ML19290C917
| ML19290C917 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 12/04/1979 |
| From: | Kellogg P, Kidd M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19290C906 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-338-79-45, 50-339-79-54, NUDOCS 8002150061 | |
| Download: ML19290C917 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000338/1979045
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA ST
N.W.. SulTE 3100
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
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Report Nos. 50-338/79-45 and 50-339/79-54
Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company
P. O. Box 26666
Richmond, Virginia 23261
Facility Name: North Anna Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339
License Nos. NPR-4 and CPPR-78
Inspected at North Anna- Site,Ci /near Mineral, Virginia
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Inspected by:
r,7&',//[,
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,[c , M. S. Kidd, Resident Inspector
Date Signed
Approved by:
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P. J. Kellogg, QRction Chief, R6NS Branch
Date Signed
SUMMARY
inspection on October 9 - November 2, 1979
Unit 1 Areas Inspected
This routine inspection by the resident inspector involved thirty seven hours
onsite in the areas of licensee event reports, maintenance procedures and activ-
ities, previously identified open and unresolved items, and plant tours.
Unit 1 Findings
Within the four areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were
identified in two areas. Two apparent items of noncompliance were identified in
two areas (Infraction - Failure to operate within the Limiting Condition for
Operation for main steam channels for loops A and C
paragraph 11.b; Deficiency -
Failure to maintain mechanical and electrical maintenance training records in
accordance with requirements
paragraph 6.c).
Unit 2 Areas Inspected
This routine inspection by the resident inspector involved seventeen hours
onsite in the areas of IE Bulletin followup, reports per 10CFR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR 21, previously identified open items, and plant tours.
Unit 2 Findings
No items of noncompliance or deviaitions were identified.
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
R. A. Berquist, Assistant Instrument Supervisor
- W. R. Cartwright, Station Manager
L. O. Goodrich, Supervisor - Mechanical Maintenance
- E. W. Harrell, Superintendent of Maintenance
J. R. Harper, Instrument Supervisor
S. L. Harvey, Operating Supervisor
D. M. Hopper, Health Physics Supervisor
H. T. Hyer, Mechanical Foreman
Other licensee employees contacted included operators, three mechanics, and
three office personnel.
Other Organizations
Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation (S&W)
W. L. Lehmbeck, Assistant Lead Advisory Engineer
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 19, and 26 and
November 2, 1979 for those persons indicated in Paragraph I above. The
apparent infraction defined in paragraph 11.b and the apparent Deficiency
described in paragraph 6.c were discussed in detail on November 2, 1979.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(Closed) Unresolved Item 338/79-13-01:
Piezometer Trend Analysis.
Discussions by the Resident Inspector and a Regional Specialist Inspector
on September 21, 1979, revealed that the specialist had reviewed the vendor's
analysis provided to VEPCO on April 4, 1979, and had no further questions.
This item is resolved.
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to
determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or
deviations. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are
discussed in paragraph 11.f.
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5.
Plant Status
The first Unit I refueling fuel shuffle was completed October 30, 1979.
The shutdown is expected to continue through early to mid December, 1979.
Unit 2 was in the final stages of preoperational testing at the conclusion
of the inspection period.
6.
Maintenance Procedures and Activities - Unit 1
During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed selected maintenance
procedures for activities to be performed during the current refueling
shutdown, witnessed portions of one maintenance activity, and reviewed
qualifications of certain maintenance personnel as defined below:
a.
Procedure Reviews
The following procedures were reviewed and compared to the provisions
of ANSI N 18.7-1972, " Standard for Administrative Controls for Nuclear
Power Plants"; VEPCO's Nuclear Power Station Quality Assurance Manual
(NPSQAM), sections 7, " Control of Purchased Material, Equipment and
Services" and 16, " Corrective Action"; station administrative procedures
8.0, " Fire Prevention" and 45.0, " Housekeeping"; and Mechanical
Maintenance administrative procedure 6.0, " Cleanliness Control".
1-M0P-5.94, " Removing C Reactor Coolant Loop From Service for
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Maintenance"
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1-M0P-32.3, " Pumping Water From a Steam Generator to Clarifier
Using Steam Generator Transfer Pump (1-WT-P-35)"
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MMP-C-MISC-3, " Mechanical Maintenance Procedure for Steam
Generator Explosive Tube Plugging"
1-M0P-5.32, " Steam Generator 1-RC-E-IC"
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1-M0P-8.02, " Charging Pump 1-CH-P-1B"
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MMP-C-CH-2, " Mechanical Maintenance Procedure for Seals on
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Charging and Safety Injection Pumps"
MMP-P-CH-1, " Mechanical Maintenance Procedure for Charging
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Pumps /High Head Safety Injection".
The above procedures, covering two maintenance activities, were
reviewed along with other maintenance controls, such as the
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Maintenance Report and Tagging Record, defined in sections 16 and 14
of the NPSQAM, to determine whether the following functions had been
properly addressed:
(1) Administrative approvals for removing the system from service and
returning it to service.
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(2) Hold Points for inspection / audit and signoff by QA or other
licensee personnel.
(3) Provisions for operational readiness testing following maintenance.
(4) Requirements to obtain special authorization for activities
involving welding, open flame, or other ignition sources, and
posting of a firewatch as needed.
(5) Provisions for review of materials certifications data, if
applicable.
(6) Provisions for assuring that LC0 requirements of the Technical
Specifications were satisfied during the repair period.
(7) Provisions for the control of housekeeping during the maintenance
effort.
(8) Provisions for cleaning safety related systems / components
following Maintenance.
(9) Provisions for assuring that system valves, breakers, etc.
are
aligned for normal service.
(10) Provisions for removal of jumpers which may be required for
maintenance / testing activities.
(11) Respvasibility for reporting to licensee management details
concerning design or construction related deficiencies identified
during maintenance.
The inspector had comments on MMP-C-CH-2, relating to maintenance of
system and component cleanliness, and on MMP-C-MISC-3 regarding the
sequence and adequacy of certain steps involving tube plugging opera-
tions. Licensee personnel had initiated changes to the procedures to
address the inspector's concerns, thus there were no further questions.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
b.
Maintenance Activity Witnessing
On October 25 and 26, 1979, the inspector observed portions of the
disassembly and inspection of the out board seal for charging / safety
injection pump 1-CH-P-1B. This activity was conducted by use of pro-
cedures 1-M0P-8.02 and MMP-C-CH-02, Maintenance Report (MR)
N1-78-12040635, Tagging Record (TR) N1-6287, and Radiation Work
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Permits (RWP) 79-SP-317 and 79-SP-320.
Observations included the
following:
(1) A sampling of valves and breakers found them to be properly
tagged and positioned as requied by 1-M0P-8.02 and the TR.
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(2) Copies of the procedure were available and in use in the pump
cubicle and the auxiliary building " hot shop", where the seal
inspection and repair was conducted.
Also, RWP's were posted at
both locations.
(3) A Quality Control inspector was present and observing hold points.
(4) Necessary deviations to procedures were processed in accordance
with the NPSQAM and Technical Specifications.
(5) System and pump internals cleanliness was being maintained.
Housekeeping was in order.
Within the areas observed, no items of noncompliance or deviations
were observed.
c.
Personnel Qualifications
Records of training, education, and previous work experiences for two
mechanics and one mechanic trainee involved in the charging pump seal
replacement discussed in 6.b were reviewed to ascertain their qualifi-
cations for this activity. Available records demonstrated that the
mechanics were qualified for this function.
The trainee, working in
an assisting capacity, is in step 3 of the 10 step Mechanic Development
Program. The inspector had no questions regarding training / qualifications.
During the review and discussions with station personnel, it was noted
that records of training for mechanical and electrical maintenance
personnel via the Mechanic Development Program (see FSAR section
13.2.1.6) are not maintained at the station, but are maintained in
VEPCO's corporate offices. The inspector stated that this appeared to
be in noncompliance with Unit 1 Technical Specification 6.10.2 b as
implemented by section 17, " Records," of the NPSQAM. The Specification
requires that records of training and qualification for current plant
staff members be maintained as lifetime records. NPSQAM section 17
and VEPCO's Topical Report Quality Assurance Program - Operations
Phase (VEP-1-3A) section 17.2.17 commit to retention of such records
in accordance with ANS1 N-45.2.9, 1974, which requires a special
storage repository or duplicate records systems. This apparent non-
compliance (Deficieny) is designated as 338/79-45-01.
7.
Plant Tours
Tours of selected plant areas were conducted on October 19, 22, 24, and 25,
1979. The following items, as available were observed:
a.
Fire Equipment
Operability and evidence of periodic inspection of fire suppression
equipment.
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b.
Housekeeping
Minimal accumulations of debris and maintenance of required cleanliness
levels in systems under or following testing.
Observation regarding
certain areas were given to station management who acknowledged the
inspector's comments.
c.
Equipment Preservation
Maintenance of special preservative measures for installed equipment
as applicable.
d.
Component Tagging
Implementation and observance of equipment tagging for safety or
equipment protection.
e.
Communication
Ef fectiveness of public address system in all areas toured.
f.
Equipment Controls
Ef fectiveness of jurisdictional controls in precluding unauthorized
work on systems turned over for initial operations or preoperational
testing.
g.
Maintenance of controls to assure systems which have been cleaned and
flushed are not reopened to admit foreign material.
h.
Security
Implementation of security provisions for both Units.
Within the above areas, no items of noncompliance or deviations were observed
when compared to the applicable station programs and procedures.
8.
IE Bulletin 79-02, Unit 2
Inspection of the Unit 2 program, procedures, and installation for pipe
support base plates using expansion anchor bolts was documented in IE
Report 50-339/79-37 with no adverse findings. Following receipt of an
internal NRR memorandum stating that the Mechanical Engineering Branch of
the Division of System Safety had no further questions on this IEB for
North Anna 2, the inspector informed station management that the IEB was
considered closed for that unit (339/79-28-06).
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9.
Followup on Reactor Trip and Safety Injection - Unit 1
Compilation of the inspection / investigation report for this event, 50-338/
79-39, and confirmation of data and information gathered during that inspec-
tion period were discussed with Region II and/or station management on
October 9, 11, and 15-13, 1979. Details of the event and inspection findings
are given in the referenced report.
10.
Followup on Previously Identified Open Items
Fuel Transfer Tube Surveys (338/78-28-06)
a.
This item resulted from IE Bulletin 78-08 and was used to track the
conduct of radiation surveys of the fuel transfer tube and surrounding
plant areas during the first refueling.
0n October 18, 1979, surveys were conducted on two spent fuel assem-
blies as they were transporeted to the fuel building.
Readings as
high as 400 R per hour were seen on the fuel tube shield block.
Levels around the operator's fuel handling machinery control panel in
containment were about 200 mr per hour.
Considerable streaming was
evident on all levels of containment.
Station management administra-
tively controlled access to containment during fuel movement, allowing
only operators and health physics personnel to be present on the 291
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foot elevation (operating deck) during spent fuel movement. Also,
operators were instructed to move to a more shielded area after
initiating fuel transfer at the control panel.
In certain instances,
other workers were allowed in containment if their work stations were
not near the fuel tube and constant health physics coverage provided.
These administrative controls appeared successful, but station manage-
ment was informed that consideration should be given to installation
of shiciding around the transfer tube prior to the second refueling on
Unit 1 and the first refueling on Unit 2.
Management stated that
studies would be conducted to determine what shielding measures could
be taken.
Item 338/78-28-06 remains open and item 339/79-54-01 is
identified for Unit 2.
b.
Unit 2 Radiation Monitoring Systems Testing (339/78-31-02)
This item was identified to track completion of preoperational test
2-P0-10.
This completed test was reviewed and findings discussed in
IE Reports 50-339/79-45 and 50-339/79-48.
This item is closed.
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11.
Licensee Event Reports - Units 1 and/or 2
The following events or problems were reported as prompt (24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) LER's
per Unit 1 Technical Specifications and/or under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR 21 for Unit 2 during the inspection period:
Service Water Radiation Monitoring Pumps (LER 79-133)
a.
On October 5,1979, licensee personnel reported that the Unit 1 Service
Water (SW) radiation monitoring pumps, 1-SP-5, 6, 7, and 8 all failed
to start on a test containment depressurization actuation (CDA) signal
as they are designed to do.
The motor overloads were found to be
tripped. This will be reviewed in more detail at a later date (0 pen
item 338/79-45-02).
b.
Main Steam Pressure Transmitter Tubing Reversed (LER 79-142)
On October 16, 1979, station management reported that while pressurizing
Unit 1 "C" steam generator to check for tube leaks, it was observed
that the Channel IV steamline pressure indicator for "A" steam generator
gave an indication while the channel IV steamline pressure indicator
for "C" steam generator was unaffected. This signified that the two
indications were swapped.
It was found that the sensor tubing from
the transmitter root valves were swapped. A test procedure was devel-
oped that same date and other main steam pressure sensing lines check
to assure proper alignment. No other discrepancies were found.
Station man gement stated that this test procedure (IMP-P-PROC-4)
would be used to verify proper alignment of all fluid sensing lines
for Units 1 and 2.
This effort was continuing at the conclusion of
the inspection, having been slowed down due to containment accessibility
problems during fuel shuffle in Unit 1.
This verification process
will be reviewed prior to Unit I restart and Unit 2 fuel load (items
338/79-45-03 and 339/79-54-02).
In researching the cause of the sensing line swap for transmitters
PT-1476 and PT-1496, S&W discovered that the lines had been properly
installed at the time of reletse to VEPC0 by documentation required by
1-TIP-2, an installation test procedure which checks continuity of
sensing lines, along with other construction checkout tests.
In
July of 1977, a rework control form (RCF) I-350 was issued to cut
these two lines to allow modification of piping hanger supports in the
The retest requirement specified on the RCF was only for a leak
area.
test of the lines after rewelding.
S&W Field Quality Control (FQC)
procedure QC-15.4, paragraph 4.2.7 states that during rework and prior
to any retesting, the Advisory Engineer or his designee shall record
any retest requirements on the original RCF. The procedure does not
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provide any guidelines for determining what retest requirements should
be specified for a given job. Licensee personnel were informed that
this weakness should be evaluated and rectified unless adequately
covered otherwise by the FQC Manual (Unit 2 open item 339/79-54-03).
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The inspector stated that the swapped sensing lines had created a
situation wherein the minimum required operable channels for steam
generators "A" and "C" given in Technical Specification Table 3.3-3,
item 1.e were not met.
In that the parameter being compared is dif-
ferential pressure between steam lines, the swap negated the ability
of the affected channels to be used in such a comparison. He further
stated that this appeared to be in noncompliance (Infraction) with
Action Statement 14 of Table 3.3-3 which permits operation with the
number of operable channels being one less than the total number of
channels until the next required Channel Functional Test (monthly),
provided the inoperable channel is placed in the trip condition within
one hour.
In that station personnel were not aware of the inoperable
channels because of the swap, the Action Statement was not adhered to.
This apparent Infraction is also designated as 338/79-45-03.
c.
Cracked Valve Disk - Unit 2
On September 28, 1979, licensee personnel reported that a crack had
been found in the disk of MOV-2380, a Unit 2 containment isolation
valve. This was reported per 10 CFR 50.55 (e) and 10 CFR 21 and will
be reviewed in more detail at a later date (open item 339/79-54-04).
d.
Insulation in Diesel Generator 2-H Turbocharger
On October 12, 1979, licensee personnel reported per 10 CFR 50.55(e)
and 10 CFR 21 that insulation material had been found in the turbo-
charger for Unit 2 emergency diesel generator (DG) 2 H. This had the
potential for rendering the DG inoperable. Circumstances of this
event will be reviewed in more detail at a later date (open item
339/79-54-05).
Safeguards Building Ventilation Seismic Qualification - Units 1 and 2
e.
On October 31, 1979, the inspector was informed that S&W had discovered
that the discharge ductwork of the Unit 2 safeguards area ventilation
exhaust system was not built to Seismic Class 1 standards as stated in
FSAR section 9.4.6.1.
This was reported per 10 CFR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR 21 for Unit 2 and as a prompt LER per Technical Specifications for
Unit 1.
Requirements for design of the discharge ductwork from the
fans out to the vent stack were questionable in that FSAR Table 3.2.1-1
and supplementary section S9.68 state that only the suction ductwork
for these exhaust fans is Class 1.
The office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulations (NRR) Safety Evaluation Report for Units 1 and 2 states in
section 9.4.2 that the exhaust system is designed to Class I require-
ments making no distinction between suction and discharge ductworks.
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Evaluation of this potential problem by VEPC0 and S&W was continuing
at the conclusion of the inspection period. NRR representatives were
apprised of this matter on October 31, 1979. Licensee personnel were
informed that this system as well as others shown on FSAR Figure
S9.86-1 as not being seismic Class 1 should be evaluated for adequacy.
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This is designated as unresolved items 50-338/79-45-04 and 50-339/
79-54-06.
Station management stated that these systems would be
evaluated further.
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f.
Defective Electrical Cable - Unit 1
On October 23, 1979, station management reported that s defective
cable had been identified during installation in Unit 1.
A partially
exposed wire was discovered in the area of an apparent insulation
splice in a twelve conductor control cable being installed in the
control circuitry of a Unit 1 emergency DG. This cable had been part
of an order of four reels, with this one cable being the first appli-
cation in safety related circuits for Unit I none of which had been
used in Unit 2.
The cable and unused /used reels were returned to the
vendor, Cerro-Rockbestos, except for one reel, which had been sent to
the Surry Power Station (later notified of potential problem). At the
conclusion of the inspect ion, the cable vendor, S&W and VEPCO were
involved in analyzing the defect and evaluating its possible generic
implications. This matter will be reviewed further and is designated
as open item 338/79-45-05.