ML19275G743

Alternate Safe Shutdown Capability in Event of Fire in Cable Spreading Room

ML19275G743
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	01/31/1980
From:	BOSTON EDISON CO.
To:
References
NUDOCS 8006160001
Download: ML19275G743 (92)

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

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2.0 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS 3

3.0 ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM - DESCRIPTION 10 4,0 ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM - DESIGN 17 I

s.0 ALTEaNAre SaU,DOWn SvSTEM - TES11Ne 22 I

6.0 SAFETY EVALUATION 29 I

7.0 SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE 41 I

8.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 42 9.0 MAINTEHANCE AND REPAIRS 43 5

10.0 TABLES 44 11.0 DRAWINGS 49 12.0 ATTACHMENT 50 I

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for fire protection, which supports Amendment No. 35 to our Operating License (DPR-35), stated that "an alternate shutdown system will be provided, independent of cabling and equipment in the Cable Spreading Room" (item 3.1.18).

In addition, the NRC Staff Position entitled " Safe Shutdown Capability" specifies the information required by the Staff to complete the review of item 3.1.18.

This report provides the Boston Edison Company's response to the above requirements I

Section 2.0 details the result of the Safe Shutdown Analysis per-formed on the Cable Spreading Room (CSR) Area (Fire Zone 3.2 in our fire plan).

I Sections 3.0 and 4.0 describe all the modifications to be perfomed at Pilgrim Power Station in order to assure Safe Shutdown with an assumed loss of the CSR.

Section 5.0 details the testing and acceptance criteria for the Alternafa Shutdown System.

I In Section 6.0,a Safety Evaluation of the modification is provided.

I Section 7.0 contains a Station Procedure to be enacted in the event of a Fire in the CSR I

I Sections 8.0 and 9.0 discuss Technical Specifications and maintenance requirements of the ' Alternate Shutdown System.

I Sections 10.0,11.0 and 12.0 provide the back-up material (Tables, Drawgins, and other attachments).

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I 2.0 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS I

An analysis was conducted to determine the capability to accomplish a safe plant shutdown with total loss of function of the Cable Spreading Room (CSR) due to an assumed unlimited, unmitigated fire.

I 2.1 Assumptions The following assumptions were made while conducting the Safe Shutdown Analysis:

2.1.1 No analyzed accident occurs concurrently with a fire in the CSR.

I 2.1.2 The most severe natural phenomena do not occur concurrently with a fire in the CSR.

2.1.3 Safety related component failures do not occur concurrently with a fire in the CSR, except as directly caused by the fire.

2.1.4 Abnonnal operation transients, as defined in the FSAR Appendix G, can occur concurrently with a fire in the CSR.

2.1.5 One of the redundant safety divisions in the CSR is conservatively assumed to be fuctional during the initial period of twenty (20) minutes from the time a fire is detected and the emergency shutdown proredure is initiated. _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _.

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This time frame is sufficient to allow all of the electrical isolations to be perforined from local shutdown panels.

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!j The above assumption takes into consideration the following fire protection measures existing in the CSR:

i a.

Smoke and heat detection systems.

b.

Automatic C0 fire-suppression system.

2 c.

Fire barrier protection and. spatial separation j

between safety related raceways.

d.

Coating of all PVC-insulated cables in the CSR with Il a flame retardent material (recently accomplished) e.

Coating (with flame retardent material) all redundant i

Safety Division B exposed cables and bottom part g

of all lowermost cable trays in the CSR.

f.

The encasing of Safety Division B power conduits I

passing through the CSR in a 3-hour fire enclosure to assure their functionability.

2.1.6 Spurious operation of equipment and switchgear may occur i

2 due to a fire in the CSR if the control circuits pass j

through the CSR.

2.1.7 The systems required to be operable in support of a safe shutdown may be in their test mode concurrently i

with a detection of CSR fire. The alternate shutdown system provides the capability to recover from the test mode, as required.

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I 2.1.8 Three plant operators will be available to implement the emergency shutdown procedure.

2.2 Methodology I

2.2.1 A review of Appendix G to the Pilgrim Unit #1 FSAR was conducted _ to detennine the system operability requirements based on the assumptions for shutdown with a fire in the CSR as stated in Section 2.1.

2.2.2 The system operability requirements identified in (2.2.1) were expanded to list all active equipment and switchgear in systems whose operation may be required to facilitate a safe shutdown with a fire in the CSR. This list of components was developed through a review of the FSAR, P&ID's and relevant design documents and is presented as Table I (See Section 10.0, Table I). The breakers and control power circuits associated with a specific piece of equipment are not listed separately. Since single failures are not assumed coincident with the fire, any breaker that must trip as a result of fire damage is. assumed to function sroperly and this category of breakers is not listed. This system review used a definition of an active component as one which must be operable to support a safe shutdown under the assumptions of Section 2.1. -

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2.2.3 The components listed in Table I were reviewed for any interaction with the CSR. Two independent approaches were used in the review process:

I a.

For each of the components in Table I, the I

scheme index, circuit and raceway schedules, and electrical location drawings were searched to detennine if any power or control cables associated with this component passed through tre CSR.

I b.

Assuming total loss of the CSR, all the raceways were searched for their contents and a list of components required for shutdown under the assumptions of Section 2.1 was determined.

I The lists compiled as a result of both approaches were compared and matched.

I The control circuits for 4160 volt and 480 volt load center breakers were excluded from this review since these breakers can be manually operated and their control circuits can be mcnually isolated from the CSR if required as part of an Emergency Shutdown g

Procedure.

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1 2.2.4 The electrical schematics were reviewed to determine what equipment and switchgear functions were associated with cables identified in Sec. 2.2.3.

These functions were evaluated to determine the impact on component operability if they were lost through isolation or the effects of a fire. The results of this evaluation identified the requirements for cable isolation from the CSR and duplication of component functions outside of the CSR. Table III (See Section 10.0 Table III) presents the components for which design modifications were considered necessary. Note that modifications for components identified with a double asterisk (**) are to provide a single control power source to MCC D9, and are not associated with any system operability requirements.

2.2.5 The system operability requirements identified in Sec.

2.2.1 were further expanded to list all passive equipment and switchgear whose spurious actuation could have an unacceptable affect on the achievement of a safe shutdown with a fire in the CSR. This list of components was also developed through a review of the FSAR, P&ID's and relevant design documents and is presented as Table II (See Sec.10.0).

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1 The components listed in Table II will be prevented from unacceptable spuri?us actuation through manual operator action, which is detailed in an

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Emergency Shutdown Procedure, covering required

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operator actions following the detection of a fire jj in the CSR.

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Power cables associated with the breakers which are shown as" Closed"in Table II were reviewed to insure M

that they did not pass through the CSR.

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2.3 Analysis Conclusions 2.3.1 Under the assumption of total loss of all circuits a

within the Cable Spreading Room,a safe plant shutdown cannot be assured with the existing elcctrical layout.

I 2.3.2 Two basic types of modifications will have to be performed to provide for a safe plant shutdown with loss of the CSR:

2.3.2.1 Design modifications which include:

)

a.

Isolation of the control circuitry of J

components required for safe shutdown 1

_j from the CSR and provisions for control of those components.

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b.

Duplication of instruments that are necessary for safe shutdown and assumed to be lost in the CSR fire.

c.

Provisions for alternate power supplies for several components whose power supplies will be affected due to a CSR fire.

I 2.3.2.2 Administrative modifications which include:

I a.

A Shutdown Procedure for the event of Loss of the CSR.

I b.

Applicable changes in Surveillance and Testing Procedures.

c.

Rigid application of a procedure to Control transient combustibles.

-g.

I 3.0 ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM-DESCRIPTION 3.1 Requirements Based on the results of the Safe Shutdown analysis, the design provides for the following:

3.1.1 Isolation of electrical control circuits associated with the shutdown equipment listed in Table III (See Section 10.0) from a CSR fire.

3.1.2 Control of the above shutdown equipment at an alternate location.

3.1.3 /,lternate power supply to compnents and circuits that lose power in the event of a CSR fire.

3.1.4 Duplicate instrumentation which is necessary for I

Safe Shutdowa and which is assumed lost as a result of a fire in the CSR.

3.2 Criteria 3.2.1 All the modifications and new installation associated with the Alternate Shutdown system are Safety Related and as such they comply with 'he separation and qualification requirement that ensure:

a.

Control of the shutdcun-systems from the Control Room during normal plant operation, or for all types of accidents (excluding a CSR fire),

b.

Alternate control of the shutdown system in the event of a CSR fire.

3.2.2 Manual operator actions are relied upon when feasible.

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I 3.2.3 Duplicate instrumentation indication is provided only in cases where Control Room indication is lost due to CSR fire and is not retrievable at another location in the station.

3.2.4 Cable routing for the Alternate Shutdown system takes into consideration the results of the Safe Shutdown capability study performed on all fire-zones in the station.

3.E.5 The design provides the means of accomplishing isolation from the CSR fire of all necessary control cables within the time-frame of twenty (20) minutes as specified in Sec. 2.1.5.

3.3 Mcaification Description The modifications included in the design of the Alternate Shutdown System are of four basic types:

3.3.1 Installation of isolation /centrol switches on the control circuits of essential components to provide isolation from CSR during fire and control of the components.

3.3.2 Installation of isolation switches on some control circuits of HPCI and RCIC turbinas and the Diesel Generators. This provides isolation from the CSR and the capability for local control either by a duplicate set of instrumentation (in the case of HPCI, RCIC turbines) or by existing instrumentation ( in the case of the Diesei Generators).

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I 3.3.3 Power source modifications. Control power in the -

ADS system and Breaker-control power in 250V DC MCC 09 are currently provided from the Control Room. This modification will permanently replace Breaker-control power source in D9 with a more reliable source.

In addition,it provides an alternate power source during Loss of CSR Shutdown to the ADS system.

I 3.3.4 Safety division isolation and reenergization from snother division. 480V AC Load Center B6 is located in the CSR. A fire in the CSR may disable power supply to "X" Division MCC's. For several components in MCC B20, an alternate power supply from Division "A" is provided. This power supply will be switched-in only after B6 is discon-nected from its power sources during Loss of CSR Shutdown.

3.4 The Shutdown Panels The isolation / control switches and the instrumentation described in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 are housed in thirteen (13) Shutdown Panels.

The panels are of two types:

Pedestal-mounted and wall-mounted.

They are to be located as close as practical to the equipment or switchgear they serve, with accessibility during normal plant operation and during a CSR fire.

The panels are key-locked and wired to alarm in the Control Roc.1 if tampered with.

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3.5 System Modes of Operation The Alternate Shutdown System has three basic modes of operation:

3.5.1

" Remote"-

Switches on REP 0TE position allowing control of components from the Control Room.

3.5.2

" Isolate"-

Switches on an isolation position (Note: this position may have different names depending on the component served by the switch).

I 3.5.3

" Control"-

The control of components is performed from switches, instrumen',ation or locally at the equipment.

During plant start-up, nonnal operation and all types of accidents and events,the system is expected to maintain the

" Remote" mode.

During the Loss of Cable Spreading Room event,.the system-(perplant Procedure) will be switched into the " Isolate" mode and later, as required, to tne

" Control" mode.

3.6 Instrumentation, Control, Indication and Alarms 3.6.1 General The instrumentation introduced by the Alternate Shutdown System does not constitute a complete set of instrumentation required for Safe Shutdown. Whenever possible, existing instrumentation, verified to be operable in the event of a CSR fire, is relied upon (for example:

Instrumentation in Racks C2205A & B, C2206A & B).

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I 3.6.2 Instrumentation and Control The instrumentation to be installed is the HPCI and RCIC Turbine Centrol loops.

Each set consists of a DC-to-AC Inverter, Square Root Extractor, Turbine Speed Indicator, Turbine Flow Indicator and a Turbine Flow Controller. This enables HPCI/RCIC flow control. The control of valves and pumps will be done from the Isolation Switches. Diesel Generator control will be achieved locally at the generators.

3.6.3 Indication Several types of indication are introduced:

3.6.3.1 A set of red and green position indication or status lights for each valve or pump is located at the Shutdown panels above the respective Isolation /

Control switch.

This set duplicates the Control Poom set of indication lights and will anow the position or status of the component at all times.

3.6.3.2 An amber light on the hinged cover of each panel will be illuminated when all switches in the panel are in their REMOTE position. It will not be-illuminated if any of the switches are removed from the REMOTE position.

I 3,6.3.3 The ADS Shutdown Panels are equipped with an amber light that indicates the availability of standby DC power to energize the circuit. This light will be illuminated at all times if standby power is available.

I-I 3.6.4 Alarms Two alann windows in Control Room Panel C905 are assigned to monitor the status of the Shutdown Panels.

One alarm will annunciate as soon as a panel door is tampered with. The second alarm will annunciate if the key-locked HFCI or RCIC switches are removed from their REMOTE position.

3.6.5 Redundancy, Separation 3.6.5.1 Whenever a modification is performed on one system, it is performed on its redundant system (example: liPCI vs RCIC).

3.6.5.2 Whenever a modification is performed on a component of loop A in a system containing two loops, it is performed on the redundant component in loop B of that system (example:

Diesel Generators, valves, pumps).

3.6.5.3 Physical separation, raceway separation and Fire Protection requirements (such as the requirement for Safe Plant Shutdown in the event of fire in any designated plant area) were taken into consideration in the system design.

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I 3.6.6 Failure Effects 3.6.6.2 The system is designed to be operable under the normal ambient temperature and humidity ranges in the areas of installation.

3.6.6.2 The system is designed to withstand extreme environmental and seismic conditions specified for the areas of installation, without affecting the automatic control of associated components.

The system is not designed to be operable under the extreme conditions. They are not assumed tc exist concurrently with 'a CSR fire.

2.6.6.3 The system is designed to withstand all electrical short or open circuits resulting from. a CSR fire.

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4.0 ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM - DETAILED DESIGN I

4.1 Physical Layout I

The shutdown panels are located as close as practical to the switchgear or equipment they serve. The following list details the approximate location of each panel:

Panel C150 - Near Motor Control Center B14 in the Auxiliary Bay Elev. 3' Panel C151 - Near Motor Control Center B15 in the Auxiliary Bay Elev. 3' Panel C152 - Near Motor Control Center B17 in the Reactor Bldg. Elev. 23' Panel C153 - Near Motor Control Center B18 in the Reactor Bldg. Elev. 23' Panel C154 - South wall of Reactor Bldg. at RCIC Entrance Elev. 23' Panel C155 - West Wall of Reactor Bldg. at HPCI Entrance Elev. 23' Panel C156 - East Wall of Reactor Bldg. Elev. 23' (Near C152)

Panel C157 - North Wall of Reactor Bldg. Elev. 23' Panel C158 - West Wall of Reactor Bldg. at HPCI Entrance Elev.

23' (Near C155)

Panel C159 - South Wall of Reactor Bldg. at RCIC Entrance Elev.

23' (Near C154)

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Panel C160 - In Ciesel Generator A Room Elev. 23' Panel C161 - In Diesel Generator B Room Elev. 23' Panel C163 - Near Mo?.or Control Center B20 in the Reactor Bldg. Elev. 23' See Section 11.0 for the fol'owing layout drawings showing approximate location of the panels:

1.

E-298 Reactor Building Areas 1 & 3 - Plan Above El. 23'-0" 2.

E-309 Reactor Building Aux. Bay Area 2 - Plan between El. 3'-0" and (-)17'-8".

3.

E-316 Conduit Layout Diesel Generator Bldg. Area 5 I

4.2 Electrical Layout 4.2.1 System Control Electrically, the design provides for the isolation and control of all necessary components within a system (or within a loop in a system), to be accomplished at one location (either one or two Shutdown panels).

I The following list associates the shutdown panels with their respective systems:

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I Panel System (s)

C150 Service Water Loop B Pumps,RBCCW Loop B Pumps C151 Service Water Loop A Pumps,RBCCW Loop A Pumps C152 RHR Loop A M0V's, Core Spray Loop A MOV C153

_RHR Laop B M0V's, Core Spray Loop B MOV C154 RCIC M0V's C155 HPCI M0V's & 011 Pump C156 ADS Valves A & C C157 ADS Valves B & D C158 HPCI Turbine Control Instrumentation C159 RCIC Trubine Control Instrumentation C160 Diesel Generator A C161 Diesel Generator B C163 RHR "X" M0V's I

4.2.2 A typical Modification on a Control Circuit I

The following drawings and sketches provide the details of a typical modification perfonned on RBCCW Pump P202A control circuit (See Section 11.0):

I 4.2.2.1 Drawing E-176 shows the existing circuitry for the pump. The wiring shown between points B15 (the MCC) and C1 (a panel in the Main Control Room) passes through the Cable Spreading Room under the present design.

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I Be 4.2.2.2 DCN B2 to E-176 shows the Isolation / Control switch added to the scheme. The switch is 43 31 labeled and its contacts are capable of isolating the wiring between B15 and C1 and provide local control and indication. The switch is located at shutdown panel C151.

I 4.2.2.3 SKE-76560-101 is an internal connection diagram 3

31 of panel C151; the switch marked by is the Isolation / Control switch discussed above.

I 4.2.2.4 SKE-76560-111 is the external connection drawing for panel C151 showing the cables routed between C151 and "CC B15.

I 4.2.2.5 DCN B3 to E-217 sheet 9 is the external connec-tion drawing for MCC B15, Breaker 1531.

It shows all the wiring changes in B15 and additions necessary to accomplish the Isolation / Control I

function.

I 4.2.3 A Power Circuit Modification I

SKE-76560-140 (See Section 11.0) shows the one-line diagram of the power circuit modification perfomed to supply power to components M01001-50, MO 1001-28A and fi0 1001-28B. Since Load Center B6, Division "X",

is located in the Cable Spreading Room and is assumed I

I to be lost in the event of a CSR fire, MCC B20 is assumed to be lost, leaving the above components without power source.

An alternate power source is provided in the design (Breaker 52-17116 in MCC B17 division."A").

In order to prevent a possible separation violation between the safety divisions "A" and "B", an automatic trip logic is provided to trip breaker 52-17116 whenever Load Center B6 is energized (from B1 or B2 or both).

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I 5.0 ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM - TESTING All modification included in the design of the Alternate Shutdown System will be subjected to two types of testing:

I (a) Construction Testing (b) Pre-0perational Testing 5.1 Construction Testing I

The intent of this type of testing is to assure proper installation as required for all Safety Related modifications.

5.2 Pre-Operational Testing I

The purpose of this type of testing is to demonstrate the proper operation of the afiected components after the completion of the modification to add the Alternate Shutdown System.

I Acceptance criteria for the pre-operational testing were prepared. They are detailed here for each modification type (See discussion on modification types in Section 3.0).

I 5.3 Type 1 Modification Acceptance Criteria This modification adds the Isolation / Control switches to the control circuitry of the shutdown components.

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5.3.1 When the Isolation, Control switch associated with a component is in its REMOTE position,the following must e

be satisfied:

5.3.1.1 Equipment or component performs all it s designed functions through automatic control.

5. 3.1. 2 Equipment or component performs all its dssigned functions through manual control from the Main Control Room.

I 5.3.1.3 Shutdown panel status indicating lights for each component match the flain Control Room indication.

I 5.3.2 When the switch is set for local control:

5.3.2.1 Status lights in the Main Control Room are 0FF when associated local switch is not in REMOTE.

I 5.3.2.2 All control of a ccmponent or equipment -

automatic and/or manual - is lost from the Main Control Room when associated switch is not in REMOTE.

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5.3.2.3 If the component is a pump:

(a) When local switch is ' positioned from REMOTE to STOP, pump stops if previously running or remains stopped if previously stopped.

(b) Local status lights correctly monitor conditions of pump.

(c) The pump can be started and stopped using local switch.

5.3.2.4 If the component is a valve:

(a) When local switch is positioned from REMOTE (pull-to-lock) to normal (N) - the valve remains "as is".

I (b) Local status lights correctly monitor position of valve.

(c) The valve can be manually controlled by using the local switch.

I 5.4 Type 2 Modification Acceptance Criteria E

This modification adds Isolation switches in the Emergency l

Diesel Generators Control circuitry and HPCI, RCIC Turbine l

control circuits.

It adds an instrumentation loop to the Turbine control circuits of the HPCI and RCIC Systems.

5.4.1 In the Diesel Generators modification:

I 5.4.1.1 When Isolation switch is in REMOTE, the following must be sat 1.,.ed:

(a) Diesel-generator " auto start" and "run" functions nonnally.

(b) Diesel-generator can be manually started and run from the Main Control Room.

I 5.4.1.2 When the Isolation switch is in its LOCAL position,the following must be satisfied:

I (a) Control Room control is lost.

I (b) Diesel Generator can be manually started and run per the Shutdown procedure (with all its automatic control circuits de-energized).

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I 5.4.2 In the HPCI/RCIC modification:

E 5.4.2.1 When Isolation switch is in REMOTE the following must be met:

I (a) Turbine performs all its designed functions through automatic control.

(b) Turbine performs 6: 1 its designed functions through manual control from the Main Control Room.

I (c) Local instrumentation is de-energized and no local control is possible.

5.4.2.2 When the switch is in LOCAL the following has to be satisfied:

I (a) Local instrumentation (in the panel) is energized.

I (b) Main Contrcl Room control (automatic and manual) is lost. All Control Room instrumer.'.< tion remains energized.

(c) Turbine can be manually controlled from the Shutdown Panel.

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5.5 Type 3 Modification Acceptance Criteria E

This modification provides an alternate DC power source to breaker control schemes at MCC 09 and 125V DC source to the ADS control scheme.

5.5.1 In 09 modification, equipment functionability with the new power source is considered as the acceptance criterion for this modification.

5.5.2 In the ADS mcdification, an indicating light should correctly show, at the Shutdown panels, the status of the power source.

I 5.6 Type 4 Modification Acceptance Criteria I

This modification provides an alternate 480V AC power to three "X" division components from an "A" division MCC.

I The criteria associated with this modification are:

I 5.6.1 Separation of Safety Divisions A and X is maintained under all conditions.

I 5.6.2 When either B1 or B2 are connected to Load Center B6 --

Breaker in B17 to B20 components trips whenever closed manually.

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5.6.3 When B6 is de-energized - Breaker in B17 to B20 components can be closed.

I 5.6.4 Components (M0V's M0 1001-28A, 288, 50) can be operated and controlled from the shutdown panels when energized from B17.

I 5.7 Panel - Security Modification Acceptance Criteria The pre-operational testing is to verify the following indication and alann measures:

I (a) An amber light in each panel is ON when all its switches are in REMOTE.

I (b) This amber light will be 0FF when any switch is removed from REMOTE.

(c) An alarm sounds in the Main Control Room when a panel door is opened or a key-locked switch is opened and positioned to LOCAL.

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6.0 SAFETY EVALUATION I

6.1 Applicability I

6.1.1 This evaluation is applicable for the following types of modifications included in the design'of the Alter-nate Shutdown System:

6.1.1.1 Isolation from CSR combined with local digital control (breakers, starters).

6.1.1.2 Isolation combined with local analog control (instrument control loops).

6.1.1.3 Power source modifications.

I 6.1.1.4 Safety division isolation and re-energization from another safety division.

I 6.1.2 The following items are related to Safe Shutdown with loss of the CSR but were found to require no modification or re-evaluation.

I 6.1.2.1 Reactor trip - the ability to trip the reactor from or outside the Main Control Room (independent of the CSR) already exists under the present design.

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6.1.2.2 Prevention of spurious operation - for those plant components which must be disabled to prevent spurious operation in the event of a CSR fire, means exist within the present design to disable the equipment.

6.2 Modification Evaluation 6.2.1 Type 1 Modifications:

B Type 1 modifications utilize isolation switches to effect separation from CSR cabling. Normally these switches are set in the " Remote" position, which allows control from the MCR. No paralleling of control circuits is used. Local control cannot be accomplished unless the switches are set to their " Local" position. No control from the MCR is possible in the " LOCAL" switch e

position because at this time all circuits passing through the CSR and connected to the switch are electrically opened by the isolation switch. Therefore, no short circuit, open circuit, ground or spurious application of voltage applied to the cabling due to fire in the CSR will affect local control once the switch is positioned to the " Local" position.

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j The isolation switches are rated for use at 600V, which is greater than any voltage which could conceivably be applied due to faults in the CSR. All cables passing through the CSR which now carry greater than 480V, i.e.

4160V, will be separated from the rest of the CSR by I

walls cnd/or fire barriers as required by NRC Safety i

Evaluation supporting Amendnent #35 to Unit #1 Technical Specifications.

It is therefore not credible to postulate that a fire in the CSR could result in i

application of a voltage to control cables which would y

exceed isolation switch insulation ratings.

wth os ases. A1s t hes are f proven design (Electroswitch series 40) and are qualified to

,5 IEEE-323-1974 (environmental) and IEEE-344-1975 (seismic).

i They are mounted in qualified control panels. Switches are prevented from ' inadvertent operation by being enclosed in panels with lockable front covers or by having keylock j

handles. A light on each panel indicates that all switches in that panel are set to the remote position.

An alarm sounds in the MCR if any panel cover is opened for any reason.

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Inco*poration of isolation switches into existing k

safety-related control circuitry does not increase the l

probability of consequences of an accident, nor does it

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increase the probability of equipment malfunction.

The isolation switch manufacturer's test data show that identical model switches received cycling far in excess of that envisioned for this design, and, since the switches do not have to be operated during nonnal or accident conditions, but only in the event of fire in the CSR,. their mean time between failures will be much greater than other similar components in each circuit.

Installation of isolation switches does not increase the possibility of an accident or a malfunction different from those evaluated in the FSAR. Separation of safety divisions is maintained by mounting only switches for equipment of the same division in the same local panel.

Panels of different divisions are physically separated.

A switch inadvertently left in the local position would produce results no different than if a control switch were left in "off" or a breaker manually opened.

No effect results on margin of safety for those systems with added isolation switches. These switches have current and voltage ratings far in excess of any current or voltage which could reasonably be expected during operation of the system in any control mode. The added circuitry imposes no significant electrical loading on the control systems. No decrease in system redundancy results from addition of isolation switches 4

as each control system is assigned to a tnique switch.

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All switches, panels, tenninal blocks, wiring and other appurtenances added to the' existing control circuitry are both seismically and environmentally qualific.

I 6.2.2 Type 2 modifications:

Type 2 modifications are applied to the HPCI and RCIC turbine control systems. The two systems are electrically identical. The isolation switches serve to isolate only.

Control is provided by a separate locally-mounted control loop when the " Local" switch positior,is engaged.

Additionally, each isolation Switch serves to interrupt power coming from the MCR for the local flow transmitters in each loop and power for each turbine's governor circuit, thus enabling local power to be supplied to these com-ponents. Turbine remote trip is also interrupted, but r.o local electric trip is provided as each turbine contains a mechanical trip which can be operated by hand.

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A new turbine flow control loop is provided for each turbine and mounted in the panels containing the isolation switches. Each loop consists of a square root extractor, flow indicator, flow controller, turbine speed indicator and inverter power supply. Each compo-i nent, except the power supply, is identical to those existing in the fiCR. The existing power supply model is 4

no longer manufactured and a different model has been substituted.

The control loop senses HPCI or RCIC turbine pump output j

provided by the local flow (differential pressure) trans-mitter, computes the square root, displays the flow, and supplies system flow information to the flow controller input tenninals. The controller compares sensed flow to desired flow (set point) and sends an output error signal to the turbine governor, which then adjusts turbine steam flow in a manner which acts to reduce the error to zero. Turbine speed is also displayed for operator convenience.

The modifications enable local manual control of the turbines to be performed. No paralleling of the local and MCR loops is used. The local instruments and power supply are de-energized when the isolation switches are set to " Remote". The inputs and outputs of the MCR loops are open when the isolation switches are set to

" Local" (MCR loop is not de-energized). _ _......

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The isolation switches used for the HPCI/RCIC control loops are Electroswitch series 24. All new instruments being identical to the existing MCR instruments, meet the qualification requirements for MCR instruments except for the inver.er power supply, which is mounted sesarately. These components are mounted in a seismic and environmentally qualified panel, Locking switch handles prevent inadvertent switch operation. A switch contact provides an alarm to the MCR if the isolation switches are set to the local position.

Another type 2 modification involves the Diesel generators.

In this case, however, the capability for

' local control already exists. Therefore, no new instrumentation is required. The isolation switches serve only to interrupt the control signals from the MCR. The Diesel generators may then be started locally and loaded from the switchgear rooms as required.

E Provision of the local control loops and isolation switches does not increase the probability or conse-quences of an accident, nor is the prooability of equipment malfunction increased. As with the type 1 modifications, the switches do not normally play an active part in circuit operations.

Isolation switches do not increase the possibility of I

l an accident or a malfunction different from those I

evaluated in the FSAR (see type 1 for explanation).

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The proposed changes do not decrease the control systems' margin of safety (see type 1 for explanation).

j 6.2.3 Type 3 modifications:

i Type 3 modifications comprise modification of the control power sources of certain DC equipment whose control I

power cables presently pass through the CSR. The existing power sources and cables will be abandoned.

Control power will instead be taken from DC MCC's such j

that no control power will pdss through the CSR. Some DC equipment will receive both type 1 and 3 modifica-tions. Divisional separation is maintained with

,E either modification type.

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i Rercuting of control power does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident nor does it increase the probability of equipment malfunction. This modification does not increase the possibility of accident or malfunction different from those evaluated in the FSAR. There will be no effects on margin of safety of the DC power systems.

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1 6.2.4 Type 4 modifications 1

Type 4 modifications involve some components normally assigned to the "X" safety division.

Loss of the CSR would also result in loss of power to these components which are required for safe shutdewn. The modifications will install new circuit breakers to feed power from the "A" safety division in the event of loss of "X" power.

E Existing "X" circuitry will be retained.

In order to prevent the "A" and "X" circuit breakers from being closed at the same time, which could possibly con-nect two divisions together, electrical interlo::ks will

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be provided which will trip the "A" power feeder breaker to the "X" division components if either of the nomal "X" division power feeders are closed. Override of these interlocks is not possible by operator action.

Additionally, paired circuit breakers wil; be provided at the component level in the "X" motor control center.

Locks will be provided for each circuit breaker.

I Nomally each "X" breaker will be locked to provide power to the components involved; each "A" breaker will be locked in its open position. Administrative procedures will be prepared to require an operator to first lock 1

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the "X" breakers in their open position before unlocking and closing the "A" breakers.

It sLould be noted that "X" division is normally fed from "A" power with switchover to "B" power as backup. Connection between two divisions would only occur if both "A" and "X" breakers were closed at the same time as "B" was powering "X".

I Incorporation of this change does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident, nor does it increase the probability of equipment malfunction.

The possibility of an accident or malfunction different from those defined in the FSAR is not increased.

I Margin of safety for division "A" power source is not materially affected by this change.

6.3 Considerations I

In performing the safety evaluations, the following were considered:

1.

Single Failure Criterion - no effect by modification types 1, 2 and 3.

Type 4 has the additional requirement of administrative control to prevent possibility of single failure effects, in addition to provision of interlocks.

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Effects of natural phenomena - earthquake is the only 2.

natural phenomenon which can be envisioned to cause an effect. All modifications will be seismically qualified to prevent damage in this event.

3.

Potential failures caused by increased loads, etc. - no material effects. Certain loads will increase marginally (to provide indicating lights), but these loads are extremely small when compared to existir.g loads.

4.

Effects of failures of other systems - no increased proba-bilities. Local control panels will be located such that the effects of pipe whip, pipe jets or missiles will be miumized. Control panels of different divisions will be physically separated and electrically independent.

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Requirements for separation and redundi'ncy - no changes to these requirements. All proposed modifications were designed in keeping with the concepts of separation and redundancy.

6.

NRC Regulatory Guides, review plans and other rules - no changes. All applicable NRC documents were followed in preparing this change.

7.

Applicable industry codes and standards - all applicable codes and standards were observed.

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8 are anticipated.

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7.0 SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE I

A Shutdown Procedure to be enacted in the event of a fire in the Cable Spreading Room is being developed. Attachment A of Section 12.0 is our latest draft of the Shutdown Procedure.

It should be noted that this draft is subject to reviews and changes and it should not be regarded as the final procedure.

An evaluation on manpower availability and utilization of personnel in the event of a CSR fire is currently prepared and will be transmitted under a separate cover letter.

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I 8.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS Technical Specifications for operation of equipment from the Alternate Shutdown Stations and the surveillance requirements are currently in preparation and will be transmitted under a separate cover letter.

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9.0 MAINTENANCE AND REPAIRS 9.1 General Cold Shutdown Systems and components are repaired using Station Maintenance And Calibration Procedures.

I 9.2 Spare Parts A quantity of material /sparo parts for each cold shutdown system and component are maintained on site, based on engineering judgement of the operating personnel and recommendations of the component manufacturers.

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10.0 TABLES I

The following tables are included in this section:

10.1 Table I

- Safe Shutdown Equipment and Switchgear, Operation May Be Required.

I 10.2 Table II - Safe Shutdown Equipment and Switchgear, Operation Not Required, Prevent Spurious Operation.

10.3 Table III - Components Requiring Design Modifications.

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I TABLE I SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT AND SWITCHGEAR 0,PE_PATION MAY BE REQUIRED E

System Component Service Water SSW Punp - P208A SSW Pump - P208B I

SSW Pump - P208D SSW Pump - P208E RBCCW RBCCW Pump - P202A RBCCW Pump - P202B RBCCW Pump - P202D I

Heat Exchanger Cooling Water Valve - M0 4060A RBCCW Pump - P202E Heat Exchanger Cooling Water Valve - M0 4010A I

Diesel & Standby AC Diesel Gen. A X107A Diesel Gen. B X107B Diesel Oil Transfer Pump P141A Diesel Oil Transfer Pump P141B RHR RHR Pump P203A RHR Pump P203B I

RHR Pump P203C RHR Pump P203D RHR Test Line Valve - MO 1001-34A I

RHR Test Line Valve - MO 1001-36A RHR Test Line Valve - MO 1001-34B RHR Test Line Valve - M0 1001-36B RHR Shutdown Cooling Iso. Valve M01001-47 I

RHR Pump Suction Valve M01001-7A RHR Pump Suction Valve M01001-7B RHR Pump Suction Valve MO 1001-7C I

RHR Pump Suction Valve MO 1001-7D RHR Shutdown Cooling Suction Iso. ValveM01001-50 RHR Shutdown Cooling Block Valve MO 1001-43A RHR Shutdown Cooling Block Valve MO 1001-43B I

RHR Shutdown Cooling Block Valve MO 1001-43C RHR Shutdown Cooling Block Valve MO 1001-43D RHR Inboard Valve MO 1001-28A I

RHR Inboard Valvo MO 1001-28B RHR Balancing Valve MO 1001-19 RHR Balancing Valve MO 1001-53 I

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I (Table I cont.)

I System fomponent HPCI Turb. Aux 011 Pump P229 PP Min. Recirc. Valve M0 2301-14 Shutoff Vv to CST M0 2301-15 I

Turb. Steam Supply M0 2301-3 PP Disch. Valve M0 2301-8 Test Bypass to CST Vv MO 2301-10 I

HPCI Turbine / Pump X203/P205 RCIC Steam Supply Valve MO 1301-61 I

PP Discharge Block Valve MO 1301-49 PP Min. Flow Bypass MO 1301-60 Turb. Cooling Shutoff M01301-62 Test Bypass to CST Vv M0 1301-53 I

RCIC Turbine / Pump X202/P206 ADS Auto Blowdown Relief Valve - SV 203-3A I

Auto Blowdown Relief Valve - SV 203-3B Auto Blowdown Relief Valve - SV 203-3C Auto Blowdown Relief Valve - SV 203-30 CRD CRD Pump P209A CRD Pump P209B I

Core Spray Core Spray Pump P215A Core Spray Pump P215B CS Injection Valve - MO 1400-25A CS Injection Valve - MO 1400-25B Reactor Bldg. H & V RHR/CS Room Unit Cooler - VAC 204A RHR/CS Room Unit Cooler - VAC 204C RCIC Room Unit Cool.e - VAC 202A HPCI Room Unit Cooler - VAC 201A SWGR Breaker 152-501 to A5 from Shutdown Transf.

I Breaker 152-505 to A5 from Auxiliary Transf.

Breaker 152-504 to A5 from SU Transformer Breaker 152-509 to A5 from Diesel Generator I

Breaker 152-601 to A6 from Shut:own Transf.

Breaker 152-605 to A6 from Auxiliary Transf.

Breaker 152-609 to A6 from Diesel Generator I

Breaker iti2-604 to A6 from SU Transformer Breaker 5J-102 to B6 from B1 Breaker 52-202 to B6 from B2 Breaker 52-105 to B29 from B1 I

Breaker 52-203 to B28 from B2 Breaker 52-106 to P110A from B1 Breaker 52-206 to P1108 from B2 I

Breaker 72-164 to D16 from B10 Breaker 72-174 to D17 from B10 Breaker 72-1014 to D10 from D13 I

I TABLE II SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT AND SWITCHGEAR OPERATION NOT REQUIRED, PREVENT SPURICUS OPERATION Nonn. Plant I

cnponent Operation C

Status RHR H.X. Bypass Valve - MO 1001-16A Closed RHR RX. Bypass Valve - MO 1001-16B Closed RHR Cont. Spray Valve - MO 1001-23A Closed I

RHR Cont. Spray Valve - MO 1001-23B Closed RHR Head Spray Valve - MO 1001-60 Closed RHR Min. Flow Bypass Valve MO 1001-18A Open I

RHR Min. Flow Bypass Valve MO 1001-188 Open RHR Outboard Valve M0 1001-29A Open RHR Outboard Valve MO 1001-298 Open CS Test Line Valve - M0 1400-4A Closed I

CS Test Line Valve - MO 1400-4B Closed CS Pp. Suction Valve - MO 1400-3A Open CS Pp. Suction Valve - M0 1400-3B Open I

CS Pp. Injection Valve - MO 1400-24A Open CS Pp. Injection Valve - M0 1400-248 Open HPCI Steam Line Iso. Valve - MO 2301-4 Open HPCI Pp. Suction Valve - M0 2301-6 Open I

HPCI Steam Line Iso. Valve - M0 2301-5 Open HPCI Pp. Injection Valve - M0 2301-9 Open RCIC Steam Line Iso. Valve - M0 1301-16 Open I

RCIC Steam Line Iso. Valve - MO 1301-17 Open RCIC Pp. Suction Valve - MO 1301-22 Open RCIC Pp. Discharge Valve - MO 1301-48 Open I

RBCW H.X. Outlet Valve - M0 3800 Open RBCW H.X. Outlet Valve - M0 3806 Open Main Steam Drain Iso. Valve M0 220-2 Closed Brkr. 152-508 for X21 (from A5)

Closed I

Brkr. 152-608 for X22 (from A6)

Closed Brkr.52-101 for B1 (from X21)

Closed Brkr.52-201 for B2 (from X22)

Closed Brkr.52-310 for B3 (from B1)

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Brkr.52-410 for B4 (from B2)

Open Brkr.52-103 for B15 (from B1)

'losed Brkr.52-104 for B17 from B1) losed I

Brkr.52-204 for B14 fromB2)

Ciosed Brkr.52-205 for B18 from B2)

Closed Brkrs. 72-161, 72-162, 72-165, 72-166, 72-29 Closed I

Brkr. 72-163 Open Brkrs. 72-171, 72-172, 72-175, 72-176, 72-30 Closed Brkr. 72-173 Open Brkrs. 72-1013, 72-31, 72-1021 Closed I

Brkr. 72-1025 Open I I

I TABLE III COMPONENTS REQUIRING DESIGN MODIFICATIONS I

System Component I

Service Water SSW Pump P208A SSW Pump P208B SSW Pump P2080 SSW Pump P208E I

RBCCW RBCCW Pump P202A RBCCW Pump P202B I

RBCCW Pump P202D RBCCW Pump P202E Heat Ex. Cooling Wtr. MO 4060A Heat Ex. Cooling Wtr. MO 4010A Diesel &

Diesel Gen. A&B Control Circuits Standby AC RHR RHR PP Suct. Vv M0 1001-7A RHR PP Suct. Vv MO 1001-78 RHR Shutdown Cooling Vv M01001-43A I

RHR Shutdown Cooling VV M0 1001-43B RHR Test Line Valve M0 1001-34A RHR Test Line Valve M01001-34B I

RHR Test Line Valve M0 1001-36A RHR Test Line Valve MO 1001 -36B RHR Shut. Cool. Suct. Vv M01001-50 RHR Inboard Vv Mo 1001-28A I

RHR Inboard Vv M0 1001-28B RCIC Steam Supply Valve MO 1301-61 I

PP Discharge Block Valve MO 1301-49 PP Min. Flow Bypass M0 1301-60 Turb. Cooling Shutoff M01301-62 I

Test Bypass to CST Vv M0 1301-53 RCIC Turbine / Pump Control Loop HPCI PP Min. Recire. Valve M0 2301-14 I

Shutoff Vv to CST M02301-15 Turb. Aux. Oil Pump P229 Turb. Steam Supply M0 2301-3 I

PP Disch. Valve M0 2301-3 Test Bypass to CST Vv M0 2301-10 HPCI Turbine / Pump Control Loop ADS Auto Blowdown Relief Valve SV 203-3A Auto Blowdown Relief Valve SV 203-3B Auto Blowdown Relief Valve SV 203-3C Auto Blowdown Ralief Valve SV 203-30 Co e Spray Block Valve A Loop M0 1400-25A Block Valve B Loop M0 1400-25B

• • 250V DC Power MCC 09 Bkr. Control Power I

11.0 DRAWINGS I

The following drawings and sketches are a part of this report:

I 11.1 E-298 - Reactor Building areas 1 and 3, Plan above El. 23'-0".

I 11.2 E-309 - Reactor Building Aux. Bay Area 2 - Plan between El. 3'-0" and (-)l7'-8".

I 11.3 E-316 - Conduit Layout Diesel Generator Building Area 5.

I 11.4 E-176 - Schematic Diagram - Reactor Building Cooling Water System.

I 11.5 DCN B2 to E-176 - Schematic Diagram Reactor Building Cooling Water Pump P-202A.

11.6 SKE-76560-101 - Alternate Shutdown Panel C151 Inter Connection Drawing.

11.7 SKE-76560-111 - Alternate Shutdown Panel C151 External Wiring Diagram.

I 11.8 DCN B3 to E-217 Sh. 9 - MCC B15 Bkr.1531 Connection Drawing.

I 11.9 SKE-76560-140 - Power Circuit Modification, One Line Diagram.

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12.0 ATTACHMENT A.

" Fire In Cable Spreading Room Alternate Shutdown Procedure" I

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Attachment A To The Safe Shutdown With Loss Of The CSR Report FIRE IN CABLE SPREADING ROOM ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE I

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SYMPTOMS A fire in the Cable Spreading Room (CSR) can be detected by the existing smoke detection system, actuation of the CO system or chservation by 2

plant personnel.

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IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION If a fire is detected in the Cable Spreading Room (CSR) and is not immediately extinguishable, the Unit will be shut down as rapidly as practi:al.

III. DISCUSSION If a fire is detected in the CSR and is not immediately extinguishable, it must be assumed that some power and control cables have been affected resulting in their associated equipment being spuriously operated or becoming inoperaole. Therefore, to minimize these effects, a design change has been implemented, which allows manual bypassing of essential safety related control cables that pass through the CSR.

At selected locations in the plant, Alternate Shutdown panels have been installed with applicable Control Switches for the safety related equipment needed to place the unit in cold shutdown.

All these Control Switches are normally maintained in their REMOTE position allowing control of related equipment from the Control Room.

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Changing the position of these switches from REMOTE, will bypass the CSR cables and require local control of the equipment / components.

The Shutdown Panels are located as close as possible to the associ-ated equipment and consist of a locked enclosure housing switches and instrumentation. These panels utilize a master key which is held in a glass-sealed enclosure adjacent to each panel. Applicable inst ruction sheets are kept inside each Shutdown Pane; to aid the operators in the emergency operations from this panel. The Shutdown Panel enclosures are f

wired to two annunciators in Control Room Panel C905 which will be activated if the panels are tampered with during plant operation.

The operator on tour will verify the proper position of the switches in the Shutdown Panels by observing an amber light on the cover door of each panel. The light is illuminated when all the Control Switches in a panel are in the REMOTE position.

w If a Control Switch is positioned from REMOTS, status indication in the Control Room panel for the associated component is lost, and the amber light in the Shutdown Panel will go out.

The Alternate Shutdown Panels are located in the following locations:

C150 - Near Motor Control Center B14 in the Auxiliary Bay Elev. 3' C151 - Near Motor Control Center BIS in the Auxiliary Bay Elev. 3' C152 - Near Motor Control Center B17 in the Reactor Bldg. Elev. 23' C153 - Near Motor Control Center B18 in the Reactor Bldg. Elev. 23' C154 - South Wall of Reactor Bldg. at RCIC Entrance Elev. 23' C155 - West Wall of Reactor Bldg. at HPCI Entrance Elev. 23' C156 - East Wall of Reactor Bldg. Elev. 23' (Near C152)

C157 - North Wall of Reactor Bldg. Elev. 23' C158 - West Wall of Reactor Bldg. at HPCI Entrance Elev. 23' (Near C155) e m

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C159 - South Wall of Reactor Bldg. at RCIC Entrance Elev. 23' (Near C154)

C160 - In Diesel Generator A Room Elev. 23' i

C161 - In Diesel Generator B Room Elev. 23' C163 - Near Motor Control Center B20 in the Reactor Bldg. Elev. 23' Attachment A indicates the general arrangement of the switches I

e and/or instrumentation in typical Shutdown Panels.

1 IV.

ASSUMPTIONS l

If a fire that is detected in the CSR, it is assumed that the unit is at 100%

power with normal plant shift personnel on site. A complete loss of off-site power is assumed to occur when the Main Generator is tripped. Some

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1 control circuits may have their protective fuses blown due to shorts resulting from the CSR fire. The plant PA system may become inoperable due to the CSR fire and backup voice communication system may be required.

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PROCEDURE If a fire that is not immediately extinguishable is detected in the CSR:

I 1.

Notify REMVEC and immediately start reducing the speed of the Recir-1 culating Pumps to minimum.

2.

Position Reactor Mode Switch out of "RUN" l

3.

Verify that scram occurs as indicated on Panel C905.

If scram has not occurred - refer to Procedure 5.3.1 " Shutdown From Outside Control Room".

4.

Trip all the in-service Reactor Feed Pumps and keep two Condensate Pumps in service.

4 _ _ _ _ _. _.

5.

Dispatch one Nuclear Plant Operator to Switchgear Rooms A and B to verify that Diesel Generator breakers 152-509 and 152-609 are open.

Disah?.a breakers 152-509 and 152-609 by pulling knife switches. In case of misoperation, see Attachment F.

After completing the verification, the oper: tor should notify the Control Poom that breakers are open.

6.

Diesel Generators shall auto-start, if not - start them from the Control Room.

7.

After completing Step 5, the operator will go to all the Alternate Shutdown Psaels and position all the switches from REMOTE to their next immediate position (as indicated in the instructions provided at each panel).

Note:

As the extent of damage to the control cables cannot be de-termined at this time, the most conservative approach in this case is to bypass the required control circuits that pass through the Control Room and provide local control.

8.

When bypassing is ccmpleted, the same operator will go to Elevation 51' in the Reactor Building and advise the Operating Supervisor in the Control Room of the vessel level and pressure as indicated on Panels C2205 A and B and C2206 A and B.

9.

After the Nuclear Watch Engineer has assured himself that the CSR fire is being properly controlled, he will proceed to the Control Room and take charge of the operation.

At this time, one Control Room operator or the Operating Super-visor will, using Attachment F as a guide, place all identified breakers in their indicated position for CSR Fire Shutdown Status.

Replacement of blown fuses may be required. Operator shall obtain spare fuses from the Control Room for this purpose.

I Note:

All the breakers identified in Attachment F have control cables that pass through the CSR. Placing the breakers in their designated position will eliminate the potential I

for spurious operation of necessary equipment.

10.

If loss of off-site power has occurred, verify Diesel Generator (s) operational and close breakers 152-509 or 152-609 or both (at bWGR Buses A5 or A6).

11.

If only one Diesel Generator started and the second one is required, notify Control Room and, using Attachment B, manually start the second emergency Diesel Generator.

Note:

Auto-start logic cables are assumed to be lost or electri-cally bypassed at this point.

12.

PCIS will occur when Reactor Protection M.G. Set trips due to loss of offsite power. Pressure Relief Valves will open at their set level and, if necessary, water inventory can be made up using a CRD pump or HPCI or RCIC systems.

13.

If operation of HPCI or RCIC systems is required, operate them locally.

See Attachments C or D for details.

Note:

Local operation is necessary due to the bypar. sing of CSR cables.

14.

If necest.ary, when ordered by the Watch Engineer, manual operation of ADS valves can be performed at Shutdown Panels C156, C157.

15.

Locally place one loop of RHR in Suppression Chamber Cooling mode.

See Attrchment E for details. The required RBCCW and SSW pumps can be started at Shutdown Panels C150 and C151.

16.

Continue to verify vessel level and pressure at instrument racks C2205, C2206.

I I

17.

Additional steps to be taken:

A.

Within one hour, notify the NRC and maintain continuous communications.

B.

Start a CRD pump when Diesel is available (Breakers 152-502, 152-602 in SWGR Buses A5 or A6).

C.

Maintain the Condensor Vacuum Breakers in " closed" position.

D.

Turn the MSIV switches to "close" position in Control Room panel C904.

E.

Close the steam supply isolation valves to the steam jet air ejectors (locally).

I F.

Assure locally that the scram discharge volume vents and drains are closed (Verified by Panel C905 lights).

G.

Verify that the Reactor Feed Pump auxiliary oil pumps are on.

H.

Restart the Recire. M.G. Set auxiliary AC oil pumps and stop the DC oil pumps (at Control Room panel C904 or locally).

I.

Ve-ify that the drywell cooling fans are on (Panel C63 in Reactor Building).

18.

When pressure is low enough to trip HPCI or RCIC, verify availability of the other RHR loop and place it in the Shutdown Cooling Mode.

If loop is not available, use RHR loop that is being used for Suppres-sion Chamber Cooling.

(See Attachment E for details).

19.

Every effort shall be made to control the CSR fire.

(See Station Procedure 5.5.2.12 - Special Fire Procedure - CSR).

20.

Reactor vessel cooldown will continue in accordance with procedure I

until zero pressure has been reached and primary coolant temperature is less than 212'F.

21.

Maintain the unit in this status until the CSR fire is completely out and a determination of the extent of damage is made.

I I

22.

When off-site power is available, restore power from the Start-up Transformer as follows:

a.

Place all auto-transfer switches to "off" position on Panel C3.

b.

Energize the start-up transformer.

c.

Place A5 auto-transformer switch in " auto" position.

d.

Trip diesel generator breaker to AS.

Auto-transfer to start-up transformer will occur in one second. Stop diesel generator and return to stand-by position.

e.

Repeat fcr diesel generator #2 and bus A6.

f.

Energize buses Al and A2 and place their transfer switches in

" auto" position.

g.

Place the Turbine Building and Reactor Building ventilation fans in the "off" position (locally at Pan-1 C61 or C63).

h.

Energize buses A3 and A4 and place their transfer switches in

" auto" position.

i.

Establish plant conditions in accordance with Normal Station Operating Procedures.

ATTACHMENTS I

A.

General Arrangement of Shutdown Panels.

B.

Local Emergency Operation of Diesel Generator with Fire in the Cable Spreading Room.

C.

Local Emergency Operation of HPCI with CSR C.bles Bypassed.

D.

Local Emergency Operation of RCIC with CSR Cables Bypassed.

E.

Local Emergency Operation of RHR System with CSR Cables Bypassed.

F.

Switchgear and MCC Breater Positions During Loss of CSR Shutdown.

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I I

I Attachment B to Alternate Shutdown Procedure Sheet 1 of 2 LOCAL EMERGENCY OPERATION OF DIESEL GENERATOR WITH FIRE IN THE CABLE SPREADING ROOM INTRODUCTION This procedure assumes the necessity to start and operate the Diesel Generators under the following conditions (caused by a fire in the CSR that requires a plant trip):

a.

Loss of offsite AC power b.

Loss of Auto-start logic cables c.

Loss of DC power to the Diesel Generator START DIESEL ENGINE Using pencils or short rods, depress actuator buttons on top of air solenoids to air starting motors and hold until engine is spinning fast enough to run on its own, (3 to 4 seconds). The engine will accelerate to about 960 RPM and be under control of the mechnical governor.

I FLASH FIELD 1.

Open the 125 VDC feeder breaker to the diesel generator control circuits in panel D4 (DS).

I 2.

Using 24V DC battery power source available near Shutdown Panel C160 (or C161) and jumper cables, sorentarily connect the batteries to the following terminals in panel C101 (C102):

a.

Attach the (+) jumper to the terminatica point between the 2.5 ohm resistor bank and CR 56.

I

I I

I Attachment B to Alternate Shutdown I

Procedure Sheet 2 of 2 b.

Attach the (-) jumper to the F" terminal.

NOTE: Terminals are identified "CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN" 3.

Remove the jumper cables as soon as Generator Output voltage begins to indicate in panel C101 (C102).

I The engine, which will now be under control of the electric governor, will reduce speed to about 900 RPM and will be ready to accept load.

LOADING THE DIESEL GENERATOR Assure that all the 4.16KV breakers on the emergency bus are tripped.

Close the Diesel Generator Breaker (152-509 or 152-609) manually; Then close manually other breakers to load the generator as required.

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I I

I Attachment C to Alternate Shutdown Procedure Sheet 1 of 3 I

LOCAL EMERGENCY OPERATION OF HPCI WITH CSR CABLES BYPASSED INTRODUCTION This procedure assumes that operation of the HPCI system is required to control steam pressure and/or vessel level with all associated Cable Spreading Room cables bypassed.

It is assumed that the s3 stem may be in the test mode when fire is detected in the CSR. Therefore, a first step will be to return to normal standby condition.

VALVE LINE-UP A.

The following valves will be open in the normal standby condition or shall be assured open by verification as required by Attachment F to this Procedure:

I MO 2301-4 (Inboard' Steam Isolation Valve) - Bkr. 1764 MCC B17.

M0 2301-5 (Outboard Steam Isolation Valve) - Bkr. 951 MCC D9 Note:

indication of steam pressure on PI-2369 (rack 2250) shows that MO 2301-4 and M0 2301-5 are open.

M0 2301-9 (Pump Discharge Valve) - Bkr. 964 MCC D9.

M0 2301-6 (Suction from Condensate Storage) - Bkr. 814 MCC D8.

B.

Verify the trubine throttle valve is closed by observing that the setpoint of flow controller FIC-2340-2 on Shutdown Panel C158 is zero.

C.

Open the following valves from Alternate Shutdown Panel C155:

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I Attachment C to Alt. Shutdown Procedures Sheet 2 of 3 M0 2301-8 (Pump Discharge) - Switch 43-954 LCS H0 2301-10 (Full Flow Test) - Switch 43-971 LCS M0 23ul-15 (Full Flow Test) - Switch 43-941 I

LCS M0 2301-3 (Steam Supply to Turbine) - Switch 43-944 LCS M0 2301-14 (Pump Minimum Flow) - Switch 43-821 LCS TURBINE STARTUP A.

Start the Turbine Auxiliary Oil Pump P229 from Alternate Shutdown Panel C155, Switch 43-921 LCS B.

Allow steam to enter turbine by slowly increasing setpoint of turbine flow controller FIC -2340-2 in panel C158. Observe that turbine starts and increases speed as indicated on SI-2340-2, Shutdown Panel C158.

C.

After turbine start is verified, increase flow to desired level.

I SYSTEM OPERATION Valve M0 2301-10 is a jog valve and can be used to control the discharge pres-sure of the HPCI pump. Discharge pressure is indicated on PI-2357 (rack 2250).

The turbine will be operating in flow control mode; therefore, increasing or decreasing HPCI pump discharge pressure will respectively require increase or decrease in steam flow to the HPCI turbine.

I

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I Attachment C to Alt. Shutdown Procedure I

Sheet 3 of 3 NOTE:

Maintain minimum flow at all times as the minimum flow valve I

(M0 2301-14) will not function automatically.

I SYSTEM SHUTDOWN A.

Close valve M0 2301-3 (Steam Supply to Turbine) - Switch 43-944.

LCS B.

Return flow setpoint to zero on controller FIC-2340-2, Shutdown Panel C158.

C.

Secure Turbine Auxiliary Oil Pump from Alternate Shutdown Panel C155 about 10 minutes after turbine stops.

D.

Close the following valves from Alternate Shutdown Panel C155:

M0 2301-10 (Full Flow Test)

- Switch 43-971 LCS M0 2301-15 (Full Flow Test)

- Switch 43-941 LCS MO 2301-14 (Mimimum Flow)

- Switch 43-821 I

LCS I

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I Attachment D to Alt. Shutdown Procedure Sheet 1 of 3 LOCAL EMERGENCY OPERATION OF RCIC I

WITH CSR CABLES BYPASSED INTRODUCTION This procedure assumes that operation of the RCIC system is required to control steam pressure and/or vessel level with all associated Cable Spreading Room cables by-passed.

It is assumed that the system may be in the test mode when fire is detected in the CSR. Therefore, a first step will be to return to normal standby condition.

I VALVE LINE-UP A.

The following valves will be open in the normal standby condition or shall be assured open by verification as required in Attachment F to this Pro-cedure.

MO 1301-16 (Inboard Steam Isolation Valve) - Bkr. 1864 MCC B18 MO 1301-17 (Outboard Steam Isolation Valve) - Bkr. 744 MCC D7.

Note:

inidication of steam pressure on PI-1360-12 (rack 2258) shows that MO 1301-16 and MO 1301-17 are open.

MO 1301-48 (Pump Discharge Valve) - Bkr. 771 MCC D7 MO 1301-22 (Suction from Condensate Storage) - Ekr. 754 MCC D7 B.

Verify the turbine throttle valve is closed by observing the setpoint of flow controller FIC-1340-2 on panel C159 is zero.

C.

Open the following valves from Alternate Shutdown Panel C154.

MO 1301-49 (Discharge Valve) - Switch 43-774 Lce I

I I

I Attachment D to Alt. Shutdown Procedure Sheet 2 of 3 MO 1301-62 (Lube Oil Cooler) - Switch 43-794 LCS MO 1301-60 (Min. Flow Bypass) - Switch 43-784 LCS TURBINE STARTUP I

A.

Open valve MO 1301-61 (Steam Supply to Turbine) Switch 43-751 in Panel C154.

LCS B.

Allow steam to enter turbine by slowly increasing setpoint on Controller FIC-1340-2 in Shutdown Panel C159, observe that turbine starts and in-creases speed.

Increases or decreases to speed can be made froa the con-I troller.

C.

After turbine start is verified, increase flow to desired level.

Note:

Do not throttle system as the minimum flow valve will not function automatically.

SYSTEM OPERATION Pump discharge pressure is indicated on PI-1360-5 (rack 2258). The turbine will operate in flow control mode; therefore, increasing or decreasing RCIC pump discharge pressure will respectively require increase or decrease in steam flow to the RCIC turbine.

I I

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I Attachment D to Alt. Shutdown Procedure Sheet 3 of 3 SYSTEM SHUTDOWN In Alternate Shutdown Panel C154:

I A.

Close MO 1301-61 (Steam Supply to Turbine) Switch 43-751.

LCS B.

Return controller FIC-1340-2 setpoint to zero.

C.

When turbine stops, close MO 1301-62 (Lube Oil Cooler) Switch 43-794.

LCS D.

Close MO 1301-49 (Discharge Valve) - Switch 43-774.

I LCS I

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I Attachment E to Alt. Shutdown Procedure Sheet I of 6 I

LOCAL EMERGENCY OPERATION OF RHR SYSTEM WITH CSR CABLES BYPASSED I

I.

INTRODUCTION This procedure provides the necessary steps required to achieve operation of the RHR System in the following modes:

1.

Torus Cooling Mode - to maintain Torus water temperature within acceptable limits.

2.

Shutdown Cooling Mode - to bring the unit to a Cold Shutdown.

The assumptions made in this procedure are:

(a) RHR System was in the normal LPCI standby condition prior to the CSR fire.

If a loop was in the test mode, action should be taken to bring it to its normal standby condition.

(b) All necessary action was previously taken to assure electrical isolation of RHR components from the fire in the CSR and to prevent spurious operaticn of equipment.

~

(c) One RHR Loop is temporarily not available to the operators due to damage by the CSR fire to control circuits of some components.

I II.

TORUS COOLING The following steps have to be taken to assure valve line-up and pump g

operat1on of on. 1oop 1n the ReR Tor.s Coo 11n..oe.:

I I

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I Attachment E Sheet 2 of 6 I

1.

To supply RBCCW to Heat Exchangers - Position H.X. Valves MO 4060A (Switch 43-1783 in Shutdows Panel C152) and MO 4010A (Switch 43-1883 in LCS LCS Shutdown Panel C153).

2.

Verify that Heat Exchangers Bypass Valves MO 1001-16A (317 Bkr. 1763) and MO 1001-16B (B18 Bkr. 1863) remain closed.

I 3.

Open Test Line Valves MO 1001-34A (Switch 43-1766 in Shutdown C153).

LCS 4.

Verify that Injection Valves MO 1001-28A and MO 1001-28B remain closed.

If not, close them from Shutdown Panel C163 (Switches 43-2031 and 43-2034).

LCS LCS I

5.

Verify that Pump Suction Valves MO 1001-7A and MO 1001-7B remain open.

If not, open them from Shutdown Panels C152 (Switch 43-1751 and C153 (Switch 43-1851 respectively.

LCS 6.

Since one RHR Loop is assumed to be inoperable due to the CSR fire -

determine the loop that is operable and proceed to the next steps at that loop only.

7.

Start RHR Pump P203A (or P203B) at SWGR Bkr. 152-503 (or 152-603).

(See Attachment F to the Procedure for details)

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Attachment E Sheet 3 of 6 I

8.

Jog ope

.est L.ine Valve MO 1001-36A (Switch 43-1771 in Shutdown I

LCS Panel C152) or MO 1001-36B (Switch 43-1871 in Shutdown Panel C153)

LCS until RHR Pump Breaker Ammeter increases to 100 amps. The System can remain in this condition indefinitely.

9.

If Torus temperature indication is lost in the Control Room, a temperature indicator may be affixed to the Suppression Chamber to follow temperature.

I III. SHUTDOWN COOLING A.

Shutdown Cooling Using Idle RHR Loop The following steps assume that the idle RHR Loop (the loop not used for Torus Cooling in Section II) is to be utilized for Shut-down Cooling. Since this loop may have some equipment that spuriously operated or cannot be operated electrically, mane l operation may be required.

In the idle loop, take the following steps:

1.

Close RHR Pump Suction Valve MO 1001-7A (MO 1001-7B) using I

Switch 43-1751 in Shutdown Panel C152 (Switch 43-1851 in Shutdown LCS LCS Panel C153).

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I Attachment E Sheet 4 of 6 I

2.

Open Shutdown Cooling Valve MO 1001-43A (Switch 43-1774) in Shut-LCS down Panel C152) or MO 1001-43B (Switch 43-1874 in Shutdown Panel LCS C153).

3.

Open Shutdown Cooling Isolation Valve MO 1001-47 manually.

4.

Open Shutdown Cooling Isolation Valve MO 1001-50 using Switch 43-2046 in Shutdown Panel C163.

LCS 5.

Verify closure of Injection Valve MO 1001-28A (M0 1001-28B).

If valve is open, close it using Switch 43-2031 (Switch 43-2034) in LCS LCS Shutdown Panel C163.

6.

Verify that Injection Valve MO 1001-29A (M0 1001-29B) is open.

If closed, manually open it.

7.

Start RHR Pump P203A (P203B) at SWGR Bkr.52-503 (or 152-603).

(See Attachment F to this Procedure for details) 8.

Immediately jog open Injection Valve MO 1001-28A (M0 1001-28B) from Shutdown Panel C163 Switch 43-2031 (Switch 43-2034)

LCS LCS 9.

Maintain this loop in service until normal operation can be re-sumed.

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Attachment E Sheet 5 of 6 B.

Shutdown Cooling - From Torus Cooling The following steps assume that the same RHR loop used previously for Torus Cooling has to be utilized for RHR Shutdown Cooling.

I 1.

Stop the operating RHR pump (s) 2.

Close Test Line Valves MO 1001-34A, MO 1001-36A (MO 1001-34B, I

MO 1001-36B) using Switches 43-1766 and 43-1771 in Shutdown LCS LCS Panel C152 (Switches 43-1866 and 43-1871 in Panel C153).

LCS LCS 3.

Close RHR Pump Suction Valve MO 1001-7A (M0 1001-7B) using Switch 43-1751 in Shutdown Panel C152 (Switch 43-1851 in LCS LCS Shutdown Panel C153).

4.

Open Shutdown Cooling Valve MO 1001-43A, Switch 43-1774 LCS in Shutdown Panel C152 or MO 1001-43B (Switch 43-1874 LCS in Shutdown Panel C153).

5.

Open Shutdown Cooling Isolation Valve MO 1001-47 manually.

6.

Open Shutdown Cooling Isolation Valve MO 1001-50 using Switch I

43-2046 in Shutdown Panel C163 LCS I

I

Attachment E Sheet 6 of 6 7.

Verify closure of Injection Valve MO 1001-28A (MO 1001-28B).

If valve is open, close it using Switch 43-2031 (Switch LCS 43-2034) in Shutdown Panel C163.

LCS 8.

Verify that Injection Valve MO 1001-29A (M0 1001-29B) is open.

If closed, manually open it.

9.

Start RHR Pump P203A (P203B) at SWGR BKr. 152-503 (or 152-603).

(See Attachment F to this Procedure for details) 10.

Immediately jog open Injection valve MO 1001-28A (M0 1001-28B) from Shutdown Panel C163 Switch 43-2031 (Switch 43-2034)

LCS LCS I

11.

Maintain this loop in service until normal operation can be resumed.

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Attachment F to Alternate Shutdown Procedure Sheet 1 of 9 SWITCHGEAR AND MCC BREAKER POSITIONS DURING LOSS OF CSR SHUTDOWN 1.

INTRODUCTION The purpose of this Attachment is to provide the instructions for the following:

A.

Breaker positioning in the SWGR and MCC's to prevent spurious oper-ation of equipment and breakers due to a CSR fire.

B.

Breaker positioning in the SWGR and MCC's to correct the status of spuriously operated equipment or breakers.

C.

SWGR and MCC breaker positioning to provide power supply to various necessary equipment.

For each SWGR Panel or MCC, a list of components or breakers requiring action is given along with "CSR Fire Shutdown" Status and " Action Required".

II.

IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION A.

At SWGR Room A 1.

4.16 KV Bus A5 CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT BKR. STATUS REQUIRED ACTION Bkr. 152-501 (Shutd'n Transf)

Open Disable and trip Bkr.

Bkr. 152-504 (Startup Transf)

Open Disable and trip Bkr.

Method:

1.

If breaker has tripped already:

(a) Disable control by opening cubicle and disconnecting DC control power knife-switch.

2.

If breaker is closed:

(a) Disable control as above.

(b) Trip Bkr. by operating Manual Trip Lever.

CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT BKR. STATUS REQUIRED ACTION Bkr. 152-508 (B1 feed)

Closed Disable and close Bkr.

Method:

I Attachment F to Alternate Shutdown Procedure Sheet 2 of 9 1.

If breaker is closed:

(a) Disable control by opening cubicle and disconnecting DC control power knife-switch.

2.

If breaker is open (tripped):

(a) Disable control as above.

I (b) Determine if closing springs are charged by observing CHARGE / DISCHARGE indicator.

(c) If springs are charged, close breaker by operating Manual Close Lever.

(d) If springs are discharged, charge them manually using a wrench; then close breaker by operating Manual Close Lever.

The following breakers are to be tripped initially but may be required to close at a later stage of the procedure.

I CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT BKR. STATUS REQUIRED ACTION Bkr. 152-502 (CRD PP A)

Open Disable and trip Bkr.

Bkr. 152-503 (RHR PP A)

Open Disable and trip Bkr.

Bkr. 152-506 (RHR PP C)

Open Disable and trip Bkr.

Bkr. 152-507 (CS PP A)

Open Disable and trip Bkr.

Bkr. 152-509 (D.G A)

Open Disable and trip Bkr.

Method:

1.

If breaker has tripped already:

(a) Disable control by opening cubicle and disconnecting DC control power knife-switch 4

2.

If breaker is closed:

(a) Disable control as abcve.

(b) Trip Bkr. by operating Manual Trip Lever.

2.

480V Load Center B1 CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT BKR. STATUS REQUIRED ACTION Bkr.52-102 (B6 FEED)

Open Disable and trip Bkr.

Bkr.52-105 (B29 FEED)

Open Disable and trip Bkr.

Bkr.52-106 (TBCCW PP)

Open Disable and trip Bkr.

Method:

1.

If breaker has tripped already:

(a) Open cubicle door (b) Remove TRIP and CLOSE fuses in the right hand side of the cubicle.

I Attachment F to Alternate Shutdown Procedure Sheet 3 of 9 2.

If breaker is closed (a) Open cubicle door (b) Remove TRIP and CLCSE fuses (R.H. side of cubicle).

(c) Trip the breaker mechanically usicg maintenance handle I

to charge closing springs.

CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT BKR. STATUS REQUIRED ACTION Bkr.52-103 (BIS FEED)

Closed Disable and close Bkr.

Bkr.52-104 (B17 FEED)

Closed Disable and close Bkr.

Method:

1.

If Bkr. is closed:

(a) Open cubicle door (b) Remove CLOSE and TRIP fuses (R.H. side of cubicle).

2.

If breaker has tripped:

I (a) Open cubicle door (b) Remove CLOSE and TRIP fuses (R.H. side of cubicle)

(c) Close the breaker mechanically using maintenance handle to charge closing springs.

3.

125V DC Distribution Panel D16 I

CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT BKR. STATUS REQUIRED ACTION Bkr. 72-164 (To D32)

Open Open Breaker I

Bkr. 72-163 (To D14)

Open Verify breaker open Bkr. 72-165 (To D4)

Closed Verify breaker closed Bkr. 72-166 (To D7)

Closed Verify breaker closed After assuring proper position of the above breakers, take the following action:

CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT BKR. STATUS REQUIRED ACTION Bkr. 72-161 (To D29)

Closed Verify breaker closed Bkr. 72-162 (To D11)

Closed Verify breaker closed 4.

125V DC Current Limiter D29 CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT BKR. STATUS REQUIRED ACTION Bkr. 72-29 (D1 to D29)

Closed Verify breaker closed I

I

Attachment F to Alternate Shutdown Procedure Sheet 4 of 9 B.

AT SWGR ROOM B 1.

4.16 KV Bus A6 CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN I

COMPONENT BKR. STATUS REQUIRED ACTION Bkr. 152-601 (Shutdown Transf.)

Open Disable and trip Bkr.

Bkr. 152-604 (Startup Transf.)

Open Disable and trip Bkr.

Method:

Sarre as for respective breakers of AS CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT BKR. STATUS REQUIRED ACTION Bkr. 152-608 (B2 FEED)

Closed Disable and close Bkr.

'iethod:

Same as for respective breaker of AS The following breakers are to be tripped initially but they may be required to close at a later stage in the procedure.

CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT BKR. STATUS REQUIRED ACTION Bkr. 152-602 (CRD PP B)

Open Disable and trip Bkr.

Bkr. 152-603 (RHR PP B)

Open Disable and trip Bkr.

Bkr. 152-606 (RHR PP D)

Open Disable and trip Bkr.

I Bkr. 152-607 (CS PP B)

Open Disable and trip Bkr.

Bkr. 152-609 (D.G B)

Open Disable and trip Bkr.

Method:

Same as for respective breakers in A5 2.

480V Load Center B2 CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT BKR. STATUS REQUIRED ACTION Bkr.52-202 (B6 FIED)

Open Disable and trip Bkr.

Bkr.52-203 (B28 FEED)

Open Disable and trip Bkr.

I Bkr.52-206 (TBCCW PP.)

Open Disable and trip Bkr.

Method:

Same as respective breakers in BI I

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Attachment F to Alternate Shutdown Procedure Sheet 5 of 9 CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT BKR. STATUS REQUIRED ACTION Bkr.52-204 (B14 FEED)

Closed Disable and close Bkr.

Bkr.52-205 (B18 FEED)

Closed Disable and close Bkr.

Method:

Same as respective breakers in B1 3.

125V DC Distribution Panel D17 CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT BKR. STATUS REQUIRED ACTION I

Bkr. 72-174 (To D33)

Open Open Breaker Bkr. 72-173 (To D14)

Open Verify breaker open Bkr. 72 175 (To DS)

Closed Verify breaker closed Bkr. 72-176 (To D8)

Closed Verify breaker closed After assuring proper position of the above breakers, take the following CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT BKR. STATUS REQUIRED ACTION Bkr. 72-171 (From D30)

Closed Verify breaker closed Bkr. 72-172 (From D12)

Closed Verify breaker closed 4.

125V DC Current Limiter D30 CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN C_0MPONENT BKR. STATUS REQUIRED ACTION Bkr. 72-30 (D2 to D30)

Closed Verify breaker closed 5.

250V DC Distribution Panel D10 CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT BKR. STATUS REQUIRED ACTION Bkr. 72-1021 (D9 FEED)

Closed Verify breaker closed After assuring proper position of the above breaker, take the following action:

CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONEN_T BKR. STATUS REQUIRED ACTION Bkr. 72-1013 (D31 to D10)

Closed Verify breaker closed I

Bkr. 72-1014 (D13 to D10)

Open Verify breaker open Bkr. 72-1025 (DIS to D10)

Open Verify breaker open I

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Attachment F to Alternate Shutdown Procedure Sheet 6 of 9 6.

250V DC Current Limiter D31 CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT COMPONENT STATUS REQUIRED ACTION Bkr. 72-31 (D3 to D31)

Closed Verify breaker closed C.

AT THE AUX. BAY (ELEV. -3')

1.

430V MCC B14 I

CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT COMPONENT STATUS REQUIRED ACTION Bkr. 52-1414 (D12 FEED) t:losed Verify Bkr. closed I

Bkr. 52-1414 (D13 FEED)

Closed Verify Bkr. closed MO 3806 (RBCCW HX Outlet)

Open Trip Bkr. 52-1464 2.

480V MCC BIS CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT COMPONENT STATUS REQUIRED ACTION Bkr. 52-1513 (D11 FEED)

Closed Verify Bkr. closed MO 3800 (RBCCW HX Outlet)

Open Trip Bkr. 52-1564 D.

AT THE REACTOR BUILDING (ELEV. 23')

1.

480V MCC B17 CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT COMPONENT STATUS REQUIRED ACTION MO 1400-3A (CS PP SUCTION)

Open Trip Bkr. 52-1741 MO 1400-4A (CS TEST LINE)

Closed Trip Bkr. 52-1743 MO 1400-24A (CS PP' INJECTION)

Open Trip Bkr. 52-1744 I

M0 1001-18A (MIN. FLOW BYPASS)

Open Trip Bkr. 52-1754 MO 1001-23A (RHR CONT. SPRAY)

Closed Trip Bkr. 52-1756 MO 1001-16A (RHR H.X. BYPASS)

Closed Trip Bkr. 52-1763 M0 2301-4 (HPCI STEAM LINE ISO.)

Open Trip Bkr. 52-1764 2.

480V MCC B18 CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT COMPONENT STATUS REQUIRED ACTION MO 1400-3B (CS PP SUCTION)

Open Trip Bkr. 52-1841 MO 1400-4B (CS TEST LINE)

Closed Trip Bkr. 52-1843 MO 1400-24B (CS PP INJECTION)

Open Trip Bkr. 52-1844 MO IGGi-18B (RIIR MIN FLOW BYPASS)

Open Trip Bkr. 52-1854 I

MO 1001-23B (RHR CONT. SPRAY)

Closed Trip Bkr. 52-1856 MO 1001-16B (RHR H.X. BYPASS)

Closed Trip Bkr. 52-1863 MO 1301-16 (RCIC STEAM LINE ISO.)

Open Trip Bkr. 52-1864 I

Attachment F to Alternate Shutdown Procedure Sheet 7 of 9 3.

125V DC MCC D7 CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT COMPONENT STATUS REQUIRED ACTION M0 220-2 (MAIN STEAM DRAIN ISO.)

Closed Trip Bkr. 72-721 MO 1301-17 (RCIC STEAM LINE ISO.)

Open Trip Bkr. 72-744 MO 1301-22 (RCIC PP SUCTION).

Open Trip Bkr. 72-754 MO 1301-48 (RCIC PP DISCHARGE)

Open Trip Bkr. 72-771 4.

125V DC MCC D8 CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT COMPONENT STATUS REQUIRED ACTION I

MO 1001-60 (RHR HEAD SPRAY)

Closed Trip Bkr. 72-844 MO 2301-6 (HPCI PP SUCTION) open Trip Bkr. 72-814 5.

250V DC MCC D9 CSR FIRE SHUTDOWN COMPONENT COMPONENT STATUS REQUIRED ACTION I

MO 1001-47 (RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING ISO.)

Closed Trip Bkr. 72-961 I

M0 2301-5 (HPCI STEAM LINE ISO. VV)

Open Trip Bkr. 72-951 MO 2301-9 (HPCI PP. INJECTION VV)

Open Trip Bkr. 72-964 I

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I Attachment F to Alternate I

Shutdown Procedure Sheet 8 of 9 III. CORRECTIVE ACTION The fire in the CSR is assumed to cause some spurious operation of valves that are required for plant shutdown, thus disrupting valve I

line-up. The following instructions provide the corrective action to be taken in order to achieve and assure correct position of the spuriously operated valves:

1.

If control power is available (position indication lights illuminated):

A.

For a Full-Stroke Valve:

(a) Open MCC cubicle door to expose starter.

(b) Verify power breaker in closed position.

(c) Using an insulating device, momentarily depress I

either "open" or "close" section of starter contacts depending upon desired operation.

(d) Starter should " seal-in" and valve should move I

to desired position, at which time starter should de-energize by action of valve limit switch.

I (e) After starter de-energizes, disable valve by opening power circuit-breaker.

B.

For a Jogging-Valve:

(a) Open MCC cubicle to expose starter.

(b) Verify power breaker in closed position.

(c) Using an insulating device, depress contacts I

of starter required to achieve desired motion.

Starter will not " seal-in".

(d) Keep contact depressed until valve is at end of I

stroke as evidenced by automatic acutation of overloads in starter.

(e) Release starter when overloads actuate.

(f) Disable valve by opening power circuit breaker.

2.

If control power is lost due to a blown fuse or open control power transformer, the same procedure used above (in the case of a Jogging Valve) should be used.

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Attachment F to Alternate Shutdown Procedure Sheet 9 of 9 IV.

BREAKER l'OSITIONS TO OPERATE rQUIPMENT The instructions in this Section are intended for use when the need arises to operate some components whose power supplies were discon-nected in Section II.

1.

The following 4.16KV components / breakers may be required to operate afur their breakers were disabled:

1.

CRD Water Pumps P209A, P209B (Bkrs. 152-502, 152-506) 2.

RHR Pumps P203A, P203C, P203B, P203D (Ekrs. 152-503, 152-506, 152-603, 152-606).

3.

Core Spray Pum s P215A, P215B (Bkrs. 152-507, 152-607) 4.

Diesel Generators A and B (Bkrs. 152-509, 152-609) tiethod of Breaker Closing.

(a) Open cubicle and determine if closing springs are charged by observing CHARGE / DISCHARGE indicator.

(b) If springs are charged, close breaker by operating Manual Close Lever.

(c)

If springs are not charged, charge them manually using ratchet wren:h, then close breaker by operating Manual Close Lever.

I 2.

The following 480V components will require alternate power supply t-

.f-rate:

1.

MO 1001-28A RHR Inboard VV.

2.

MO 1001-28B RHR Inboard VV.

3.

MO 1001-50 Shutdown Cooling Suction Iso. VV.

Method:

(a) Verify Breaker 52-102 in Load Center B and breaker 52-202 in Load Center B2 are open.

I (b) Unlock the padlocks of Breakers 52-2036, 52-2071

.nd 52-2093 in MCC B20.

(c) Open Breakers 52-2031, 52-2034, 52-2046 in MCC B20 and I

lock the breaker handles with the padlocks of step (b).

(d) Unlock the padlock of Breaker 52-17116 in MCC B17.

(e) Close Breaker 52-17116 in MCC B17.

(f) Close Breakera 52-2036, 52-2071, 52-2093 in MCC B20.

(g) T1.e valves now can be controlled from Shutdown Panel C163.

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