ML19276H285
| ML19276H285 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 02/06/1971 |
| From: | Howard E, Hunnicutt D, Kirkman R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19276H275 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-289-71-01, 50-289-71-1, NUDOCS 7910160630 | |
| Download: ML19276H285 (11) | |
Text
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S. ATOMIC ENERGY C0FSiISSION l
9 j
REGION I DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE Report of Inspection C0 Report No. 289/71-1 Licensee:
Metropolitan Edison Company (Met Ed)
Three Mile Island Unit No. 1 License No. CPPR-40 Category A Date of Inspection:
January 18 and 19, 1971 Date of Previous Inspection:
October 8-9, 1970 JM[7/
Inspected by:
M v> v.'m7/C~
D. M. Hunnicutt, Reactor Inspector (Principal)
' Date
).9n d wnb 2 7 E. M. Howard, Senior Reactor Inspector Date 2-$~l Revleued by:
.l/72-w a,* eG - w R. W. Kirkman, Directot', Region I Date Proprietary Information:
None SCOPE A routine, announced inspection was made of Unit No. 1, one of the two 2535 MWt pressurized water reactors (B&W) under construction on Three Mile Island, near Middletown, Pennsylvania.
The inspection effort was directed toward an appraisal of the perfomance of the licensee-contractor effort of various items listed in P; 3800/2 and included an inspection of Attachment C - Con-tainment, " Concrete", (4705.04.a.1 and a.2); Attachment I - Electrical (5205.03 and 5205.04); outstanding items from previous inspections; and a review of the Polar Crane Lead Testing and Inspection and the Installation of NSSS and Steam Generators Procedures.
SUhMARY Safety Items - None Nonconfomance Items - Site records indicate that approximately 230 cubic O
yards of concrete were poured when the measured temperature of the surface to be in contact with the concrete was less than 32 F/gACNL=beingissued 0
to cover this deficiency.
/g 7910160 30
l O Y.
9 Other Significant Items 1.
The inspection of the electrical and instrumentation area revealed that the construction had no quality control program in this area, ano did not have knowledge of the latest FSAR revision.
The A-E program review in this area revealed a number of significant ambiguities were not yet resolved between the licensee, constructor, and the 'A-E.
A CDN was not considered since at the time of the inspection, no safeguards circuits were installed or in the process of installation.
T.. A fire occurred on January 19, 1971, which destroyed six temporary buildings related to Unit No. I activities.
No personnel were injured.
No equip-ment which is associated with the project was damaged or destroyed.
The inspection was terminated due to the confusion resulcing from the fire.
3.
A summa-/ of outstanding items and their disposition is contained in Attachment A.
Status of Previously Reported Problems 9
1.
Reactor vessel inspections are being performed in accordance with the ap-proved procedure.
This item is considered resolved.
(See Section D) 2.
Three reactor vessel nozzles were marred during transit to the construction site.
Inspection and evaluation of the damage which appears to be slight is now in progress. This item is not considered resolved.
(See Section D) 3.
Grinnell Company will submit a " Certificate of Conformance" for those individual items which require documentary evidence of conformance to codes.
Cortifications will be issued by Grinnell to Met Ed when the con-tract has been completed.
This item is not considered resolved.
(See Section C) 4 Met Ed is evaluating the use of grease rather than grout for the tendon sheathing fill.
(See Section,I.1)
Management Interview A management interview was held with Messrs. Hreczuch, Allen, Stuebner, Fant, Hardy, and Goodenough on January 19, 1971.
The inspector stated that Deficien-cy Report No. DR-0323 and discussions with various site personnel indicated that a concrete pour of about 230 cubic yards in a fuel handling building wall violated AOI Standards referenced in the FSAR and a QC stop work procedure.
The inspector asked how the applicant would assure adequate enforcement of 9
procedures and commitments in the future.
The answers were inconclusive.
The inspector stated that formal cot'respondence with Met Ed would be forthcoming.
IA19 110
/4D 3-Mr. Howard stated that inspection of electrical cables and terminations indicated that the organizational structure was satisfactory.
However, there was evidence that the program was not being implemented.
UE&C and the appli-cant were attempting to perform their functions without knowledge of many aspects of the CAI program and the commitments contained in the FSAR. The applicant stated thot further work would be started on the program and that they would notify CO:I when their revised program was ready for inspection.
The inspector stated that he had reviewed the polar crane testing and inspec-tion program procedure and the procedure, if fully implemented, would provide adequate testing of the crane.to determine its capabilities and structural integrity.
DETAILS A.
Persons Contacted Met Ed Mr. Gene Hreczuch, Construction Engineer Mr. Earl Allen, Resident QA Supervisor Mr. Vern Stuebner, Resident Engineer, Electrical UE6C Mr. J. E. Fant, Site QC Manager Mr. David Lambert, QA Inspector Mr. Paul Dailey, QC Engineer Mr. A. Hardy, Assistant QC Supervisor CPU Mr. Neal Goodenough, Assistant QA Manager B.
Construction Status Mr. Hreczuch estimated that Unit No. I was approximately 607. complete, based on man hours expended.
Initial reactor fueling is estimated for about October 1972, according to Mr. Hreczuch.
C.
Grinnell Documentation
- Mr. Hreczuch stated that Grinnell Company will submit a " Certificate of O
Conformance" with individual items which require documentary evidence of con-formance with a code throughout the life of the contract.
When the contract has been completed, Grinnell Company will supply Met Ed with the certifications.
The inspector re-emphasized the provisions stated in Appendix B, 10 CFR 50, concerning adequate documentation prior to installing components.
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- C0 Report No. 289/70-7, paragraph D.
.. D.
Reactor Vessel
- Site records indicate that the reactor vessel is being inspected in ac-cordance with UE&C procedure NCP-5 and the results are recorded on " Periodic Component Inspection", Form SF-SU-ll3.
Mr. lireczuch estimated that the reactor vessel would not be installed in the containment vessel until about May 1971.
Mr. Hreczuch stated that Met Ed and B&W have not completed the inspection, evaluation, and procedures for repair of the three nozzles ( one 14 inch core flooding, ana two 28 inch coolant) that were slightly marred durirg t.ra ns i t.
The iispector will continue to follow this item until it is re-solved by the opplicant.
E.
Concrete Pour When the Measured Surface Temocrature in Contact With the Concrcte Was Less than 320F Site records and discussions with various Met Ed and UE6C personnel re-vealed the following:
1.
Approximately 230 cubic yards of concrete were poured in a fuel handling building wall (CAI specification SP-5406) when the measured surface temperature to be in contact with the concrete was below 320F at the beginning of the scheduled pour.
2.
The location of this concrete pour is from elevation 331 feet to 346 feet running north and south from 17 feet west of the reactor center-line.
3.
UE&C QA issued a deficiency report, No, DR-0323, dated January 8, 1971.
4.
Volume II. Section 5 of the FSAR states in part:
"a.
The Reactor Building has been designed ur.aer the fol-lowing coder:
Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete, ACI 318-63 Specification for Structural Concrete for Buildings, ACI 301-66."
5.
This concrete pour was in violation of the above referenced ACI Stand-ards.
6.
In addition, QA procedure, QC-30, Revision 2, was not used in a timely manner to stop the work subsequent. to determining that the conditions of the ACI Standards were not met prior to start of the concrete pouring.
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- C0 Report No. 289/70-7, Management Interview.
t s
If
. 7.
A CDN has been prepared for issuance to the applicant concerning this concrete pour.
F.
Proposed Polar Crane Load Testing and Insocction Procedure MCP-6, Revision 1, dated December 23, 1970, contains the load testing and inspection requirements for the reactor building polar crane and associated lifting components to be used durin; installation of the two steam generators and other major nuclear components for Unit No. 1.
The procedure defines the method of load testing and inspection of the polar crane and associated components. The performance of the test and in-spections are intended to demonstrate that the 7.tructural and operational capa-bilities of the polar crane and associated lif ting components meet the require-ments for lifting and handling during the installation of the heavy nuclear Components.
The polar crane bridge, which consists of le on and 275 ton trollies, the center support structure and 700 ton capacity jack for the center support of the polar crane will be load tested and inspected by CONAM Inspection, Incorpor-9 ated. NDT subsequent to testing will include UT, PT, and MT.
Procedure MCP-6 lists related ccnstructi6n procedures, specifications and drawings, operation and maintenance instruction manuals, hoist, trolley and crane bridge speed data, special tools and equipment.
Preoperational check of the polar crane includes operating and maintenance checks, crane bridge thrust roller check, trolley positions, hoisting cable lifting length check, crane clearance check, minimum temperature specified is 400 F for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to the check, and the assembly of a load test rig (consists of 600 tons of concrete blocks).
The heaviest component to be lifted is the 575 ton steam generators.
Therefore, the polar crane is scheduled to be tested at about 1057. of maximum anticipated lift load.
The erection and grouting of t,he center support for the polar crane, the polar crane and center support geometric center and thrust rollers location, installation and operation of the 700 ton jack, polar crane center support test, polar crane axial thrust testings, polar crane swivel trolley traverse, and crane rotation testinr, are included in the scheduled testing program.
All structural compo'ents of the polar crane vill be visually inspected after the load test.
The whcci to rail bearing areas will be visually in-spected with 10 power magnification.
9 The planned polar crane testing procedure and subsequent NDT and visual inspection appear to be adequate to determine the capabilities and structural integrity of the crane.
9
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i.-
. G G.
Pronosed Procedure for Installation of NSSS and SG Procedure NCP-4 defines the responsibilities, states the detailed in-structions, methods, precautions to be followed, as well as outlining material and equipment to complete aspects of receiving, storing, transporting, rig-ging, setting and cicaning the NSSS, the SG and associated components for Unit No. 1.
The procedure appears to be adequate to assure proper installation of the NSSS, the SG and associated components.
H.
Attachment C - Containment 1.
Review of OC System for Pre-Stressed Concrete (4705.04)
Material Certification on Hardware (4705.04.a.1) a.
The tendon wire, TUFWIRE, manuf actured by the Armco Steel Corpora-tion, Kansas City, Missouri, has been purchased and' delivered to the Inland-Ryerson Company, Chicago, for fabrication into tendons.
A review of the material certifications for Heat No, 27568, coil e
No. 517, was selected as representative of the tendon material.
The review indicated that this 1/4 inch diameter wire meets ASTM The chemical Specification A 421-65 (Volume 2, FSAR, page 5-21).
and physical certifications are as follows:
C Mn P
S Si 0.82%
0.76%
0.0107.
0.019%
0.25%
221,200 psi Yield at 1% extension 255,000 psi Ultimate tenstic strength Ultimate elongation in 10" -
4.807.
29,200,000 psi Modulus of elasticity b.
Chemical Analyses on Greases (4705. 04. a. 2)
~
A review of the chemical analyses for the NO-0X-ID grease, manu-factured by the W. R. Grace Company, indicated that the chloride was 4 2 ppm, nitrates ( 1 ppm and sulfide was "not detectable."
2.
Containment Vessel Tendons and Sheathing a.
Tendons Mr. Hreczuch stat ed that GA1 has almost completed an evaluation that comparcs the advantages of grease (N0-0X-ID, manuf actured by the W. R. Grace Company) with grouting.
Mr. Ilreczuch said that the tendon sheathing will probably be filled with NO-0X-ID instead of grout as originally intended.
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/7y O b.
Sheathing The inspector reviewed the sheathing alignment records for 20 of the 166 vertical and fo_r 20 of the 164 horizontal tendons.
The records indicated the maximum out of plumb was i 1/2 inch.
This alignment is within the maximum permissible misalignment stated in the erection procedure.
I.
Cables and Terminations 1.
Implementation of Ouality Assurance Procram (5205.03)
The organizational structure is satisfactory; however, there was evidence that the program was not being implemented.
United Engineers and Con-structors and the licensee were attempting to perform their function without knowledge of many aspects of the Gilbert Associates program and the commitments contained in the FSAR.
The licensee and his agents have not implemented to any measurable extent, the QA program.
The design personnel have created a program, 9
but this program has not been reviewed by the personnel performing the work except for the cable pulling information.
2 Review of Quality Control System (5205.04) a.
Procurement (5205.04.a)
The procurement document consists of a standard purchase order stating only conductor numbers and size, quantity and price.
b.
Materials Certification (5205.04.b)
(1) Conformance with Specifications (5?05.04.b.1)
There are no specifications.
(2) Nondestructive Tests (5205.04.b.2)
Certification, although not required, has been received covering immersion of insulated conductors in water for a minimum of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, a guarantee that insulation resistances exceed a given ohmic value at 60
-F, and a 60 cycle ac five minute voltage test.
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c.
Shipping and Receipt (5205.04.c) 7 l
(1) Marking and Identification (5205.04.c.1)
No marking or identification is specified in procurement docu-ments. UE&C personnel were not aware of whether or not cable was marked on the outside jacket.
/T'
. 9 (2) Packacing (5205.04.c.2)
Packaging techniques were not specified.
(3) Quarantine and Disposition of Nonconforming Material (5205.04.c.3)
UE&C's procedures do not require segregation, but require an identifying tag.
d.
Storane and Issue (5205.04.d)
(1) Segregation of Sizes (5205.04.d.1)
Segregation will not be practiced.
Procedures require that recis be tagged and procedures require a physical audit on a periodic basis.
The audit had not been performed.
(2) Identification and Control (5205.04.d.2)
Reels will be tagged; however, control appears to be rather ill-O defined since several 500 MCM, three conductor cables were ordere-which varied only by type of ground, and no satisfactory answer could be provided describing how the craf t could be assured that the correct conductor was being utilized.
The design cable schedule or pull card does not provide a unique designation.
(3) Protection (5205.04.d.3)
UE&C's procedure QC-3 requires that cables be stored in a locked, fenced area, but does not provide for protection against deter-ioration; however, the cable external jacket is prop rietary ma-terial, manufactured by Kerite which has excellent physical char-acteristics and does not appear to warrant phycical protect ion against the environment.
(4) Confirmation of Is' sue of Specified Material (5205.04.d.4)
This area appears to be inadequately controlled. The " pull card" specifies conductor by size (i.e., 500 MCM, three con-ductor); however, no unique designator system has been used to assure that the correct 500 MCM, three conductor cabl'e has been used.
Procedures in this area were inadequate.
e.
Handlina (5205.04.e)
(1) Protection from Physical Damane (5205.04.e.1)
No procedures.
(5205.04.e.2]
ff ff (2) Protection from Contamination No procedures.
/46 9 f.
Installation (5205.04.f)
(1) Size and Tyne of Wireway and Conduits to Accomodate Exnected Cabiing Needs (5 205. 04. f.1)
There are no controls specified; however,, cable tray loading is to be controlled in accordance with paragraph 8.2.2.13 of Amendment 15 to the FSAR.
(2) Location and Routine of Wireways and Conduits to Provide for Necessary Separation (5205.04.f.2)
Paragraph 8.2.2.12.d of Amendment 15 of the FSAR addresses physical separation at the penetrations which appears adequate.
Paragraph 8.2.2.12.c addresses physical separation of redundant circuit trays but is very general with a separation of 12 inches being permitted with the use of fire barriers.
The treatment is considered inadequate and does not provide the QC engineer with the design guidelines against which to check.
G (3) Proper Bonding or Grounding of Wireways and Conduits (520 5.04. f. 3 Procedures were not available for review.
(4) An Identification System Integratine Wireways and Conduits with Routine Recuirements for Cable, Assurine the Proner Size and Type of Cable Will Be Routed Procerly for Identified Circuits (5205.04.f.4)
A computer program is used to route cables.
The readoat is in the form of a " pull card" showing routine, conductor, approximate length, and date the card is issued.
The program appears de-ficient in that:
(a) There is no designation on the pull card which permits veri-fication that the card being used is the latest revision, nor is a computer readout provided which lists the latest revision number.
(b) There is no unique designation provided which assures the proper cable has been used, since several cables with the same size and numbers of conductors are available.
9 (c) The feed back information is not verified for a determination that the latest information was used to pull the cable, fjl
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10 -
The program for verification in the field was not considered adequate in that the frequency of field verification of installa-tion was not specified.
The procedures state that a " periodic "
inspection will be made.
The scope of this, inspection is not contained in the text of a check list form, but simply states,
" periodic surveillance of cable pulling activities.
(5) Redundancy, Separation of Redundant Circuits. Seoaration of Power Cables from Control or Instrument Cables, Separation of Control and Safety Circuits (5205.04.f.5)
Procedures were not available for review; however, the FSAR, paragraph 8.2.2.12, Amendment 15, entitled, " Separation of Re-dundant Cirucits", describes in detail the system.
UE&C, who has the responsibility for installation,was not aware of this amendment nor the f.act that there would be color coding of cables and the related safety equipment.
Paragraph 8.2.2.13 of the FSAR, entitled, " Cable Tray Loading 9
and Separation", adequately describes the separation of power cables from control and instrument cables; however, again UESC was not aware of the criteria.
There was no program for imple-mentation of the QC function, only a requirement for " periodic surveillance of cable pulling activities." UE&C was not aware of what they were to inspect against and had not specified fre-quency or provided a check list for their inspectors.
The system,as it is contained in the FSAR, does not treat ncn-redundant circuits that can and will be placed in redondant circuit trays to identify and prevent these cabb Trom ulti-mately occupying a second and different redunds treuit tray.
CAI stated that their system prevented such a cross-over; how-ever, the system does not provide for verification that a cross-over has not occurred.
UE&C was unprepared to provide a QC function, although installa-tion could be accomplished except for color coding, wnich UE&C appeared unaware of.
(6) Wireway or Conduit Fill Soecifying Number, Size, Tvoe, and Arrangement of Cables to Limit Heatine Effects (5205.04.f.6)
Paragraph 8.2.2.13 of Amendment 15 to the FSAR, entitled, " Cable Tray Loading and Separation", adequately describes the intended 9
cabic tray loadings.
The computer program readout is on the basis of a cross-sectional area which provides the basis for heat calculations, which are based on a square rather than a circular configuration.
J l9 118
l'l 9 The computer readout is not provided concerning the cable tray fill for a given tray to the site.
The physical.ill specified for the worst case for control and instrument cables of 1007. is considered reas'onable.
UE&C personnel could not provide impleme' ting inspection pro-n cedures nor did these personnel indicate a knowledge of these requirements.
(7) Cable Pullina (5205.04.f.7)
UE&C procedures state that manufacturer's recommendations would be followed; however, these recommendations were not provided to the craft, nor did the UE&C quality control procedure address this as an inspection point.
(8) Cable Terminations (5 205. 04. f. 8)
Procedures were not developed.
The GAI procedure, SP-5550, re-O quires visual check of cable installation and terminations for visible damage and physical integrity, correct identification and tagging, continuity check at both ends of conductors, phas-ing and polarity checks, de megger (500 volt) on all safeguards circuits, 2500 vol't megger on all power (safeguards) circuits.
This procedure is. incorrect in that meggering of iron-constantin wire will permanently damage the wire.
Implementation and documentation procedures have not been de-
- veloped, tilli
.a,9 ii,
.