ML19296B610
| ML19296B610 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 11/08/1979 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-1676, NUDOCS 8002210132 | |
| Download: ML19296B610 (40) | |
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DATE ISSED:
11/8/79 Q
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hbh - /b 7 MEETING MINUTES OF THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON TMI-2: ACCIDENT BULLETINS AND ORDERS OCTOBER 2, 1979 WASHINGTON, D.C.
On October 2,1979, the ACRS Subcommittee on TMI-2: Accident Bulletins and Orders met in Washington, D.C., to continue review of the response of vendors /
utilities to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins and NRC Orders. The notice of this meeting appeared in the Federal Register on Friday, September 14, 1979. There were no requests or oral or written statements from members of the public and none were made at the meeting. Attachment A is a copy of the meeting agenda. The attendees list is Attachment B.
Attachment C is a tentative schedule of presentations for the meeting. Selected slides and handouts from the meeting are Attachment D to these minutes. A complete set of slides and handouts is attached to the office copy of these minutes.
OPEN SESSION (8:32 am - 5:35 pm) INTRODUCTION Mr. Mathis, Subcommittee Chairman, called the meeting to order at 8:32 am. The Chairman. explained the purpose of the meeting and the procedures for conducting
'the meeting, pointing out that Mr. Paul Boehnert was the Designated Federal Employee in attendance. The Chairman introduced Dr. Denwood Ross (NRC Staff) to begin the day's cresentations.
B&O TASK FORCE REVIEW ITEMS - C. THOMAS, S. BRYAN Dr. Denwood Ross, B&O Task Force Leader, gave a brief introduction of the meeting discussion items, and introduced Mr. Cecil Thomas to outline the status of the GE plant review effort.
Mr. Thomas noted that, as with the other vendor's plants, the Task Force is reviewing both the Licensees' responses to I&E Bulletin 79-08, as well as preparing a generic report on the topics of a plant auxiliary feedwater systems and small break LOCA. Mr. Thomas also noted that a SER addressing 800ccio ty
c' TMI-2 B&O Mtg October 2,1979 Bulletin items has been issued for ' :llstone Unit 1 and that the SER for the Brunswick units is currently under management review. The generic NUREG report on BWRs should be issued in November of this year.
Mr. Sam Bryan (Inspection and Enforcement) and Mr. Jim Murray (Office of the Execu-tive Legal Director) discussed the use of I&E Bulletins and NRC Orders to enforce regulations.
The bulletins are looked on as "infomal" enforcement mechanisms,
since they are administrctive in nature, while an NRC Order is a legal document and carries the force of law.
In response to a question from Dr. Theofanous, Mr. Murray noted that if an I&E Bulletin provides the desired response to a NRC concern, it will be used instead of an Order.
In response to a question from Dr. Lawroski, Mr. Bryan noted that, in a typical year, I&E issues about 12-18 Bulletins. This year, to date over 20 bulletins have been issued.
STATUS OF I&E BULLETIll REVIEW FOR WESTINGHOUSE AND C0f18USTION ENGIflEERIllG PLANTS -
P. O'REILLY Mr. O'Reilly reviewed the status of the Task Force review of I&E Bulletins79-06A and 06C for the Westinghouse plants (Figures D l-2), as well as the status of review for Bulletins79-06B and -06C that apply to the B&W plants (Figures D 3-4).
fir. O'Reilly noted that no Westinghouse plants have been issued a SER that will close out review of the Bulletin items.
For the CE reactors, flillstone Unit 2 was issued an SER in June 1979.
Mr. O'Reilly briefly reviewed the status of the Task Force Generic Review of the Westinghouse and CE auxC Nry feedwater systems and small break LOCA analysis.
He noted that the report deals.ith three areas:
(1) auxililary feedwater system review, (2) review of
'all break LOCA analysis and operator guidelines, and (3) plant procedures and aperato.r training.
A draft of the Westinghouse Generic Report (NUREG-0611) was provided to the Subcommittee Members prior to the meeting.
.A final version of the report is due out by mid-October.
The Combustion Engineering Generic Report is scheduled to be issued in November 1979.
1 Tf11-2 B&O Mtg October 2, 1979 Mr. Michelson asked if the Staff is looking at the effects of such non-LOCA transients as secondary side blowdown and its impact on termination of high pressure coolant injection. fir. Norian (NRC Staff) said that NRC is performing calculations to evaluate the results of such a transient and this information will be reported to the Committee at a future date.
NRC REVIEN OF WESTINGHOUSE AND COMBUSTION ENGINEERING PLANT AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TYSTEMS - P. MATTHEWS, NRC STAFF Mr. Matthews stated that the purpose of the auxiliary feedwater system review of Westinghouse and CE plants was to determine if any changes were required in light of the TMI-2 experience to assure adequate AFWS performance reliability.
He noted that the review gave a heavy emphasis to system reliability. The review encompassed 33 plants in total - 25 W plants and 8 CE plants. The review analyzed the effects of three sets of transients:
(1) loss of feedwater with all power sources available; (2) loss of feedwater with loss of offsite power; (3) loss of feedwater with DC power only (AC power assumed loss for two hours).
Tiie above. review resulted in a series of generic short-term and long-term recommendations to upgrade the reliability of the auxiliary feedwater systems (Figures D 5-6).
The short-term recommendations involved modifications of procedures and technical specifications. The long-term recommendations involve actual hardware changes.
Mr. Matthews also described four additional generic recommendations.that resulted from the review of the B&W auxiliary feedwater systems. These recommendations.are :
(1) installation of redundant level indication and low-level alarm for the primary auxiliary feedwater source; (2) the require-ment for a 72-hour endurance test for the auxiliary feedwater pumps; (3) installation of: safety grade indication of auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generator; and (4) stationing of a dedicated individual at the manual valves controlling auxiliary feedwater flow, if one of only two available s
'1 TMI-2 B&O Mtg 4-October 2,1979 trains is on test.
The application of the short-term and long-term generic recommendations to the Zion plant were discussed.
In addition to the above ceneric recommendations a tech spec requirement was inposed at Zion that stipulated tnat the water level in the condensate storage tank would not drop below 170,000 gallons.
There was considerable Subcomnittee discussion of the above recommendations and their application to the Zion plant. Highlights of the discussion include:
1.
Concerning the requirement that at least one train of the auxiliary feedwater systen be able to operate for at least two hours given an AC blackout, Mr. Bender suggested the Staff consider provisions for bringing in a backup water supply.
2.
fir. Ebersole and Mr. ilichelson raised the concern of the possibility of steam flow being shut-off to the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine given an unfavorable ambient environment (high temperature) that could mimic steamline break conditions.
3.
Dr. Catton raised the concern of what actions are to be taken given a AC blackout and a loss of air supply to air operated valves.
Dr. Ross replied that the plant procedures would be reviewed for the action to be taken in such a situation. fir. Bender suggested the Staff analyze this situation so that they are cognizant of the operator actions that need to be taken in such a situation.
Dr. Ross also suggested that when the Subcommittee meets at the Westinghouse lead plant, this topic to be discussed further at that time.
4.
Mr. Ebersole and fir. tiichelson asked if the Staff was giv4ng consideration to guaranteeing provisions for blowdown of the secondary side, so that low pressure water supplies can be made available as auxiliary feedwater sources. Dr. Ross was of the opinion that most plants have guaranteed blowdown, even by manual action on the part of the operator.
5.
Mr. Michelson and f1r. Ebersole raised the concerm of overfilling of the steam generators leading to water flow through the auxiliary feedwater turbine.
Dr. Ross commented that he thought that most of
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TMI-2 B&O Mtg October 2,1979 the standard Terry turbines could run on water flow.
6.
Mr. Etherington asked if the flow stability (motor-driven versus steam-driven feed pumps) of the Zion AFW system had been evaluated by the Staff. Mr. Matthews said that while the Staff did not specifically evaluate that question, they were not aware of any stability problems at the plant.
7.
Mr. Bender expressed concern over the apparent lack of detailed NRC review of plant, operator, and maintenance procedures.
Dr.
Ross acknowledged that this is a concern of the Staff, and is being addressed. Mr. Bender expressed further concern at the pace of the Staff's effort in this area.
8.
Additional concern was expressed by the Subcommittee regarding the potential damage to equipment in auxiliary Lildings from the break of the steamline that feeds the AFW turbine.
Mr.
Ebersole remarked that this concern relates back to the generic item that addresses steam pipe rupture outside of containment.
9.
Mr. Mathis asked what the Staff's rationale was for a 72-hour AFW pump endurance test. Dr. Ross replied that the length of time was arbitrary; however, NRC wanted to assure that the failure threshold of the pumps was significantly beyond the conventional usage the pumps normally experience.
It was also noted that the Franklin Institute recommended this amount of time as being sufficient for detection of any problems.
10.
In response to a question from Mr. Ebersole, Mr. Matthews noted that the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine at the Zion plant is seismically qualified.
l WESTINGHOUSE SMALL-BREAK LOCA ANAYLSES - R. AUDETTE, NRC Mr. Audette noted that the Westinghouse analyses responded to three general concerns of the Staff. These concerns are:
(1) the general characteristics of the small breaks; (2) analysis of the limiting small breaks; and (3) the plant behavior given specific small break scenarios.
r TMI-2 B&O Mtg October 2,1979 Mr. Audette reviewed the small break spectrum, divided into four categories of break sizes (Figure D-7).
The primary system response is dependent on the break size, for breaks between 3/8 of an inch and 1 inch in diameter, the system response is also dependent on the shut-off head of the high pressure injection pumps. Westinghouse has two types of HPI pumps; one is a low-head pump (1500 psi), the other is a high-head pump (above 2200 psi).
For all breaks less than 2 inches in diameter the system pressure remains above the accumulator setpoint.
The peak clad temperature for limiting small break analyses on the Westinghouse 3-loop plant was discussed (Fiqure D-8).
The 3-loop plant was choosen for this analysis since it characteristically gives the highest PCT. There were questions from the Subcommittee concerning the point labelled "L" just under the 2200 F limit. Westinghouse noted that this point was representing an evelope of all minimum safety injection curves and represented a worst-case for all evaluation model calculations.
In response to a question from tir. Ebersole, Westinghouse noted that the evaluation model estimates show the core begins to uncover for a 2-inch break, and a "better-estimated analysis shows core uncovery beginning for a 3-inch break. Mr. Michelson asked at what point the operator would proceed to initiate letdown flow. He noted that the small break scenarios takes several thousand seconds to complete and that early initiation of letdown was a significant contributor to the core damage at Three Mile Island.
Dr. Ross noted that this problem will be addressed in the analysis of the vendors operator guidelines, and that not all the guidelines have been received from the vendors as of yet.
Dr. Ross suggested that Westinghouse address this issue during the upcoming W Owners' Group presentation.
Mr. Audette presented a summary of the results of the W small break analyses (Figure D-9).
Of interest, is the required operator action and the time allowed for this action to prevent core uncovery (Item D - arrow).
9 O*
e TMI-2 B&O Mtg October'2, 1979 Mr. Audette noted the extent of the Staff's review, the small break scenarios analyzed, and indicated that the Staff has concluded that Westinghoyse has provided an adequate basis for preparing the generic set of guidelines for operator actions (Figure 0-10).
There were a number of questions from the Subcommittee concerning the details of the Westinghouse small break analyses. The Chairman noted that there will be a 2-day meeting of the ECCS Subcommittee on October 17-18, 1979, and these questions would be more properly addressed at that meeting.
NORTH ANNA TRANSIENT - D. ROSS, NRC Dr. Ross described the North Anna transient which occurred on September 28, 1979.
A malfunction in a feedwater heater led to a turbine trip, and as steam was bypassed to the condenser, one of the bypass valves stuck open. This action led to a over-cooling of the primary system, and actuation of the HPI system.
Following the instructions of the I&E Bulletins, the operator tripped the reactor coolant pumps, and the HPIS was allowed to run for about 20 minutes.
it was noted that during the transient, the PORV cycled open and closed approximately 20 times to relieve excess coolant pressure.
Dr. Ross noted that the cycling of the PORV was unexpected for a non-LOCA transient of this type. He said this incident would require additional analysis and possible clarification of the HPIS te rmination criteria.
Dr. Ross also noted that there is general disagreement among the PWR vendors concerning the HPIS termination criteria, and this is under evaluation by the NRC. Mr. Michelson noted that the North Anna transient indicates that it is possible to repressurize the primary system quite early in a transient, and this may increase the probability of a stuck open PORV.
HPI AND REACTOR COOLANT PUMP TERMINATION CRITERIA - D. ROSS
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Dr. Ross noted that at present there is disagreement among the PWR vendors concerning when safety injection should be terminated. There is a similar disagreement among the vendors concerning whether or not the reactor coolant pump should be tripped, and what the consequences of this pump trip would be.
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TMI-2 B&O Mtg October 2,1979 Dr. Ross also noted that there are significant differetices in the models used by the vendors to describe the effects of RCP trip. Dr. Theofanous suggested ~ that the Staff seek the " truth" in these models by performing their own calculations, independent of the vendors.
Mr. Norian (NRC) stated that while the Staff agrees with this approach, it is severely limited in both man-power and time to perform these calculations.
Dr. Theofanous also observed that modeling small break phenonena is extremely difficult, and he persor. ally has not seen any details of the treatment of these phenomena. Mr. Ebersole asked Westinghouse why they had installed on the Sequoyah plant a 30 second time delay for reactor coolant pump trip in the event of an over-power transient.
Mr. Zordin (W) said that he would have to check on this in order to reply to Mr. Ebersole's question.
WESTINGHOUSE AND CE OWNER'S GROUP PRESENTATIONS D. WATERS, R. NEWTON, WESTINGHOUSE-G. LIEBLER, CE Mr. Waters begin by giving a status report on the current activities of the Westinghouse Owners' Group. He noted that the effori.r. of the Owners' Group has been shifting to deal with the short-term recommendations specified by the Lessons Learned Task Force and delineated in NUREG-0578.
Mr. Newton discussed the activities of his Working Group on procedures. This working group has been charged with the task of developing procedure guidelines to be used by the utilities in developing operator proceaures for various accident and transient situations. Mr. Newton noted that the Group is composed of eight individuals, some of whom have operating experience and are familiar with accident analysis.
Mr. Newton reviewed the efforts of the Procedures Working Group to date (Figure D-11). Emergency procedures E-0 through E-3 have been reviewed and submitted to the NRC Staff.
In October, these procedures are due to be distributed to'the utilities for their use. Future procedures will address the items of natural circulation, inadequate core cooling, and reactor coolant system leaks.
In response to a question from Dr. Catton, Mr. Newton
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n a w - w w. s ' s -. -- ;
THI-2 B&O fitg October 2, 1979 replied that the above procedures have not been tested on a simulator.
Dr. Ross noted that this item is still open, and that it is likely the Staff will insist these procedures be tested on a simulator.
Mr. Ebersole suggested that full-scale slow-moving transient tests be conducted at selected power reactors to verify the vendcr's predictions concerning such phenomena as natural circulation. These test results could also be used to benchmark the reactor simulators fcr additional operator training. Mr. Bender expressed concern that the NRC does not have a program to qualify the reactor simulators and suggested that Mr. Ebersole's suggestion be given serious attention.
Mr. Newton agreed in principal with Mr. Ebersole's suggestion, but noted that it would be difficult to enlist volunteers, given the expense and potential for damage involved.
Dr. Ross noted that the NRC now has a program to perform one or two transient tests at selected operating plants as they come on line.
fir. Newton described proposed criteria for RCP and HPI termination that was developed by Westinghouse and reviewed by the Procedures' Working Group. The RCP termination criteria calls for stopping all reactor coolant pumps after high head safety injection pump operation has been verified, and before the wide range reactor coolant pressure drops below 1250 psig plus indicated inaccuracy.
Safety injection would be terminated if,:
(a) reactor coolant pressure is greater than 2000 psig and increasing, and (b) pressurizer water level is greater than 50% of span, and (c) the water level in at least one steam generator is in the narrow range span or in the wide range span at a level sufficient to assure the U-tubes are covered.
In response to questions from Mr. flichelson, Mr. Newton noted that the NRC has not reviewed these proposed criteria. fir. Newton also responded to an earlier question from Mr. Michelson concerning when norral letdown and charging flow would be reestablished following a transient of the type discussed above, fir. Newton responded that following termination of safety injection, normal charging and letdown flow would be established.
I
TMI-2 B&O Mtg October 2, 1979 Mr. Michelson stated f>r the record that regarding an earlier discussion concerning the seconuary side blowdown rate of vendor plants, the Combustion Engineering plants are capable of secondary side blowdown equal to 10%
of normal mass flow which Michelson observed is a very large blowdown rate.
Mr. Waters summarized the i Owners' Group efforts in the analysis area. He f
noted that they are working on the inadequate core cooling scenarios requested by the NRC; however, thic effort has slipped somewhat due to other commitments.
The Semiscale small-break " pre-predictions" are due to be submitted to the NRC by the 5th of October. LOFT small-break pre-predictions will be submitted by the 10th of November.
In addition to the above, the Owners' Group is also working to resolve NRC questions on information in WCAP-9600.
Mr. Liebler discussed the activities of the CE Owners' Group. He noted that since the meeting with the Subcommittee in July, the operating reactors and non-operating reactors Owners' Group has merged into one Owners' Group.
Mr. Liebler noted that the CE Owners' Group efforts are running about one month behind the W efforts.
LONG-TERM GENERIC REQUIREMENTS FOR B&W PLANTS - R. CAPRA, NRC Mr. Capra begin by delineating the short-term requirements of the NRC Orders issued to all B&W plants (Figure D-12).
The NRC has established eight long-term generic requirements for B&W plants.
Four of these requirements resulted from the long-term portion of the initial NRC Orders imposed on the B&W plants (Items 1-4 below). The remaining four requirements were developed by the Staff as a result af their evaluation of the Licer. sees' complia'nce with the short-term portion of the NRC Orders (Items 5-8 below).
N
TMI-2 B&O Mtg October 2, 1979 These requirements are:
1.
Continued upgrade of auxiliary feedwater system.
2.
Failure mode and effects analysis of the integra'ted control system (ICS).
3.
Upgrade of anticipatory reactor trip to safety-grade (loss of feedwater and turbine trip).
4.
Continued operator training and drilling to insure a high state of preparedness.
5.
Detailed analysis of the thermal-mechanical conditions in the reactor during recovery from small breaks with an extended loss of all feedwater.
6.
PORV and safety valve lift frequency and mechanical reliability.
7.
Small break LOCA analysis (additional information and analyses).
8.
Analysis of loss of feedwater and other anticipated transients.
Figures D 13-23 provide details of the NRC efforts on the short-term actions, long-term actions, approach taken, and schedule for resolution of each item.
During the above discussion, Dr. Catton requested that B&W provide a copy of the equations used to program the training simulator. B&W responded that they had provided a copy of these proprietary equations to the ACRS Staff.
(Note: A copy of these equations has been sent to Subcomittee members and cons ultants. ) During the discussion of Item 7 above, Dr. Theofanous raised a question of verification of the small-break codes when they are used, for example, to pre-predict the upcoming LOFT small-break test.
Dr. Ross suggested that at the upcoH ng ECCS Subcommittee meeting on October 17-18, 1979, Drs. Tong and Rosztoczy respond to this question.
B&W OWNERS' GROUP PRESENTATION - R. GILL Mr. Gill made a brief presentation describing the organization and objectives of the B&W Owners' Group (Figure D-24). A Subcommittee of the Owners' Group (TMI-2 Follow-up Subcommittee) is handling the TMI-related work. Mr. Gill noted that the Owners' Group cannot speak for an individual utility.
He also noted that the problem areas have included an understanding of the NRC's needs and schedules, the effet invalved with putting together a well-founded program.
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TMI-2 B&O "tg October 2,1979 "lcox is not a member of the Owners' Group, but advises the Group Babcock ant as necessary.
There was a question and answer period.
Mr. Bender commented that he was disturbed that there was no active participation by the Owners' Group in such problems as instrumentation to follow the course of an accident for example.
Mr. Ebersole asked if the Owners' Group had initiated any action above and beyond the minitrum requirements of the NRC. fir. Gill replied that Duke Power proposed to install a stand-by shutdown facility design to mitigate the consequences of a fire or sabotage within the turbine building by providing emergency feedwater.
In response to a question from Mr. iiichelsen, Mr. Gill noted that the Owners' Group only deals with problems designated as " generic".
OPEN EXECUTIVE SESSION During a brief open executive session, Dr. Ross noted that he would transmit a staff report in response to Commissioner Ahearne's request that addresses the question of whether or not construction activity should be suspended on B&W plants pending the outcome of the Staff's analysis of the Three Mile Island accident.
It was suggested that this report be transmitted to the B&W Subcomittee for ACRS action. The Subcomittee also discussed when its next meeting should be held. Dr. Ross suggested that the next meeting be held in late November-early December, and it should be held at a Westinghouse plant that is designated as the lead plant for implementation of the B&O Task Force requi rements.
The meeting was adjourned at 5:45 p.m.
NOTE: Additional meeting details can be obtained from a transcript of this meeting available in the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C., or can be purchased from Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.,
444 North Capitol Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
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Federal Register / Vol. 44: No.180 / Friday. September 14. 1979 / Notices NUC1. EAR REGUI.ATORY Tuesday. October 2.1979.
0 8:30 a.m. untd the conclusion of Adviscry Committee on Reactor hs, ness.
Safeguards Ad Hoc Subcommitteeon The Subcommitta may meet t the Three Mile Island. Unit 2. Accident Executive Session. with any o ts Bulletins and Orders; Meeting consultants wF.o may be psent o The ACRS Ad Hoc Subcommittee on explore and exchange their prelimmary the Three Mile Island. Unit Accident opmions regarding matters which should be considered durmg the meeting and to
, Bulletins and Orders. will hold an open formulate a report and recommendation meeting on 0+- ? So 9 in Room to the full Committu.
1046,1717 H St NW., Wasnmgton. DC At the conclusion of the Execunve 20533 to consider the response of Session, the Subcommittee will hold vendors and utilities to the NRC Office discussions with representatives of the of Inspection and Enforcement Bullet:ns NRC Staff. vanous utilities and and NRC Orders.
industries, and their consultants.
In accctdance with the procedures pertinent to this review.
outlined in the Federal Register on Further information regarding topics Octcber 4.1978 (43 FR 45928), oral cr to be discussed. whether the meeting wntten statements may be presented by has been cancelled cr rescheduled. be members of the public, recordings wdl Chairman's ruling on requests for the be permitted only dunng those portions opportunity to present oral statements of the meeting when a transcnpt is being and the time allotted therefor can be kept, and questions may be asked only obtained by a prepaid telephone call to by members of the Subcommittee,its the Designated Federal Employee for
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consultants and Staff Persons desinns this meeting. Dr. Thomas G. McCreless.
to make oral statements should notify (telephone 202/834-32S7) between 8:15 the Designated Federal Employee as far a.m. and 5:00 p.m. EDT.
in advance as practicable so that Dated: September 10.1979 appropriate arrangements can be made to allow the necessary time during the lohn C. Hoyle.
meeting for such statements.
Agyisory cocunineeManagement Officer.
The agenda for subject meeting shall I
be ae follows:
8O C" "*"
ATTACHMEtlT A
ACRS SUBCOM!ilTTEE ON TMI-2: ACCIDENT BULLETINS AND ORDERS OCTOBER 2, 1979 WASHINGTON, D.C.
ATTENDEES LIST NRC TOKYO ELEC POWER C0 ACRS W. Mathis, Chairman R. A. Capra H. Hamada C. Thomas H. Etherington S. Lawroski F. R. Audette THE 0AK RIDGER P. E. Norian I. Catton C. Ilichelson M. W. Hodges M. James T. Theofanous G. Kuzmycz P. Boehnert, Staff
- P. D. O'Reilly GILBERT ASSOC.
D. Ross
- Designated Federal Employee P. flatthews J. R. Hoke II J. P. Murray CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT - H D. F. Thatcher VE&C O'4NERS' GROUP D. Garner C. ? tiller D. Waters B&W FLA. POWER CORP Si1VD J. Mason B. Ham P. Y. Baynard B. Dieteriga E. R. Kane UISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER - W_
P. Delozier OWNERS' GROUP DUKE POWER C0 R. Newton R. L. Gill FLA POWER & LIGHT C0 P. M. Abraham VA ELECTRIC & POWER C0 T. P. Ha rall G. Lebler J. A. Ahladas VEPC0 WPPSS WESTIflGHOUSE R. W. Cross R. A. Delorenzo M. J. Hitchler KEPC0 BECHTEL POWER CORP R. Muench T. Zordan K. Ota B. S. Montgomery B. King D. H. Rawlins NORTHEAST UTILITIES BBR B. M. Bownan R. W. Wells K. O. Layer GPU TOLED0 EDISON AMERICAN NEW SERVICE C. W. Smyth T. J. tiyers M. Davis SACRAMENTO UTILITY DIST F. R. Miller D. L. Timb R. Dieterich ARKANSAS POWER &
LIGHT CO L. D. Young B. Leyse D. G. fiardis D. Williams E. R. Grant ATTACHMENT B
ACRS StroC09tITEE MEEIDG CN MI-2: ACCIEENT BULLM AND CRDERS OCTT ER 2, 1979
)@Sr1INGTCN, D.C.
- TDCATIVE SCFIXILE -
PR5DCATICN*
N TIE
- I.T I.
IhTitcDUCTICN 5 min 8:30 am W. MAniIS, GAIRMAN II.
NRC PRESDCATICN A.
Introduction - D. Ross 10 min 8:35 am
' Genesis of Bulletins and Orders
' Status of GE Plant Reviews B.
Westinghouse Generic Report 1.
Auxiliary Feedwater System 30 min 9:00 am Reliability - P. Matthews
'AFW Upgrade Requirements
' Plant Specific Requirements
- BREAK -
10 min 10:00 am 2.
Analyses - R. Audette and B. Sheren 30 min 10:10 am
'Small Break LOCA
'HPCI Termination
' Pump Trip
' Operator Guidelines 3.
Future Activities - P. O'Reilly 10 min 11:10 am
- Instructions to Licea. sees
' Anticipated Schedule for Audit Reviews of Plant Procedures and Operator Training
- PRESDCATICNS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO DIE TIME SHCWN - AN ALLCHANCE NiOLWrDG TO 50-100% CF DIE PRESDCATICN TIME HAS BEDI MADE FCR SUBCCMMITIEE QUESTICNS.
f['[/$d NA$Y
s
.,r E 94I-2: B&O 0:tober 2, 1979 IHESENTATION*
A M.
TIME TIME C.
Ccatustion EW.ineering Generic Report -
15 min 11:30 am
- p. O'Reilly
' Status
- Differences frem W Generic Reoort
- LUNCH -
I hr 12:00 noon III. W AND CE CWNER'S GROUP /VENDCR FRESDirATICNS Discussion of NRC Staff Requirements
' Implementation
- Plant Specific Items
' Owners Group / Vender Input to NRC Requirements 1.
W Owner's Group - D. Waters, R. Newton, 20 min 1:00 pm and V. Esposito 2.
CE Osner's Group - G. Liebler 20 min 1:45 pn IV.
NRC REQUIRDENTS KR B&W REACTORS Status Report on the Following Topics -
45 min 2:30 pn R. Capra
' Auxiliary Feedwater System Upgrade
' Failure Mode and Effects Analysis of the ICS
' Upgrade of Anticipatory Reactor Trip to Safety-Grade
'KRV/SRV Reliability Study
- BREAK -
10 min
' Analysis of 'Iber:::al-Mechanical Ccndition in Reactor Duri.9 Re-covery from Small Breaks with Extended toss of All Feedwater
- PRESENIATICNS SHOUID BE LIMITED TO DIE TIME SRCM1 - AN ALIIWANCE MCUtfrDG TO 50-100% CF DIE PRESENTATICN TIME 1RS BEEN MADE KR SUBC04MI'I'rEE QUESTICNS.
.c i
DiI-2: B&O October 2, 1979 PRESDCATICN*
AC"?JAL TIME TIME
' Operator Training and Crilling
' Analysis of Loss of Feedwater with Cther Anticipated Transients V.
B&W CMER'S GRCUP/VENCCR PR5DCATICH - R. GIII 30 min 4:10 pn
' Introduction (Purpose Scope, Members)
- Implementation and Schedule
'Problan Areas (if any)
- Input to NRC Staff Requirements 5:10 pn VI.
DISCUSSICN VII. AIUCURNMDC 5:45 pn O
e
- PRESE.VTATICNS SHCULD BE LIMITED TO TdE TPI SHGN - AN ANNCE AMCtREDG TO 50-100% CF 'IEE PRESDRATICH TIME liAS BED 4 MADE EtR SUBCCMMITTEE QUESTICNS.
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il15O)RD H-ESIC4ED G8ATING PLafE5 STATls G IE MII: TIN 7%'Ea E#Ll'ATICN REPCRTS:
!GE ISSED TO IMTE.
LICEliSEE RESFC?E TO STACF'S IfFCF?ATICN RECESTS CUTSTsiDING:
D. C. C00( 1 & 2 EAVER VALLEY 1 fGTH ANM 1 CPENITEMSUNEERREVIEW:
ITEM 2 - VOID Rt.CCG11TICN #iD MllRAL CIRCllATICN Iikli 7(s) - HPI TERMIMTICN ITEM 12 - CPERAIING MCIS AND PRCCEDURES FOR EALING WITil h IN RCS CR IN CCNTAlfET MOST LICE?EES PAVE REFEREtED ilE WmK I lit 11 OfERS' CROUP IN TEIR RESPONSES TO CE OR (GE I TE ABOVE T}EE ITEMS, TESE ITEMS SHOLLD E RESOLVED DURING OCTOER 1979.
9 0
e L
f)f7MH/?If/Yf D-l
STATUS OF IE BullFTIN 79-06C FOR H-DESIGNED OPERATING PLANTS
-ITEM 1 - (TRIPPING RCPs & TWO LICENSED O'PERATORS IN CONTROL RCOM)-
LICENSEES ARE IMPLEMENTING THIS REQUIREMENT.
-ITEM 2 - (LOCA ANALYSES FOR RANGE OF SMALL BREAKS AND RANGE OF TIME LAPSES IN TRIPPING PUMPS) - LICENSEES HAVE REFERENCED H REPORTS WCAP-9584 AND WCAP'-9600 IN THEIR RESPONSE THIS ITEM.
-ITEM 3 - (GUIDELINES FOR OPERATOR ACTI0tl BASED ON THE ANALYSES IN ITEM 2, AB0VE) - LICENSEES HAVE REFERENCED H REPORT WCAP-9600 IN THEIR RESPONSE TO THIS ITEM.
-ITEM 4 - REVISE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND TRAIN OPERATORS BASED ON GUIDELItjESDEVELOPEDUNDERITEM3,AB0VE.
-ITEM 5 - (INADEQUATE CORE COOLING ANALYSES) - LICENSEES HAVE REFERENCED WORK OF R OWNERS' GROUP IN THEIR RESPONSE TO THIS ITEM.
THE REQUESTED COMPLETION DATE FOR THIS ITEM (0C10BER 31, 1979) MAY CREATE RESPONSE PROBLEMS.
THE AB0VE ITEMS'.'ARE LISTED AS SHORT-TERM ITEMS.
IN ADDITION, A LONG-TERM ITEM REQUIRES THE AUTOMATIC TRIPPING OF THE OPERATING RCPs UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH SUCH ACTION MAY BE NEEDED.
/> p.
s C-E.
O P E R'A T i ll G REACTORS STATUS OF IE B U L L E T I t!79-06B EVAHATTG1 E?CRTS:
- Min STOE 2 - EVALinTION EPCRT ISSED JUE 7,1979
- Cal'ERT CLIFS - EVALUATIGl E:CRT UCER TIAG:1ENT EVIS
- EMAINING C-E P!RfTS - EVALUATIGl CGEINUING, #0 T'E FOU.CWItiG Gel IT9S 3EING EVIPED:
OPEN ITBS IMER EVIEW PLANT h
3 11 En 60 7
9 10 11 PALISAIES X :.
X X.
X X
X X
MIE YN1, X
X FT. CAL 4031 X
X X
X X
X
- 10-2 X
X X
X X
ST,LUCIE 1 X
X X
X X
. StBJECT '% IER OF GE1 ITEE:
ITEM NO.
S(R_ECT 2A
\\01D ECOGilTICN 3
CONTAInfBff ISOLATIG{ INITIATIGl #8 PF00 DUhd 4
IEDICATED It0IVII1RL TO INITIATE APd FLry 63 CRITERIA FOR TRIPPING HPI P11PS So LEE OF SEVEPAL PAPAFETERS IN EVALlRTING Pl#ff C0 7
POSITIGilNG REQUIF991TS #0 CGITRO.S RR ESF VALES 9
mINTDME #0 TEST PROEDUES 10 PB0tPT EPORTING PRXEUFES 11 0FEPATING ttIES #9 PROEDUES FOR EALING WITH H 2
IN-GGaAlwen g3
STATUS OF IE BULLETIN 79-06C
- FEM 1 - (TRIFFING RTs a Tno UGGED CFEPATCFS IN CCtriFCL ECfD-ALL UEEEES AE Iffl98{TItiG THIS ECUIEFBIT.
- ITEM 2 - (LTA X? LYSES FOR P#iE OF SmLL BENG AND F#!E OF TIE LAPSES IN TRIFPING PlffS) - ALL UCENSES PA\\E EEFSIED C-E EPORT
~
EN - 115 - P IN EEIR ESPCtEE TO iHIS IlEM.
- ITEM 3 - (GUIIELIES FOR TEPATOR ACTIG1 BASED Ctl TE #@ LYSES IN ITEM 2, RO\\E). -
ALL UENSEES HA\\E W.r2NED C-E EFORT G1 - 115 - P IN TEIR ESPG6E TO EIS ITEM.
' (NGE: TE GUIEUtB CGfiAIED IN Gl - 115 - P ItELLE #1 IttEDIATE ACTIGI TO TE EFFECT THAT OtLY TO EACTOR C00lRff PlffS EE TRIP:{D, I.E., OtE ER LOT. THIS
' GUIIEUtE IS Ill (It!FLICT WIT.i ITEM 10F THE BlLLETIN NID EQUIES ESOLIITI0tl BERE PROEDURES RR C-E PUWIS CNi EE IE\\ELCPED.)
- ITEM 4 - (EVISE EEEENCY PROEDUES AND TPAIN OPEPATORS BASED G1 GUIEUES E\\ELTED LIER ITEM 3, ASO\\E.) - SEE PFGEM IIBff1FIED ABOE.
- ITEM 5 - (INAEQUATE COE OJ0ut!G MlALYSES) - TE EQlESTED CGPETION DATE FOR THIS ITEM (OCTTER 31,1979) WILL CEAE ESPQEE PROBlDS.
THE ABO \\E ITE?S AE U51ED AS SHORT-TEFM ITE?S.
IN ADDITIC(1,. A L0t!G-iEFM ITEM EQUlfES TE AUTCf% TIC TRIPPItiS OF THE CEPATIt!G RCPs [MER ALL CIRClfSTN1ES Ill'nHIG1 SU0i ACTIGi mY EE EEIED.
D-y
- w.,, %.
GENERIC RECOMMENDATIONS - LONG TERM GL-1 AFWS SYSTEMS,SHOULD HAVE AUTOMATIb INI'TIATION.'
RETA,1N ItANUAL START AND STOP CAPABILITY WITH MANUAL START AS BACKUP TO AUTOMATIC INITIATION GL-2 INSTALL REDUNDANT PATH (PIPING AND VALVES)
HHERE PRIMARY AND ALTERNATE HATER SOURCES PASS THROUGH SINGLE PIPE AND VALVE.
6l-3 EVALUATE AFWS DESIGN TO ELIMINATE A-C DEPENDENCY FOR ONE AFWS GL-4 EVALUATE AFMS DESIGN TO PREVENT MULTIPLE PUMP DAMAGE DUE'TO DRY PUMP
["
OPERATION RESULTING FROM NATURAL PHENONENA DAMAGE (EARTHQUAKE, TORNADO)*,.
TO UNPROTECTED PRIMARY WATER SUPPLY CONCURRENT WITH AUTOMATIC PUMP START e
GL-5 PR0 vide SAFETY GRADE AFWS AUTOMATIC START SIGNALS e
9 4
9 O
i h
I
N...
Ridu'is' hi'liEVIEU i
GENhRibRhbOMMENDATIONS-SHORTTERM
'GS-1 TECH SPEC LC0 - TIME L[MIT ON buTkUE bF 1 [RAI~N GS-2 T'ECH SPEb ADMINISTRATIVh CONTR0(S ON MANUA( VA(VE
-LbbKkil0VhRIhY VALVE POSI. TION
- SINGLE SUCTION LINES AND VALVES GS-3 RE-EVALUATE AFWS FLOW LIMITS TO REDUCE.AFWS WATER HAMMER OCCURRENCE j
GS li EMERGENCYPROCEDURhFORCONNhbT[NGBkCKUPWkTh'RSOURbbTOAFWSPUMP i
SUCTION GS-5 EMERGENCY PR0bbDURE5 TO $SURENhchSSkRYdPEikkTORACTIONSkRETkKEN TOASSURE.AFWSAVk!(kBI(ITYINEVENTOhACBLkbK00T 6S-6 IEC[I SPEC,- AFWS FLOW YhRIFIbdTION To SThAM dENERkTOR F0(LOWYNG HAINTENANCE OUTAGE WHICH AFFECTS AFWS FLOW CAPABILITY GS-7 NON-SkFbTY GRADE AFWS A'uTbMAT[C START StdNk(S GS-8 AUTOMATIC ACTUAT[0N OF APdS a
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X GENERIC ANALYSIS 1.
SMALL BREAK SPECTRUM CHARACTERISTICS 2.
LIMITING SMALL BREAKS 3.
SMALL BREAK SCENARIOS A.
PORY STUCK OPEN (1 AND 3 VALVES)
B.
PUMP TRIP DELAY C.
LOFW 1.)
0" BREAKS 2.)
MIN. BREAKS - NO HPI D.
ISOLATED STEAM GENERATOR E.
BREAK ISOLATION 1.)
PORVs 2.)
LETDOWN LINES 4.
ADEQUACY FOR GENERIC GUIDELINES t
0 -10
PFLEUES EVIEW BY MITE C@lP uUE E-0, "INfDIATE ACTICIS #3 DIA90STICS" #9 E-L "LES T EACTOR CColM" PPDEDJF5 FOR HIGH HEAD HPSI PL41TS PE/IB1 CGM AND StBillitu IN WCAP-isf0, JULY E-2, " LOSS CF SECONDARY C00l>NT" #0 THFOUGi E-3, "SWAi EE?ATOR TLEE RUPTUE" SEFEEER PFCCEUES FOR HIGi HEAD HFSI FU!fiS fBIBl CU?!11td.
E-0, E-1 NO E-3 PFOCEDL!PS FOR LrhER HEAD HPSI PLWS REVIEW COM.
OCT@ER DISTRIBlHION OF PPDCEDUE GUIDELIhB TO lITILITIES SSilNAR Gi TP#4SIBITS NO Pf0CEDUE GUIDELDES FlHUPE NATUPAL CIRCLtATIGi EVIB1 It@DEQUATE CORE C00 LITE 0F EACTOR C00L#1T SYST9115AKS C4JIEELIiES e
~
g_ //
', ~
FACILITIES CFER ISSUED DER LIFiB OCGEE 1, 2, 3 MY 7 FAY 18
- UC-1 PAY 17 FAY 31 P#iCHO SECO MY 7 JLIE 27 JULY 6 DAVIS-EESSE 1 PAY 16 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 t'AY16 JULY 6 SHCET-TER1 E0jlf9BTS 0 CFTFS
- 1. [FGRAE T THEF,lm SYSTD1
- 2. IBELCo CAPABILITY & PP001UES TO CCtfTPCc AFW/E&l INDEFSEENT T TE. IffEGPATED CMTROL SYSTD1 (ICS) 3.
INSTALL CGTPDL-CPAE EXTCR TRIP FOR LES T FEEIMATER #0 TUFBIE TRIP (LORI #0 TD 4.
- iALYSIS #0 PR001UES FOR St9LL BEAK LOSS-&-C0CUWT-ACCIIENTS
- 5. OY.PATCR TPAINING (SIfi)lATOR TRAINING CN TMI-2 ACCIDElfD I
6-/R
UPGPAE TE TINU!ESS 40 ELIABILIT/ CF TE AFW SYSTEM SHORT-TER4: SIGNIFICNiT GW;ES WEE t%E TO IPFFGE TE TIEUESS
- 0 EUABIUTY CF ELIWRf CF TE AFW SYSTEM AS A ESULT CF ACTIWS T#Si IN ESPWSE TO EE SHORT-TEM PORTIm CF TE ORERS lE'G-TEM:
ETFR11tE ADDITIGPL PORTImS OR CCFFGSTS OF TE AFd SYSTEM FEEDING IFFROGEIT APPPGDi:
- 1. ALL B&W PLAWS AE E0JIED TO E?f0RM #1 APW SYSTEM El_IABILITY STUDY SIMILAR TO THAT DGE BY TE STAFF FOR TE W.IND E PL41TS
- 2. AFW ELIABIUT/ IS AWSS:D FOR EEE CASES:
(A) LDSS CF FAIN FEEWATER WIlh EACTOR TRIP G) LCSS CF PAIN FEEWATER WITH LES CF CFFSITE PCWER G) LOSS OF PAIN FEEDWATER WITH. LOSS CF ALL AC F0iER
- 3. FAULT TEE TE0?il0UES USED TO IIBITIFY DCMItWIT FAILUE COURIBlITORS ACFECTING SYSTEM ELIABIUTY SO B JLE:
'07mm - ET WITH OstEPS' GRCUP TO DISCUSS EQUIF9EITS 08A)95 - ET WITH 04EFS' GROUP TO DISCUSS PKPCSED SCCPE
- 0 SOBJLE 08/308 - ET WITH 9UD & B&W TO DISCUSS PEUMINARY EPORT m LEAD PLRiT (P#ioi0 SECO) 09/178 - EEINED D9fT ENRT FOR LEAD PIRIT IL222 - DRAFi EFORTS FOR EPAINING PLANTS 124)3m - fit @L EFORT FOR ALL B8W FACIUTIES
- NRC STAFF IS EVIEWING t%1ERIAL AS EEINED
- NRC STACF CCMEiTS d LEAD Pl#1T DPAFT WILL BE FCWAEED TO St1JD #0 ChtEE' GRCLP L
D-13
3 FAIWE MWE tht. CTS #1ALYSIS CF TE INTEGPAlto CMTPCL SYilEi (IG)
SWFCE: l11EG-G560 ECGTEED THAT FAIWE lUE NO EFECTS EE USED TO IEiTIFY EALISTIC PWii INTEPACTIQS ESULTING FFGi FAIWES IN lG-SAETY SYSTBS, SAETY SYSTES #0 GEPATOR ACTIGE ECUTEGATIQ INCCff0 PATED INTO CEER RJNCTIQ: IG PPD /IES C00EDINATIGl CF TE EACTCR, SIE#1 GBEPATOR, EEWATER CGITRCL #4D TURBIE LMER ALL GEPATING CGGITIGE RJRPOSE CF TE. STUDY: TO IIBfTIFY S0JRES CF TPREIBITS INITIATED BY TE IG #0 TO EFIE P0iE4TIAL AEAS FOR liFDEBIT 1 FAT CGW EDUE THE rEEiCY CF TESE TPKEl&lTS STATUS:
1.
EPORT SUBMIT itu BY B&! W NJPjsT 17,1979 - IG ELIABILIT( ANALYSIS
- 2. TWO PART EPdE:
(A) REA (D ETER41E HETER #1 IG FAIWE C#1 CAUSE A FAIWE MWE WHEEBY THE SAETY SYSTES WOUW NOT PROTECT TE FE/CTOR COE (2) FAiWES #iALYZED THAT COULD AFFECT TE EEDWATER SYSTB1, ARikPd SYSTBi, PESSURIZER PESSUE/ LEVEL OR GAllENE TE PORV, SAETY VAL \\ES, NiD TE RPSASFAS G) IG WAS DIVIED IfE0: INRHS, 011BJTS #0 RJNCTIGAL BLOCE IN TURI E01 WAS FAILED (HIGi CR LW) #6 ITS #FFli G TE fSSS EVALUATED G) OPEPATING IllSTORY (D TP#EIENT EET DATA GTAINED m EA01 CEPATING PL#1T (2) NiALYSIS OF PL41T TP#EIBiT E\\B1TS #8 IG ASSESS?EiT G) #tALYSIS (F ICS PARDWAE FAIWES A-/W
(1) E EACTCR COE FEdAltS PPSTECTS THPOJGiGli #iY CF TE ICS FAIWES STUDIED (2)
ICS PABAE EFFOR'A"E PAS NOT ED TO A SIS 1IFIC#1T ?UEER CF TRIPS (6 OJT CF 310)
PELIMIfMRY CWCUJSIUS CF TE STAFF
- 1. TEE IS A PARTICULAR tED d E8W Plf[{TS (WITH TE OTS NO PECISE C0iTFDL SYSTBi TO COCFDINAlE EE EACTCR, STENi Et9ATCR, rtm. WATER SYSTBi NO TUEltE I1! RING E0E tiCR'AL #S UPSET CCt0TIGS.
- 2. ME IS A tED TO EoSSESS OLD ICS WORK, IN LIG1T CF EENT EMS SCE.0F hHICH EFECT TE ttr. CTS CF TE GiR4ES IN THE SETPOINT TE POP # #0 HIGl RCS PESSUE TPJP.
3.
IT APEARS THAT FAIWES IN TE INTEFFACING E0JIRelT, INCWDING TE CEPATOR, CAUSE A LARE NUMER CF FAILUES.
IF hE ATIDFT TO P00JS m TE ICS ALGE THE PPGlBS WOJLD EPAIN. IED TO IthESTIGATE TE INTEPACTIGS #0 PLoNT DYN#1ICS CF THE EaW PRIMARY AM) SECG0;RY SYSTB'E.
SGBJE 0971tfB9 - CAK RIDE CGfTRACTED TO EFFORi EVIEW 10/15/79 - PILEST FOR ADDITIGML INFOR'ATIm 11A)1B9 - DPAFT EPORT EVAWATING AEQJ/Cf #0 ACOJPACY E #@ LYSIS 11/1549 - FINAL EFORT.EVAWATING CGCWSIGG, EC&fE0ATIGG #0 CEPATING EXPERIB4E Oqr 4
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UPG?AE T #RICIPATCRY EACTOR TRIP TO SN:iY-GFAE PES 8R:
AU_ PLAWS NW HAVE #1 AfiTATIC, CGITFCL-GPAE, siTICIPATCRY E/LTCR TRIP MilGi WILL ACTUATE UPG LCSS T PAIN hr. WATER TURBINE TRIP PPGCSED PEUMINARY ESIG1 #4D SOEllE PCR INST #1ATId S8ili e!)
ESIGt:
IN ESPWSE TO IE BUU.ETIN 73-GB SOEUE:
NRC APPROVAL & ESIGi CGEPT ETAILED ESIGl NO PROCUFEEfi INSTAUATIm (EE TO EFELING OJTME)
TOTAL TIE:
22 TO 18 MWTHS GEPATING.
tUTER CF TIES TRIP CAU.ED UPW:
5 HISTORY:
FREER OF FAILUES:
1 (ANO-1 8/13/B)
STATUS:.
EQUEST SENT TO U@! SEES W SEPTBEER 7.,19B:
G)
IWROE SOEULE SUG THAT SAFETY-GPAE TRIP C#1 E INSTALLED WITHIN APPEtXIPATELY 6 mffHS (2)
IF EXEDITED S0iEDULE CNiNOT E ET., IWF0VE llE EUABILITY T PESSiT CGfTRCL-GPAE TPJP AS #1 INTERIM EASUE (EDUNDNICY #iD TESTABIUTY)
(3) ADDITIGAL INPDFt'ATId EEED TO APPPGE ESIGN
- ESPWSES SHalD E EEIWD BY OCTGER 5., lay.t e
CUITIfED CEPATCR TPAINIllG & DRILLING E9JIiBEIT:
.UGiSES WIU C0t!TIiLE EACTOR GEPATCR TPAINING #0 DRILUNG TO ASSUE A HIG1 STATE E PEPAEDNESS D001ETATICN:
Gi AUGJST 21,1979, TE STAFF DIECED liiAT EAGi LIGISE KGETT TE SEPS IT HAS TAEl TO INSUE THAT CGITI??JED CFEPATCR TPAINI!!G
- 0 DRILUNG INCCFFCPAES TE ECESSAR( ESSG!S LEARE FRCfiIMI-2 NO ASSUES A CGUINUlfiG HIGH STAE CF PEPAr~EESS ESF0iSES:
ESPG4SES EE SEPTUT:ER 21,197?
ESPalSES EEIVED: ILE NO FPC CRITERIA:
ACEPT#iE CRITEPJA FCR ItitRilNING CG?LI#;E WITH EE LGiG-TERi PORTIG1 CF TE OFER - EACH LIGISEE MjST INCCE0PATE TE FCLIDlING ITOS INTO ITS HOT UCSISE NO E0JALIFICATIGl PPDGPM:
A. LECTUES khh B. Gi-TE-JCB TPAINING C. EVAUJATIG1 4
e e
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A. ECTUE TCPICS:
i 1.-
TMI-2.ACCIIEfi EVIEW h
(A) SEDS4E CF E\\ SITS G) EXPL#1ATIW CF TP#iSISfi CURES (O ETIGitt E?? CPS
- 2. SMALL BEAK #iALYSIS (A) CTSECEiES \\S. SECTPUi CF BE2K SIZES A'S LCCATIGS G) LOSS CF FEENATER #3 LTG TERi CCCLING (O LGS CF RCPS NO NATUPAL CIPCULATIW
@ TrEPl0DYN#ilG - SATUPATIW, SLBC00 LING, ETC.
3; OTbs ELATED TP#1SI9fis
'(A) UERCCOLING #0 OERC00 LING E\\0ffS
@ INAEWATE CCFE COCUNG
- 4. PLAW l0DIFICATIWS NO PROGEUE EVIEW B. Ut..TE-E TRAINING:
- 1. S_lfijLATOR TRAINING (A) TMI-2 ECIIEii #0 ELAls CASUALT( TRAINING (HOT UGE & FIPST EQJAD NOTE:
- ALL OGSED CEPATORS AT Pai FEILITIES (EXEPT TMD HAVE CUhw 4-6 H0JR SIMJLATOR CWRSE
' SIMJLATOR TPAINING IS NOT PESafiLY EQUIED FCR AU. HOT UGEE #6 EWAL PRCGP#S; HOEH,10ST USE
- 2. ESIG, PROEDUE #9 UGNSE #8DBfi OWiES C. EVALUATIm:
- 1. OPit #0 WRITi21 EXA% TO INCLLEE TMI-2 ELATED TCPIG NOTE:
- ALL F%i UG4 SED GEPATORS Hart EEEN EQUIED TO PASS A WPJTTE1 EXAM (PASSING GPAE 900
- RJPJE ETAL EX#5 MAY BE AIIiINISTEED BY NPC
- RJiUE EQL!AUFICATIm GPKES TO BE CCFFATIBLE WITH 0.B CRIlERIA L
.m...
TER'AL-EGAHCAL EPY CUERi:
POETIAL FCR BRITRE F?ACil)E CF TE EACTCR ESSEL TRIfiG ECOERI FF04 SPALL BEAK LCCA EWiTS WITH #1 EXTEEED LGS CF RENATER CCtD HPI WATER IS USED FOR COE C0 CLING WITH SYSTEi EAT ED/AL
- 0 FESSUE CGUEL VIA TE PCW
~
SHORT-TERi:
EaW SUPlilTTALS (D 06/135-EVALUATIm CF ECTOR WSSEL BRITTLE FAILDE TE TO IfLECTId CF CCLD HPI WATER WRING SPALL LCCA EETS.
CD G/1V/9-LtiltR #0 SUFPL99ffAL CALCULATIWS T0 CD ABOW G 06/268-GUIELINES FOR AVOIDA'il CF EXTCR 'ESSEL BRITTE FFACil)E WRING ECOERY FKri SPALL LOCA ESTS BOI AGEED TO PROVIE A ITAILED TER'AL-E0WilCAL SERIC LWG-TERi:
EPORT m THIS SUBJECT m 07/128 TE STAFF SENT A FOR'AL EQUEST FOR TE STUDY AVLYSES E0)ESlED IN TE STUDY WILL BE CARRIED WT TO E H0JPS FOLLWING LOSS CF ALL FEENATER PL#1T PAP #ETEFS USED WILL CWSERVATIVELY ENELTE liiE GEPATING B8W Ft#1TS S0iEDUE:
EPORT.WILL E COPLETE BY 12/218 so
(
......w.
PORV #O SAEiY VALVE LIFT FEGENCI NO EG#11 CAL ELIABILITI LIFT FE9E1C/:
If.. ASSESS TrE PPCPASILITI CF CHAHEGlfiG WE PCW #0 SAhiY VALVES AS A ESULT CF T/E EVIS8 SETPONIS FCR TE HIG RCS PESSUE TPJP #3 PORV ACTUATIm PFEVIWS EVISED PORV SEIF0lNT 2255 PSIG _
2450 PSIG HIG RCS PESSUE TRIP 2355PSIG 2IO PSIG
- 2. ASSESSIEiT TO E VAE USING PL#fi CFEPATING HISTCW (A) TEPATIm WITH CLD SETPolffiS (146 D02PENitu PCW LIFTINGS)
TABULATE:
(D CAUSE CF EEfr (2) INITIAL FChER LSEL G) WHETHER TE EACTOR TRIPPED W HIG RCS PESS /SAETY VALVES LIFIED (4) #tALYZE EFFECT IF EVISED SETPOINTS EE USED (B) (PEPATIm WITH fEi SEIP0INTS TABULATE:
CD CAUSE E EACTOR TRIP (2) INITIAL POER l BEL (3) hHETER TE FORV OR SAET( VALVES ACRIATED (4) #4YZE EFFECT IF OLD SETP0lNT WEE USED (C) ESTIVATE INCEASE IN EACTOR TRIP FEQE1CY.AS A ESULT E LWERING TE EACTOR TRIP SETFOINT #0 INSTtulNG IFE thTICIPATCRY EACTOR TRIP G LOSS CF FEEWATER NO TUfBINE TRIP (D EVIEW ESIG CRITERIA POR Nt1EER CF TRIPS CER PLN4T LIE (2) EFECT CF TE INCEASED TRIP FEQUENCf m TESE CRITERIA
~
G) PROVIE BASIS FOR ACEPTABLE tOEER E TRIPS IN TERG CF LIMITING CGPGEfiS SGEEULE:
ESPGtSES TO E EEIVED BY 10/15B9 C-3P
WO%11 CAL EllABILIT/
- 2. THIS ECGGEATIm WAS E?ECPSED IN TE STAFPS EVALUATIGG CF UEliSE CGFU#iE WITH TE SHORT-lERi ERTIQ CF TE CEE5
E0JIES OJAUFICATIm CF PCW #0 SAETY VALVES LIEEP, EXPECTED CEPATING CGOITIGS, hMIG WWW INCL!IE SCUD-WATER #0 Th0-FHASE FLW C00lTIGS IT'IS NOT CLEAR bETER TdE PAST FAILUES ESULTED FRGi INAEWAIE QJALIFICATIm CR FPm A BASIC UNEUABIUT( CF VAL \\E ESIG WALIFICATI.m TESTING WILL PPD /IE SUE CF TE ItiFCR% tid EESSARf FOR ASSESSING TE BASIC EUABIUTY OF TE VAL \\E ESIGN SING FAILUES OR SUCmMS CF WALIFIED VALTcS WILL BE A PARTIAL It01CATId CF VALVE EUABIUTY B. SCEDUE:
(1) 0141/8 - SEtilT PPGP#1 ESCRIPTIG (2) 0741/8 - C&FLETE TESTING O
e 9
O-2)
SPAll BEM LCCA #lALYSIS
- E2W 8ERIC WLYSIS, "EVALUATim CF TPMSIETT E81NICR SiORT-TERi:
NO SMALL EACTCR CCCL41T SYSTEM BFE*S IN TE D7 FA FlRIT" WAS SEliliitu IN PAY 19B
- SEVEPAL SUFFLHEffS EEIWD SESECENT TO FAY E:CRT
- NFC STAFF EVALUATIm 0F EFCRT #5 GUIELIES ME FCU!O ACCEPTABLE LmG-TEFM:
- NRC STAFF EVAL'JATIm T EsW 8ERIC ECORT (NUEG-0565) '
SOEULED FOR PGLICATIm IN OCTCEER 195 ADDITIGAL INF0FFATIm E0 JESTED:
SL*111TTAL DATE SJBJECT 09/28B9
- JUSTIFICATIm TO SH04 THAT TE 3 NCE STtA18EPATOR MCEL USED IN TE CP/FT-2 CCCE IS AIQUATE TO PEDICT STEAM OEPATOR EAT TPA1SER
. CPAFT-2 SIMJLATIm I FIRST 3 HOURS OF TMI-2 ACCIENT (OR AS FAR AS CCCE WILL RJN UP TO 3 H0JFS)
- JUSTIFICATIm & ELIEF NO SAFETY VALVE FLW MCCELS USED IN TE CP/FT-2 CIE 10/01/B
- EVALUATIm 0F ECBri S8ilSCAE EX RlbDff (S-07-E3) 10/15B9 QJALITATIVE ASSESSENT T EACTOR SYSTEM ESPmSE TO A SPALL BEAK LOCA hHIOi CALEES TE SYSTBi TO EPESSURIZE AND CFEN THE PCRV (#!ALYSIS WILL EE SUEMITTED 02/0149)
E8GFARK #1ALYSIS CF SEQUENTIAL #JXILIARY EE
.12E//9 SIEAM 8E?ATCfS FCLLQ4ING A LOSS W MAIN FEEDWATER LEING CP/FT-2 01/15E
- EVAUJATId I LCFT (LTT SCEDJLED TO START H/1549)
-: ~
- RYSIS FOR LOSS CF PdATER #0 OTER ADDITICtlAL TP#5181TS f1JEG-E60 ECGiBEED FUE EALISTIC Ni; LYSES FCR CEPATIGR TP#SIDfiS
- 0 TE IEELTfEff E CEPATIOVL C4]IDELIES BASED W TESE
- R YSES EIS ECatSiDATIGl WAS B00 RED IN EE STAFF'S EV;LUATIGS 7 LIENSEES' CG'PLI#iG WITH TE SHORT-TERi FORTIG CF TE CCft11SSIW CRIPS ADDITIGR E9JIFEEiTS SUFEFSEED IN SCCE #0 SCHUE BY SECTIm T lUEG-0578 PROGP#1 COVEPS TEPATICtR GJIELINES FCR INAEQJAE COE CCCLING #0 OT
- B!CR'ALTPRSIBfTS SCFEUE
- 08/098 - ET WIE 04EFS' GROJP TO DISCUSS SCOE AT) S0iEDUE 09/138 - ET WITH GERS' GROUP TO DIS 0JSS PROGESS m PROGP#1 INAE0JAE COE COOLING (ICC) 10/318 - LOSS E INVENTORY WITH RCPS OFF 12/148 - LOSS OF INVBiTORY WITH RCPS m & DURING EFUEl.ING 02/22/8 - DiB PGER GEPATIGi ABNORR TP#GlBE CPEPATIGR GJIELIES (ATOG) 10M8 - EET WITH STAFF TO DIS 0JSS #RYSIS Gi LEAD PLMIT (#10-1) 01/08/9 - EET WITH STAFF TO DIS 0JSS ADDITIGR INFOR'ATIm m #10-1 02/22/8 - ISSE DPAFT GJIELIES FOR #iO-1 05/01/8 - ISSE DPAFT C'IIELIES FOR /LL Pl#fTS en D-33
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