ML19305E642

Forwards IE Bulletin 80-12, Decay Heat Removal Sys Operability. Written Response Required

ML19305E642
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	05/09/1980
From:	James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Burstein S WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 8005200155
Download: ML19305E642 (1)

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UNITED STATES 8'

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GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137 Docket No. 50-266 Wy gg Docket No. 50-301 Wisconsin Electric Power Company ATTN:

Mr. Sol Burstein Executive Vice President Power Plants 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53201 Gentlemen:

Enclosed is IE Bulletin No. 80-12 which requires action by you with regard to your PWR power reactor facilities with an operating license.

8 Should you have any questions regarding the Bulletin or the actions required by you, please contact this office.

Sincerely, fAdY MM bamesG.Keppler Director

Enclosure:

IE Bulletin No. 80-12 cc w/ encl:

Mr. G. A. Reed, Plant Manager Central Files l

Director, NRR/DPM Director, NRR/ DOR C. M. Trammell, ORB /NRR PDR i

Local PDR NSIC TIC Sandra A. Bast, Lakeshore Citizens for Safe Energy Mr. John J. Duffy, Chief Boiler Inspector, Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations

O UNITED STATES SSINS No.:

6820 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Accession No.:

0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 8005050053 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 s

4 May 9, 1980

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IE Bulletin No. 80-12 DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM OPERABILITY

==

Introduction:==

The intent of this Bulletin is to improve nuclear power plant safety by reducing the likelihood of losing decay heat removal (DHR) capability in operating pressurized water reactors (PWRs).

PWRs are most susceptible to losing DHR capability when their steam generators or other diverse means of removing decay heat are not readily available.

Such conditions often occur when the plants are in a refueling or cold shutdown mode, and during which timt concurrent maintenance activities are being performed.

There is a need to assure that all reasonable means have been taken to provide redundant or diverse means of DHR during all modes of operation.

(Note: A redundant means could be provided by having DHR Train A AND Train B operable; a diverse means could be provided by having either DHR Train A OR Train B operable AND a steam generator available for DHR purposes.) TheFe is also need to assure that all reasonable means have been taken to preclude the loss of DHR capability due to common mode failures during all modes of operation.

Background

On several occasions, operating PWRs have experienced losses of DHR capability.

In each instance, except that of the Davis-Besse Unit 1 incident of April 19, 1980, DHR capability was restored prior to exceeding the specified RCS temper-ature limit for the specifi~c mode of operation.

Nonetheless, the risk and frequency associated with such events dictate that positive actions be taken to preclude their uccurrence or at least ameliorate their effects.

The most noteworthy example of total loss of DHR capability occurred at Davis-Besse Unit 1 on April 19, 1980.

(See IE Information Notice No. 80-20, attached hereto as Enclosure 1).

Two factors identified as major contributors to the Davis-Besse event in the Information Notice are:

(1) extensive maintenance activities which led to a loss of redundancy in the DHR capability, and (2) inadequate procedures and/or administrative controls which, if corrected, could have precluded the event or at least ameliorated its effects.

ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY LICENSEES OF PWR FACILITIES:

1.

Review the circumstances and sequence of events at Davis-Besse as des-cribed in Enclosure 1.

2.

Review your facility (ies) for all DHR degradation events experienced, especially for events'similar to the Davis-Besse incident.

E Bulletin No. 80-12 May 9, 1980 Page 2 of 3 3.

Review the hardware capability of your facility (ies) to prevent DHR loss events, including equipment redundancy, diversity, power source reliability, instrumentation and control reliability, and overall reliability during the refueling and cold shutdown modes of operation.

4.

Analyze your procedures for adequacy of safeguarding against loss of redundancy and diversity of DHR capability.

5.

Analyze your procedures for adequacy of responding to DHR loss events.

Special emphasis should be placed upon responses when maintenance or refueling activities degrade the DHR capability.

6.

Until further notice or until Technical' Specifications are revised to resolve the issues of this Bulletin, you should:

a.

Implement as soon as practicable administrative controls to assure that redundant or diverse DHR methods are available during all modes of plant operation.

(Note: When in a refueling mode with water in the refueling cavity and the head removed, an acceptable means could include one DHR train and a readily accessible source of borated water to replenish any loss of inventory that might occur subsequent to the loss of the available DHR train.)

b.

Implement administrative controls as soon as practicable, for those c ";es where single failures or other actions can result in only one DHR train being available, requiring an alternate means of DHR or expediting the restoration of the lost train or method.

7.

Report to the NRC within 30 days of the date of this Bulletin the results of the above reviews and analyses, describing:

Changes to procedures (e.g., emergency, operational, administrative, a.

maintenance, refueling) made or initiated as a result of your reviews and analyses, including the scheduled or actual dates of accomplish-ment; (Note: NRC suggests that you consider the following: (1) limiting maintenance activities to assure redundancy or diversity and integrity of DHR capability, and (2) bypassing or disabling, where applicable, automatic actuation of ECCS recirculation in addition to disabling High Pressure Injection'and Containment Spray preparatory to the cold shutdown er refueling mode.)

b.

The safeguards at your facility (ies) against DHR degradation, including your assessment of their adequacy.

The above information is requested pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f).

Accordingly, written statements addressing the above items shall be signed under oath or affir-mation and submitted within the time specified above.

Reports shall be submitted

IE Bulletin No. 80-12 May 9, 1980 Page 3 of 3 to the director of the appropriate NRC regional office, and a copy forwarded to the Director, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D. C. 20555.

Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7-31-80.

Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems, i

Enclosure:

IE Information Notice No. 80-20 l

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IE Bulletin No. 80-12 Enclosure May 9, 1980 RECENTLY I55UED IE BULLETINS Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To No.

80-11 Masonay Wall Design 5/8/80 All power reactor facilities with an OL, except Trojan 80-10 Contamination of 5/6/80 All power reactor Nonradioactive System and facilities with an Resulting Potential for OL or CP Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release to Environment 80-09 Hydramotor Actuator 4/17/80 All power reactor Deficiencies operating facilities and holders of power reactor construction permits 80-08 Examination of Containment 4/7/80 All power reactors with Liner Penetration Welds a CP and/or OL no later than April 7, 1980 80-07 BWR Jet Pump Assembly 4/4/80 All GE BWR-3 and Failure BWR-4 facilities with an OL 80-06 Engineered Safety Feature 3/13/80 All power reactor (ESF) Reset Controls facilities with an OL 80-05 Vacuti Condition Resulting 3/10/80 All PWR power reactor In Damage To Chemical Volume facilitier holding Control System (CVCS) Holdup OLs and to those with Tanks a CP 79-01B Environmental Qualification 2/29/80 All power reactor of Class IE Equipment facilities with an OL 80-04 Analysis of a PWR Main 2/8/80 All PWR reactor facilities Steam Line Break With holding Ols and to those Continued Feedwater nearing licensing Addition 80-03 Loss of Charcoal From 2/6/80 All holders of Power Standard Type II, 2 Inch, Reactor OLs and cps Tray Adsorber Cells