ML19289E776
| ML19289E776 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001113, 07901113 |
| Issue date: | 03/29/1979 |
| From: | Kahle J, Potter J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19289E760 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-1113-79-07, 70-1113-79-7, NUDOCS 7905290099 | |
| Download: ML19289E776 (8) | |
Text
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pa neog, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION il 5
101 M ARIETTA STREET, N.W.
i-2 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
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Report No. 70-1113/79-07 Licensee: General Electric Company P. O. Box 780 Wilmington, North Carolina 28401 Facility Name: Wilmington Manufacturing Department Docket No, 70-1113 License No. SNM-1097 Inspection at Wilmington Manufacturing Department near Wilmington, North Carolina 3/0 $ /7 9 Inspector:
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J. B. K hle Date / Signed is s 1 -
Approved by:
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9 J. P.
tdr, Section Chief, FF&MS Branch D te igned
SUMMARY
Inspection on February 26 - March 2, 1979 Areas Inspected This routine, unannounced inspection involved 31 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of 10 CFR Part 21, safety committees, procedure control, operations review, nuclear criticality safety, nonroutine events, followup on items of noncompliance and followup on a survey for sludge buildup in liquid waste retention tanks.
Results Of the 8 areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in 7 areas; one apparent item of noncompliance was fo nd in one area (deficiency - failure to post responses to notice of violations paragraph 7.b).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- R. J. Alkema, Plant Manager
- B. F. Bently, Fuel Chemical Operation Manager
- W. B. Haverty, Compliance Auditor
- G. F. Finders, Compliance Auditor
- W. C. Peters, Senior Nuclear Safety Engineer
- J. R. Mohrbacher, Nuclear Safety Engintering Manager
- R. C. Keller, Fuel Chemical Quality Cor. rol Manager
- G. M. Bowman, Senior Nuclear Safety Engineer
- S. J. Menendez, Nuclear Safety Engineer
- W. B. Smalley, Senior Environmental Protection Engineer
- W. J. Hendry, Regulatory Compliance Manager
- A. L. Kaplan, Licensing and Compliance Audits Manager
- E. A. Lees, Quality Assurance Manager
- C. E. Cliche, Fuel Fabrication Operation Manager
- G. E. Powers, Senior Nuclear Safety Engineer T. R. Crawford, Powder Production Operatics Manager B. J. Beane, HVAC Engineer C. L. Beane, Manufacturing Engineer L. E. Lewis, Dispatcher D. M. Whaley, Nuclear Saf>ty Technician J. L. Goodson, Instruments and Controls Supervisor C. V. Robinson, Process Document System Specialist H. L. Runion, Manufacturing Engineer E. M. Rollins, Nuclear Safety Engineer R. J. Keenan, Radiation Protection, Shif t Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included 6 Operators and 2 Office Personnel.
- Attended exit interview.
2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 2, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph I above.
Licensee representatives acknowledged the findings regarding the item of noncompliance and stated that corrective actions had been taken.
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9 3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings a.
(Closed) Noncompliance (78-20-01): Failure to place special nuclear material in designated limit areas. Verification was made from discussions with operators and e review of the records of round table meetings that operating procedures relative to criticality safety controls were discussed between foremen and manufacturing workers. Discussions with unit managers and an examination of a licensee internal memorandum revealed that unit managers had dis-cussed the importance of placing special nuclear material in designated limit areas with their foremen. An examination of audit reports by the Licensing and Compliance Audits Unit showed that criticality controls and limits were inspected during the walk-through audits by the Compliance Auditors and the Manager, Compliance Audits.
b.
(Closed) Deviation (78-20-02): Failure to maintain operable photo-electric devices in the vaporization chambers to aid in leak detec-tion. During a tour of the vaporization area it was observed that an operator was on duty to observe the process equipment and opera-tion for any signs of irregularities or a UF6 gas leak. The licensee had completed a study to determine the best technical approach for a UF6 gas detection system. Their findings showed that the photo-electric device offered greater reliability than alternate systems such as halogen leak detectors or infra-red photoelectric sensors.
The present photoelectric devices have been upgraded on all but two vaporization systems and they are targeted for completion by May 1979.
A licensee representative stated that they had experienced some sensor alignment problems, however, during a tour on March 1, 1979, all existing UF5 gas leak devices were operable.
c.
(Closed) Noncompliance (78-23-01): Failure to close the vaporization main block valve causing an accidental release of special nuclear material. During a tour of the vaporization area the inspector examined a vaporization chamber which was not in use and verified that a pigtail plug had been installed as described in the licensee's response. An operator demonstrated how it was used. A licensee representative stated that the other chambers had been equipped with an identical plug. The inspector observed that an additional operator has been assigned to the vaporizab ou area to be present during operation of the vaporization process. Discussions with operators confirmed that they had been instructed and cautioned about placing valves in their proper positions and utilization of the pigtail plugs. The vaporization procedure has been revised to assure consistency and clarity in the instructions to workers.
Recommendations made by the investigating team for corrective actions to prevent a recurrence have been adopted. A three-way 2047 J09
- valve was being installed on line one for evaluation purposes.
Smoke detectors have been upgraded and maintained in an operable condition. Live-time air saiplers located in the vaporization area will now produce an alarm in the UF6-UO2 Conversion Control room.
This is part of the overall live-time air sample program. A study is being conducted to determine the adequacy of the roof scrubber.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
10 CFR Part 21 The inspector examined the licensee's 10 CFR 21 File and implementing procedures, P/P 40-12, " Nuclear and Environmental Incident Investigation",
and P/P 30-17, " Reporting Defects and Noncompliance". The licensee has performed two evaluaticas since the 10 CFR 21 regulation became effective.
In each case a determination was made that the event was not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 21.
Th. inspector verified that bulletin boards in all buildings were posted in accordance with the regulations. Two procurement documents were examined to verify that aoplicable information pursuant to 10 CFR 21 was contained on the document.. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Safety Committees The Wilmington Technological Safety Council met on November 21, 1978.
Minutes of the meeting showed that the business pertained to the Site Emergency Plan. The members present met the conditions of he license.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Operations Review a.
Procedures During a tour of the operating areas, the inspector observed that operating procedures (PRODS) were placed at the operator's work station or nearby at a designated location. Discussions with operations personnel revealed that they were cognizant where the procedures were located and of the nuclear safety requirements. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
b.
Postings 10 CFR 19.11(a) requires that each licensee shall post, among other things, any notice of violation involving radiological working conditions and any response from the licensee. On February 26, 2047 Jl0
, 1979, during a tour of the FM0 Building it was observed that the Notice of Violation of NRC inspection reports 70-1113/78-20 and 70-1113/78-23 were posted on three bulletin boards, designated for posting information pertaining to regulatory compliance. The licensee's responses to these reports had not been posted. A licensee representative stated that failure to post the responses had been an oversight on their part.
Copies of the responses were posted on these bulletin boards on February 29, 1979, when the matter was brought to the licensee's attention. The licensee wcs informed that this matter was an item of noncompliance.
c.
UF-6 Cylinder Valves (1) On January 15, 1979, the licensee was requested by telephone cylinders with to determine whether they have procured UF6 valves or valves supplied by Superior Valve Company between May 8, 1978 and October 25, 1978. These valves could be defective and cause a release of UF. The licensee stated that they had received previous not!fication of this potential problem and had not purchased any cylinders or valves during 1978, but would conduct an investigation to confirm their statement. The inspector verified from licensee documentation that such ar investigation had been conducted showing that no valves or cylinders had been purchased during 1978. Also, the docun.entation showed that a purchase order for new cylinders contained a statement excluding the UF cylinder valves manu-6 factured by Superior Valve Company between May 8 and October 25, 1978. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
(2) The inspector examined the installation and quality assurance cylinder valves. The procedures and records for replacing UF6 valve replacement acceptance criterion stated in OR0 651, Rev.
4, "Uraniu.n Hexofloride:
Handling Procedures and Container CritcIion", for insertion of valve threads is that the number of threads inserted should not be less than seven (7) or more than twelve (12). The licensee's acceptance criteria stated in their procedure was that there shall be 1-6 threads showing after the valve was inserted.
It was recocinended that the procedure be revised to state that the number of threads inserted shall be 7-12 or verification be made that the valve did indeed contain 13 threads prior to insertion, since the acceptance criteria was 1-6 threads showing after insertion.
The licensee agreed to review and revise the procedures. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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4 d.
Instruments and Controls Verification was made that differential pressure sensor trans-mitting devices for the chemical stack HEPA filters were installed with read out capability and alarms in the UF -UO, control room, A g
continuous graph recorder has been added to the system. A licensee representative stated that the annunciator would sound at 4 inches water pressure differential. The system was being calibrated when the inspector verified that the system had been installed. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
e.
Housekeeping Housekeeping conditions appeared adequate. There were no apparent fire or safety hazards. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Nuclear Criticality Safety a.
Waste and Scrap Verification was made that waste and scrap containing special nuclear material was accumulated in accordance with the licensee's process procedures and storage limits.
b.
Arrays and Isolation During a tour of the plant the inspector observed that special nuclear material was placed in designated locations (limit areas) and verification was made that containers of special nuclear material did not exceed the mass limits specified in the license and the licensee's procedures.
c.
Geometry The inspector verified that fuel pellets and rods were handled and stored within the safe slab requirements or other approved geometry controls.
d.
Nuclear Safety Analyses The inspector examined five nuclear safety analyses and verified that the methods used were authorized by the license. Verification was made that the calculations and results had been rechecked by another qualified individual. The records revealed that a physical inspection had been performed prior to issuance of a nuclear safety release. The master plan had been updated to reflect the latest changes.
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Criticality Alarm System An examination of the records showed that the criticality warning system had been tested, source checked and calibrated in accordance with calibration procedures. A licensee represent..;ive gave the inspector a detailed explanation of the new alarm ; yt tem.
The detectors are G. M. tubes with a range up to 10 R/hr. There is a special circuit to prevent saturation which will permit detection up to 10,000 R/hr. Each unit contains a remotely controlled check source which will provide a radiation intensity of 15-20 mR/hr.
The system will operate on batteries with trickle chargers. A licensee representative stated that the horns would operate approxi-mately for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> on the batteries if commercial power was not available to operate the trickle chargers. The system has been designed to provide 3 detectors at the process lagoons, 4 detectors at the waste treatment facility, 6 detectors at storage pads 1-4, 6 detectors at storage pads 5-8 and 29 detectors inside the FM0 and FM0X complex.
It was apparent that t>
detector coverage meets the 10 CFR 70.24 regulatory requirements.
f.
Sludge Buildup in Large Tanks The licensee stated that the contents of all their large tanks where any liquid which could conceivably contain any uranium were discharged from the bottom except two which by design had side discharge. These two tanks, V-104 and V-108, were designed to collect sludge in the bottom for uranium recovery. The licensee stated that it was routine to inspect all the large waste treatment and recovery tanks during plant shutdown and no sludge buildup had been detected. They stated that large vessels containing feed solutions were physically separated frou piping containing special nuclear material by anti-siphon breaks. They stated that the ammonium recovery storage tanks was an exception to this and it would be inspected for sludge at the next opportunity.
g.
Special Nuclear Material Inveatory The inspector verified that the quantity of special nuclear material at the plant site was less than the license limit of 50,000 kg U-235.
h.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were idedtified.
9.
Procedures Control The following licensee procedures were reviewed by the inspector on-site:
Practices and Procedures 7047 ll3 10-1 Index of Practices and Procedures
6 10-3 Issuing mfd Practices and Procedures 10-4 Issuing Section Administrative Routines 80-6 Process Requirements and Operating Documents (PROD) 80-32 Temporary Operating Instructions - FM QASAR 320-10.0 Index of Quality Assurance f.ection Administrative Routine 320-10.1 Quality Assurance Section Administrative Routine Issuance and Control 320-170.1 Issuing Nucle.ar Materials Management Procedures 320-180.1 Nuclear Safety Instructions Issuance and Control PROD 10.05 Vaporia.ation It is apparent that the documents provide a system for establishing, maintaining, reviewing, approving, revising, distributing, and controlling procedures. The system requires that the procedures be reviewed for nuclear safety considerations. The procedures control system provides for changes to be disseminated to the Unit Managers / Supervisors who have the responsibility to promptly advise the operators of the document change. A document control system is provided to assure that culy approved and current procedures are used.
Copies of these proce lures were furnished to the inspector for further evaluation by NRC staff personnel. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
Nonroutine Events An examination of the incident by records showed that there had not a.
been any occurences of substantial magnitude or consequence to be considered nonroutine events other than those previously reported to the NRC. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
b.
A licensee representative stated that their plant policy, which they have established, regarding news releases pertaining to nonroutine events such as plant evacuations, individurJ i taken to hospitals, etc., and which could arouse media interest, had not changed from the licensee's position during the previous inspection.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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