ML19291C283
| ML19291C283 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 06/23/1978 |
| From: | JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19291C260 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001230276 | |
| Download: ML19291C283 (4) | |
Text
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201 539 6111 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/78-10/IT-0 Report Date June 23, 1978 Occurrence Date June 7, 1978 Identification of Occurrence Violation of the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.7.B., when the breaker permissive switch for breaker SlB was left in the trip position for a period greater than seven (7) days.
This event is considered to be a 24-hour reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.a.2.
Conditions Prior to Occurrence The major plant parameters at the time of the occurrence were:
Power:
Feactor,1718 MWt Electric, 584 MWe 4
Flow:
Recirculation, 16.0 x 10 gpm 6 lb/hr Feedwater, 6.371 x 10 Stack Gas Activity:
54,000 pCi/sec Description of Occurrence On Wednesday, June 7, 1978, at approximately 1315 hours0.0152 days <br />0.365 hours <br />0.00217 weeks <br />5.003575e-4 months <br />, it was discovered, during a systeta checkout being performed by a shift supervisor for a license trainee, that the breaker permissive switch for the SIB breaker was in the trio position.
There was no tag on the switch to indicate that the switch should be in this of f-normal position.
1792 223 Apparent Cause of Occurrence Investigation of the occurrence revealed the permissive switch was possibly in tne as found position since February 21, 1978.
At that tine, it was apparent ly placed in the trip position when an operator was carrying out swit.ning orders given to him by a systen operator.
The purpose of the 8 0 01 > 3 0 c)) Jb7
ATIACIMENT VIII Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/78-10/1T-0 P ge 2 of 4 June 0, 1978 switching and racking out of the SIB breaker was for the purpose of inspection of cables leading from the SB (startup) transformer to the IB bus.
The switching orders did not explicitly give directions to place the permissive switch in the " trip" position, although the safety practice when racking out a breaker with an automatic function such as this breaker is to place the permissive switch to the trip positicn.
This safety practice is implemented to prevent breaker operation during the period of time the breaker 's being racked out.
After completion of the necessary inspection, switching orders were initiated and carried out on February 23, 1978, to place the startup transformer and its associated conductors back into service.
- Again, the switching orders did not specify placing the permissive switch back to its normal position, since it did not appear on the initial orders.
Apparent cause of the occurrence can be attributed to the performance of switching not speci fied to be performed, placing the switch in an of f-nor-s
= t*!cn without the hanging of a tag, and the lack of an approved prvcedure to perform the racking out and racking in of the 4160-volt breakers.
Analysis of Occurrence The station auxiliary buses are connected by appropriate switching sequences to an alternate source of auxiliary power.
In the event of a total loss of the auxiliary power sources, auxiliary power shall be supplied from a standby diesel-driven generator.
The standby power source is physically independent of any normal power system.
Effect of the permissive switch being lef t in the " trip" position rendered the SIB breaker Inoperable.
Off-site auxiliary power would not have been available to power the IB bus and its other connected buses.
Additionally, on several occasions, Diesel Generator #2 was removed f rom service for preventative maintenance or surveillance.
Bus ID during this period of time had no active and no standby power sources.
Corrective Action immediate corrective action was to place the permissive switch to the "close" position to make the breaker operable.
Additionally, the following corrective actions will be taken:
1.
All operators and electricians will be instructed to note in the switching and tagging log whenever any switch is tagged out or placed in an other than normal position.
The switch in question shall also be tagged.
2.
An evaluation will be made to determine if a specific procedure for racking breakers in and out is necessary.
3 Jersey Central Power & Light Company's Systems Operations Department will be nade aware of the 4160-volt breaker permissive mode capability.
4.
A program will be incorporated into the Operations Department training schedule to better educate the operators performing tours in areas containir.g this equipment.
They will be instructed as to what otbe-observation and checks should be routinely performed.
1792 224'
ATTAOBET VIII Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/78-10/iT-0 Page 3 of 4 June 23, 1978 5
An evaluation will be made on the feasibility of installing an alarm circuit to inform the operator when the breaker is in the permissive mode.
Failure Data Not applicable.
9 9
1792 225
ATTACIEEITT VIII Page 4 of 4 RESPONSE TO DCLOSURE CfJESTIONS REPORI"GLE OCCURRE:CE 50-219/78-10 Section A of Enclosure Questions is pertinent since this event ircmlved only one Startup power source.
RESPONSE
A.1 'Iko circuits are normally available; one was lost.
A.2 Cause of event was erroneous position of breaker closure permissive switch.
A.3 Only one system breaker permissive switch was left in the wrong position.
A.4 No voltage excursions were involved in this event.
A.5 No frequency excursions were involved in this event.
A.6 Until discoverod, the switch was in the wrong position for approximately 106 days as reported.
A.7 Inte of event: 6/7/78 1792 226