ML19296D013
| ML19296D013 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/21/1979 |
| From: | Minogue R NRC OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19296C882 | List:
|
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 SECY-79-682, SECY-79-682-01, SECY-79-682-1, NUDOCS 8002290218 | |
| Download: ML19296D013 (12) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES Cecember 21, 1979 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION SECY-79-682 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20ss5 CONSENT CALENDAR ITEM For:
The Commissioners From:
Robert B. Minogue, Director Office of Standards Development Thru:
Executive Director for Operations E G s '-
I
Subject:
ACCESS CONTROLS TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT VITAL AREAS
Purpose:
To obtain Ccemission approval for a notice of a proposed rule change which would more explicitly define the criteria for access controls required at entrances to nuclear power plant vital areas.
Category:
This paper covers a minor policy question requiring Commission approval Discussion A recent survey at the Surry nuclear reactor station, initiated because of a successful attempt to damage fuel at the facility, determined that several hundred licensee and contractor personnel had access to the area where the fuel was stored (a vital area) during the time the attempt was made.
Many of the personnel did not require access to this vital area during the time the incident occurred and many did not need access to this vital area at all.
Surveys at other nuclear power reactors revealed that similar conditions existed.
That is, access to vital areas was autt ized on a basis which generally was tied to an individual's title,
.e., nuclear engineer, without estab-lishment of the need for an individual to be in an area at all nor to be in an area during a particular time frame.
Also, " tailgating" (more than one person passing through a control point on only one person's authorized access) was taking place at the facilities.
Current regulations and associated guidance documents containing criteria dealing with access controls to vital areas are discussed in Enclosure B.
In approving the physical security plans submitted to fulfill 10 CFR 73.55, NRC has delegated to the licensee the respon-sibility for determining which individuals may have access to vital areas within the context of the regulations and guicelines listed in Enclosure B.
The recent surveys of all operating nuclear power reac-tors revealed that some of the licensees have broadly interpreted the guidelines and have used lax criteria for authorizing individuals unescorted access to vital areas.
That is, access lists to particular vital areas included anyone who might need unescorted access to that area regardless of the frequency or duration of the need.
This was not the i' tent of the regulations or guidelines.
In order to define more clearly the criteria for access controls to vital areas and to put them into regulatory requirements, it is pro-poseo to revise 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7) along the following lines:
Contact:
k3 8002290 9
t-The Commissioners 2
(1) Access to a vital area shall be correlated to the need to have access to that area, and shall be limited to a particular time period for which access is needed.
(2)
Licensee procedures and/or equipment shall be made available to assure that only the authorized individual can gain unescorted entry to a vital area on his/her authorization.
The regulatory requirements being proposed are essentially those that the staff intended licensees to implement through present regulations and existing guidance.
The present regulations, however, are not suffi-ciently specific as to their intent; the proposed regulation would pro-vide the needed degree of specificity.
The requirements.being pro-posed already are contained in an Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin, IE Bulletin No. 79-16, " Vital Area Access Controls" issued July 26, 1979 (Enclosure C).
This bulletin was issued to advise licensees that these changes to vital area access controls were needed in light of the Surry incident.
One criterion in IE Bulletin No. 79-16 not included in the requirements, is that having to do with trustworth-
- iness, i.e., a screening program meeting American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard, ANSI 18.17, Industrial Security for Nuclear Power Plants.
The reason this criterion is not included in these requirements is that, to prescribe a licensee administered trustworth-iness program by rule at this time, when the Commission has under con-sideration both a proposed material access authorization rule and alternative programs for establishing trustworthiness at nuclear power plants, would be inappropriate.
10 CFR 73.55(g) is also being amended to include access control equip-ment and all other security-related devices or equipment under the testing and maintenance requirement.
It is expected that the changes resulting from the amendments would, for the most part, be procedural, e.g.,
keeping of access lists, which the licensee can implement without a major modification of the security or contigency plan.
However, plans would need some revisions to address the new requirements.
These revisions would be handled as changes that "do not decrease the safeguards effectiveness of the plan" and, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p), shall be submitted to the NRC within 2 months after the revisions are made.
These actions involve no new resource requirements.
Recommendation:
That the Commission:
1.
Aoprove the proposed amendments set forth in Enclosure "A"
for publication for comment in the Federal Register.
2.
Note that the public will be given 60 days in which to comment.
on the proposed changes.
o The Commissioners 3
3.
Note that the value/ impact analysis (Enclosure "D") will be placed in the Public Document Room.
4.
Note that the appropriate congressional committees will be notified of this action.
5.
Note that a public announcement of this action will not be Isiued.
6.
Note that neither an environmental impact statement nor a nega-tive declaration need be prepared since the proposed amendments are not significant from the standpoint of environmental impact.
Coordination:
The Offices of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Inspection and Enforcement, and Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards concur in the recommenda-tions of this paper.
The Office of the Executive Legal Director has no legal objection to the recommendations of this paper.
The Office of Public Affairs indicates that a public announcement is not warranted.
Scheduling:
For affirmation at an early policy session.
Sunshine Act Recommendation:
It is recommended that this pa r be considered in an open meeting.
The Executive Director for Op ations c urs in this recommendation.
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o@e, D rector
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OfficejofStandardsDevelopment
Enclosures:
"A" - Proposed Federal Register Notice "B" - Criteria Dealing with Access Controls to Vital Areas "C" - IE Bulletin 79-16 "D" - Value/ Impact Analysis
4 Commissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Friday, January 11, 1980.
Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT January 4,1980, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.
This paper is tentatively scheduled for affirmaticn at an Open Meeting during the Week of January 21, 1980.
Please refer to the appropriate Weekly Commission Schedule, when published, for a specific date and time.
DISTRIBUTION Commissioners Commission Staff Offices Exec Dir for Operations ACRS Secretariat
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[10 CFR Part 73]
Physical Protection of Plants and Materials Access Controls to Nuclear Power Plant Vital Areas AGENCY:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ACTION:
Proposed rule
SUMMARY
The Commission is considering amendments to its regulations to define more explicitly the criteria for personnel access controls for nuclear power plant vital areas.
The controls would be, for the most part, procedural irl scope and would require that (1) access authorization to a vital area be correlated to the need to have access to that area during a particular time period, and (2) licensee procedures and/or equipment be used to assure that only the authorized individual can gain unescorted entry to a vital area on his/her authorization.
The require-ments being proposed are contained in Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin No. 79-16, " Vital Area Access Controls" July 26, 1979.
DATES:
Comments must be received on or before (60 days after publica-tion in the Federal Register).
ADDRESSEES:
Comments or suggestions for consideration in connection with the proposed amendments should be sent to the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention:
Docketing and Service Branch.
Copies of comments received may be examined at the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D.C.
1 Enclosure "A"
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
T. S. Michaels, Safeguards Standards Branch, Office of Standards Development, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion, Washington, D.C. 20555, 301-443-5903.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
The requirements for access controls at vital areas of nuclear power plants are in section 73.55(d)(7) of 10 CFR Part 73.
Supplementary guidance in this area has been developed and made available to licensees.
This includes Acceptance Criterion 5.B of the Security Plan Evaluation Report (SPER) Workbook, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regula-tion (NRR) Review Guideline #21, and NRR Review Guideline #23.
- Also, NRR, in meetings with licensees in March 1977, to explain section 73.55 and provide information on what an acceptable security plan should con-tain, explained that positive control of access to a vital area consisted of two elements:
first, in order to be authorized access to a particular vital area, the person requesting entry must have had the necessary back-ground screening and have an established need to perform job related functions in the area, and second, that there be a need to enter the vital area to perform a specific function at a specific time.
In the past, the determination of which individuals have had access to particular vital areas has been left up to the licensee to implement within the context of the regulation and guidelines mentioned previously.
Recent surveys of all operating nuclear power reacturs have revealed that some licensees have broadly interpreted these guidelines and have used lax criteria for authorizing individuals unescorted access to vital areas.
That is, access lists to particular vital areas have included anyone who might need unescorted access to that area regardless of the frequency or duration of the need.
This was not the intent of the regulations or guidelines.
2 Enclosure "A"
In order to define more clearly the criteria for vital area access controls and to put them into the codified regulations it is proposed to revise section 73.55(d)(7) and other applicable sections along the follow-ing general guidelines:
(1) Access to a vital area will be correlated to the need to have access to that area, and also will be limited to the particular tinie period that access is needed.
(2) Licensee procedures and/or equipment shall be made available to assure that only the author-ized individual can gain unescorted entry to a vital area on his/her key, key card, or other entry mechanism.
The amendments being proposed are essentially those that the Commis-sion intended licensees to implement through present regulations and existing guidance.
The present regulations, however, are not sufficiently specific as to their intent.
The proposed regulation would provide the needed degree of specificity.
The criteria being proposed are contained in a Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin, IE Bulletin No. 79-16,
" Vital Area Access Control" issued July 26, 1979.
One criterion in IE Bulletin No. 79-16 not incluued in the requirements is that having to do with trustworthiness, i.e., a screening program meeting American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard, ANSI 18.17, Industrial Security for Nuclear Power Plants.
The reason this criterion is not included in these requirements is that, to prescribe a licensee administered trustworthiness program by rule at this time, when the Commission has under consideration both a proposed material access authorization rule and alternative programs 3
Enclosure "A"
for establishing trustworthiness at nuclear power plants, would be inappropriate.
10 CFR 73.55(g) is also being amended to include access control equipment and all other security-related devices or equipment under the testing and maintenance requirement.
It is expected that the changes resulting from the amendments would be procedural,
'.g., keeping of access lists which the licensee can imple-ment without a major modification of the security or contingency plan.
However, plans would need some revising to include the new requirements.
These revisions would be handled as changes that "do not decrease the safe-guards effectiveness of the plan" and, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p) shall be submitted to the NRC within 2 months after the revisions are made.
The amendments, if approved, would become effective 75 days after publication in the Federal Register.
The promulgation of the amendment would not result in any activity that affects the environment.
Accordingly, the Commission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act, the Council of Environmental Quality guidelines, and the criteria of 10 CFR Part 51.5(d)(3), that neither an environmental impact statement or environmental impact appraisal to support a negative declaration for the proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 73 is required.
Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and Section 553 of title 5 of the United States Code, notice is hereby given that adoption of the following amendments to Title 10, Chapter I, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 73 is contemplated.
4 Enclosure "A"
PART 73 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS 1.
Section 73.55(d)(7) of 10 CFR Part 73 is amended to read as follows:
S73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against industrial sabotage.
n x
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n (d)(7)
The licensee shall positively control al' loints of per-sonnel and vehicle access into vital areas.
Access to vital areas shall be limited to individuals with access authorization who are-setherized access-to-vital equipment-and-whe-reqeire-such-access-to perform-their deties have a need to enter the vital area based upon assianed duties requiring the performance of tasks in the vital area.
Aetherization-for sech-individeais-shafi-be provided-by-the-isseance-of-speciali -coded f
numbered-badges-indicating-vitai-areas-to-which-eccess-is-setherized-Access-to-vitai-areas-for-the perpese-of generai-familiarizatien-and-ether non work-related-activities shaii-net-be-authorized except-for good-cause shown-to-the-ficensee-Unoccupied vital areas shall be locked and protected by an active intrusion alarm system.
Access shall be based upon the following:
(i) Access lists shall be established and approved for each vital area by the onsite individual responsible for security (or equivalent) or his designated representative.
Aporoved access duration and areas shall be commensurate with the tasks to be performed.
To remove individuals who no longer have a need for access, access lists shall be reviewed, 5
Enclosure "A"
updated and reapproved at the end of each access duration period not to exceed 31 days.
(ii)
Each individual granted access to vital areas shall be issued a serially numbered badge that displays a visible code indicatina the level of unescorted access granted and corresponding to vital area designations in the secur-ity plan.
(iii) Emergency access lists shall be established and aoproved for each vital area by the onsite individual responsible for security (or equivalent) or his designated representa-tive.
Access controls and written procedures to cope with emergency conditions shall be established.
(iv)
Licensee procedures and/or equipment shall be established to assure that only the authorized individual can gain unescorted entry to a vital area on his/her key, key card, ir other entry mechanism.
2.
Section 73.55(g) of 10 CFR Part 73 is amended to read as follows:
(g) Testing and maintenance.
Each licensee shall test and maintain intrusion alarms, emergency alarms, access control equioment, communica-tions equipment, physical barriers, and all other security-related devices or equipment utilized pursuant to this section, as follows:
a a
6 Enclosure "A"
[ Sections 161i, 1610, Public Law 83-703, 68 Stat. 949, 950, as amended, Pub. Law 85-507, 72 Stat 327, Pub. L.93-377, 88 Stat. 475 (42 U.S.C.
2101); Sec. 201, Pub. Law 93-438, 88 Stat. 1242-1243 (42 U.S.C. 5841)]
Dated at Washington, D.C.,
this day of 1979.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission 7
Enclosure "A"
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ENCLOSURE B
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