ML19308C376
| ML19308C376 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/23/1979 |
| From: | Desiree Davis NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE, TERA CORP. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001230344 | |
| Download: ML19308C376 (39) | |
Text
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N U CLE A R R E G U L ATO R't CO MMIS SIO N f
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IN THE MATTER OF:
THREE MILE, ISLAND ur i
SPECIAL INQUIRY l
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DEPOSITION OF DONALD K.
DAVIS O
Place - Berkeley, California 1
Date - Sunday, September 23, 1979 Pages 1 - 39 23hN bs$$bkb
(:c:1347 37co ACE - FED ERAI. REPORTERS,INC.
OfficalReporters 14 t North Ccpitol Street 8 0 012 3 pgq Washingten, D.C. 20001 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE. DAILY f
1 BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSICN 2
SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP FOR 3
THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT
. rf~)
J LSt!}SITION OF DONALD K. DAVIS, taken by Special 5
6 Inquiry Group for Three Mile Island Accident, pursuant to 7
Notice, in Suite 1200, 2150 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, 8
California, on Sunday, September 23, 1979, commencing at 9
4:00 o' clock p.m.
10 APPEARANCES 11 ROBERT CHIN, Esq.,
ROBERT BERNERO, 12 Special Inquiry Group for Three Mile Island Accident, 13 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
(({}
Washington, D.C. 20555 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 i
22 c) 23 24 25 l
I
2 1
E2EIEEll 2
UI DIESSES :
DIRECT CROSS REDIRECT _
RECROSS 3
Donald K. Davis 3
7 4
U 5
6 7
EXHIBITS 8
NUEGER MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION 9
Davis Exhibit No. 1 3
10 Davis Exhibit No. 2 4
11 12 13
,f U
15 16 17 18 19 20 21
(.. '
23 24 25 l
l l
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3 I
MR. BERNER0:
On the record.
2 Mr. Davis, as you can see from this letter, I have 3
been given the authority to take depositions in this inquiry.
4 DONALD K. DAVIS, 5
of lawful age, being produced, sworn and examined on the 6
part of the Commission, deposeth and saith:
7 DIRECT EXAMINATION 8
BY MR. CHIN :
l 9
Q.
Mr. Davis, let me show you a document marked Ex-
.0 hibit No.1.
Is this a copy of the letter the Special Inquiry 11 Group of the N.R.C. sent you regarding your deposition here 12 today?
13 A.
Yes.
(\\ j 14 (THEREUPON A IAln.R WAS MARKED BY THE REPORTER 15 AS SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP, DAVIS EXHIBIT No. 1 FOR 16 IDENTIFICATION.)
17
- BY 4E. CHIN :
18 Q.
Have you read the ~ document in full?
19 A.
Yes.
20 Q.
Do you understand the information contained in the 21 letter, including the general purposes of this inquiry and 22 g
your right to have an attorney present and the fact that what h7 23 you say here today will eventually beccme public?
24 A.
Yes, to all three questions.
25 Q.
Mr. Davis, is counsel representing you here person-
l 4
I ally today?
2 A.
No.
3 MR. CHIN:
I would like to note for the record d
o that the witness is not being represented by counsel today.
u) 5 BY MR. CHIN:
6 Q.
Mr. Davis, if at any time during this inquiry you 7
feel a need for counsel or feel you need counsel present, 8
please advise and we will stop this inquiry this morning and 9
allow you to make arrangements.
Is that agreeable with you?
10 A.
Yes.
Il Q.
Mr. Davis, did you bring a resume to this deposi-12 tion?
13 A.
Yes.
(
14 Q.
Is this document, a two-page document, entitled 15 Don K. Davis, a copy of that resume?
16 A.
Yes, it is.
17 Q.
Does this resume accurately summarize your educa-18 tional and employment history?
19 A.
Yes.
20 MR. CHIN:
It 's marked Exhibit No. 2.
21 (THEREUPON A RESUME WAS MARKED BY THE REPORTER l
22 AS SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP, DAVIS ' EXHIBIT NO. 2 FOR g) m/
23 IDENTIFICATION.)
24 MR. CHIN:
1 hank you.
Mr. Bernero.
25 BY MR. BERNERO:
l L
J
5 I
Q.
Mr. Davis, I would like to go through some parti-2 cular questions, related to the T.M.I. accident in respense 3
to it, 4
When did you first hear of the T.M.I. accident?
r-
\\..b) 5 A.
Wednesday morning, about 8 or 8:15.
6 Q.
Would you please describe the sequence of your 7
involvement with the T.M.I. response on that first Wednesday?
8 A.
The first Wednesday, someone notified me in my of-9 fice that I was needed in Eisenhut's office to--
10 MR. CHIN :
Would the witness spell Eisenhut?
11 THE WITNESS:
E-i-s-e-n-h-u-t.
I went there and 12 at that time was told that the Incident Center and East-West 13 Highway was being activated and I was to provide scme consult-
! %)
14 ing in Eisenhut's office to the Incident Center.
15 The rest of that day, the effort was largely talk-16 ing to the Incident Center, Carl Berlinger or others there, 17 being relayed, various plant parameters and some information 18 as to what was going on, both at the Incident Center and at 19 the Three Mile Island facility; callig other engineers ir.
i 20 from the staff to find out various design information, and 21 phone calls with B. and W. to find out their knowledge of what 22 was going on.
g) z.)
23 At about 4 to 5 o' clock, Eisenhut and I left the 24 office and met a group of people to go to the Incident Center 25 and assist there.
6 I
BY MR. BERNERO:
2 Q.
Then, were you there through the evening?
3 A.
I was there for quite awhile.
I was there until 4
A at least 11 or 12 and I think I went home sometime for WJ 5
several hours sleep, because at that time we had scheduled a 6
meeting with the Commission and Udall subcommittee and I was 7
supposed to assist in some way with that meeting; at least 8
be present there for those meetings.
9 So, I went home for two or three hours sleep and 10 then rame br:.k in the morning.
Il Q.
Lat I would like to do first is just reconstruct 12 the chronology of your involvement through those days and 13 then we will go back and talk in substance about what was O
(L/
ja happening.
15 A.
My memory is very fuzzy.
It all runs together 16 after awhile.
17 Q.
Certainly.
18 A.
I think I may have had--
19
-Q.
So, then, you went home during the night between 20 Wednesday and Thursday for several hours, perhaps; came back 21 in, completed preparations for the Commission meeting--
22 A.
Actually, yes, I can't remember actually when it g
23 was determined there would be a Commission meeting and then 24 the Udall subcommittee meeting, because there was some con-25 troversy about which would occur first and the precise arrang e-l t
7 I
ment.
But it was clear there was going to be some sort of 2
a formal meeting throughout the night, Wednesday night.
At 3
-least a couple of commissioners were there, in any event.
4 fp Q.
After you--you were present at the Commission meet-(V 5
ing and the Udall hearing the next day and then did you go 6
back to the I.R.C.?
7 A.
Then I went back to the I.R.C. and I think actually 8
as it turns out, I stayed at the I.R.C. all the way through 9
Thursday and Thursday night, Friday and must have left about 10 2 or 3 in the afternoon, shortly after--let's see, was it 11 Friday, the day that Denton and the people went up to the 12 site?
13 9.
Yes.
((
)
Id A.
I went two or three hours after they left and went 15 back to get some sleep.
Then I came back about 12 o' clock 16 Saturday or some time.
The hours--or Friday, midnight, some-17 thing like that, I picked up a few hours sleep and went 18 back.
19 The process we were oing under was that we tried o
20 to get a few hours sleep and then Eisenhut, Grimes and I would 21 try to rotate and be in the Incident Center.
22
,n MR. CHIN:: Off the record.
('x)
./
23 (Discussion off the record.)
24 MR. CHIN:
On the record.
I 25 BY MR. BERNERO:
i
8 1
0.
Were you trading shifts then?
2 A.
Yes.
3
.Q.
With who else, now?
4 A.
The first several days, it was Eisenhut, Grimes and
, (~)
VV 5
myself and basically we would be there, one of us would be 6
there all the time and, of course, there was usually a few 7
hours overlap.
G Sometimes we would get off site, where there would 9
be a 12-hour overlap and it would really mess things up.
But 10 we eventually prepared little staffing rosters of the In-11 cident Center and generally there was someone, either one of 12 the three of us in charge of the N.N.R. staff.
13 Then there were usually two groups, a radiological Ib,_
~
14 team and a systems team and that's how we tried to staff the 15 N.N.R. aspects of it.
16 Occasionally, I remember several nights that the 17 when one of the senior managers would not be there.
They 18 would appoint one of us to act for the E.M.T. on that 19 shift.
20 Q.
Let me take from that point and go forward.
At the 21 time of the accident, were you familiar with the N.R.C.
22 emergency procedures?
g~s h'[)
~
23 A.
No.
24 Q.
Did you know what the E.M.T. and the I.R.A.C.T.
25 were?
9 1
A.
I didn't know those acronyms.
I knew in Eastwcod 2
Towers there was an Incident Center.
I had not been there, 3
-but I-knew there-was such a center.
[]}
4 Q.
When you were over at the Incident Response Center, 5
did you perceive a difference between the E.M.T. in that 6
central room with the fancy telephone and the support team 7
or I.R.A.C.T.?
8 A.
Yes, there was a difference.
It was more sharp 9
at some times than others, but in general there wasalways 10 a distinction between the senior management and the support 11 group.
12 Q.
So you felt it did ficw as support, giving informa-13 tion to the E.M.T. ?
(I) 14 A.
Sure, in fact we even locked the doors occasional-15 ly.
16 Q.
And you mentioned occasionally one of you had to 17 sit in for the E.M.T. member?
18 A.
Yes.
19 Q.
Who would be the norma'. E.M.T. member for you?
20 A.
Normally--
21 Q.
Well, when you were there, who would be absent that 22
{]
would warrant you to sit in?
(((
23 A.
Normally, I suppose, we would report up through 24
-CASE for much of the duration, because Denton wasn't really 25 there that often, especially after Mattson and Stello went to l
t I
~.
10 1
the site.
2 Usually Gossick was in charge of the E.M.T. and 3
if he weren't there, he would either have Case or John Davis 4
act as E.M.T.
5 Occasionally, neither of those three people would 6
be there, in which case usually if I were on shift, I would 7
be designated E.M.T. or potentially someone from I.N.E. who 8
would be one of the division directors.
9 Q.
You seem to be describing a pattern of management 10 where people were responding in their normal chain of manage-4 11 ment.
The N.R.R. people reported to N.R.R. people or stood 12 in for N.R.R. people ?
13 A.
That was somewhat true, but it was rather informal (O
14 and we would generally work colleagually with I.N.E. and the 15 other people that were there.
16 If there was a decision needed, we would jointly 17 reach it.
We would ef fect the decision,so it wasn't complete-18 ly organizational.
In fact, if anything, I would say in 19 terms of calling additional resources, there were no bcunds.
20 If John Davis or someone had a question and they l
21 thought anybody could answer it, they would ask it.
There 22 p
wasn!t a formal line.
I 23 However, if there were an issue of substance, then 24 the organizational lines were to be followed.
25 Q.
The E.M.T., when you were present, was headed by
11 1
Gossick ?
2 A.
It would vary.
3 Q.
Who might -be a substitute for him when he wasn't d
there?
5 A.
Actually, as I said before, either Case or. John 6
Davis.
7 Q.
Were people in your branch of N.R.R. at that time 8
heavily involved as you were with the T.M.I. response?
9 A.
My branch?
10 Q.
- Yes, 11 A.
The branch I had responsibility over?
12 Q.
Yes.
13 A.
None.
O 14 Q.
No, they weren't?
15 A.
I would later find a few of them had some perpheral 16 involvement.
17 Q.
But not as heavily.
I was specifically looking for I8 someone who was as deeply involved.
19 In your opinion, from your experience in the T.M.I.
20 response, is it practical for N.R.C. to set up a special 21 management structure for emergency response?
22 i
n
.A.
It s possible.
You saypractical?
It would be some-(L) d 23 what difficult in that the decisions are basically agency 24 decisions and it would require the upper managers to all agree 25 to delegate their legal type responsibilities to some ot.her I
12 I
group.
I think it's possible and practical.
I den 't know 2
whether they would do it or not.
3 0
O.K.,
let's turn to some of the more technical 4
f {)
questions now, w/
5 On that first day, Wednesday the 28th, could you 6
describe how you participated in the initial appraisal of 7
the plant's condition?
8 A.
I would say until 5 o' clock, I was more of an cb-9 served in trying _
ingest what very few bits and pieces of 10 information we had gotten.
Il When we went over to the Incident Center, I began 12 to get more information and digest more of it myself.
I 13 don't believe I was effectively in an analyzing mode until
('u,/
14 later that evening.
15 Q.
When you first went to the Incident Resporse Center 16 at 4 to 5 p.m..,
did you and Eisenhut immediately sit dcwn 17 and discuss the matter with Stello?
I8 A.
There were some discussions when we arrived with 19 Stello and others, Denton I think.
But we were still, as you 20 recall the scenario, the accident was not really terminated 21 until around 7:30 that night.
22 So, people weren't sitting around talking in any 23 kind of structured manner until, really, days later.
There 24 were bits and pieces of conversations, but people were still 25 on the earphones to control room and communici: ions were still
~
13 1
coming through rather poorly in terms of the audio and infor-2 mation and I think it wasn't clear, until 7:30 or so, that 3
-the, incident was terminated.
4 C.
When you arrived at the Incident Response Center M(3 5
were you present, by any chance, to overhear a conversation 6
by Vic Stello with the site and later with the Commissicn 7
about the core being uncovered?
8 A.
I don't really recall a specific conversation like 9
that.
It's possible.
10 Q.
Do you recall discussing the concern about the 11 core being uncovered?
12 A.
I don't really recall that.
I can only reflect 13 back over my impressions and assume those words would have (i]
14 triggered, maybe, a little more realization on my part, as 15 to the degree to which the core was damaged.
16 So, I don't really recall those words used.
17 Q.
Was superheated steam temperature being discussed?
18 A.
Definitely.
19 Q.
Definitely?
20 A.
Yes, in fact that was a concern on Wednesday night- -
21 well, Wednesday afternoon, because it became obvious during gs the course of Wednesday afternoon the outlet thermo couples 22 b3 23 were superheated.
That, I think, was what triggered most 24 people into believing there was something fairly significant l
1 25 was wrong.
14 1
c.
Was the discussion about core damage in that first day using the terminology or the sense of fuel failure rather 2
3 than fuel damage?
4 A.
I can't remember if I discussed this you on the 5
phone or not, but sometime after the incident, maybe a couple 6
of weeks, I was talking with Stello and we were trying to 7
basically just discuss the incident.
8 He seemed to make a big differentiation in his 9
mind between fuel damage and fuel failure in that one would 10 imply greater damage than the other.
11 He indicated he thought he used fuel damage the 12 first day or two to describe the condition of the core.
13 Even if he had used fuel damage, I'm not sure it would have c0 14 triggered a different meaning in my mind than fuel failure.
15 So, if that's responsive to your question, that's 16 the best I can recall.
17 Q.
On that first afternoon when you got over there, 18 did you sense any concensus in the N.R.C. staff as to what 19 the most desirable plant operation would be to cool the core?
20 This is when you got over to the N.R.C., before the incident 21 was terminated.
I 22 A.
Everybody expected Wednesday night, by 7:30, that p
(.d
-)
23 by 10 or 12 we would be in cold shutdown condition.
In fact, 24
- 1. stayed over there for much longer than I was really needed 25 initially, compared to the amount of sleep I needed, because t
15 1
we were waiting for it to be in cold shutdown and the Com-2 missioners were very interested in when it would reach 3
cold shutdown.
4 f (
Q.
May I hold you up for a moment.
By cold shutdown, d
5 do you mean to go on the decay heat removal system?
6 A.
Right.
7 Q.
And consequently to depresaurize the plant?
8 A.
Right, everybody expected that initially, at least 9
the first day.
In fact, if I recall in the Canmission meet-10 ing and it 's fuzzy.
I can't really recall when it was that 11 we concluded that wasn't the prudent thing to do.
12 Q.
I can refresh your memory. The Commission meeting 13 discussed cold shutdown or decay heat removal system as the V
14 next orderly step.
15 Did you personally participate in the preparations 16 for that briefing on the 29th?
17 A.
I must have, since I was down there, but I don't 18 recall what I did, if anything.
I'm just trying to think 19 what kind of hard information we had.
We 'd drawn some hand 20 figures of what the piping system looked like, but that's 21 about it.
22 3
I recall, for example, in terms of preparing for the (Q.;
23 meeting that one of the things I wanted early on was more 24 information about what happened in the first four hours, be-25
..cause I was. concerned that I could not analyze or diagnose the
16 1
incident well without understanding what happened in the 2
first four hours.
3 I-pushed people to try to get some information in 4
the first four hours.
There was reluctance for people at
,dp
\\
S headquarters to ask the people at the site for information, 6
because of a concern that the plant wasn't in a stable condi-7 tin and it may not be proper to start in pursuing some sort 8,
of an investigation.
9 Q.
Did you hear complaints within the I.R.C. or field 10 a complaint yourself that the information we were gett/.ag 11 from the site wasn't coherant, that it was piecemeal?
12 A.
Oh, yes, I guess we all had that complaint.
On 13 the other hand, the information was, to a large degree, what b
14 was asked, the answers to questions.
15 Q.
And the questions were being asked piecemeal?
16 A.
Right.
17 Q.
Did you hear, other than what you just said about 18 research'in the first four hours, did you hear of any attempt 19 to instruct the I.E. people on site to develop a more coherant 20 bodyof information?
21 A.
I think I was the one, as I recall it, that pushed 22 them the most and that was the idea of trying to get plots
.I 23 or hard data as to what any of the plant parameters were, 24 numbers.
25
.And, two, to try to reconstruct, at lease to some l
n
17 1
degree what the sequence of events was that led to the in-2 cident.
3 I think it was--I finally convinced Norm Moseley to pursue it and he pursued it with a plan, but it was still S
quite awhile before we got anything.
6
?.
Who was the most resistant to pressing the plant 7
for this sort of information?
A.
I don't know there was any one person.
I think it 9
was a general thought that the people at the site were proba-10 bly very busy, very concerned, and they didn't want to start II interrogating them at this time.
12 On the other hand, my view was it should be done 13 fx not in an interrogating type manner, but eventually people (O
14 seem to have adopted that approach.
15 I can't remember when, but I don't believe we got 16 what I call good information until, final.ly, we got some I7 charts of plant parameters and that was several days after-I8 wards.
I' That's what led to the initial sequence of events 20 that I put together with Tom Telford and, basically, once we 21 diagnosed the causes of the incident, then we came up with 22
]
the recommendations for the bulletin, what should be in the 23 first set of bulletins that went out.
24 Q.
This sequence of events you refer to was the one 25 L
that was prepared for the Commission briefing the following I
j week?
I
18 I
A.
Yes.
2 Q.
Approximately, on April 3rd, I think it was, or 3
2nd?
d A.
I don't know.
5 Q.
The first sequence of events--
6 A.
I think that was a Monday and it seems like Sunday 7
was the day.
We worked on Saturday and Sunday.
I know we 8
had to clear it through the site and we sent down there and 9
Carl Seyfric was the party down there reviewing the informa-10 tion in terms of its accuracy.
11 Q.
If we go back to the Commission briefing of Thurs-12 day, March 29, I will characterize that briefing as saying 13 that we really don't know what happened to the plant. We 14 really don't know what condition the plant is in right now, 15 but we are greatly relieved that it's stabilized.
16 Perhaps that's overdrawing it.
Let me ask you.
17 Did you, as a participant, have great misgivings about the I8 status of the plant at that time?
19 A.
I guess my posture was more one of ignorance.
It 20 seemed to be fairly premature to hold any kind of technical 21 discussion or any kind of definitive briefing that early.
q We were, obviously, required to have the briefing 22 C"Y 2a and it did seem to occupy a fair amount of people's time 24 that were really the same people that would have to diagnose 25 the incident and eventually come to grips with all the after-
7)
I effects, because it took almost all day, eight hours.
2 Q.
For both briefings?
3
-A.
Ue went to the Udall =ceting and obviously they
([{
sent down people they thought were at least fairly knowledg-5 able about what was going on.
That left out quite a few 6
other people, so in my view, it was largely an area we really 7
didn't understand.
8 In fact, that was the reason I pushed most of us 9
so hard to try to get some more information.
I felt somewhat 10 embarrassed not being able to answer a simply questien like, Il "What happened?"
"What started this all?"
12 It turns out nobody asked the question, as I recall, 13 but it did seem to me a rather obvious questien for somebody Q
I4 to ask.
It was hard to understand how we couldn't answer this 15 simple questic 16 Q.
A brief question in passing, in the N.R.R. principal 17 staff involved in the T.M.I. response, am I correct in assum-18 ing you were probably the most familiar with B. and W. plant l9 systems?
20 A.
I think Roger Mattson had a fair familiarity with 21 them.
We worked together when he was a technical reviewer 22 on licensing a couple of B. and W. facilities.
Denny Ross, 23 when he came over, was pretty familiar with them.
24 I guess I would be one of the ones that were more 25 familiar with the der. ails of the B. and W. design.
Whether I
20 1
would be the most familiar, I don't know if that's the case 2
or not.
3 g,
Let's turn to another aspect of technical questions
<T3 4
When did you realize for the first time that the reactor O
5 coolant system contained a large volcme of ncn-condensible 6
gas?
7 A.
It seemed to me it must have cccurred sometime 8
Thursday, I woulc assume, because that's when we all begcr.
9 to understand the reluctance to go cold shutdown and ccupied 10 with it the radioactive inventory.
11 So, I don't recall any specific time.
I would 12 certainly say by Friday morning, but maybe you cculd refresh 13 me with some other information.
7~
.v 14 0.
No, I can't point to any single milestone that 15 would refresh your memory, but as you began to perceive--
16 A.
The way I found out, the way I understood it the 17 first time, -were the operators were saying the system felt 18 scrungy anddidn't feel solid, didn't feel right.
19 They actually said enat Wednesday afternoon during 20 the day.
They knew something was wrong, because it didn't 21 feel right.
22 Whether and how long it took before we realized fs h'
23 that was noncondensible versus something else, some other 24 condition, instruments or whatnot, I don't really know.
25 Q.
There are conversations that used the term spongy
21 1
and into Thursday where the volume of gas was being measured, 2
finally.
3 With your knowledge of the plant and its systems,
' ('..'(.v^)
did you perceive at the outset how they might remove the gas?
5 A.
At the outset, it's not clear to me.
What do you 6
mean by that?
7 9.
When you realized there was gas, how did you think 8
it would be removed?
9 A.
I don't know whether I independently thought of it 10 or not, or whether it was presen-ted at the same time, they 11 were using a. letdown system and the pressurizer to separate 12 the gas.
13 I know we had looked for other paths.
A tremendous 14 effort wsnt into looking for other paths to relieve the gas, 15 including the control rod drive, overheating--
16 Q.
But basically you foresaw variations on conventional 17 degassing versus any exotic method?
18 A.
There were a lot of exotic methods proposed, too, 19 snaking things around and blowing out the control rod drives 20 and things like that.
21 I know early-on, I recommended to B. and W. to 22 develop emergency procedures for blowing out the seals on the
'("
23 l
pumps in case it were needed to depressurize, but that didn't l
l 24 really tie into the bubble.
25 Q.
In tie discussions you had on methods or means to l
l
22 I
remove the gas, you were probably discussing this with sys-2 tems people for the most part?
3 A.
.Yes.
d
([O Q.
Weren't there any attendant discussions about the 5
radioactivity content of the gas being removed and where it 6
was going?
7 A.
Radioactivity in the gas?
8 Q.
Yes.
9 A.
No, not too much.
The only time was the one in-10 cident where they had isolated letdown and they created the II 1.2-R per hour plume over the plant.
12 C.
This is the Friday morning one that caused the 13 great consternation?
(
I4
-A.
Right.
That was obviously related to the systems 15 operability and cooling function and even though it was being 16 released to the environment, I recall at the time the dis-I7 cussions being that versus isolating he pump, which didn't 18 potential problem of appear to be prudent, because of u.
s 19 trying to restart the pump.
20 So even if, you know, I don't think there was a 21 whole lot of discussion where it was going to be contained, 22 but I guess that was one of the reasons why the concern about mbb 23 getting the recombiner going.
l 24 One of the first big issues at the plant was to 25 send them some lead so they could shield the recombiner and
get it started.
2 0.
And start the pump back system so this vented gas 3
could go--
A.
For whatever reason.
The idea was it seemed to be 5
a reasonable thing to get the recombiner on there and oper-6 able.
But I don't think there was much concern.
Containment 7
was obviously tight and most of the pressurizer leak was 8
going in there.
9 I guess I just assumed it was normal waste gasses 10 that was functioning reasonably well.
Then Friday morning, it was obvious it wasn't functioning all that well and we 12 didn't have a whole lot of discussions about that.
I3 Q..
When you heard'of that l','200 mrem per-hour plume
'{
14 are you saying you feltno great concern about the size of 15 that release?
16 A.
No, I thin!< it was a matter of concern, but if it 17 was that or risking terminating ecoling to the core, it seemec 18 the thing to do was to continue cooling to the ccre and ob-19 viously, everybody was frantically trying to get the makeup 20 system back on line and working, the letdown system.
21 It seemed to be clogging.
2 O
Q.
Let us pursue the gas question a little bit and 23
,then go-on to the evacuation issues.
24 During the discussions when it was realized there 25 was a large volume of gas in the reactor coolant system, de l
i
--g-
24 I
you recall discussions including consideration of oxygen 2
being present or formed in that?
3 A.
Yes.
4
'/3 Q.
Could you recount when you think that discussion t
5 came up?
6 A,
Ie s all very fuzzy in my head exactly when.
It 7
seemed to me the first inclination was really, maybe, on 8
Thursday, when Steve Hanauer came back.
He was on a trip.
9 Q.
Steve didn't come back until Saturday morning.
10 A.
Are you sure he didn't come back until Saturday Il morning?
12 0.
Yes, Steve Hanauer returned to town at 2 a.m.
13 Saturday and came straight to the Incident Response C4:nter.
( ")
Id A.
Andthen he stayed a few hours?
15 Q.
No, he stayed until the following day--no, you are 16 right.
He stayed for a few hours, went home to sleep and 17 came back later in the afternoon and stayed through until 18 Sunday.
19 A.
It seemed like he would have been there earlier 20 than that.
The oxygen question, I guess, the way it was 21 staffed out, it wasn't really a responsibility of mine when 22 it became a real' concern.
(
23 As I understood it, Ed Case had basically assigned 24 with Gossick, the responsiblity for hydrogen-oxygen, the l
25 whole bubble issue to Research.
Then later I understood that
25 1
Mattson had been somewhat involved with Tedesco, but I 2
didn't get involved in detail with this.
3 I do recall when, one conversation--well, I rec.11 7m 4
Mattson, before he left for the site, trying to staff out
'O 5
with Research people and some other people what were the 6
concensus or colleagural numbers on hydrogen-oxygen in the 7
bubble before he left.
8 He never got resolution and, therefore, they called 9
back when he and Hendrie were in the car going down there 10 and Bob Budnit had a conversation with them.
11 That was when I first realized the import people 12 were really putting on this explosion potential.
13 About that time, it seemed to me they were ccming I,U 14 up with about the same answers, all without any consideration 15 of recombination in the reactor coolant system, which is in 16 a specialty area, but as I recall, I did talk to someone who 17 was doing that, either Murley or Levine saying they ought to 18 consider whether there was any oxygen in the bubble, versus 19 any hydrogen.
20 Q.
During that time of hydrogen-oxygen discussions, i
21 did you have any conversations with Babcock and Wilcox, in 22 particularly Don Nitti?
23 A.
We talked about this over the phone.
I don't re-24 call any specific conversation.
I have a vague impression 25 that Hanauer and I talked about various things.
I think
26 I
maybe it was part of what he was putting together for the 2
Commission with assessment-type models.
3 It-seems, the -only thing that 's cicar, is that 4
(
Hanauer and I talked about hydrogen and oxygen and then com-5 ing to the conclusion that it didn't look like much of a 6
problem, because that's the normal way P.W.R.'s operate, 7
hydrogen pressure to prevent oxygen being formed.
8 That's about all I recall.
At that time, it would 9
have been consistent with the normal mode of operation to 10 call somebody else, like B. and W., and ask them if they had Il done any calculations in that area.
12 It's all supposition, but there could have been a 13 conversation at that time I don 't recall one.
I recall (Q
other conversations with Nitti in the course oh the incident.
I4 15 I'm not exactly sure on what issue, but I know we talked 16 about sending in samples to analyze, because he was in charge 17 of the chemistry ' lab there.
18 I'm sure we talked to him about other chemistry-19 related issues.
It turns out the N.R.C. staff was rather 1
20 weak in chemists, so most of the advice was coming from 21 other people.
22 l
-s Q.
That brings me to another opinion I would like to h-.
23 seek.
Do you, in your personal opinion, think the N.R.C.
24 response to this issue of whether or not there could be 25 hydrogren and oxygen present, to constitute a hazard, whether
27 I
it would have beendifferent and better if N.R.C. had a 2
technical group with clear acknowledged expertise in coolant 3
chemistry?
d
(.Q A.
Yes, definitely.
5 Q..
Let's turn to the subject of evacuation.
On the 6
first day, the Wednesday, March 28th, were you present at 7
or a party to any discussions about evacuation?
8 A.
This was Wednesday?
9 C.
The very first day, that first Wednesday.
10 A.
I don't recall any.
Il Q.
On the 29th, Thursday, the day of the two brief-12 ings, the one to the Cornission and the one to the Udall 13 committee, do you recall any discussions on that day?
14 A.
The only day I recall any discussions on evacuation 15 was the day, the Friday morning, of the 1.2-R per hour re-16 lease.
There were discussions there of evacuation.
17 Q.
Were you present at those discussions ?
18 A.
Yes, most of them.
I recall some of the discus-19 sions.
20 Q.
Where were these discussions, in the E.M.T. room?
21 A.
Yes and like I said, this wasn't an area of my 22 O
expertise or my specific involvement.
I didn't offer any I
D:
23 opinions to it.
l 24 But as I
. call, it probably started about 9 or 10 25 in the morning.
I'm not actually sure who framed the ques-
28 1
tion.
Maybe it was the fact the state wanted some advisory 2
or something.
3 But there was a discussion in the E.M.T.,
I think 4
between Harold and Case and others about the prudency of 5
evacuation, where I guess the general conclusion was that it 6
was a reasonabl+ thing to do.
7 Harold Collins, Dr. Collins, went out of the roem 8
tohis little room and made some phone calls and all.
Then 9
it seemed like the rest of the day, there was nothing but 10 discussions of evacuations, should there or shouldn't there
~
11 and under what criteria.
It was a very tense situation for 12
-the next several hours, trying to get a concensus recommen-13 8
dation as to whether there should be or shouldn t be.
(,r')
V 14 The issue was not of any known impending danger.
15 In other words, there was a certain amount of impending dang-16 er, but whether it was basically prudent.
17 Q.
Based on uncertainty?
18 A.
Uncertainty of knowing what was going on and as 19 a prudency in that clearly if the people were evacuated there 20 would be less danger to them.
21 Q.
When you mentioned Dr. Collins left the room to 22 make a phone call, that would have been shortly after 9 o'-
!O 23 clock on Friday morning the 30th of March.
t 24 Do you recall whether there was a concensus at that 25 time, apparent, about advising the state?
29 I
A.
Frankly, I wasn't that interested in it.
At the 2
same time, there were some other interesting findings being 3
made.
One was, there.was a primary coolant sample taken and 4
((3 it's rough reading was that there had been a very large re-
%J 5
lease.
6 At the same time, the thermocouple data was all 7
crystalizing, also, and I can't remember if we were beginning 8
to get some other readouts besides the computer, but that 9
whole scenario was developing and we figured there had ben 10 major damage to the core.
11 I think we were more concerned about those issues, 12 at least I was, then I was about the more, I guess, political-13 ly sensitive issues of evacuation.
(_3)
Id Q.
Going to the system management then, as you were 15 getting this information about the core damage, were you ex-16 pecting the plant would depressurize and still go down?
17 A.
I can't remember at that time.
It became pretty 18 clear around that time when we had high coolant activity and 19 then we found out later they had a leaky R.H.R. system, but 20 it was beginning to come about that the gasses would come 21 out anyway, if you took it outside of containment, with any 22 kind of a leaky system.
23 So, sometime on Fridt or around that time the 24 view completely shifted from any consideration of the pressuri 25 zation and going to the R.H.R. mode was sort of out of the
m 30 I
question.
2 a.
Roger Mattson has spoken of concern that the plant 3
'was still going to depressurize.
d A.
I don't recall those concerns, myself.
Maybe if I 5
reviewed more notes or if I tried to reconstruct from the 6
tapes or what was going on, it would be more meaningful, out 7
1 don't recall anything like that.
8 0
You felt the new information was giving reason to stay where the plant was, if at all possible?
10 A.
As I recall, there were a lot of discussions of H
scenarios that we were developing, fa11 backs in areas.
There 12 were several options.
The whole concern was with the reactor I3 coolant pump, that it be kept running and if not, what would 14 we do.
15 As I recall, there were two basic alternatives, 16 start injecting high pressure injection water atil it would I7 start coming out of the safetys or the electromagnetic 18 relief value; or try to depressurize and go on the R.H.R.
system.
20 Most of the discussion was really related to the 21 high pressure injection as probably the only certain thing 22 to start with, but it has some downfalls, too, if you do 23 that.
24 Q.
In that context where evacuation was being dis-25 cussed, did you have a personal opinion then about whether or l
l
I not an evacuation should take place?
2 A,
go, 3
4.
Did-ycu feel'from wPit you saw that the E.M.T.
4
( (~l felt able to make the N.R.C. decision on evacuation?
gi 5
A.
The E.M.T. being Gossick?
6 0.
Gos.;ick.
7 A.
No, I think that very quickly--like I said, I 8
wasn't really involved that much with the decision.
I do 9
recall some consternation over the time it was taking to 10 reach a decision and the pressure that we should reach a 11 decision now and such and such.
12 Then I think the Chairman got involved and then it 13 became obvious he would make the decision.
g 14 Q.
That any decisions wonid be referred to him?
15 A.
Yes, but that was later in the day, probably about 16 10 or 12, sometime like that, maybe 11 or 12.
Like I said, 17 I really wasn't that involved with it.
18 MR. BERNERO:
That completes my line.
19 BY MR. CHIN:
20 Q.
Mr. Davis, I have just one or two clarifying ques-21 tions.
You mentioned that Thursday, that you heard the 22 operators were using the letdown and pressurizer u reduce t
s i
.)
23 the bubble, is that correct?
24 A.
I don't.know if it was Thursday or when it was l'
25 that we heard that.
I was mainly involved with calculations l
l l
32 I
of the bubble size and in directing some calculations as to 2
how long it should take to depressurize.
From my calculationt 3
it 1 coked like it would.take a long time to vent the hydro-4 F
gen out of the system by either of those two paths.
5 q.
Did you have any conversations with B. and W. offi-6 cials about the possibility of reducing the bubble within a 7
few days by using the letdown pressurizer method?
8 A.
I don't recall those within three days, no.
That 9
would have probably stuck in my mind.
10 2.
May I refresh your memory?
11 A.
Sure.
12 9.
I believe Dr. Mattson mentioned three days to the commissioners on Friday as ccming from Don Roy of B. and W.
(/3 14 Does that refresh your memory?
15 A.
No.
I know we were involved with it, but I can't 16 remember.
The early calculations looked like it wculd take 17 weeks to remove the hydrogen and basically before, at least 18 in my mind; we resolved the fundamental issue as to hcw to 19 calculate both the bubble size and the rate of remeval if 20 the bubble was gone.
21 Q.
Did you at any time have discussion with Mr. Roy 22 about reduction of the bubble?
23 A.
I expect I did, but I don't recall the specific--
24 the best source is these notes that we used to keep. Eisenhut, 25 Grimes and I would keep a pad and we would each write down
{
l 33 1 !
notes as to what we were doing, and shuffle it off to the 2
next guy so he could see what was going on and we could have 3
some shift turnover.
{f
')
We usually, also, went over it with each other half 4
5 an hour of overlap and those notes would have indicated what 6. was going on, I expect.
I 7
Q.
Do you recall whether Mr. Roy or anyone from 3. and 8
W. being more optimistic than you about the time taken to re-9 duce the bubbic?
10 A.
Not offhand, I don ' t recall it.
There were more 11 discussions, I think, on hcw to measure the bubble, then there 12 was on rate of removal.
, f~)
There was, apparently, a lot of uncertainty in our 13 v
14 minds as to how they were calculatig the bubble size and what 15 would be the correct procedure.
16 We resolved that after awhile, but it turned cut 17 the plant was using one procedure and we were getting infor-18 mation from the plant about that and at the same time, B. and 19 W. Was independently doing a different methodology, so there 20 wac just someconfusion because two people were doing it.
21 Like I said, I guess the Systems Group was doing 22 more of the detailed calculations and I was serving in more of (g
23 a coordinatiorf r61'e than actually doing calculation, though 24 did do some calculations.
25 Q.
At some time, possibly Friday, there was an agree-
34 1
ment on how they were going to measure the size of the bubble?
2 A.
There was an agreement.
I don't know when it was, 3
but, yes, there was an agreement.
Zoltan Rostoczy was in-4 volved in the review of the formulation of B. and W. 's bubble (7
m 5
size model.
6 I believe before he got involvd in detail, there 7
was a general agreement among other people that it looked 8
pretty good, it looked pretty detailed.
There was then a 9
rather thorough review of those.
10 MR. CHIN:
Off the record.
11 (Thereupon a short discussion was had off the 12 record.)
13 MR. CHIN :
On the record.
(-.
14 BY MR. CHIN:
15 Q.
You testified earlier that you had some conversa-16 tions with Mr. Nitti?
17 A.
'Yes, 18 Q.
You also testified you don't recall discussing the 19 oxygen content of the bubble with Mr. Nitti?
20 A.
No, I don't.
21 Q.
Did you discuss it with anyone in B. and W.?
f-22 A.
Not that I recall.
(u.)g 23 Q.
Could you describe, generally, the communications
~~
(
24 that you or the I.R.C. had with B. and W on Wednesday, Thurs-l 25 day and Friday?
I
35 1
A.
On Wednesday afternoon the conversations were from 2
Eisenhut's office and there were maybe one or two phone calls 3
to find out.what they knew.
p Wednesday night, I don't recall recall anything on 4
v 5
this, but there could well have been.
Generally, the conver=
6 sations were out of Moseley's office and there would usually 7
be several of us in the room.
8 So, maybe some of their notes would be better than 9
'mine.
It would be just trading information back and forth, 10 for example.
We had a lot of thermocouple readings later on 11 in the incident and we would read them.
We would get informa-12 tion from them, what they were calculating, what their ideas 13 were.
So, that kind of information.
There were a lot of
' ( (]
14 phone calls, I am sure.
I juse don 't ' remember them a11.
15 Q.
These were usually originated by the people in the 16 I.R.C. or the other way around?
17 A,
.Usually originated by us, yes.
18 Q.
You also testified earlier you felt it might have 19 been too early on Wednesday.
20 A.
Thursday.
21 Q.
No, on Wednesday, to have technical discussions 22 with the Commission.
V 23 A.
Or definitive ones, anyway.
24 Q.
Did you voice your concern to anyone at that time?
25 A.
No, I guess the political reality and while it was
36 1
a little early, there didn't seem to be any real recourse.
2 It didn't seem to be very fruitful to say, Gee, we 're not 3
really ready for this discussion and we can't tell you very 4
much."
G s.v s
Most of the commissioners knew what we knew, John 6
0'Hearne was at the Incident Center all that night and he was 7
getting information as fast as we were.
Plus, the other com-a missioners were we either briefed individually or they were 9
there.
10 So, they knew what the situation was.
The real forcing function was Representative Udall's ccmmittee wanting 11 12 a discussion.
It seemed that somebody had to get it on there.
13 Q.
Could you name the persons you know in 3. and W. in
( (f i
~' s 14 Lynchburg?
Is A.
That I know?
At the time and that I talked with?
16 0.
That you know and talked with, during the incident.
17 A.
Jim Taylor 'is their manager of licensing.
I don't 18 know if I knew him or not, but I talked with him.
There's a 5
guy named Don--can somebody help me out?
It starts with H.
20 Q.
Don Roy?
21 A.
No, Don Roy, also, I talked with.
Don Nitti, I am 22 sure I talked with.
I expect there are many others that I 23 could have talked with and not recalled their names.
24 I know another guy I talked with whose name is 25 Don something or other, Haskins or something, and it turns out
I 37 1 l we were in school together at N.C. State and I had forgotten i
I 2
him until we were on the phone.
3 da., BEm;ERO :
It doesn't ring a bell with me.
('
4 THE WITNESS:
Generally, the point of contact was
,y) 5 Taylor or Roy.
6 MR. CHIN:
I have no further questions.
7 BY MR. BERNER0:
8 Q.
Do you know if the licensee was adding any chemicals 9
to the reactor coolant system during the incident?
10 A.
I don't recall any discussion about it.
Later on, 11 we found out they were adding demineralized water instead of 12 boric acid, but I don 't recall discussing chemical addition 13 one way or the other.
g-U 14 There was some discussion about adding getter type 15 chemicals for removing either hydrogen or oxygen, as the 16 case may be, but that's all the discussion.
17 Q.
But'no actual operation, to your knowledge, actual 18 addition?
19 A.
Not that I--you are talking about in the first week 20 or so?
21 Q.
In the first three or four days.
22 A.
Not that I recall.
23 Q.
One final question I have, do you have relative to 24 the President 's visit on Sunday, when that milestone occurred, 25 do you have a perception, a memory, of when you felt the
38 1
bubble was gone?
2 A.
No.
When the bubble was gone?
I actually felt 3
more confident, the first feeling and the only significant 4
'~(]
one that I can recall andI can't recall when it was, but was 8
when I finally--when we all finally agreed the bubble was 6
going down in sice.
7 That was more important than the actual elimina-8 tion, because in my mind, the only real safety problem with 8
the bubble was that it could get large enough to cavitate the 18 pump and we would have lost the best cooling path to the l'
l core.
12 So, that was the major problem and whether it was 13 it. creasing in hydrogen, oxygen or what, any increase was a
(
14 bad sign.
15 BY MR. CHIN:
18 Q.
Do you remember when you had that sensation or was 17 told the bubble was redncing in size?
18 A.
Not in time, no.
18 Q.
Could you say it was Friday or Saturday or Sunday?
20 A.
I really don't know.
21 Q.
Do you recall, was it before the President's visit?
g 22 A.
I really can't recall that either.
It's more of an (t.)
23 lv emotional thing, milestone, than it was any kind of timing.
24 There was so much to do regardless of these occurances, that 25 it was hard to pin anything down.
l 39 1
The other thing was that getting tuo or three or i
2 four hours sleep a night, all these bunch together in your 3
. mind, or at least in my mind they all have.
4 T'y I don't think I got a night 's sleep for a week and v
5 one-half or something like that.
6 Q.
Would your knowledge of this fact ccme frco N.R.C.
7 people on site, from their own systems measurement, or from a
B. and W. or utility measurements?
9 I A.
It was a combination of all of that.
We were sitt-10 ing back, trying to get all the in' :mation, the stuff from 11 the site, the stuff from B. and W.,
the stuff frca the 12 utility and reaching some judgment as to whether they all 13
, j.3 agreed and whether we agreed with them.
( )
14 We do some of our own confirming calculations.
Of-15 ten, we try--in every situation, we try to get at least two 16 or three independent bases for reaching a decision like that.
17 MR. CHIN:
In conclusion, Mr. Davis, let me say 18 this is an ongoing investigation and although we have complete i 19 the questions we have for you today, we may need to bring you 20 back for further der sitions.
21 We will, however, make every effort to avoid doing 22 b4 so.
23 I will now recess this deposition, rather than ter-24 minating it.
I wish to thank you for your time, on Sunday, 25 for being here with us today.
i 8M tT
\\
m
""[yp r,( y'o,;
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a
- .g q j. e WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
%f'??4$
e AUG 2 71979 Mr. Donald K. Davis TERA Corporation 2150 Shattuck Avenue, Suite 1200 Berkeley, California 94704
Dear Mr. Davis:
I am writing to confirm that your deposition under oath in connection with the accident at Three Mile Island is scheduled for September 24, 1979 at 9:00 a.m., at Suite 1200, 2150 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California. This will also confirm my request for you to bring with you a copy of your resume and any documents in your possession or control regarding TMI-2, the accident or precursor events which you have reason to believe may not be in of ficial NRC files, including any diary or personal working file.
The deposition will be conducted by members of the NRC's Special Inquiry Group on Three Mile Island. This Group is being directed independently of the NRC by the law firm of Rogovin, Stern and Huge.
It includes both NRC personnel who have been detailed to the Special Inquiry Staf f, and outside l
staff and attorneys.
Through a delegation of authority from the NRC under Section 161(c) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Special Inquiry Group has a broad mandate to inquire into the causes of the accident at Three Mile Island, to identify major problem areas and to make recommenda-tions for change.
At the conclusion of its investigation, the Group will issue a detailed public report setting forth its findings and recommendations.
Unless you have been served with a subpoena, your participation in the deposition is voluntary and there will be no effect on you if you decline to answer some or all of the questions asked you.
However, the Special Inquiry has been given the power to subpoena witnesses to appear and tastify under oath, or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place.
Any person deposed may have an attorney present or any other person he wishes accompany him at the deposition as his representative.
You shculd realize that while we will try to respect any requests for confi-we can make no dentiality in connection with the publicction of our report, Names of witnesses and the information they provide may eventually buarantees.
inasmuch as the entire record of the Special Inquiry Grosp's become public, investigation will be made available to the NRC for whatever uses it may deem appropriate.
In time, this information may be made available to the public e
I AA/
9an e &-
1
2 voluntarily, or become available to the public through the Freedom of Information Act.
Moreover, other departments and agencies of government may of 1974.
The request access to this information pursuant to the Privacy Act to committees or information may also be made available in whole or in part
,r 3 subcommittees of the U.S. Congress.
If you have testified previously with respect to the Three Mile Island accident, it would be useful if you could review any transcripts of your previous statement (s) prior to the deposition.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Sincerely,
/
d yy
,i. Yector tifIchellRogov i
NRC/TMISpecialIn[uiryGroup c.
i e
@h@T2.;
DON K. DAVIS Manager - Nuclear Engineering Operations 4
Education B.S.
Nuclear Engineering, turth Carolina State University Graduate Numerical Sciences, The Johns Hopkins University Studies Summary of Experience Mr. Davis has IS years of nuclear engineering experience. He has managed a variety of programs for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and has extensive experience per-J forming safety analyses for commercial power plants. He has directed multiple discipline
-E engineering groups evaluating the design aspects of commercial power plants including potential site hazards such as earthquakes and floods, structural and mechanical design, electrical engineering, system performance and reactor core accident analysis.
In
'I oddition, he has participated in many policy decisions associated with the regulation of nuclear power plants.
1979 - Present Manager - Nuclear Engineering Operations, TERA Corporation 1972 - 1979 Chief, Systematic Evoluotion Program Branch, NRC. Responsible for ig the safety evaluation of II older power plants in over 130 technical E
issues from seismic design to accident analyses. Supervised 30 engineers working on contracts amounting to $1 million.
c m)
Chief, Operating Reactor Project Branch, NRC. Responsible for the
)j"V licensing activities associated with 15 power reactors and supervision of NRC project managers.
Technical Assistant, Division of Operating Reactors, NRC. Assisted in the direction of the technical staff evaluati.,g operating reactors.
Prepared numerous reports addressing safety issues at operating reactors.
Technical Support Section Leader, Dffice of Nuclear Reactor Regula-tion. As the NRC was first formed, provided technical assistance and advice on policy issues to the Di.ector and Deputy Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulations.
lE Project Manager, Light Water Reactors, AEC.
Responsible for the licensing review of nuclear power reactors including the evaluation of certain technical aspects such as ECCS performance and fuel densification, j
1967 - 1972 Reactor Engineer, Hittman Associates. Responsible for the design and safety analyses of several nuclear power plants and spent fuel shipping containers.
Conducted analyses of primary and secondary system transients and loss-of-coolant accident analyses for several power reactor designs. Performed thermal, structural and shielding analyses necessary to license shipping containers.
7 i
sam Q
d g
TERA CORPORATION
l DON K. DAVIS Page Two 1964 - 1967 Research Assistant, North Carolina State University. Responsible for dosimetry research associated with 10 kilowatt research reactor and i
30,000 Curie Cobalt-60 irradiator.
l Professional Affiliations and Honors
l American Society of Mechanical Engineers a
Tau Beta Pi, Engineering Honorary Sigma Pi Sigma, Physics Honorary i
Phi Kappa Phi, Academic Honorary I
i I
m
'I I
'I
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1:I
?I l.
TERACORPORATION
.-