ML19280B558
| ML19280B558 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zimmer |
| Issue date: | 10/08/1981 |
| From: | Jamarl Cummings NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR & AUDITOR (OIA) |
| To: | Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19280B555 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8112080194 | |
| Download: ML19280B558 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000358/1980009
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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MDiORANDU!' FOR:
Chaiman Palladino
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FROM:
James J. Cummines, Director
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Office of Inspector and Audito
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SUBJECT:
DIA REPORT DATED AUGUST 7,1981, "ADEQUD OF IE
ITNESTIGATION 50-358/80-09 AT THE WILLIAM H. ZIMMER
NUCLEAR POWEP STATION"
Your nemorandum of October 2,1981, requested that the Office of Inspector
'and Auditor (OIA) review EDO comments on the subject report.
DIA has
completed a review of the ED0's memoranda dated September 17, 1981, and
our responses are as follow:
ED0 Comment (First EDO memorandum - Attachment 1)
"The OIA findings and supporting argunents contained in the August 7,
1981 memorandum, J. Cunmings to the Commissioners, disturb me
deeply.
I am forced to conclude that DIA may not clearly understand
the NRC mission or priorities, nor the processes and controls
involved in the construction of a nuclear power plant.
I am unable
to conclude that the OIE investigation of Applegate's allegations
was unsatisfactory.
"Our goal forplants under construction is to ensure that they are
constructed in a manner to provide adequate public protection after
they are licensed to oper>te. We attempt to ensure that all potential
construction defects, irrespective of how they are identified, are
adequately corrected prior to the operation of a nuclear power
pl a nt.
To that end, the optimal use of our resources is achieved
when identified defects are vorified to be in a utility's corrective
action system.
The potential for further reduction of risk to the
public is not commensurate with the incremental resources required
to broaden the depth and breadth of this type of investigation as
suggested in the OIA report.
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"I have been infomed there are factual inaccuracies in the OIA
report.
I will be forwarding our detailed comments on the 01A
g c 7 g 9: y
report in a separate nemorandum."
e112080194 811116
ADOCK 05000358
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Chaiman Palladino
2
OIA Response
The above ED0 comment attempts to obfuscate the real issues by
cuestioning OIA's understanding of NRL programs and suggesting that
the public health and safety would not have been served if IE had
conducted a cetailed investigation in this and similar type cases.
First, the issue is whether IE conducted an adequate investigation
cf fir. Applegate's original allegations, not whether 01A understands
the NRC's mission and priorities.
An investigation is defined on
page 4, Chapter 8 of the IE Inspector's Manuel as follows:
"An investigation .uii be defined as an activity conducted as a
result of an incideat, accident, reporta'le occurrence, allegations
u
or complaint reported by a licensee or others which involves
licensable materials or activities to gather, correlate and
evaluate information indepth for the purpose of establishing
the cause, nature, extent, and circumstances of a condition or
an occurrence.
"An investigation differs from an inspection in that it is not
a scheduled activity but is a response to an outside stimulus.
It focuses on a specific natter and examines it in detail.
The goal of an inve%igation is to obtain all certinent infomation
Lvailable regarding a specific subject or event.
Investigations
a_re concuctea to cetemine what happened, to identify causes,
to detemine compliance or noncorpliance, and to ornvide the
information necessary to evaluate the significance of the
matter.
In some instances the results of an investigation may
identify the need for a change in NRC regulations or policy.
The tem' investigation does not carry with it the implication
of criminality, wrongdoing or dishonesty. A given investigation
may, nowever, involve these matters."
(Emphasis added.)
Clearly, IE Investigation 50-358/80-9 did not satisfy the above
standards or generally accepted investigative standards of cther
Government agencies.
It shoulu clearly be understood that DIA did
not evaluate IE's investigation based on FBI or other criminal law
enforcenent investigative procedures and/or standards.
Fundamentals
basic to e'l investigations were simply not observed in this instance.
The inw .igative file conteined no results of interview g all
nor wr
sere any detailed record of copies of the documentation
rev1:
Second, the ED0's position that the potential for further reaction
of risk to the public would dictate that investigations of this
.
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Chaiman Palladino
3
type not be broadened-is without merit in this instance.
In this
case the IE investigation did not even review the weld dats packages
relative to the specific welds alleged to ba defective, nor did the
IE investigation pursue logical leads on the issue of whether the
CG&2 OA Manager ordered the alteration of the hR which allowed the
pipe spool pieces to be released for installation.
DIA beheves that
the minimal additional resources required to adequately address these
issues would have been more than justified by the potential benefit
to the public health and safety.
Third, DIA believes that the ED0's statement "I have been informed
there are factual inaccuracies in the OIA report" is not supported
by the ED0's detailed comments.
Finally, over the past several years IE has conducted numerous
investigations and inspections of the Zimmer plant.
Despite this
presence it is only recently that the dimension of the licensee's
paperwork problem associated with the QA welding program in some
a reat has surfaced.
A cmtributing factor to the delay in identifying
this defect might have t~en that these inspections and investigations
were not sufficiently comprehensive to identify this issue in a
timely manner.
EDO Comment (Second EDO memorandum - Attachment 2)
" Enclosed are the OIE comments relative to the OIA investigative
findings.
I would like to specifically direct your attention to
the enclosed weld chronologies.
Clearly, these velds had been
identified and placed in a corrective action system prior to Applegate's
i nvol veme nt.
"I believe the OIA report sunmary (page 2) best characterizes the
safety issue.
'One of Applegate's nain allegations was that defective welds
in safety-relatet systems have been accepted.... By virtue of
prior IE inspections..., it is clear that Region III was well
aware of the chronic and long history of welding problems at
Zinner:
specifically, that unacceptable welds in safety-
related systems' had for all intents and purposes been accepted
by both the contractor and, in some cases, the licensee.
Based upon these inspections, P.egion III required the licensee
to rereview radiographs and reports of all welds which had
been accepted for turnover prior to operation; this review
started in October 1979 and portions of this review are still
being studied by Region III.'
"It appears to be irrelevant to debate whether or not the welds had
been accepted; the pertinent fact is that the welds were in a
system to obtain corrective action.
.
Chairman Palladino
4
"I am confident that the aggregate of licensee and HRC actions
would have resulted in adequate welds prior to the operation of
this plant, irrespective of Applegate's involvement."
OIA Discussion
Enclosure 1 to the second EDO memc andum is Office of Inspection and
Enforcement Canments entitled " Replies to OIA Findings." This document
lists seven 01A findings and discusses each of these findings.
Unfortun-
ately, this IE docunent is not responsive to the four reasons listed by
OIA as the justification for 01A's finding.
Rather, it is a selection
of seven portions from the summary section of the 01 A report.
Enclosure 2
to the same letter is Weld Chronologies and nrlates to the three welds
in question.
The basis upon which IE attenpts to dispute the "seven OIA findings" is
based to a large degree on information which was not known to IE until
after the OIA report was issued and after IE had conducted a reinvestigation
of the facts.
Nevertheless, the following is an 01A response to the
seven comments,
"1.
DIA Finding
OIA review of investigative files disclosed inadequate docunentation.
Discussion
The OIA canment on documentation (page 2) refers to the RIII
investigative file, rather than the investigation report
i tsel f.
They noted that no "results of interview" or copies
of weld documentation reviewed were in the file.
On page 13,
it is pointed out that no identification key was generated for
the investigative file.
Neither NRC, IE, nor RIII procedures require a "results of
interview" to be generated for each interview, and all interviews
are not required to be portrayed in detail in an investigation
reports
Investigation reports should contain all pertinent
information, whether obtained through observations, records or
interviews, concerning the matter investigated.
There is no need for retention of copies of all documentation
obtaineo during an investigation.
If a document appears to be
relevant to the case, it is often reviewed onsite, and no copy
is obtained.
If a document appears central to an allegation,
.
2.
(
Chairmon ralladino
5
it is then copied, and may be made an attachment to the report,
if warranted by the issue involved."
OIA Response
See OIA response, page 2,
paragraphs 3 and 4 (continued on page 3) of
this remorandum.
"2.
DIA Finding
IE investigative report did not identify the dates on which
the welding rework was conducted on weld K-811.
Discussion
Although the IE investigation report did not identify the date
when weld K-811 was removed (approximately January 16,1980),
the report did correctly identify that the weld had been
removed as provided by the disposition of NR No. E-2138Rl.
Thus, the weld alleged to be improper was nonexistent, having
been renoved eighty-two days prior to the investigation team's
arrival at Zimmer.
Determination of the date of rework was
not necessary in our view."
OIA Response
The rework on weld K-811 was done in mid January 1980.
This was after
Applegate had been hired by CG&E - approximately mid December 1979 -
and after Applegate had brought infornation of potential weld defects in
weld K-811 to the attention of CG&E officials - early January 1980.
Thus the question of exactly why and when weld K-Bil was replaced should
have been fully resolved.
Despite IE's review of NR No. E-2138R1, (this
document indicated a cut out and replacement date between January 14,
1980, and January 22,1980),
IE neither resolved the question nor
reported this information in their investigative report.
"3.
01A Finding
~
The IE investigation report did not identify that a nonconformance
report (NR) on weld K-811 had initially been closed with the
notation " accept as is," and was later voided and reopened to
order the weld cut out.
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Chairman Palladino
6
Discussion
The finding as stated is incorrect.
The " accept as is" stsiement
on the NR was conditional in that it only applied if a radiegraph
snowed the weld to be acceptable.
Apparently the OIA investigator
misunderstood the NR."
0IA Response
Weld K-811 was welded in January 1979 and accepted by Kaiser in January
1979 according to the Vaiser weld data sheet.
Some 10 months later,
October 1979, NR No. E-2138 was generated by Kaiser noting that the ANI
hold point had been missed and directed that the weld be radiographed
and, if the radiograph were acceptable, the weld was to be accepted as
is. The NR further categorized the problem as a " procedural" one.
The
IE investigation never reviewed (or even attempted to locate) this
original version of HR No. E-2138; therefore the IE investigation failed
to determine that Kaiser had proposed accepting the weld without the
approvLi/*siver of the ANI. More importantly the IE investigation relied
on a revision of this NR, NR No. E-2138R1, which contained bogus information
both as to the date of the weld, October 1977, and the date a decision
was made to cut out the weld, October 1979.
"4.
OIA Finding
The investigation did not determine that weld RH-42 had been
cut out and replaced after initiation of the investigation.
Discussion
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The finding is correct.
The investigation did, however,
properly determine that weld defects had been identified and
corrective action was planned. The actual date of corrective
action is not significcat."
OIA Response
OIA believes IE's failure to determine the fact that weld RH-42 was in
fact cut out after the investigation was initiated is indicative of the
shallowness of the investigation.
IE's bottom line statement that "the
NES level II radiographer found some discrepancies that have not been
resolved, and the weld has not been given final acceptance" (IE Report
at page 8) is a far cry from the true status of this weld.
'.
.
Chaiman Palladino
7
"5.
DIA Finding
None of the welds alleged to have been deficient were inspected
by the investigation team nor was all pertinent weld documentation
reviewed.
Discussion
The finding is correct but considered irrelevant.
The investigators
did not inspect the welds but did review the radicgrephs,
which was the correct method of evaluation.
Visual examination
of the weld would not identify internal defects.
The investigators
did not review all weid documentation but did review the
pertinent documentation to establish propar weld disposition."
OIA Response
If a visual inspection had been conducted, IE would have discovered that
weld RH-42 was non-existent and that weld CY 606 was covered by concrete -
despite its NES review status.
These facts are hardly irrelevant.
"6.
DIA Findino
The IE investigators did not fully investigate or accurately
report on the alteration of a noncomfomance (fM) related to
spool pieces containing defective welds.
The IE report only
identified an individual as a "CG&E official" vice "QA Manager,"
thus obscuring that this was the licensee's senior person
responsible for the site QA program who ordered improper
voiding of a NR.
Discussion
Investigator Phillip indicates that the natter was discussed
with his supervisor, and the pursuit of who directed the
lining-out was seen as having little significance.
This was
because a separate NR had been opened, previoing tracing of
the nonconfomance.
Finally, neither OIE nor DIA could substantiate
the allegation."
OIA Response
As a result of IE's investigation Region III cited CG&E - ir. fraction -
for release of the pipe spools "...This release was achieved through
unauthorized removal of the noted exceptions on the NP.."
(1. ten a.,
part-
graph 2 of the Notice of Violation, Appendix A to letter from I:eppler (NRC)
to Borgmann (CG&E) dated July 2, 1980.)
IE also had received infomation
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Chairman Palladino
8
that the CG&E QA manager was the individual who directed this unauthorized
action.
If the action in question was considered serious enough to
warrant a citation against the licensee then how can it now be rationalized
as "having little significance" with respect to identifying the individual
who was responsible for this action.
Furthermore, IE was unable to
produce any results of interview of the parties involved. Significant
information sinply cannot be arbitrarily withheld from investigative
reports.
"7.
OIA Finding
The IE report found Applegate's allegations on defective welds
was "not substantiated" because welds had not been finally
accepted. This is a question of semantics and not consistent
with the facts.
Discussion
The use of the term "not substantiated" was linked with the
RIII view of the status of the acceptance of welds.
RIII was,
through previous inspection findings, well aware that nondestructive
examination techniques had been found to be deficient. Based
on the NRC findings and related concerns, a consultant had
been hired by the licensee to review wold radiograpns. That
action negated any previous " acceptance" of plant weld radiography.
The previous inspection findings and status of the welds in
question are correctly stated in the IE report.
As such, it
should be clear that the licensee had not given final acceptance
to the welds in question and a system was in place to assure
that defective welds would be identified and corrected prior
to final acceptance.
As shown in the chronologies, decisions
to grind out and replace two of the welds in ouestion (WR-K-
911 and RH-42) had been nade prior to initiation of the RIII
investigation."
DIA Response
Applegate alleged that defective welds had been accepted - among them
CY 506, RH-42 and K-811.
CY 606 was accepted by Kaiser in August 1976
and again in June 1977.
RH-42 was accepted by Kaiser in August 1976 and
V-811 was accepted by Kaiser in January 1979.
Furthennore, until 1979
acceptance and turnover of a weld by Kaiser, for all practical purposes,
enounted to acceptance by CG&E.
.
.
.
J
Chairman Palladino
9
Weld Chronolooies
(See Attachment 2)
OIA Resoonse
OIA fails to see the ED0's point in asterisking items in the weld
chronology with the notation "significant information not in 01A's
chronol ogy. "
If the point is that DIA's investigation was deficient /
incomplete because it also failed to document the complete history and
status of the welds in question then it should be pointed out that 01A's
job was not to conduct a cc prehensive reinvestigetion but rather to
evaluate the work done by IE. The additional fielc work done by IE to
detennine the correct status and history of the welds in question is
precisely the type of field work that should have been done by IE in
their initial investigation.
01 A's determination that the IE investigation
failed to determine the correct status and history of several welds is
valid, i.e., weld RH 42 was cut out in April 1980, weld K 811 was not
welded on fiovember 9,1977 but on January 29, 1979.
Attar':aents:
As stated.
cc:
Conmission (4)
W. Dircks
V. Stello
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