ML19276H326
| ML19276H326 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/18/1968 |
| From: | Cantrell F, Moseley N US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19276H275 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-289-68-02, 50-289-68-2, NUDOCS 7910160668 | |
| Download: ML19276H326 (10) | |
Text
T* 'ff U.
S.
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 9
REGION I DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE Report of Inspection CO Report No. 289/68-2 Licensee:
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station)
Provisional Construction Permit No. CPPR-40 Date of Inspection:
September 18-19, 1968 Date of Previous Inspection:
August 22, 1968 Inspected By: # I_
/8//<'!d f F.
S. Cantreigp'Meactor.Inspectcr 6 ate'
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Reviewed By:
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N. C. Moseley, Senh6'r Reactor Inspector batd SCOPE A rouiine announced inspection was made of the 2452 Mwt pressurized water power reactor now under construction en Three Mile Island near Middletown, Pa.
The inspection effort was directed toward' the overall quality assurance prcgram, and a review of the concrete problem reported on the initial inspection.
A scheduled meeting was held at the site with operating personnel on preparation of preoperational test procedures.
SUMMAR'I Safety Items - None Status of Previousiv Reoorted Problem - During the initial site visit in August, the contractor was having difficulty preparing uniform concrete as shown by the slump test and the subsequent 9
cylinder break test.
Strict limits were established for slump and temperature and United States Testing inspectors were assigned re.sponsibility for accepting each batch of concrete1419 246 7910160 dM
2, p =p
. DEI' AILS A.
Persons Contacted Mr. Vernon Steubner, Resident Engineer, MET-ED Mr. Harry Alexander, Field Quality Control Engineer, U.E.&C.
Mr. Arthur Ballschmeider, Vendor Inspector, U.E.&C.
Mr.
N. Cole, Quality Control Engineer, MPR Associates Mr. Jim Bartman, Supt. of Production, MET-ED Mr. Kick Klingaman, Senior Mechanical Engineer, Three Mile Island (TMI), MET-ED Mr. Jim Floyd, Station Engineer, TMI, MET-ED Mr. Harold Morris, Supervisor of Maintenance, TMI, MET-ED Mr. Joe Colitz, Supervisor of Operations, TMI, MET-ED B.
Precoerational Testina The. inspector discussed the preoperational testing program with Mr. Bartman and other MET-ED supervision assigned to develop procedures for preoperational testing.
The Compliance role in 9
the preoperational testing program was explained.
Definitions of the categories of procedures in the CO inspection manual were given with examples of each category.
It was emphasized that our review of their procedures was for the purpose of a better understanding of the test program, not approval of the procedure.
The reactor is designed to go from full base load to station load without a reactor trip.
Mr. Eartman asked if it was nec-escary to test this ability.
He was told that he may want to test this ability in steps, but that the inspector believed that a test from full power would be necessary.
C.
Quality Assurance Procram 1.
Gilbert Associates (GA) is responsible for developing qualit,y control Jrocedures for all elements of con-struction, except the nuclear ccmponents*.
GA was not inspected; however, MET-ED said the original ccncretc procedure was not adequate (Paracraph D)**.
- CO Repcrt 289/68-1
!419 247
770
. G 2.
United Engineers and Constructors (UE&C) as contractor is responsible for all field quality control and shop quality control for equipment and materials other than that eupplied by Babcock & Wilcox.*
UE&C is discharging their responsibility as follcw.s:
a.
A full time Quality Control Engineer, Harry Alexander, has been assigned to the Quality Control Program.
He is responsible fcr field and vender' inspections, check-ing inspection reports, and maintaining the records.
Pricr to the TMI Project he was an Acsistant in the Quality Control Program at Indian Point No.
2.
He appears to have the records well organized.
b.
U.
S. Testing (UST) was hired by UE&C to perform all field inspections and test of concrete work and welding.
Since the removal of the low compressive strength concrete from the containment building base, *
- good results have been achieved with concrete (pa ra -
graph D).
9 The UST inspectors have sole responsibility for determining that batches of concrete meet specifi-cations.
The inspector at the batch plant certifies
'the mix and the inspector at the pour site makes slump test, prepares cylinders, checks temperature, time, revolutions and placement of concrete per the quality control procedure for concrete.
Records show that some batches have been rejected.
(So far the re.jected batches have been used in other non-critical locations, i.e.
concrete pad for service and temporary storage buildings.)
UST inspectors are inspecting cadwell joints.
Approximately 3%
have been rejected visually.
All visually accepted production joints tested had a tensile strength greater than the 70,000 psi min.
- PSAR Appe.ndix 5D
- CO Rep;rt No. 289/68-1 O
!419 248
L'ilj
. O c.
Twenty-seven vendor inspections have been made to determine that the vendor has the necessary Quality Control Program, personnel, and tools needed to assure the quality specified in the order.
Action to assure conformity to specifications was taken with two ven-dors prior to start of the MET-E3 crder.
The in-spector looked at the report of the initial visit to one of these vendors and at the follow-up in-spection report.
The follow-up report indicated workmanship and quality control had been improved, and were now acceptable.
The inspector was given a list of the above inspections and a list of the cur-rently scheduled inspections.
3.
MPR Associates has been hired by MET-ED to monitor and audit all inspection activities and reports.
The reactor inspector briefly discussed MPR activities with one of their engineers (N. Cole) while observing a con-crete pour.
He was one of five that are assigned to the TMI Project on a part-time basis.
They are not required G
to be present while all concrete is being poured, however to date, they have covered all of the concrete in contain-ment building.
MPR activities and reports will be reviewed in more depth on the next inspection.
D.
Concrete Mr. Steubner, Resident Engineer, MET-ED, credits strict adherence to the revised concrete quality control procedure for the improvement in concrete for the containment.
He stated that the original procedure did not adequately consider the hot weather experienced during the first pour of the containment base,* and that site personnel were not prepared to control the temperature of the concrete.
The new concrete quality control procedure limits the concrete temperature to 70 F maximum, re-qu. ires a 1" to 4" slump, and assigns UST the responsibility of accepting each batch of concrete.
Test cylinders are field cured at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> before being moved to the field laboratory for stripping and curing.
- CO Report No. 289/68-1 O
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~
2 72i The concrete pour observed was a section of the containment base.
Conveyor belts and a bucket were used to lower the cen-crote to the level of the pour.
operation of the conveyor crew appeared to be satisfactory.
When the bucket was used to placc concrete near the edge where the vertical reinforcing steel had been installed, the concrete was allowed to dr p about five feet.
When questioned, Mr. Steubner stated that a tremie was used on previous placements when the concrete had further to fall.
On the observed placement the concrete" was about 3-4 feet from the bottcm of the bucket after the concrete was dropped but before compacting with vibrators.
This subject is discussed further in the management inte view section of this report (Par. I).
A local commercial concrete supplier has been retained to act as "back-up" in the event of a breakdown of the on-site batch plant.
If the back-up plant is used, UST will assign an inspector to the back-up plant.
Trial runs have been made to assure UE&C that the required quality control can be maintained.
Ice will be added at the site batch plant, if needed.
9 E.
Cadweld Splicina Each man is qualified as an individual to perform cadweld splices instead of two men being qualified as a team.
Initially one of each 25 production splices will be removed and tested to destruction.
Approximately 3% of the splices have been rejected visually.
All of the visually accepted production splices that were tested, failed above 70,000 psi.
The inspector observed one cadweld splice being made.
Appropriate parts of the pro-cedure in Attachment A were folicwed.
P.
Testina Laboratorv A larger laboratory building is being erected.
More space is needed for curing test cylinders.
Test equipment has been ordered to make the cylinder break test and to test cadweld splices at the site.
O O
!41? 250
Elb G G.
Contairment Trumpets are being set in the containment base for both 90 and 170 wire tendens.
In order to centinue pouring concrete while a decisicn is being made between the designs, once a decision in reached, the unneeded trumpets will be plugged.
H.
Miscellaneou?
One of the cranes used in constructing piers for the bridge across the river fell in the river and caught on fire when a section of the dike under the crane caved in.
The crane was travelling 7.long the dike with its boom up at the time.
There were no injuries.
I.
Exit Interciew An exit interview was held with Vernon Steubner, the Sanicr MET-E3 site representative.
The inspector reviewed the item of noncenformance whereby concrete was allowed to drop about 5 feet G
without a tremie or a pipe for a guide.
He stated that the crew had been using a tremie, but at that point, they were in the way of the crew that was compacting the concrete.
He said he was aware of the 3 foot limit imposed by the UE&C procedure, but had decided to permit the higher drop near the edge of the pour, since the bucket was being lcwered between reinforcing steel until it was stcpped by the reinforcing steel.
In addition, a crew was cleaning concrete from reinforcing steel above the concrete level being poured.
The inspector expressed his con-cern about deviations frcm established precedures and the effect it might have on subsequent operations.
Mr. Steubner later phoned to repcrt that smaller concrete buckets that could be lowered between the reinforcing steel were modified and put into service the day after the inspecticn.
It was reported that all of the concrete was being placed with less than 3 feet of free fall.
1419 251 O
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ATTACHMENT A (Excerpted from U.U.&C. Quality Control Procedure No. 1, Rev. August 30, 1968)
II.
PROCEDURES (Continued)
A.
_P_relimina ry Tests (Continued) 6.
Cadweld Splices a.
Reinforcing steel bars larger than #11 shall be spliced with the "Cadweld" process.
b.
Mill test reports for splicing sleevec and powder will be required and reviewed for com-pliance with specification requirerents.
Rejected material will be returned to the Vendor or otherwise removed from the site.
c.
Prior to production work, the operator des-O ignated to perform "Cadweld" splicing will be qualified by preparing a test joint-for each bar size and position he will be required to aplice.
These test joints will be tested in tension after visual excmination.
If the test splice developz at least the minimum specified ultimate ctrength of the bar (A408 bars - 70 ksi) the operator shall be considered qualified to produce that size and position of splice.
d.
Using previously qualified operators, approx-imately fifty splicos will be prepared under production c:nditi0ns.
From these splices, at leact sixteen will be randemly selected and tested to destruction.
Results of these tests will be turned over to the Engineer for evalun-tion and determination of the initial sampling rate for producticn splices.
e.
In qualificatic: cf both pre-prcduction and production splices, each completed splice shall meet the following acceptance etandards:
O 1419 ?52
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(1)
Sound, non-percus filler metal shall be visible at both ends cf the splice sleeve and at the top hele in the center of the sleeve.
(A single shrinkage bubble present below the riser is nct detrimental and should be distinguished from general porosity.)
(2)
There shall be evidence of filler metal be-tween the sleeve and bar fo'r the full 360 however, splice sleevez which are not exactly concentric or axially sligned with the bars are acceptable.
(3)
The bar ends shall be clean and free from rust, mill scale, slag, grease, paint, moisture, etc.
(4)
Bars shall be longitudinally centered in the sleeves as shown by previously affixed center-punch marks or similar identifiable location G
marks on the bar.
(5)
Bars shall not be scarfed and the portion of the bar in the sleeve shall have uniform de-formations alcng its length consistent with the rolled mill pattern.
E.
Field Tests _ (Continued) 6.
Cadweld Inspection - Cadwelding in the containment structure shall be inspected by a representative of the T.L. as follows:
No Cadwelding will be permitted if the re'lative a.
humidity is over 80%.
b.
Sleeves and crucibles shall be checked for cleanli-ness, rust, etc.
Mclds to be preheated when necessary (new mold c.
or change of shift).
!412 253
- "17 d.
Bar ends shall be free frem lcoce mill scale, rust, and moisture.
e.
Bars shall not be scarfed.
f.
Bars shall be marked by center-punching or other suitable meanc, so that assurance of centering ends within the sleeve may be made.
g.
Completed splices shall be visually inspected in accordance with'the folicwing procedure.
Any splice which, in the judgment of the in-spector does not pasz visual inspection, shall be cut out and replaced.
(1)
Properly made splices will have filler metal visible at both ends of the sleeve and at the top hcie in the center of the sleeve.
(2)
Filler metal need not flow to the very 9
edge of the sleeve due to the gasket action of the asbestos wicking used to seal in the molten filler metal.
(3)
As a result of the Cadweld process, a shrink-age bubble may be visible at the top hole, where the molten metal is introduced and shrinkage fissures and pinholes may be visible at the top of a vertical splice.
These casting ficw do not adversely affect the physical perfcrmance of the splice and therefore do not cenctitute cause for re-jection.
h.
Random samples of visually acceptable splices at a rate to be specified by the Engineer shall be selected, cut from the structure and tested in tension to destruction.
1.
For each Cadweld splice, data shall be recordec on rebar data sheets shewing:
O
!4i3 354 Ayu (1)
Splice number (Thic number shall also be 9
applied to the splicing sleeve using a heat and werther resistant mIrking pencil.)
(2)
Location (3)
Size and orient 1 tion of the splice (4)
Operat r number (crew number,)
(5)
Date, weather conditiens, and time the aplice was made.
(6)
Inspectcrs initials (7)
S mple number and test result, if applicable.
J.
Failure of a tencion test of a splice selected from the structure as in "h" above (test result less than 70,000 psi will be cause for additional campling.
The next previous cr subsequent splice e
made by the source operater shall be cut from the structure and tested in tensien to destruction.
If this test result is over 70,000 psi the process will be considered in centrol.
If this splice
~
also fails, an engineering evaluation will be made, during which time the operator / crew responsible shall discontinue Cadwelding.
till
,41)., 255 2
a-
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