05000334/LER-1980-019-03, /03L-0:on 800310,while Steam Flushing,Crack Found in Channel Head of Liquid Waste Evaporator Bottoms Heat Exchanger.Caused by Equipment Failure,Probably Due to Chloride Stress Corrosion.Sleeve Welded Over Channel Head

From kanterella
(Redirected from ML19305D809)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
/03L-0:on 800310,while Steam Flushing,Crack Found in Channel Head of Liquid Waste Evaporator Bottoms Heat Exchanger.Caused by Equipment Failure,Probably Due to Chloride Stress Corrosion.Sleeve Welded Over Channel Head
ML19305D809
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 04/08/1980
From: Werling J
DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML19305D782 List:
References
LER-80-019-03L, LER-80-19-3L, NUDOCS 8004150545
Download: ML19305D809 (2)


LER-1980-019, /03L-0:on 800310,while Steam Flushing,Crack Found in Channel Head of Liquid Waste Evaporator Bottoms Heat Exchanger.Caused by Equipment Failure,Probably Due to Chloride Stress Corrosion.Sleeve Welded Over Channel Head
Event date:
Report date:
3341980019R03 - NRC Website

text

_

- O.

U. S. NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISS$2N f

NRC FC8tM 366 (7 778 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLoCx: l l

l l

l l

]@

iPLE ASE PR:NT OR TYPE ALL REQUIREO INFORMATION)

FR l P I ^ I B lV l s l 1 j@l 0 lo l-l 0 lo l0 lo lo l-lo lo j@p 11 l1 l111 l@lsi ur 34 @

l i

8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE Nu.'dEM

.6

6 LaCENSE TvPE ao Cos r M

Z,"c'lLl@lol 510l010l31314l@l0l3l1l0l8l01@l0l4l01818lOl@

8 60 6'

OOCnifNbVMER 6d 63 EvtNT OATE to 75 RE' ORT O A TE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES h lTTTI l Liquid Waste Evaporator lines had been plugged due to insuf ficient flushing after l

pr77] l bottoms transfer. While steam flushing, a crack was found in a channel head of the i l o 14 I I Liquid Waste Evaporator bottoms heat exchanger. Because of the low pressure (less l

[TTTl I than 15 psic) during normal operation, it was felt that the fluid could be containedl ITTTl I within the Auxiliary Building even if a cross failure occurred and would be 1

["5'TTI I detected by sump level and radiation monitors.

Since the radiation monitors would I

g i ave diverted flow through the main filter banks, the (continued on attached) h I

80 as s eEOE sENE SOI:'E

  1. '$E su8CiEE COuPONENT COOE
  1. ^

CO lM lA l@ l El@ lD l@ l Hj Tl El Xl Cl Hl@ lG ]@ l Zl@

O 9 F

S 9

10 11 12 13 18 19 20 SEQUENTI AL CCCURAENCE REPORT REVISION g

EVENT YE AR REPORT NO.

COOE TYPE NO.

@ y"(j,]n;nol8 l0 l l-l l 0l ll 9l l/l l0 l3 l l Ll l-l [0_j af g

_ 21 22 23 24 26

, 27 28 29 30 31 J2 Y

N A O

ON PL NT VET HOURS S SAIT FOR1 8.

5 PPLIE MAN F CTuRER I n l@La J@

l z l@

L2.J@

lofofolof Lv_J@

l N l@

lAl@

l Z l 4 I 4 l 4lh 3J 34 35 36 31 40 at 42 43 44 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS h l i j o l l The cause of the incident was equipment failure, most probably due to chloride 1

l stress corrosion since the unit handles water susceptable to chloride contamination I i

I g land concentrates it.

Temporary corrective action was to weld a sleeve over the I

l channel head of the heat exchanger since additional cracks appeared when weld l

t 3 g l repairs were attempted. Engineering is investientine (continued on attached) l 90 7

a 9 ST S

% POWER OTHER $7ATUS is RY OtSCOVERY OESCRIPTION y W@ l 0 l 0 l 0 l@l Desien Change l

lAl@lOperatorobservation l

44 4s 4e u

it ti Out ge CO$ TENT

' Activity RELE ASEO OF RELE ASE AVOUNT OF ACTivtTY LOCAT80N Of RELEASE [i_LsJ L1] @ l zi@l N/A I

I N/A I

7 8 9 10 tt 44 45 40 PER$ONNEL EXPO $uRES NuveER TYPE DESCRIPTICN ITTTI I o ! o l o j@l z l@l N/A I

,ERsON.NE'L INau'R'its cEsCRiPriON@

NuveER i. lololol@l N/A l

7 8 9 il 12 80 LOSS Of OR OAvaGE TO FACIL TV TvPE OESCRIPTION l:l@l N/A l

i 9 7

8 9 10 60 15d5ut @OESCRIPTION l

N/A I

I!IIIIIIIII!li 2 9 4 3 to 68 69 60 5 UE 412-643-1258

{

N A. tE OF P'-EP ARER PHONE;

\\

800.4150545

Y

=

Attachment To LER 80-019/03L Beaver Valley Power Station Duquesne Light Company Docket No. 50-334 Event Description And Probable Consequencesoffsite implications would have been negligible.

Cause Description And Corrective Actionsmaterials that will be more compatible with the process fluid to preclude the more deleterious effect of corrosion. There have been no previous failures of this type.

O l