ML19301C496
| ML19301C496 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/06/1983 |
| From: | Heltemes C NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD) |
| To: | Cunningham G NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19301A041 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-86-234 NUDOCS 8306290178 | |
| Download: ML19301C496 (1) | |
Text
pr.atcp UNITED STATES e'
e NUCt. EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
Guy H. Cunningha.m /
Executive Legal Director T. A. Rehm, Assistant for Operations Executive Director for Operations FROM:
C. J. Heltemes, Jr., Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
SUBJECT:
HARTMAN ALLEGATIONS AND RELATED MATTERS In response to puestions pcsed by Commissioner Gilinsky in his May 31, 1933 memorandum to the EDO, I wish
".o inform you that AEOD does not have any documents bearing on how the..ertman issue was to be handled by the staff in the TMI-1 restart proceeding. AEOD has not been involved with this aspect of the TMI-1 restart proceedings. Thus, AEOD persennel were not aware of Tim Martin's view on falsification of leak rate data.
One cf my staff me cers (Hal Ornstein) deposed Harold Hartman in October 1979 while he was detailed to the SIG.
However, since he joined AECD in February 1980, he has not worked on the Hartman issue.
Enciesed is a memorandum that H. Ornstein has provided regarding his knowledge of Hartman's allecations en falsification of leak rate data and TMI-l's training practices.
C.
. Heltemes, r., Director Of... for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
Enclosure:
As Stated cc w/ enclosure:
W. Dircks J. Rce V
V. Stello
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H. Denton R. DeYoung Q 3 g;2 7 bl 7 CF J. Allan
I UNITED STATES
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- t e g'e, flUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISslCN WASHINGTON l D. C. 20E55 VM/
aus e un MEMDRANDUM FCR:
C. J. Heltemes,,Jr., Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operaticnal Data FROM:
Harold L. Ornstein, Lead Engineer Reactor Operations Analysis Branch Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
SUBJECT:
HAROLD HARTPAN ALLEGATIONS In response to numerous questions that have arisen, I wish to explain my involvement in the Harold Hartman case.
In 1979 I was detailed to the Commission's Special Inquiry Group on Three Mile Island.
~
One of my assignments was to investigate TMI operator training.
In carrying cut that assignment, I learned of Harold Hartman.
I deposed him under oath at the Holiday Inn, Lancaster, PA, on Octcber 29, 1979.
The issues pursued at the deposition addressed TMI operator training including a discussien of transcripts from "walkthrough" examinacions and safety valve leak test falsification.
I provided a writeup on the Hartman allegations for inclusien in the SIG's rescrt - a copy of my 12/?/79 draft " Allegations.cf a former TMI-2 licensed reactor operator in the areas of cperator training and noncompliant plant operatien" is attached.
L' hen I learned that SIG management was not using the attached material, I appealed (en several occasions), but to no avail.
It was my contention (which I made the SIG management aware of) that the leaking relief valve, was an important factor which affected the course of the accident.
(The fhet that the plant operated for several months with the leaking valve which resulted in an elevated tailpipe temperature hindered the cperaccrs' ability ta recognize the open FORV during the accident.)
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C. J. Heltemes, Jr..
On a Saturday morning about a year after the SIG report was published, I received a call from IE* Region I.
I was told that Harold Hartman was making allegations on a tiY TV talk program, and that Region I was looking for information on Hartman.
Later that day, I met a mamber of IE headquarters at my office and prcvided him with my file on Harold Hartman (my SIG deposition and all exhibits).
Subsequently, I discussed this matter with OIA and provided 01A with some add:tional material.
The material that I provided to IE and 01A has not been returned to me.
My deposition of Hartman and the exhibits associated with it provided a clear picture of what transpired.
I believe that Hartman's allegations, which were given under oath, were correct.
It should be notee '. hat in 1979 GPU was fined 5155,000 because they operated the plant for several months with the ic:hir.g relief valve.
WhW Harold L. Ornstein, Lead Engineer Reactor Operations Analysis Branch Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data Att achmer.t :
As Stated O
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(??79)
Allegations'ef a fomer TMI-2 licensed reactor operator in the areas of ope ator training a3d ncncomplianY( plant operation shortly after the accident, one of THI-2's licensed reactor operat6rs (w d
worked for[/ f
_ years at TriI-2, and was also in the Nuclear Navy for 8 Y years) resigned his position.
In discussions with NRC Inspection and Enforcement Personnel and in followup interviews with the NRC's Specia Inquiry Group he noted the following:
Training - He thought that his training - cold licensing program (at TMI-1) was comprehensive and well dene. [I&E tape
!254,page31).
His training included 8' weeks on the si=01ator;he had taken mock NRC exams, both written and oral walk throughs which were given by General Physics Corp.
He thought that the preliminary training had been quite helpful.
- However, he did note (i id p. 32) that the operators.that did join TMI-2 after the cold licensing program "are trained to take They ar(e trained to cperate the p n oi?) ed.
an NRC examination.
/t They have copies of NRC tests, the cuestions..."
He noted that the TMI trainees and cperators had a good record on NRC examina tions, cnd that he feit that it was due to the fact that the trainees kneIwhat to expect on the examinations:
"If they know that a certain examiner is going to e
come, t! ey can dig out all his old tests, they can, and we I ave old interviews that somebody might have Attachment
F' Snuti a little tape recorder in their pocket and taped the entire walk around and you can get the tape conversations of those I've seen those flying around."
Subsequently the operator provided the NRC SIG with a
, copy of the transcripts frem walk-arornd examinations.
He indicated (IE tape #254, p. 34)that he *.houghg but was not certain that TMI operators had ebtained the transcripts from 0 75-the THI training department.
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Similarly in an SIG deposition on 29/79,(p.23,
/
he stated that he had no knowledge of Met Ed ever transcri ing walk-through examir,ations, but he stated that "...I presented hou with a set of documents which I received from training" -
later on he backed off and stated (ibid p. 24)"I assumed that they came from training."
The operator noted (ibid p. 21) that there wera a large number of people who had copies of old walk-through exams, and that such practice was co=nonplace.
Recarding a comparison between Navy nuclear and Met Ed
~
ibid training, he noted ( h r::, % ;.
p.13) that the Navy training was done by " top notch people, hand picked by the " Admiral." 'The Navy had a' systematic approach in which the learning was done in progression - each concept was learned, before another one was introduced it was ceared to teach the ci erator to think and be analytical; whereas,
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I the Met-Ed auxiliary operator training program
,i didn't.
That training was " haphazard and not as thorough.
Regarding the Met Ed instructors, He felt that they were knowledgeable, but that they couldn't put together a program or do as professional a job as the Navy did.
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Nonetheless, he felt that Met-Ed had done a " fine job of trainthg us with what they had, and people, material-wise, I think they did a fine jcb."
(i. bid,p.
Regarding cold licenseg(J e training of reactor operators,(8 week simulator course at B&W, Lync}. burg) d thought that the program was well coordinated and was considered invaluable.
He noted that the operators developed skills during their simulator training progra:
which included applying classroom knowledge to the simulator with simulated casualties.
He felt that such simulator training helped him with being able to recognize and analy:e pr:blems quickly.
(/I/ /(
Noncomoliant olant operations In his May 22, 1979 intervies: with 1&E, the cperator Eentioned the fact that for at least three months before the accident, he knew that the pressurizer code safety valves were leaking (ILE tape #254, p.14).
He noted that the thermocouples downstream of the safety valve were between 150 and 150 degrees,
f W[ Y 5
E and sometimes were over 200.
He stated that a leak rate was required every tbree days; and "That leak rate had to be fudged every time we got, just about everytime we got it, we had to do scmething to make it right."
idp.15)
He mentioned that all the shift foremen and shift supervisors that ope the-plant in the three months before the accident knew of the leakage (Ibid, p.15)
R&w n
The operator mentiened (Wdeposition (p. 49)) that upon telling his- -
supervisors about the leaking safety valves, he was just told to "get a good leak rate.". There were occasions when he could not get a " good leak rate" all night.
(Ibid p. 50)
The facility was required to get a " good leak rate" once every three days; consequently, frequent testing w day and night such that once every three days an acceptable leak rate was ceasured.
(Ibid, p. 50)
Beyond going to the shift supervisor and shift foreman, the operatcr didn't go to anyone with his concern about the excessive leakace because he though it was such an cbvious problem, the people that he would go to were proba There was}la general fear of rocking th so aware of the problem already.
A and there were apparently no avenues through the Met Ed QA organization that he was aware of which could have been depended,upen for resolving the leaky safety valve problem.
(Ibid p. 51).
w...
ENCLOSURE 5
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