ML19290D955
| ML19290D955 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/03/1979 |
| From: | Kehoe D, Mccabe E, Stetka T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19290D939 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-271-79-17, NUDOCS 8002290561 | |
| Download: ML19290D955 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000271/1979017
Text
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION I
Report No.
79-17
Docket No.
50-271
License No.
Priority
--
Category
C
Licensee:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation
20 Turnpike Road
Westborough, Massachusetts
01581
Facility Name:
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station
Inspection At:
Vernon, Vermont and Shrewsbury, Massachusetts
Inspection Conducted:
0_ctober 22-31, 1979
0
WP
/
Inspectors:
t[MGL/C
// /.27/77
T. F. Stetka, Reactor Inspector
/ date
,,
.
~L
ll
?h?
D. V. Kehoe, Reactor Inspector
date
date
Approved by:
f. d A M . h
st.l f h i
E. C. McCabe, Jr. , Chief, Reactor Projects
date
Section No. 2, RO&NS Branch
Inspection Summary:
Inspection on October 22-31, 1979 (Report No. 50-271/79-17)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of plant operations, critical
fire areas, control rod drive return line relocation, licensee action on Informa-
tion Notice 79-20, Licensee Event Reports, activities of the Nuclear Safety Audit
and Review Committee, and, licensee actions on previous inspection findings.
Facility
tours were conducted.
The inspection involved 55.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> onsite by two region-based
inspectors.
Results:
One item of noncompliance was identified (Infraction-failure to check
operability of a redundant system during removal of a pump from service).
Region I Form 12
(Rev. April 77)
8002399
.
DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
a.
Licensee Personnel
- L. Anson, Training and Document Control Supervisor
- L. Bozek, Operational Quality Assurance (YAEC)
- R. Burke, Engineering Support Supervisor
W. Conway, Plant Superintendent
P. Donnelly, I&C Supervisor
- D.
Girroir, Technical Assistant
S. Jefferson, Reactor and Computer Supervisor
B. Leach, Health Physicist
- W. Murphy, Assistant Plant Superintendent
J. Pelletier, Maintenance Supervisor
- D. Pike, Manager, Operational Quality Assurance (YAEC)
- R. Sojka, Operations Supervisor
G. Wyman, Chemistry and HP Supervisor
b.
Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) Personnel
- L. Heider, Vice-President
- J. Hoffman, Manager, Mechanical Engineering Group
- R. Martin, Senior Engineer, Operational Quality Assurance
- D. Moody, Manager of Operations
- D. Pike, Manager, Operational Quality Assurance
- L. Reed, Operational Quality Assurance
R. Wanczyk, Plant Operations Engineer
c.
State of Vermont Personnel
- Mr. P. Paull, State Nuclear Engineer (Vermont Public Service Board)
The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel.
- Present at the October 26, 1979 exit interview.
- Present at the October 31, 1979 exit interview.
- Contacted via telephone call.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items
(Closed) Unresolved Item (271/77-08-01):
The licensee completed Plant
Design Change Request (PDCR) 79-11, adding a high point vent and connections
to the condensate system to provide keep full capability to the RCIC and
HPCI systems when their suctions are lined up to the torus.
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3
(0 pen) Noncompliance (271/78-29-03):
Failure to provide adequate procedures.
The inspector reviewed the revisions to AP-0155 and AP-0156 and concluded
that they were adequate.
The inspector further determined that the
design modification to remove the interface between the demineralizer
system piping and the instrument racks had been completed but the docu-
mentation package including procedure updates had not been completed.
This item remains open pending NRC review of the modification documentation.
(0 pen) Noncompliance (271/79-12-01):
Failure to start reactor feed pump
as required by procedure.
The inspector noted that operations personnel
had been instructed on the need to monitor critical parameters during
reactor startup, but could not determine that any corrective action with
respect to procedural adherance had occurred.
The licensee acknowledged
the inspectors comment and stated that operations personnel would be
reinstructed on the importance of procedural adherence.
This item remains
open.
(Closed) Noncompliance (271/79-12-02):
Failure to write MR prior to
conducting corrective maintenance.
The inspector verified that the
licensee had implemented the corrective action as specified in his letter
(D. E. Moody to E. J. Brunner) dated October 9, 1979.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (271/79-12-04) Revision of OP-1200, OP-1201,
OP-5204, and OP-5224 to include return to normal criteria.
The inspector
reviewed the referenced procedure revisions and concluded that they
adequately address return to normal criteria.
3.
Review of Plant Operations
a.
Shift Logs and Operating Records
The inspector reviewed the records listed below for compliance with
the licensee's administrative procedure for Operations Department
Logs.
(1) Night Orders for the period October 1-23, 1979.
(2)
Lifted Lead / Installed Jumper Log for the period July 10, 1979
through October 20, 1979 and a sample verification of installed
jumpers and lifted leads.
(3) Chemistry Logs for the period August 20, 1979 through October
1, 1979.
(4) Maintenance Request Log for the period July 16, 1979 through
October 23, 1979.
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.
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4
(5) Control Room Operator (CRO) Log for the period August 16, 1979
through October 24, 1979.
(6) Auxiliary Operator Logs for the period October 1, 1979 through
October 23, 1979.
(7) Shift Supervisor's Log for the period August 16, 1979 through
October 24, 1979.
(8) Work Request Log for the period July 16, 1979 through October
24, 1979.
(9) Tagging Order Log for all outstanding entries and a sample
verification of present tagging status.
Inspection consisted of verifying adequate management review, correct
identification of problem areas, completeness, and determination
that conditions contrary to the Technical Specifications did not
exist.
During the inspector's review of the Shift Supervisor's Log the
following log entry, dated September 14, 1979 and concerning disabling
the "A" Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) pump to repair
the pump status indicating lights, was made:
" Adjustments were made
to the mechanism and indications restored to normal before alternate
Technical Specification testing could be started."
Review of Mainte-
nance Request (MR)79-717 and the Potential Reportable Occurrence
(PRO) report indicate that RHRSW "A" was disabled at 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br /> by
racking out the breaker to adjust the mechanism that controlled
these indicating lights.
The adjustment was made and the breaker
racked in by 1615 hours0.0187 days <br />0.449 hours <br />0.00267 weeks <br />6.145075e-4 months <br />.
The pump was subsequently tested for
operability.
As noted in the log entry, there was no attempt to
check operability of the pump or operability of the redundant RHRSW
subsystems prior to disabling the "A" pamp.
Disabling of the
"A"
pump represents voluntary entry into a degraded mode of operation.
Failure to immediately check operability of the redundant RHRSW
subsystem while intentionallly disabling the "A" pump is contrary to
the requirements of TS 3.5.C.2 and 4.5.C.2 and is an item of noncompli-
ance (271/79-17-01).
6.
Facility Tours
The facility was engaged in a refueling outage.
Therefore, particular
emphasis was placed on radiation area controls, plant housekeeping conditions,
and fire protection controls.
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5
The tours encompassed the following areas:
All levels of the reactor building;
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Turbine building;
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Diesel Generator rooms;
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Cable Spreading room;
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Rad Waste building;
Switchgear room; and,
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Interior and exterior of the torus.
(1) Shift Staffing
The inspector verified by spot checks that the operating shift met
Section 6 of the Technical Specification with regard to numbers and
licenses.
The inspector also observed a shift turnover on October
24, 1979 to verify that continuity of system status was maintained.
(2) Radiation Areas
Radiation control zones were observed to verify proper identificaticn
and implementation.
These observations included review of step-off
pad conditions, disposal of anti-contamination clothing and area
posting.
Passage of personnel through the radiation check point was
observed on numerous occasions to verify the adequacy of the licensee's
contamination controls.
These observations were made during peak
traf fic periods (i.e. , lunch hour and shif t changes).
No inadequacies were identified.
(3) Plant Housekeeping Conditions
Storage of material and components was observed with respect to
safety and fire hazards.
The licensee is replacing anchor bolts to
meet the requirements of IE Bulletin 79-02 and many areas were in
need of cleanup.
The licensee was also completing maintenance
activities associated with the refueling outage and was in the
process of cleaning up the plant.
Progress on housekeeping conditions
will be examined during subsequent inspections.
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6
(4) Fire Protection
Fire extinguishers and fire fighting equipment were observed to be
unobstructed and recently inspected for operability.
No evidence of
smoking was observed in designated "No Smoking" areas and the cardox
fire suppression systems were observed to be operable.
4.
Critical Fire Area Inspection
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) has performed evaluations of fire pro-
tection programs at all operating plants.
These evaluations have identified,
in the NRR Fire Protection Safety Evaluatioc Report (SER), critical areas
where a fire may affect redundant safe shutdown systems.
The Vermont Yankee critical fire areas are the switchgear and cable
spreading rooms.
The licensee is modifyirg these areas to provide additional
fire protection and expects to complete these modifications by the end of
the 1980 Refueling Outage.
A review of administrative procedures, fire permits, and surveillance
tests was conducted to verify that:
provisions have been made and imple-
mented to establish fire watches as required; surveillance tests are
being conducted to meet Technical Specification requirements; and controls
are adequate to control combustible material and ignition sources in the
critical fire areas.
The following procedure and surveillance tests were
reviewed:
.
--
AP 0042, Plant Fire Protection; Rev 3; and,
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OP 4020, Surveillance of Fire Protection Equipment, Rev. 7.
The following specific sections of OP 4020 were reviewed to verify that
the required surveillance tests were being conducted:
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Section I, Six Month CO Fire Extinguisher and Cardox Bottle Surveil-
2
lance and data recorded on November 29, 1978 and May 31, 1979;
--
Section J, Six Month Surveillance-Fire Detect':n Functional Test and
data recorded on August 28, 1978, March 15, 19/9, and September 6,
1979;
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Section Q, Operating Cycle Test of the Cardox System and data recorded
on August 2, 1978 and July 10, 1979; and,
Section R, Operating Cycle Check of Fire Barrier Seals and data
--
recorded on October 4, 1978.
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7
Tours of the critical fire areas (as discussed in paragraph 3.b) verified
implementation of the fire protection controls.
The inspector had no
further questions on this item.
5.
Control Rod Drive Return Line Relocation
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions with respect to this modifi-
cation to determine if the necessary Technical Specification (TS) changes
had been made.
The licensee proposed a TS change to NRR on October 5,
1979.
That proposal makes valve deletions and additions to Tables 4.2.7.a
and 4.2.7.b which list the primary containment isolation valves.
No inadequacies were identified.
6.
The inspector queried licensee representatives to determine whether
licensed operators were aware of and had reviewed the information discussed
in Information Notice 79-20, NRC Enforcement Policy-NRC Licensed Individuals.
These representatives stated that the operators had reviewed 79-20 and
provided the inspector with a sign-off sheet documenting that review.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
7.
Review of Licensee Event Reports
The inspector reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) to verify that:
a.
The reports accurately described the events;
--
--
The safety significance was as reported;
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The report was accurate as to cause;
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The report satisfied requirements with respect to information
provided and timing of submittal,-
Corrective action was appropriate;
--
--
Action has been taken; and,
--
The event was reviewed and evaluated by the Plant Operations
Review Committee (PORC).
LERs 79-17, 79-19, 79-21, 79-24, and 79-25 were reviewed.
The
review identified the following items.
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8
b.
LER 79-17 reported a failure of the C 7tainment Air Monitor (CAM)
pump.
That pump has been the subject of repeated failures and the
inspector asked what actions were being taken to improve reliability.
The licensee determined the repeated failures to be caused by moisture
buildup in the design of the system by the addition of isolation and
drain valves to minimize moisture buildup.
That design modification
is expected to be completed prior to plant startup.
The licensee is
also investigating an increased preventive maintenance schedule on
the pump.
The licensee's actions will be examined during subsequent
inspection and this item is unresolved.
(271/79-17-02)
c.
LER 79-21 reported a loss of water in the torus level transmitter
reference legs.
The loss of water caused an erroneous indication
for the torus water level and resulted in exceeding the Technical
Specification limits.
The licensee has instructed their technicians
to check and refill the reference legs weekly and is adding this
requirement to the technicians' work list.
The licensee is also
investigating a design change that will automatically keep these
refe.'ence legs filled.
This issue is unresolved pending addition of
the weekly check requirement to the technicians' work list and the
completion of the licensee investigation.
(271/79-17-03)
d.
LER 79-25 reported evidence of lower end plug (LEP) wear on " water"
rods that are a part of the type 8 X 8R fuel assemblies.
The wear
was discovered during the reactor vendor's (General Electric) ongoing
inspections of the 8 X 8R fuel.
The licensee has installed into the
core four test bundles that use a water rod with a different LEP
design in accordance with Special Test Procedure 79-2, E4 Water Rod
Replacement, change 0 and has performed safety evaluations for these
test bundles.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's procedures, the
safety evaluations conducted by both the licensee and General Electric
and discussed the event with both licensee and NRR personnel.
Further action on this event will be reviewed during subsequent
inspection.
This item is unresolved.
(271/79-17-04)
8.
Nuclear Safety Audit and Review Committee (NSARC)
NSARC meeting minutes for both regular (scheduled) and special meetings
for the period of May,1978, through October,1979, were reviewed to
verify the following:
--
Membership, meeting frequency and quorum for each meeting was as
required by the Technical Specifications (TS);
--
The NSARC review and audit responsibilities were consistent with
those delineated in the Technical Specifications; and,
-.
'
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9
--
NSARC meetings were conducted with attendees having sufficient
expertise in the fields reviewed to assure an adequate review was
conducted.
The review of the regular meetings indicated that meeting 79-7-R conducted
on April 13, 1979 had the minimum number of members available to just
meet the TS quorum requirements.
The NSARC consists of eleven members,
however the TS requires only five members to constitute a quorum.
Con-
sidering the amount of material reviewed during a regular meeting, the
inspector questioned whether sufficient expertise was available to provide
an adequate review.
While the licensee distributes the documentation necessary for committee
review, evidence of committee member review (via a signoff sheet) may not
appear until some time after a meeting has been conducted.
It could nct
be determined whether all members review the necessary documentation
prior to a meeting and therefore whether all necessary areas of expertise
are represented.
The inspector was concerned that a committee member may not attend a
meeting, may not have reviewed agenda documentation prior to the meeting
and, subsequent to the meeting, may have comments on the meeting agenda
in his area of expertise.
A licensee representative stated that, in this
case, the comment would be considered and an additional NSARC meeting
called if required.
ANSI Standard N18.7-1976, section 4.2, requires a written program (for
both audits and indenendent reviews) that contains provisions for assuring
that personnel responsible for these reviews are kept informed of matters
within their scope of responsibility.
The licensee's " Charter for Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Safety Audit and Review Committee" dated April 18, 1975,
which provides the program aescription discussed in section 4.2, does not
contain these provisions.
While the licensee's Operational Quality
Assurance Program (0QAP) requires compliance with this standard, that
plan also designates the TS as the governing document.
Since the TS does
not require adherence to ANSI 18.7-1976, the licensee has taken the
position to not comply with this standard in cases such as this.
This
item is unresolved pending the licensee's formal submittal of this position
to the NRC for review. (271/79-17-05)
9.
NRC In Office Review
NRC:RI in office review of the following LERs has been completed
a.
with no unacceptable conditions identified:
79-14
79-18
79-15
79-20
79-16
79-22
79-23
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10
b.
NRC:RI in office review of Monthly Operating Reports for the months
of August and September, 1979 has been completed with no unacceptable
conditions identified.
10.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are those items for which further information is required
to determine whether they are acceptable or items of noncompliance.
Unresolved items are contained in Paragraphs 7.b, 7.c, 7.d and 8 of this
report.
11.
Exit Interview
The inspectors met' lith licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on October 26, 1979 and October 31,
1979, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are
detailed in this report.
During these meetings, the unresolved items and
item of noncompliance ware identified.