Review group from which the report is written.
14 When that report is furnished to us, we would 15 request that the appendix be furnished.
At the same 16 time, if the plan is changed and such appendix is not attached, we would still request all working g.
papers.
MR. EDGAK:
Yes.
19 Q
Mr. Mallay, are there any other statements 00 that you have made, other than the ones we have-now-
- 1 reviewed?
22 A
Not that I currently recall.
23 Q
You haven't been interviewed by the NRc7 l
l l
24 A
I have acu been interviewed by the NRC.
Q Cr given any testimony?
n.
\\
EEN ! AMIN N E;80RTING SERVICE i
y y
-r---
e-T w
e-
1 n
Mallay 71 A
- have not given any testimony before anybody.
3 MR. EDGAR:
I would like to ask a few questions if I might.
5 MR. ROCKWILL:
All right.
6 CRCSS EXAMINATION 7
BY MR. EDGAR:
g Q
Mr. Mallay, earlier on you indicated that when you were working in transient analysis 9
or safety analysis, there were no calculations per-10
~
formed on the actual transients.
What was the base 11 of operating experience at the time that you were l'
~
deice that work?
U A
At the time I was doing the work, there were 14 only'a few reactors operating -- Con Ed, Dresden, 15 Shippingsport, one of the Yankee reactors in the
- * ** * *
- i ' l *
- i" -
16 Q
Were there any B&W reactors from which 1.
meaningful transient analysis could be performed?
A The only operating B&W reactor was Indian Point 1, 19 and to my knowledge, there were re eransients that -
3 were worthwhile in terms of benchcarking.-
"1 Q
Are you familiar with current practices s
02 within B&W today as to benchmarking?
l 23 A
No, I'm not.
g4 Q
Are you familiar with the arrange =ents that B&W has had with each of its utility customers o,_a SENJAMlN R EPCRTING SERVICE
1 2
~
Mallay 72 3
with respect to preparation of operating and emergency procedures?
4 A
No, I am not.
O Q
- n particular, are you familiar with the 6
arrangements on TM: 27 A
No, I am not.
3 Q
Are you familiar with the details of the 9
existing procedure for preliminary safety concerns 10 within asW7 11 A
do not have detailed knowledge of it.
However; am familiar with the fact that it is posted on in several of our bulletin boards here.
MR. EDGAR:
That is all I have.
14 MR. ROCKWELL:
Can I have a copy of what 15 is presently posted on hulletin boards here?
16 MR. EDGAR:
Sure.
II REDIRECT EXAMINATION 18 BY MR. RCCI*dE* L :
19 Q
Mr. Mallay, who was the person who took over the Licensing Section when you departed in 19757 20 A
Mr. Suhrke.
Q And did he remain as manager of the~
an.
section until Mr. Taylor took over?
23 A '
That is correct.
24 Q
Was he acting manager or was he manager?
25 S ENJAMIN R EPCRTING SEMVICE
~
l n
Mallay 73
~
3 A
No, he was the manager.
He was appointed as 4
manager of Licensing.
5 MR. ROCKWELL:
Mr. Mallay, we will recess
\\
6 your deposition now, and we are recessing it rather than adjourning it, so that we may recall you for further testimony should the need arise.
We would advise your counsel, and 9
he in turn would advise you, if we need such 10 additional testimony.
11 Thank you.
12 MR. EDGAR:
Do you have any present D
intention of calling him for additional 14 testimony?
MR. ROCKWELL:
We don't have any present la.
intention, but that doesn't preclude that we may develop a present intention in the future 17 or a future intention in the present.
18 (The deposition recessed at 11:00 a.m.)
19 3
3Eles~iiiicIs~5IIII'~~~
21 Subscribed and sworn to i
s before me this ___ day n,
Cf.__.....__..
1979-23 24 Notary Public 25 l
I S ENJAMIN R EPCRTING SERVICE l
l l
Q M
1 74 2
-N-D-E-X
'13D2!!
Digeg3 Cgoas Ref((gg3 d
3 4
James Francis Mallay 3
71 72 5
6 7
E-X-H-I -T-S 8
9 MALLAY DEPOSIT:l:QN FOR IDENTIFICATION PAGE 10 11 107 Resume of James Francis Mallay 3
12 13 ooo 14 15 16 17 18 19 21 1s 24 SENAMIN R EPQRTING SENVICE
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2 75 s: ATE oF NEW YORK
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3
) ss.:
COUNTT OF NEW YORK )
4 We, STANLEY RUDBARG, certified Shorthand 5
Reporter and Notary Public, and ROBERT :ZRKIN, 6
Notary Public, of the State of New York, do hereby certify that the foregoing deposition of BABCOCK & WILCOX by JAMES FRANCIS MALLAY 8
was taken before us on the 7th day of July 1979.
9 The said witness was duly sworn before the 10 commencement of his testimony.
The said testimony 1
was taken stenographically by ourselves and gy then transcribed.
12 j
The within transcript is a true record g
of the said deposition.
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15 any of the said parties nor interested directly 16 or indirectly in the matter in controversyi nor are we in the employ of any of the counsel.
g.
18 IN WITNESS WHE REOF, we have hereunto set gg our hands this,3u' day of July 1979.
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STANLEY AFDBARG, CSR.
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ROBERT ERKIN 24 25 1
S EN.JAMIN REPCR !NG S ERVICE
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e James F. M411ay Scre.:
ece..er 3, 1726. "orristcwn.
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EXPE4!!'iCI 3/77 - Presen:
8r: gram Manager. SER. Resconsible for tru arte:ing anc p
proja:: management of engineering services to 25A. a ;artly-
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cwned Ge nan Oce.cany of S&W.
5/75 - 7/77 Manager. Liquic Metal Fas 3reecer Reacter ::::enents.
Ressonsible for the cesign anc analysis of all =reece*
c:::enents at :ne Sacc::t & wticox C:r:any. Akren. Ohic.
3/71 - 4/75 Manager. Licensing. 31W. Res:ensible f:r all nuclear
=cwee plan: li:ensing a::1vittes wita :ne NRC. wslic nearing Ocar:5 anc :us::mers, inclucing :ne pre: ara:1cn
- f licensing re: orts anc strategy. *eore m :ing 31W :ef:re regulatory agencies, anc interpreting regula:icns.
5/ 63 - 7/ 71 Manager. Safety Analysis in tee Nuclear power Generatic, Diviston of 23W in Lynencurg. Virginia. Res:enst31e 'o*
all ac:1 cent analysis and ractation protection analysts for all nuclear ;cwer plants.
4/65 - 5/63 Lesc Enginee* in Safety Analysis.
m 9/6 7 - 6/ 71
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Le::urse in : e 3racuate Iencot f Lynen:urg 0011e;e. !A in teactor :ntrol ineory anc Aes::ar ?hyst:s i::ncurren; with :ne 3&n assignrent).
4/52 - 3/55 Unite: States Ar7. attaining ne rank Of a:: sin. Ser'rea in :ne ca:a:t:y of researca nuclear :nysic1st.
9/61 - 3/62 Ingineer in C:erati:nal Analysis See: ton in :ne A :mi:
j Energy Division of S&W i.ynen:veg. 71r; inia.
i IUCA?!01 9/55 - 5/59
!acceler of Science in v :nant:si Ing meertag. va e
Lauce, witn ncnors, at Laf aye::e College Eas::n gna M
?encsylva-ta.
1/fi - 6/61 Master of Sciente in 't. clear Engineertng a: Massa:=usetts Ins:1:Ute of te:nnology. Caro *i:;e. 'assa: usetts.n:e a 1
Nati:*ai 1:ter:e Founca:1:n Fell wsnia.
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American Nuclear Scciety Ameri:an Sc:1ety of Meenant:a1 Inginee-s Tau Be:a 81
-.l a w e gg friSua<ana epste*ec :- fessiona,,ngtreer in :nto snc 'lirginia 1
Merican Men Of I:1ence e.
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