ML19282B429
| ML19282B429 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Midland |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1979 |
| From: | Hood D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Boyd R, Bunch D, Case E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7903150008 | |
| Download: ML19282B429 (21) | |
Text
,A o#
UNITED STATES j
t NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIMION f,.
j s i?"g WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
%..V;4/'
FEB 2 71979 Docket Nos:
50-329 50-330 APPLICANT:
Consumers Power Company FACILITY:
Midland Plant, Units 1 6 2
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF JANUARY 17, 1979 MEETING ON PSAR CHANGES AND REGULATORY GUIDES ON QUALITY ASSURANCE On January 17, 1979, the NRC staff met in Bethesda, Maryland with Consumers Power Company (CPCO), Bechtel Assoc.iates, and the Babcock 6 Wilcox (B6W) Company.
Attendees are listed in Enclosure 1.
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss (1) changes to the Midland Plant designs which have occurred since construction permits issuance and (2) conformance to certain regulatory guides on quality assurance during the operations phase.
Changes From PSAR The staff stated that the applicants response to request 031.11 in FSAR Amendment 15 (Enclosure 2 hereto) failed to comply with Section 1.3.2 of Revison 2 to Regulatory Guide 1.70 and was unacceptable.
The staff further stated that, although the request was made by the Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch, the request is intended to apply to all areas of the design.
The staff emphasized the administrative and schedular significance of this information to the review process.
CPC0 will revise the response in February 1979.
CPC0 stated that reviews were conducted to assure that commitments in the PSAR were addressed in the FSAR. illustrates results of the review by B6W for its scope of supply in FSAR Chapter 7.
Results for balance-of-plant scope in Chapter 7 are illustrated by Enclosure 4.
A few of the items noted also represent design changes since the PSAR.
79031500o3
Consumers Power Company FEB 2 71979 ccs:
Michael I. Miller, Esq.
Mr. S. H. Howell Isham, Lincoln & Beale Vice President Suite 4200 Consumers Power Company One First National Plaza 212 West Michigan Avenue Chicago, Illinois 60670 Jackson, Michigan 49201 Judd L. Bacon, Esq.
Constmers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Mr. Paul A. Perry Secretary Consumers Power Company 212 W. Michigan Avenue Jackson, Michigan 49201 Myron M. Cherry, Esq.
One IBM Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60611 Mary Sinclair 5711 Summerset Drive Midland, Michigan 48640 Frank J. Kelley, Esq.
Attorney General State of Michigan Environmental Protection Division 720 Law Building Lansing, Michigan 48913 Mr. Wendell Marshall Route 10 Midland, Michigan 48640 Grant J. Merritt, Esq.
Thompson, Nielsen, Klaverkamp & James 4444 IDS Center 80 South Eighth Street Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402 4
ENCLOSURE 1 FES 2 71979 ATTENDEES D. Hood NRC M. Gerding Bechtel J. Pastor CPC0 B.
Belke NRC J. Howard B6N M.
Rothwell Bechtel J. Z ab rits ki CPC0 D. Hof fman CPC0 D. Bixel CPC0 K. Marbough CPC0 J.
Fremeau CPCO T. Buczwinski CPC0
- 0. Chopra NRC H. Daniels NRC S. Eschback B6W R. Reed B6W
Responses to NRC Questions
[ nclofvre d Midland 1&2 JAN 8 1979 FEB 2 71979 Question 031.11 (1.2.2) g Section 1.3.2 of your FSAR does not satisfy the intent of Revision ? of Hegulator y Gu tde 1.70.
Yout FSAR states that "due to extensive reformating and the additional information provided in the FSAR, cross-reference of changes is not considered appropriate and is there fore not included." We do not agree that this information should be omitted.
The purpone of this section ts to identify all significant changes from the original design which we approved during the construction permtt review.
We require that your FSAR describe all significant changes flom the construction permit design and identify the FSAR location where the revised design is described.
The description should include the basis for the change.
This section should also provide assuranc< that the* Midland un'its have not been constructed to any safety criteria that are less conservative than those to which you committed and which we 15 approved during.the review for the construction permits.
Amend your FSAR to reflect these requirements.
Response
)
A cross-reference of changen that occurred from the PSAR to the FSAR in not considered appropriate because extensive reformatting and a signiiicant amount ol' new tutormation is provided in the FSAR.
Infotmation in pr ovided in the FSAR on the requirements and f or mats of Regulatory Guide 1,70, Rev. 2 as modified by the l e t t.e r on FSAR format and content from R.S.
Boyd to S.H.
Howell dated June 2, 1976.
A comparison of the PSAR to the current FSAR would require a significant amount of engineering effort and has no overall effect on plant safety.
Hence, it is CPCo's position that the necessary information is available for staff review in the FSAR and a comparison or cross-referencing of the PSAR to the FSAR is unnecessary and will not be done.
)
QCR 1.2-1 Revision 15
E n e. l o.s v,.e. 3 The CPCo PSAR has been searched to identify B&W commitments. The CPCo FSAR has been searched for fulfillment of those commitments.
This memo reports the findings of the search as well as pointing out several areas of possible FSAR deficiencies.
(2 p/F 0 /d// D' ^' ')
I.
FSAR Deficiencies 1.
Reactor trip switch (RTS) environmental qualification is not addressed, however, seismic is addressed.
2.
Section 7.2.2.2.2 references sections 7.1.2.17 which does not exist. Should reference section 3.11.
3.
Section 7.2.2.2.3 references section 7.1.2.16 which does not exist.
4.
Section 7.2.1.1 defines the reactor trip switch and cable from the NI/RPS to the CRDCS as part of the NI/RPS. The cable is in the users scope and the RTS should be treated separately.
5.
Section 7.2.1.1 includes sensors in the NI/RPS scope.
Pump monitors and ECCAS RB pressure sensors are in the users scope.
6.
IE to IE electrical isolation is presently in the users scope. Section 7 should reflect this.
NSS and BOP isolation will be revised in later FSAR amendment.
II.
Commitments Commitments were found in sections 7.1.1.2 and 7.1.2.3.9 of the PSAR. They all related to equipment qualification either by testing or FMEA. They are quoted below for information.
1.
Section 7.1.1.2 A) Line 3
" prototype and final equipment will be subjected to qualification tests as required by the subject standard." (IEEE-279)
B) Line 4 "The tests will establish the adequacy of equipment performance in both normal and accident environments."
2.
Section 7.1.2.3.9 A) Line 6 "A system fault test analysis will be made considering the modes of failure and determining their effects on the system vital functions."
B) Testing Line 5 "The equipment manufacturer is required to provide qualification test data to verify the performance requirements of the equipment."
2-C) Testing Last PARA
" Instrumentation and control items that must survive part or all of the LOCA environment are subject to these qualification test verification procedures and requirements."
III. Fulfillment of Commitments Due to the dif f erences in organization and style between the PSAR and FSAR, it is difficult to relate specific sections.
The FSAR was searched for sections relating to qualification.
These sections are listad below.
1.
ECCAS A.
FMEA - 7. 3. 2. 3.1 (4. 2), 7. 3. 2. 3.14 (SE7 )
B.
QUAL - 7. 3. 2. 2.1 (3. 8), 7. 3. 2. 3.1 (4.4), 7.3.2.3.14 (SE8),
Appendix 3A page 121, 3.11.2.2, and 3.11.3 C.
Seismic - 7.3.2.2.1 (3.8), 7.3.2.3.5, 7.3.2.3.14 (SE6), and 3.10.2.2 2.
HI/RPS A.
FMEA - 7.2.2.1, 7.2.2.2.1 (4.2)
B.
QUAL - 7.2.2.2.1 (4.1), Appendix 3A page 121, 3.11.2.2, and 3.11.3 C.
Seismic - 7.2.2.2.4, 3.10.2.2 3.
CRDCS A.
FMEA - Appendix 7A B.
,Q,Ujg. - 3.11. 2. 2, 3.11.3 C.
Seismic - 3.10.2.2 4.
RTS A.
FM EA - t^ * ^.- r5?
?, Z.,1, l. J 0, C, 2 1.L
/,7.7.1.i B.
Environmental - not addressed C.
Seismic - 3.10.4. 2
En c I, s u r e 4 FEB 2 71979 FSAR FSAR PSAR PSAR Commitment Description Reference Subsection Commitment 7.1.1.2 The protection systems are designed The protection systems are designed FSAR Subsection to meet the requirements of the IEEE to the issued IEEE Std 279-1971, 7.1.2.4.a.
Std proposed Standard for Nuclear which supersedes the proposed 7.2.1.2.1, 7.2.2.2.1, Power Plant Protection Systems (IEEE standard.
7.3.2.2.1, Std 279, Revision 10).
Prototype
- 7. 3. 2. 3.1, and final equipment will be subject 7.3.3.3.1, to qualification tests as required 7.3.3.4.1 by the subject standard.
/ 7.1.1. 2 The reactor protection and engineered The design criteria of PSAR Sub-FSAR Subsections safeguards systems are designed to section 7.1.1.2 are incorporated
.2.1.1, meet the design criteria specified in the FSAR except for PSAk Sub-7.2.2.2, in Subsection 7.1.1.2 of the PSAR, section 7.1.1.2.4b.
All ESFAS
'.3.2.1, and the functional requirements subsystems comply except RAS and
- 7. 3. 2. 3, listed in Subsection 7.1.1.3.
RBSAS whose sensor channels are
- 7. 3. 3. 4',
energize-to-trip.
This design 7.3.3.2 reduces the possibility of spur-ious RB spray actuation while still complying with IEEE Std 273-1971.
The functional requirements of PSAR Subsection 7.1.1.3 are in-corporated in the FSAR.
In addition, the FSAR states that RB isolation valves will be operated upon detection of a low RCS pressure.
7.1.1.2.7
- lanual testing facilities shall be The PSAR commitment for manual F5;R Subsections built into the protection systems testing facilities is incorporated
~.2.d.2.1, to provide for:
into the FSAR and is described in
'. 3. 2. 3.1, detail in the discussions of
'.3.3.4.1 Preoperational testing to compliance with IEEE Std 279-1971, a.
ensure that the protection Section 4.10.
. systems can fulfill their required functions b.
Online testing to prove operability and to demonutrate reliability
FSAR FSAR Reference PSAR PSAR Commitment Description Subsection Commitment FSAR Subsection 7.1.1.4 The operating environment for equip-1.
The maximum operating RB tem-3.11 perature is 120F as described ment will be maintained in accordance in the PSAR and in FSAR with Subsection 7.1.1.4 of the PSAR.
Table 3.11-2.
The continuous operation environ-2.
ment design for RPS instrumen-tation inside RB will be provided by amendment.
3.
Engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) equip-ment inside the RB is designed to operate under an accident environment of a steam / air mixture of 100% relative humidity, 277.7F, and 70 psig as described in FSAR Table 3.11-3.
/ 4.
Seve ral seismic Category I reduidant ventilation or cooling systems have been added to the plant design since the PSAR review. The operation of these systems limits auxiliary building ESF equipment room temperatures to less than 104F (see FSAR Tables 3.11-2 and 3.11-3 for specific areas and temperatures).
Therefore, instrumentation in those areas is designed to operate con-tinuously at a temperature of 104F or p,reater, rather than 120F as indicated in the PSAR.
Instru-is also mentation in these areas designed to operate at 100% relative humidity rather than 90% relative humidity as indicated in the PSAR.
Instrumentation outside these areas is designed to operate at at least 104F and 100% relative humidity rather than 120F and 90% relative humidity as indicated in the PSAR.
FSAR FSAR PSAR PSAR Commitment Description Reference Subsection Commitment The temperature in these areas 7.1.1.4 (Continued) is not expected to exceed 104F as indicated in FSAR Tables 3.11-2 and 3.11-3.
'5.
The protective equipcent in the control room will operate in an ambient temperature of at least 80F rather than 110F as indicated in the PSAR.
The control room liVAC systems maintain the ambient temperature less than 80F.
6.
The discussion of the auxiliary building areasd described in item 4 above also applies to the cable spreadir g roo=s.
- 7.1.2.2.1 When active and passive (check When an active valve is used redun-FSAR Subsection valves) engineered safeguards valves
<lantly with a passive valve (check 7.3.3.2.1, are used redundantly, the active valv-;, the active valve will receive Fig. 7.3-8 valve will be equipped with two only one channel of actuation. The check valve provides redundancy of OR control elements, each driven the isolation function. This design by one of the engineered safe-reduces the potential for a loss of guards channels, independence between redundant channels.
7.1.2.3.9 A system fault analysis will be Failure modes and effects analvsis BAW-10003, made considering the mod _. f are provided in the FSAR.
Plant FSAR Table 7.3-5 failure and determining their technical specifications require effect on the system's vital periodic testing to ensure reliability. T/S 3/4.3.1 FSAR Sections 3.10 and 3.11 indicate FSAR Subsections functions. Acceptance testing and periodic testing will be the acceptance (qualification) tests 7.2.2.1, 3.10, designed to ensure quality and or analyses for the protection systems. 3.11 reliability of the completed systems.
PSAR PSAR FSAR FSAR Subsection Cammitment Commitment Description Reference The RB radiation monitors and the Equipment saismic and environmental FSAR Subsection reactor cool.1nt pressure transmitters qualifications which ensure ESF 7.1, Table and associated cabling will be operation are discussed in the FSAR.
3.11-1, 3.11-4, 3.10 designed to perform the required function during the reactor building design basis accident.
7.1.2.2.2 An engineered safeguards actuation The PSAR commitments are incorporated FSAR Subsection system will be provided to perform in the FSAR as follows:
7.3.3.2 the following:
1.
RBIS-I closes RB isolation valves, 1.
On detection of a high reactor RBSAS starts the RB spray pumps building pressure, close RB and opens,the RB spray valves, isolation valves, start RB and RBCAS starts the RB recir-spray pumps, open RB spray culate air cooling units.
All valves, and start RB recir-actuate at 4 psig except RBSAS culate air cooling units.
at 30 psig.
2.
On detection of high RB rad-2.
RBIS-II closes RB peaetrations lation close all RB penetra-open to the RB atmosphere upon tions open to the RB atmos-detection of high RB radiaticn.
phere. (~/ype II).
3.
RAS shifts the LPI and RB spray 3.
On detection of a low BWST pumps into the recirculation level shift LPI and RB spray mode of operation upon detection pumps suction to the recir-of low BWST level.
culation mode of operation.
7.1.2.2.3 Auto close main steam and main feed-
!!SLIS automatically closes the main FSAR Subse: tion water isolation valves after a main steam and main feedwater isolation 7.3.3.2 steam line rupture.
valves after a main steam or main feed line rupture.
7.1.2.2.4 Auto start auxiliary feedwater system AFWAS performs the function indicated FSAR Su'osection after a main steam line rupture or in the PSAR.
7.3.3.2 loss of main feedwater.
FSAR FSAR PSAR PSAR Commitment Description peference Subsection Commitment iAX-10003, data for protection system equip-Test TSAR Subsection The equipment manuf acturer is required is summarized in the FSAR in 9, /,1 3, j data to ment 3.11.3, Section to provide qualification test Sections 3.10 and 3.11.
3.10, Table 3.11-4 verify the performance requirements of the equipment. Adherence to the equipment specifications and quali-data is ensured through fication test monitoring and inspection of the manufacturer's work.
FSAR Tables Trip setpoints or abnormal conditions 7.2-1, 7.2-3, 7.1.2.4 for the initir
~a of reactor pro.
7.3-1, 7.3-2, tection and engineering safeguard
/C 2 systems will be as specified in Subsection 7.1.2.4 of the PSAR.
F5AR Subsections Simulated test signals will be util-Valid preoperational testing of the Ized to verify proper setpoint adjust-14A.l.52, s' 7.1. 3. 3 14A.I.53,
- a4*g sensing element associated operation of indicators ments, correct 14.4.1.55 with the protection systems will be and proper logic operation and alarms, f 5f^ i accomplished through the actual mani-in all operating modes.
/S O '
pulation of the measured variable and comparison of the results against a standard. Routine preoperational tests of analog sensing elements will be performed by the substitution of a calibrating signal for the sensor.
Plant technical specificat ions (Tob;cs ! ables 4. 3-1 The sensors will be calibrated during 4.3-1 and 4.3-2) indicate channel and 4.3-2 7.1.3.3 shutdowns, for refueling, or whenever calibration (includes sensor) to te the true status of any measured variable cannot be assessed be ause performed at least every 18 months.
Plant operation may continue with a of lack of agreement among the channel inoperable within the require-redundant measurements.
ments of the technical specification limiting conditions of operation.
These design features are incorporated ISAR Subsections 7.2.1.1.9 Each channel of the protection system four in the plant design.
7.1.3.4 will be supplied from one of the
.2.2.2.1, preferred a-c buset described in 7.2.1.1.1, 8.2.2.8.
The operator can initiate a
- 7. 2. 3.1.1, reactor trip independent of the auto-7.3.3.1 matic protection act en.
FSAR FSAR PSAR PSAR Reference Commitment Description Subsection Commitment FSAR Subsection 7.1. 3. 2 Start HPI at 1,500 psig low RCS pres-ECCAS actuates HPI and LPI at The 7.3.2.1 sure and start LPI at 200 psig low 1,500 psig low RCS pressure.
present design simplifies the RCS pressure.
actuation system and allows starting of the LPI sooner than in the PSAR design.
7.1.3.5 Operational tests on RPS and ESFAS An operational test on the protection Appendix 3A, RG 1.118, FSAR Chapter 16, channels are performed by substi-system channels will be perforced technical indicated in the PSAR and are tuting an analog test signal for as the variable. The test signal is discussed in FSAR Appendix 3A, specifications manually injected into the instrument RG 1.118, response Section C.7.
channel at the input of the first active channel element in the pro-tection system cabinets.
v '7.1.3.6 To ensure that failures in the control The AFW SG level control system has FSAR Subsections system cannot produce a failure in been added to the plant design since 7.3.2.3.1, e
the protection system, signals which the PSAR. The SG level transmitter 7.2.2.2.1,
- 7. 3. 3. 3. 4.1, inputs to ESFAS are also used to go to control from shared sensors and amplifiers are isolated by means control the SG 1evel through the 7.4.2.1, of isolation amplifiers. The resul-safety grade AFU SG level control Table 7.1-2 ting systems meet the requirements system. The output to the AFW SG for separation of protection and level control system is isolated from control and for single failure the protection systen.
The isolation specified in IEEE Std 279, Rev 10, device, the protection system, and the and the AIF Interpretation of the AFW SG level control system are all AEC General Design Criteria 20, safety grade systems. The system meets the requirements of IEEE 21, and 22.
Std 279-1971.
FSAR Subsection 7.2.1.1 The regulating system will limit 7.7.1.2 power transients as follows:
Between 20 and 90% power -
a.
ramp changes of 10%/ min and step changes of 10%.
b.
Between 15 and 20%, and between 90 and 100% vamp changes of 3%/ min.
I FSAR FSAR PSAR PSAR Subsection Commitment Commitment Description Reference FSAR Subsection 7.2.1.2 The regulating system is designed to 7.2.1.1.1 meet the safety considerations listed in Subsection 7.2.1.2 of the PSAR.
FSAR Subsections
/
7.2.3.4 Loss of Load The combined actions of the control The combined actions of the control 7.7.1.2, system and the turbine bypass valve system and the turbine bypass to the 15.2.2 permit a 40% load reduction or a condenser permit 25% (rather than turbine trip f rom 40% load without 40%) electrical load rejection without atmospheric dump or safety valve atmospheric dump or safety valv:
action.
The controls will limit operation, and without tripping the steam dump to the condenser when reactor. No safety licits are exceeded the condenser vacuum is inadequate, as discussed in the accident analysis.
in..hich case the atmosphere dump or safety valves may operate.
FSAR Subsection 7.3.1.1 The nucicar instrum,entation is 7.8.1 designed to meet the requirements specified in Subsection 7.3.1.1 of the PSAR.
7.3.2.1 The quantity and types of process Instrumentation f provided to ensure FSAR Section 7.7, instrumentation provided will ensure safe and orderly operation of all FSAR Figures safe and orderly operation of all systems during norrul plant operation.
5.1-1 and 5.1-2 systems and processes over the full These systems not required for safety operating range of the unit.
are discussed in FSAR Section 7.7.
7.3.2.lA A study is being carried out ty B&W Study completed.
BLW Report 1313, to determine the source strengths 3/69, FSAR Sub-section 9. 3.6 of the various ~ otopes to allow an evaluation of t..e required sensitivity of this monitor for detecting rapid fuel failures.
7.3.2.1 A xenon oscillation threshold power NRC Safety Eval-versus core life curve will be devel-uation, Supplement 2, oped from analyses performed during Page 2-3, 7/77 the design of the reactor.
FSAR FSAR PSAR PSAR Commitnant Description Reference Subsection Commitment FSAR Subsection 7.3.3.2.2 The incore tr.onitoring detectors will be 7.8.2.2.1 continuously compensated for detector burnup, contral rod position, fuel burnup, etc, by calculations derived f rom experimental programs.
NRC Safety Lcal-7.3.3.3 The applicaticn of this system for uation, Supplcment 2, detect ion of :.cnon oscillation and Page 2-3 its minimum sensitivity is being examined thro;;n the analysis of experimental data.
'Ihe analysis should be cocpleted by the end of 1968.
7.5.1 The radiation anitoring system is The design requirements of FSAR FS AR S'ec t ion designed to meet the requirements Subsection 7.5.1 are cet in the 11.5 specitied in Subsection 7.5.1 of design discussed in the FSAR Section 11.5.
the PSAR.
7.5.2.1 The absence of heavy particulate and This commitment is contained in FSAR Subsection halogen isotopes will be demonstrated the FSAR.
I I. 5. 2. l.,
Table 11.; -
by laborator) analysis of fixed inte-Crating filters.
7.5.2.2 Supplementin; the continuous monitor-This commitment is repeated in the FSAR Su b t:.w ing, samples are taken from coolant FSAR.
11.5.2.,
Table 11.5 _'
systems for laboratory verification that the gross activity levels are within permissable limits.
7.5.3.1 Each channel af the radiation monitor-The alarm described is provided.
FSAR Su%cct:on 11.5.2 ing system shall have a dawn scale alarm set below the natural counting rate so that any loss of this natural signal will cause annunciation.
FSAR Section 12.5 7.5.5 l'ersonnel radiation p rotect ion and health physics practices will be provided as specit' led in Subsection 7.5.5 of th< PSAR.
FSAR FSAR PSAR PSAR Commitment Description Reference Subsection Commitment 7.5.5 Periodic calibration checks of the area Commitments for periodic calibration FSAR Subsections radiation monitors anJ table radiation checks are included in the ESAR for 12.5.2.2, that these area radiation monitors and portable 12.3.4.1.5 ronitors are made to enst instruments remain operational.
radiation monitors.
7.6.2 The information available in the con-Information is available in the main FSAR Tables 7.5 -.,
trol room will include the parameters control room for the parameters listed 7.5-2, drawings listed in PSAR Subsection 7.6.2.
In PSAR Subsection 7.6.2.
listed in Table 1.7-9
- 7. 5. 2. 3 The selection and number of points for The area radiation monitoring system FSAR Subsection radiation monitors are coordinated is provided to supp1 ment the person-12.3.4.1, area with the plant access control so that nel and area radiation survey pro-Section 12.5 operating personnel are not able to visions described in Section 12.5 enter an unmonitored area in which to ensure compliance with the per-they could be exposed to a dose in sonnel radiation protection guide-excess of the limits of 10 CFR 20.
lines of 10 CFR 20, 10 CFR 50, 10 CFR 70, and Regulatory Guides 8.2, 8.8, and 8.12.
7.6.3
'iisible and audible alarm units will Visible and audible alarms are pro-FSAR Subsections
'e incorporated into the control vided at the areas indicated in 11.5.2, 12.3,
- raon to warn the operator if unsafe PSAR Subsection 7.6. 3.
12.3.4.2.4.5, 7.7.1.5 canditions are approached by any svstem.
Audible reactor building evacuation alarms are to be initiated from the radiatio 1 monitoring s:estem or manually by th.: operator.
Audible alarms will be sounded in appropriate areas throughout the plant it high radiation conditions are present.
- lidland Fire 7.6.5 Ihe magnitude of a fire in the control Protection Eval-room is limited by the factors listed uation Report, in Subsection 7.6.5 of the PSAR.
FSAR Subsection 9.5.1
... ~... -
FSAR FSAR PSAR PSAR Commitment Description Reference Subs'_ction Commitment FSAR Subsections 7.6.7 Special emphasis will be given to main-The control roon ventilation system taining control integrity during is designed to protect the control 9.4.1, 7.5.1.2, accident conditions. The layout of room operators and equipment from 12.3.2.2.5, drawings the engineered safeguards section of hazardous conditions which may listed in the control board will be designed result during accident conditions.
Table 1.7-9 to minimize the time required for the Engineered safeguards control boards operator to evaluate the system per-have been designed to rrinimize the formance under accident conditions.
the time required for the operator to evaluate systen performance under accident conditions. This has been done by arrand ng controls and instru.
i mentation by system and by flow of control or system operation.
In addi-tion, a status display is provided to allow the operator to quickly evaluate the performance of equipment which is automatically actuated by the pro-tection systen.
L FSAR FSAR DRL Questions Commitment Commitment Description Reference
~.7.1 The RPS and ESFAS will be designed The protection systems are designed FSAR Subsections to IEEE Std 279 effective 8/30/68.
to IEEE Std 279-197 which supersedes 7.1.2.4.a.
the 1968 revision.
7.2.1.2.1, 7.2.2.2.1, 7.3.2.2.1, 7.3.2.3.1, 7.3.3.3.1, 7.3.3.4.1 7.3 All safety and protection equipment The quality control methods and FSAR Section 17 will be monitored by quality pro-proecedures listed in the response grams which include the quality to DRL Question 7.3 are included control methods and procedures in the QA program in the FSAR.
in the response to DRL Question 7.3.
7.4 The primary coolant leakage detec-The leakage detection system described FSAR Subsection 5.2.5, tion system design criteria in-in the FSAR differs in some respects Appendix 3A, RG 1.45 clude the criteria listed in from that described in the PSAR.
How-response to DRL Question 7.4.
ever, the system is designed in comp 1.f-ance with RG 1.45.
Differences are discussed below:
1.
Reactor building atmosphere rela-tive humidity detectors are not provided.
Instead, RB air temp-erature and pressure monitors are used as an alarm to alert operator of potential problems.
2.
RB sump level alarm described at 3 inches is not provided. A rate of change level alarm is provided to alarm increase of a 0.5-inch within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 'n conformance with RC 1.45, 3.
RB area monitors at the discharge of the RB air coolers are not provided.
However, RB gaseous and particulate monitors are provided in conformance with RG 1.45.
~~~~ ~
7_ _ w m.., _ _.
FSAR FSAR DRL Commitment Description Reference Questions Commit ment 7.7 Environmental testing which may be The environmental testing perf ormed FSAR Section 3.11, required fo. controls and instru-on safety-related controls and in-Table 3.11-4 menta". ion is indicated in response trumentation is described in FSAR to DRL Question 7.7.
Section 3.11, Table 3.11-4.
7.8 The protection system and engi-The PSAR commitment described is FSAR Subsection 8.3.1.3 neered safety feature equipment incorporated isto the FSAR.
and components will be differentiated from similar items not related to protection or safety by location and grouping, color codings, name-plates, individual equipment tags, or special alphabetical letter designations.
7.9 The design criteria for the reactor The reactor coolant deborating sys-FSAR Subsections coolant deborating system is as 6em is designed as described in 7.7.1.3, described in response to DRL the PSAR response to DRL Question 7.9.
9.3.4.2.3.4.d Question 7.9.
NRC Safety Evaluation, 7.12 The data available from similar Supplement 2, 7/77, configurations of comparable FSAR Section 7.8 core size will be evaluated to verify or disqualify the stated reliance on out-of-core (instrumentation) for safe and reliable spatial power indications from the core.
9e 7.10 The design bases for the system The process steam transfer system FSAR Subsection which transfers process steam (PSTS) is not required for safety.
7.7.1.6, Section 10.3 from Unit I to Unit 2 include Interlocks prevent the cross-the requirement of separation
.onnection of the two NSSS units between NSS systems as well as through the respective secondary single-failure analysis.
systems.
Because the PSTS is not required for safety, no single-failure analysis is provided.
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FSAR FSAR DRL Questions Commitment Commitment Desc ri p t ion Reference 7.13 All of the radiation monitoring in-The radiation monitors used in the FSAR Subsection struments used in protection sys-ESFAS system are designed to IEEE 7.1.2.2, Table 7.1-2 tems will be designed to meet the Std 279-1971 which supersedes the protection systems standards 1968 standard.
requirements (IEEE Std 279, 10/68).
7.14 The bascs for criteria used to The area and process radiation moni-FSAR Subsection toring systems design criteria in-12.3.4, Section 11.5 determine the locations, range, types, and sensitivities of the cludes those listed in the response area and process radiation monitor-to DRL Question 7.14.
ing systems are as stated in response to DRL Question 7.14.
7.19 If it becomes necessary to suddenly The capability to shut down the FSAR Subsection evacuate the control room, the plant from outside the control 7.4.3.1 reactor can be brought to either room is provided. An auxiliary hot or cold shutdown condition by shutdown panel is not described in operation of valves and equipment the PSAR aids the operator when from either local breakers or local shutdown is required from outside the panels as described in response to control room.
DRL Question 7.19.
7.20 A diverse backup reactor trip to Both low RCS pressure and high FSAR Subsection the low RCS pressure trip will be containment pressure trip the reactor.
7.2.1.1.1 provided so that effective core cooling is ensured following a LOCA.
7.17 The instrumentation and controls The RPS, ECCAS, ESFAS, and emergency FSAR Table 7.1-2 for engineered safeguards, the emer-diesel generator controls are designed gency electric power system, and the in accordance with IEEE Std 344.
reactor protection system are designed to meet Class I seismic design criteria. Therefore, there will be no loss of t' unction in these systems during or following the maximum earthquake.
DRL FSAR FSAR
_ Questions Commitment Commitment Description Reference Enclosure B - Identification of Problem Areas
[ h /t 74 h 11 In accordance with the require-. Outputs of protective instruments FSAR Subsections ments of IEEE Std 279, Sectioas located inside the RB will be 7.2.2.2.1,
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4.9 and 4.11, the RB protective checked during power operation per 7.3.2.3.1, instrumentation sensor outputs IEEE Std 279-1971 by cross checking 7.3.3.4.1, will have the capability of being between channel indicators located Chapter 16 technical checked during powe. operation, on the system cabinets in the aux-specifications, Appendix 3A, Provisions for testing and cali-iliary building. Actuation logic (RG 1.118) brating channels and the devices will be tested during power opera-used to derive the final system tion at the system cabinets in the output signal from the various auxiliary building.
It is not channel signal wi U be located necessary to enter RB during power external to the RB or within the operation to test instruments. This RB air room and will be access-testing will be dc.ne at refueling or ible during power operation. The plant shutdown.
sensor signals shall have the signal offset from zero in such a manner to permit detection of shorted, or open circuits.
12 A R&D program dischssed in re-o.:
This item is currently under dis-CPCo Serial 4154 sponse to Item 12 will be con-cussion with the NRC.
ducted to ensure the adequacy and feasibility of the m'easure-ment system used to detect radio-activity in the proces:s steam.
o Enclosure A - Additional DRL Questions
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7 The high pressurizer level alarm. I shall be designed and tested as per the criteria listed in PSAR Vol. III, Enclosure A, P 7.00-1.
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