ML19274G075
| ML19274G075 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/01/1979 |
| From: | Creswell J, Hunter D, Marsh R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290431 | |
| Download: ML19274G075 (74) | |
Text
l
..r UNITED STATES OF AMERICA j
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION 1!
In the Matter of:
2l IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 31 of I
4{
William H. Zewe Shift Supervisor 5l 61 7f I
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Trailer #203 9l NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10l Middletown, Pennsylvania 11!
April 12, 1979 12 (Date of Interview) 131 July 1,1979 (Date Transcript Typea) 14!
6 and 7 15!
(Tape Numoer(s))
16i 7!
7fomo W/
181 19l 20l 21 NRC PERSONNEL:
'22l I
Robert Marsh, Investigator 23!
Darwin Hunter 2000 '79 24i i
James Creswell 25j i
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MARSH:
Before we start, make sure we are working, which I am pretty 21 j
sure we are on this one.
Ok, it is now I have just about 8 o' clock 3l l
7:59 and today is April 12. We are back in the trailer conducting 4l additional interviews.
Get my list.
Bill, how do you pronounce your k
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last name? Zewe?
6l ZEWE:
Zewe, is right.
8I 9
MARSH:
Ok.
Bill, let me introduce myself,just so we have it on tape, 10j and we will begin.
We talked momentarily before we turned the tape on.
11 I am Bob Marsh, and I am an Investigator with the NRC.
I am not a 12f technician.
I am not technically oriented, I am more on the investigative 13I side of the house and this is the reason I am supplemented with Dorwin Hunter 14 and Jim Creswell.
They are more the experts in this field that is why 15 I have them along.
Also present in the room is Bill Behrle fru Met-Ed.
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We've been talking with the individuals as we go along, one thing I do 17) want to call out is that we may be talking to you in increments, so if 18l you are called back to talk to us again, don't take that as a bad sign.
19!
The area we are trying to cover here is so vast and so intricate, we 20l are going to try and break it into blocks, and a lot of people get l
21 concerned when they are called back and spoke to a second time and 22 think apparently there is a problem and get worried.
Don't because we 23 have to break this into segments as we go along so we may be talking to 24 25 20n0 '80 l
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you several times over the next couple of weeks or so.
We are ji:it in 2'
j the very preliminary stages of the investigation, we are more or less 3
trying to establish a time line of events and put up a very rough 4
skeleton as we proceed from here on out so that we have something of 5)'
refer to as we go on down the line. Bil', to start out with, I would like you to just give us some identifying dat, your name, date of 7
birth, your social security number. I would like a local contact point O!
for you, your local address and phone number, and then we would like 9
some background, your own history of your work history.
i 10l 11 ZEWE:
Okay. I am 33 years old, born April 1, 1946.
I am the Station 12l Shift Supervisor here at TMI, I live at Border Lane, RD1, Hershey and I i
13l am employed here at Met-Ed since February of 1972. First as an Aux 14!
Operator for about 16 months, and then as Shift Foreman in Unit 1 and 15:
Unit 2 and then as a Shift Supervisor the last three years.
16i 17l MARSH:
Bill, before we go any further, I am going to ask you to stopr l
18i for a second. I want to take this back just a tad, and be sure we are 19!
getting a good recording here.
20l 21l MARSH:
We are back recording again now.
We do have a good tape. Okay, l
22 at this point, I am going to let you people get going with your series 23 of questions.
'4l 9
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HUNTER:
Okay Bill, as we indicated, we are trying to again pick up 2
some information in the events as they occurred, to get some specific 3 :
information from you. Some of it may be a repeat. We realize that, I 4
believe you have been interviewed before.
SI l
ZEWE:
Yes I have.
7 8
HUNTER:
We have read some transcripts so don't be surprised if some if 9
it is a repeat, we are trying to pick off some specific data, and 10 again, this will go on for a substantial period of time, right now 11 don't be surprised if we become bettar acquainted and come back to 12 interview with you again at a later time, For weeks, it may be longer 13 we do not know. We do not know anymore than that right now than anybody 14 else.
We want to get good information and that's what we are here for.
15l We-First thing I want to touch base with you in the-initially-stay. I 16i would like to say fairly general give me your understanding of the 17 plant conditions when you came on the 11 to 7 on the 27th thru the 18{
28th. When you first came on.
19 l
20 ZEWE:
We we e operating quite normally at about 98% reactor power.
21l Somewhere on line 900 megawatts electric.
The plant was in a fairly 22.
normal. Lineup, as far as the electric plant goes, and as far as the 23 primary plant goes it was fairly normal. The only things that were 24 really abnormal were that we were manually spraying the pressurizers 2000 '82 25
o 4
I trying to keep the boron cencentration in the pressurizer from con-2t j
centrating much higher than the reactor coolant system, so we had 3
heaters in hand and spraying in manually which is really pretty common in plant in the last several weeks. Other than that, the only real problem that we had was carried over from the previous shift. They were 6
trying to transfer some resin from a Potx Vessel, No. 7, over to a 7
receiving tank and they had it clogged in the transfer line between the 8
vessel and the receiving tank. We were trying to free that. It had 9'
happened about 4:00 p.m. the previous day and we were still working on 10l it up until the time of the problem.
11!
12f HUNTER:
That was turned over to you by the previous shift supervisor, 13 the shi't being in process?
141 15l ZEWE:
Yes it was.
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HUNTER:
Okay.
You had specific people working on that problem. Who I
18I was involved in that?
19l 20f ZEWE:
I had an Aux Operator A, Don Miller, down there who is an experi-21 enced polisher operator, trying to unclog the transfer line cause. He 22 is probably my most experienced man down there so that it was just good 23l that he was assigned there anyway.
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HUNTER:
Did--I see--did we get ah-the-ah-foreman was also in the area?
2!
3l ZEWE:
I had been down there on two separate occasions trying to lend a 4l hand, so to speak, and just before we tripped, the foreman was down ci
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helping them out.
Si HUNTER:
Allright, he had gone down, also?
8l 9I ZEWE:
Oh, yes.
10l 11l CRESWELL:
Was that Mr. Scheimnn?
i 12l t
13l ZEWE:
Fred Scheimann, yes.
14!
15i ny,tTER:
At the time the unit tripped, you know, the B feed pumps 16!
tripped, do you have any idea of why the feed pumps tripped specifically?
17i 18l ZEWE:
Not right away because I was in the office just finishing up 191 from eating and doing some paper work and I was just about to leave 20l because at 4 o' clock I was going to meet one of the operators and go t
21 out and do a walk around type tour of the Turbine Building as a part of 22 the operators training and I was just gathering up my papers just abou.
23 4 o' clock exactly when the problem happened.
My first indications were i
24l that we have a glass between my office which is in the rear of the 2 5
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Control Room and the Control Room and I heard the alarms, and for every 2
alarm, whatever it is, I always look up, you know, to see what it is 3
not necessarily the exact alarm, just to see where it's at, you know, 4
and you pretty well know what alarms that keep coming in and out so'I 5
looked and said wow because the panel 15 which monitors the ICS, it 0
looked like almost all if not al' of the alarms for our integrated 7
control system was in alarm. BTU limits, cross limits, and soforth, O
were all in so I immediately started into the Control Room and as soon 9
as I got beyond my door I noticed we had a Turbine trip, because I 10 could see that the trip master was in for the turbine and the lights 11 for the breakers were open for the turbine so I took another couple of 12!
steps and I yelled Turbine Trip but the operators were already up at 13 the console, you know, reacting to the problems and then I took another 14 step and the reactor tripped, so I yelled out "we lost the reactor,"
15 Carry out the "EP" and then I got on the page system then to warn the i
i 16[
plant that we did have a trip because at the time we were supplying i
17 Unit 1 which was in a hot shutdown condition with the feedwater heating 18l steam and also steam for their seals in the main turbine, and feedwater i
19!
pump turbines, so I called it out for that reason and also so that they 20 would know to fire up the auxiliary boilers for feedwater heating for 21 us and also to notified my Shift Foreman to come back into the Control 22 for some help which I am sure he was already on his way at this time 23 because he has undoubtedly heard that we were blowing safetys at this 24 point.
I did not know exactly where he was at the time except that he 5
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1l1 was down in the basement helping out at the polishers. So that was I
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where I got into it there and I'm afraid I have lost track of your original questions.
41 5
HUNTER:
Okay, alright that helps and that gets you going. And you, at Of that, time you walked out into the Control Room area where did you then s#
proceed? Specifically.
8l 4l ZEWE:
Well, on the trips that I observed in the past, I-one of first 10j things that need to be done is that you have to put on a second makeup 11 pump and feed the pressurizer because the RCS begins to shrink after 12 the trip because it cooldowns. And I was concerned about losing pres-13 surizer level, so I went over there and the operator was attempting to 14 start a makeup pump and then to try and control the pressurizer level.
15 The other operator was over on the side of the plant t.nere where the 16!
ICS is and the feedwater stations are at. So that's where I went, over 17l to the makeup pump.
To begin with the operator who had been there, who 18!
was now over on the feedwater side had attempted to start the makeup 198 pump but it didn't start and he tried it a second time and he left and 20l the pump tripped as soon as he left. But the other operator got there f
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just as I got there and he restarted that makeup pump and re-establish 22 our flow through the RCS.
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HUNTER:
Did the foreman come in at that time or do you recall the 2'
j first contact?
31 l
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ZEWE:
It was probably, I'd say a minute and a half maybe, that Fred
]k came into the Control Room and I instructed him and Ed Frederick, my OI other contral room operator, to maintain the makeup system and the 7
pressurizer level because I was going over to check for the turbine and 8l the feedwater, and everything else. Up till this time I thought it was 9!
a normal trip, but I didn't know that we had lost a feedwater pump at 10j that time, I didn't know that.
So then Fred came up and, just as Fred 11 got there the Operator who was checking out the turbine trip, Craig Faust, 12!
was going over to verify the Emergency feed and he yelled out that he 13!
isn't getting feed so I then turned my attention to go over there and I 14!
told Fred and Craig, you know, to establish the primary conditions then 15!
for the pressurizer level so then Just as I turned to go over to help 16!
Craig we got high pressure injection actuation which come on automatically 17' and then I yelled out to verify actuation and then go to bypass after 18l he verified actuation and we could begin to throttle to take control of 19!
the components. So then Craig, then the operater that was working 20l feedwater, then yelled out the 12's are shut, the 12's are shut, and I, i
21l why did you thut the 12's and he said "I didn't they were shutdown." I 22 said get them open and I rushed over then and he practically broke off 23 the switches trying to get them open faster and I was looking at the 24 steam generator pressure, and at the steam generator levels and the 25 t
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levels were right about 10 inches and the pressure was still about 1000 2!
i pounds in the steam generator.
It had been my experience in the past 3l j
that if you blow a steam generator dry normally you lose pressure quite 4l rapidly in the steam generator and really anything 10 inches or above i
Sl the steam generator should not be dry. Anything less than 8 or so is a dry steam generator. And this is one point here which I learned since 7'
then but I would of, you know, swore that this time frame up to now, to 8
getting the 12's open, establishing feed, was less than 2 minutes, o
Like, at first I thought it was like 45 seconds at the most you know 10; and I thought about it later on and said maybe a minute and a half at' 11 the most but then when we reviewed some of the charts and things it 12f looked like it was 8 minutes later on and it was substantiated by l
13!
various means, you know, the 8 minute points.
I couldn't believe that 14 but that is how it was 15; 16>
HUNTER:
So we-again-I understand you're saying it felt like it went 17!
much more quickly.
18!
19l ZEWE:
If I realized that it had been that long and I don't know how I 20l failed to realize that because I would have known that the steam generator I
21 would have been dry, because they blown dry in less than 2 minutes but 22 I didn't realize it at the time so whenever he oper.ed up 12's and he's 23l started to feed, we have a microphone that is out near the main steam 24 safety's, allright, and the safetys had quit blowing about this point 25 2000 '88 I
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l 10 li but as soon as you establish emergency feed we have cavitory lines in i
2' the discharge of the emergency feed pumps, just before they go into containment, and they make a very loud noise and we can pick this up by 4'
the speakers that we heard so we knew then that we were feeding because i
Ci you could hear it and the operator was establishing levels and he was 6l heading for 30 inches at this point.
7 8
HUNTER:
We understand that there was a tag involved on the valves, not 9
specifically on the valve, but overlapping the valve. Were you aware of 10!
that or what?
I 11!
12!
ZEWE:
At this point, no cecause I was learned that later that the 13 caution tag that was on the feed pump recirc valve was laying over the 14 one valve, the one 12 valve was shut, and it is true because they are 15!
above each other but, and that tag had been on for at least several 16!
weeks, or a couple of weeks anyway, because we had a problem with the 17!
instrument line had clogged up with fermanite on the instrument root 18i valve and it caused the DP change to be erratic which caused that valve 191 on the feed pump recirc to fly open so we had it in hand so it didn't 20l resr.and to the automatic signal.
21l 22 CRESWELL:
Mr. Faust referred to this Permanite 23 20nD '89 25, l
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ilt ZEWE:
Ferminite 2f l
3l CRESWELL:
Mate-ial last night, that was clogging up the instrument 4!
line. What was the fermanite used for?
i Si l
6i ZEWE:
Fermanite, for that particular jcb, allright, is was for COV 53 7
which is the instrument root valve for the Bravo feed pump flow.
8 Alright.
The recirc valves, the FWV 16B automatically comes open so Q
that it guarantees the pump recirc on anything less than 2000 gpm flow 10f so that any surge that we had in the condensate system, since the 11 fermanite was in the valve, it restricted the flow and changed the 12f response of the instrument because it restricted the flow and we had 13 found this out.
A couple of weeks earlier, on my shift, we had had a 14!
pretty good feedwater transient and we couldn't find out why because we 15; had lost hot well level.
16; 17l CRESWELL:
When was that transient?
18!
19i ZEWE:
This was on the order of 3 or 4 weeks before that and I'm not 20j sure of the week now because it was several weeks that we had lost the i
21 hot well level and we couldn't figure out why so finally we tracked it 22 down that the feed pump recirc valve on the "B" feed pump was erratic 23 and would fly open and it would pump water into the condensers and the 24 sensor for the hot well level is on the same side of the cold condenser, 25
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l for the hot condenser, pardon me, that the 1ine comes in there. It 2'
l flows across and gives a false reading from the instrument and it tells 31 the makeup valve that I'm really low level and it makes up when it 4l really has a normal level in it and it just floods out the hot water.
i Si 6
CRESWELL:
The makeup valve is to the hot well?
i 7}
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ZEWE:
To the hot well line.
9f 10f CRESWELL:
Now as I understand this fermanite was used to plug the leak 11l in a root valve line?
12:
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ZEWE:
Yes. It is the root isolation valve, CLD 53, it had a t:ody to 14t bonnet leak on it and we could repair it because we couldn't isolate it 15i to take it out of service because it came right off th'e feed pump 16; suction line and we couldn't isolate that feed pump at power and we 17l didn't want to reduce down for that leak. So we had used fermanite 18!
quite a bit on steam leaks throughout the plant and they come in and l
19!
they pump in some high pressure black and it's almost like playdough if 20:
you will, that they pump in and it hardens under certafa temperatures l
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and pressures that forms an actual gasket type material to seal it.
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1'l CRESWELL:
How is it actually applied? How do you get it to the area 2'
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that you want to seal off?
31 41 ZEWE:
Actually, they drill a hole, allright, they look at a drawing of ci t'he valve internais allright? And they know what side the leak is on and drill a 1/8 inch hole, I believe it is, in the valve and they put on special adapter and they have this like hydro pump with the stuff in b!
it and they pump it in under pressure and it goes in and it seeks the 9f crevice areas allright? Like in that particular case, it was a little 10 steam cut in there where it leaked and it would flow into the cracks 11 and crevice areas and then the high temperatures would then seal it.
12l i
13 CRESWELL:
Okay. Evidently, some of this material valved passed this 14!
root valve isolation valve and on 15; 16i ZEWE:
I think. It was actually in the valve itself yet. I don't believe i
17l we proved that it moved in the transmitter at all that the restriction 18!
was in the valve itself.
191 20i CRESWELL:
Let me see if I can understand where this valve is. Is the i
21{
valve in a instrument line that goes to a pressure transmitter?
22!
2000 '92 23 ZEWE:
To a flow transmitter.
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CRESWELL:
Okay.
2!
3 HUNTER:
Did you see...
4l 5l l
CRESWELL:
It would be a valve off the pipe 6i i
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ZEWE:
.. right, it would be the first valve to isolate it.
i 81 l
9 HUNTER:
It would be the normally open?
10l 11!
ZEWE:
Normally normally wide open.
12}
13 HUNTER:
Okay.
14!
15' CRESWELL:
So what you did you got you did you got some of the fermanite 16; on into the instrument line the blocked the flow-17!
16l ZEWE:
Yes it restricted the flow so that any of the pressure change 19!
that the system sees-it uses a DP instrument for flow-20:
21, HUNTER:
Okay.
22 23 ZEWE:
And it changed that the flow indication.
24 2000 '93 25' I
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j 15 li HUNTER:
And it gives you a false f'.ow incication. Did you have an 2t
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indication that this fermanite went any where else in the piping except 3'
just in that instrument line?
41 c
ZEWE:
I do not know If the instrument group did blowdown the transmitters 61 and everything else in an attempt to dislodge it but we have had this 7
problem before in other areas.
We have fermanite both Unit 1 and 0
Unit 2, I would say, in the neighborhood of 30 different valves at 9f least if not more. These are both large valves and small valves?
10!
Flanges, large flarges small flanges any leak that we couldn't isolate 11 that we really couldn't live with a leak.
12!
l 131 HUNTER:
At power, while you're operating?
l 15i ZEWE:
Right, right. Some leaks we could live with in some certain 16 areas, you know, if don't get worse but if it is in a place where it is 17l just better to try to fermanite 18!
19!
HUNTERi Excuse me, we're still talking the ferminite the industry 20l uses...fermanite, apparently you guys use it quite handy keep the plant 21l online.
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23 ZEWE:
Yes we do.
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HUNTER:
We are still talking uh.
feed pumps,12 valve, and the 2l' blocked valves themselves-Can you give me some your understanding of 31 how the blocked valves are used? And which-again-try to get a feeling as 4I the plant started up-valve line ups done, aux feedwater, the pumps are d
used initially to maintain steam generator startup levels, etc., and 6;
then you end up on the main feed pumps. At that time it wou N be the 12 7I j
valves would be normally open?
8!
9!
ZEWE:
During a normal startup we don't use auxiliary feedwate at all.
10!
11!
HUNTER:
Okay.
12l 13!
ZEWE:
For a normal plant lite off we alway use normal feed from the 14!
hotwell and preheat the feedwater. That's always established. You i
15i always estat,lish secondary chemistry long before you ever heat up 16:
reactor.
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HUNTER:
That status of emergency feed system at that time?
19i 20!
ZEWE:
We establish the emergency feed system yes. And the 12 valves, I
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in particular, are operated from the control room manually, but we do 22 maintain them ir full open position because they don't have the automatic 20 function at all.
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HUNTER:
Okay, right, so the from the valve are normally opened?
2!
31 ZEWE:
Right the valve line up would have them valves open-both A and l
B. And the we do surveillance on them valves and also the pumps period-
~$
ically, allright, to insure that the valves are correct and the pumps, O
you know, get their discharge head and vibration and everything else 7
though it is surveilled on a regular basis which I believe it monthly.
80 9f HUNTER:
An example-once per month-those valve wou?d be individually 10l closed as you run a pump sectign II head test then pumn about would 1 11 shut down the valve would be reopened and thats they way the procedure 12-written?
13l 14t ZEWE:
Exactly.
15.
16!
HUNTER:
And then you would normally go to the other pump and, do it, 17!
get that valve back open?
18!
19l ZEWE:
Yes.
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21j HUNTER:
Are you aware of the valves being closed at any other time for I
22 any other reason?
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ZEWE:
They should not he, no.
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i HUNTER:
If thej are closed would, for instance, maintenance would. Had 41l thera been any maintenance been performed on the pumps of the valves i
5l' recently?
4 6l I
7l ZEWE:
Not that I know of, no.
8l 9f HUNTER:
So we are back basically the only activity associated with 10j those pumps would have been the surveillance-it looks like?
11!
i 12 ZEWE:
As far as I can remember we haven't done any maintenance recently 13 on the emergency feed system at all.
14!
15; HUNTER:
None that you are aware of?
16i 17!
ZEWE:
No. And I should have been aware of this-if it was.
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191 HUNTER:
Okay, We-it is my understanding now. that as far as those 20l valves are not being connected that those valves..
21l 22f CRESWE'lgi You need to get a drink of water.
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ZEWE:
No, no no.
t 2i 31 HUNTER:
veah, you just hold your hand up and we'll.
as far as 4!
those values being out of the normal positi.. The only indication that c;
you would have would be the light on the panel.
no annormal status 6i type lights that would tell you that they are not normal?
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81 ZEWE:
That is correct.
9!
101 BEHRLE:
Can I interrupt for a second?
i ll' 12' HUNTER:
Yes.
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la BEHRLE:
There appears there is an 8:30 radwaste meeting here that I 15i did realize'-that I didn't find out about till just now-15' 17!
HUNTER:
Knock this off right now.
181 19!
BEHRLE:
What I was going to say was that there are now 35 peop'e in 20!
tnat meeting and they vacate trailer 19 and we can switch over to i
21l trailer 19.
22' 23 7
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!li MARSH:
Let's do that when we get to a break point allright.
I've got 2':
8:27 now or there abouts so I'm going to terminate the tape here and 3l we'll restart it on the other side.
We're going to relocate at this i
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.time.
5 (TAPE RECORDING INTERRUPTED) 7l l
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MARSH:
The time is now 8:34 we have relocated to trailer 19 and we are Cl set to continue.
10I 11l HUNTER:
Ok. We have just,ccmpleted talking about the emergency feed 12!
water valves-the 12 valves-and the fact, that, established the fact i
13!
that the valves are used during surveillance at some frequency, and 14:
otherwise, if they are ever closed would they normally be tagged with 15i your tagging procedures for maintenance that type thing?
16i 17!
ZEWE:
Oh as. And that would be tried tagged really to personnel 18i protection.
19 l
i 20 HUNTER:
Would they be the way that you would be aware of it? The 21:!
valves if there had been any maintenance of those valves or any main-22 tenance in that area?
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11 ZEWE:
Yes I would be aware of it because it is an abnormal condition l
2 so I would be alerted to it from the other Shift Supervisor, that I had.
4I ci HUNTER:
Do you keep a status board of abnormal condition, that type 61 of.
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ZEWE:
Yes we do!
91 10l HUNTER:
Is it in your office or in.
.?
11:
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ZEWE:
No, its ir on the outside of my office but inside tne control 13i room.
14i 15:
HUNTER:
Okay.
16; 17 ZEWE:
Plus, we turn over notes to each other when you relieve each ISI other you pass on anything thats acnormal or anything that you working 19l on from one shift to the next shift to bring the other guy up to date.
20:
21l HUNTER:
Okay, and you were not aware of any problems at all?
22l 23f ZEWE:
I was not.
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1 HUNTER:
I understand your comment was of somewhat surprise when your 2!
operator indicated that the valves were closed.
3l 4
ZEWE:
I certainly was.
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6 HUNTER:
Okay, uh moving to the morning, okay, we are interested in at 7
which time, and when, you, yourself realized that you have a larger 8
problem then just a normal trip that you routinely-it was a routinely 9l trip up to a point, then there might be a point wnere you realize, or 10 thought that, you really had a larger problem then you had initially 11; seen or visualized-can you key that to some activity where we can get a 12!
feel of?
i 13l 14!
Zfla Fairly early and just a few minutes into it, af ter we had the 15:
high pressure injection initiation alright, we bypassed that and verified 16!
that it was bypassed and then pressurizer level continued to come up 17{
when it normally it will just come down as plant shrink and we would 18!
catch it with the makeup system and then we would come back up....
to 19' abnormal pressure level then just restore your components, allright?
2dl Allright but level just kept going up. So then I instructed my shift 21 foreman and control room operator to take action to reduce and to 22 maintain pressurizer level so at that point I did not know why the 23l pressurizer level setting up other than the high presssure injection i
24t flows that we had were higher than normal.
I 25i f
2000 '01
l' l
(
23 li HUNTER:
Allright.
i 2;
31 ZEWE:
We were putting in over one thousand gallons of water a minute.
4!
HUNTER:
Alright.
6!
7i
-l ZHE1 Into the coolant system. So then, then when I was over by the 8f turbine there, helping out the other operator, and when I came back the 9l pressurizer level was still abnormally high and we had restored back to q
one makeup pump, at this point, and had reduced our high pressure lif injection flow down and increased our let-down flow.
Pressurizer level 12!
was was still high so I realized then it was indeed abnormal. Alright.
I 131 It was about this time, just a couple minutes into it, I had ask for 14!
the Unit 1 shift supervisor, Ken Bryant, to come on over and then he 15; got there about five of six minutes after we tripped and along with a 16:
couple of other B&W engineers, who were in Unit 1 at the time, they 17!
came over to see what was happening, I think, more than anything else 181 and then as soon as they walked ir, and then I asked them to contact the 19; Unit Superintendent and the Unit Superintendent, technical support 20:
allright, because, well, the trip I would inform them anyway, so that I 21 could get permission to come up again, too and then what the problem 22 was, but I had still I wanted some more help on pressurizer levels so 23 they called them and I had also contacted the Unit 1 Control Room to l
24l call the-Gary Miller, Manager of the Island, and also the Unit 1 super-25!
l 2000 02
h l
f 24 1l l
visor of operations because our Unit 2 supervisor for operations was in 2'
l Virginia at the time, at the trairing simulator. So then the pressurizer 3l levels was high so we selected the other ranges to see if there were a i
4!
l failure in the instrument and checked at the computer at the compensated
~9 j
levels and uncompensated levels and I ask the operator to go down to O!
the auxiliary building to check local uncompensated pressurizer level to try and verify if there was a actual level or not, but the level was j
high and the pressure was low for the condition, which was around 1100 9
pounds or so, but it seemed to be holding at this point, just a little 10 oscillation, and I and I, what went through my mind there was that we 11; just had the trip and we have had problems before that the pressurizer 12 heater breakers are in the same area as the main steam safeties, and 13 when that area heats up we have had a lot or breakers trip on us. So I 14i thought that we had lost some breakers for the pressurizer heater and 15; lost some heater capacity and we just couldn't recover pressures as 16 fast we should.
So then the p-imary system was showing about 540 17!
degrees or so but the level wa high in the pressurizer, about 390-395, IS!
inches and we weren't having much luck trying to restore it so-but we 19l seem very steady and it was at this point that I looked at the hot 20!
water level and the hot water level was out of sight high and we have i
21l had problem before that then you flood out the the hot well, you ficod 22t out the vacuum pumps and we would lose the vacuum. We were joined by 23 the other shift supervisor then and Ken and Fred and Ed were at the 24 primary plant, and Craig had the feedwater pretty much under control 25 2000 '03 1
I 25
{
il!
l there-30 inches at this point. He was fluctuating somewhat he had it 2!
j pretty much under control. So I directed to try to start a condensate 3;
pump and try to establish sc.ne normal feeding because at this point we 4l didn't have any condensate pumps running or any booster pumps or any c
]
feed pumps running at all.
So I tried to start a condensate pump and 61 but it wouldn't start and then I tried the other two pumps and they i
7!
j wouldn't start either so I had the operator go the the breaker to see if there was a bieaker problem. We attempted to start another one and I 9f finally started one and I had good discharge pressure on the condensate 10 pump but I didn't have any on the booster pump.
On the suction to the 11 booster pump so the booster pump wouldn't start so then I thought the 12 problem may have been the polishers because that is the only thing 13i between the condensate pumps and the booster pumps so then I went 14:
around the console to open up the motor operator bypass valve and it 15i wouldn't open up. Just thac a operator called that he had a very bad 16 leak on the suction to the condensate booster cump 2A, so I lookea over 17l the control room again and the T average was about 528 or so and then I 18i said that I am going down there and you guys keep it up here allright 19; and I went down there to isolate the leak with the operator right there 20l by the polishers. It was a pretty good leak and I noticed that all the 21!
condensate polishing valves were all shut, and I said those that darn I
22!
polishers isolated and that is what caused it. So then I was crawling 23 on up on the ventilation duct to try to open up some bypass valve which 24 I had tried to open from the control room and the hand wheel was missing as 2000 '04 l
t I
I L
I l
26 r
l!
and I located the hand wheel and commenced to crack it off its seat and 2:
reset the breaker and then we called the control room and have them 31 j
open it up so that I could have pressure and we opened up the reject 41 valve to reject the water from the hotwell to the storage tanks out so N
]
I ran way back up to the control room and, ' ere again, I thought I was only gone for 7 or 8 minutes maybe but it may have been a litter longer 7
than that, but when I got back up to the control George Kunder joined up us there, our Unit Superintendent technical support, so George, Ken ol
-l and Ed, and Craig and Fred were up there now we were discussing the 10l situation on whether we really h3d a high level or not. so then we 11l thought no the-maybe its just faulty and isn't really high so then we 12; were back to normal letdown flow and we increased our flow into the 13 system a little but more then.
14 15i HUNTER:
Like how far, how much, you were down to one pump, at that 16 time, I guess, 500 gallons per minute plus injection or some flow?
17l 18:
ZEWE:
That is the injection ficw.
19j i
20!
HUNTER:
Right, okay.
21l t
22{
ZEWE:
Plus the seal flow which is about 40 gallons / min.
23 i
241 l
251 l
2000 '05 i
l j
27 1
11 HUNTER:
And then you increase tnat?
2!
31 ZEWE:
Yes, we increased it I didn't know at that time what they had 4
been doing while I was outside but they were trying to evalute the ci situation too so when I got, back up there George and I and Ken, you 6i know, all of us were talking together you know were are trying to come 7'
up with why the strange indication. Everything looked very good except d
pressure was low, and level was high everything else looked-temperatures 9!
looked good, steam generator pressures were a little low in the B 10l generator. But everything else looked fairly good, alright, and then we 11l started to get some flow oscillations on the reactor coolant flow 12l indications.
What in the world is that.
so then we also started to i
13!
get some vibrations from the coolant pumps. Nothing really excessive 14 but, they began to show up. So at this point then George and I decided.
15 ',
Then the pressure to temperature curve that we were getting close to 16!
the net positive suction head for the coolant pump, also the fuel pin 17 compression curve, so then we decided then to take off two coolant 181 pumps, alright. So we secured two of the reactor coolant pumps and we 19l ran like that for probably another 20 minutes to a half hour and then 20!
the flow deteriorated yet, and then we secured the remaining two pumps i
21:
and we set up the steam generators because we had the feed of the steam 22l generators in hand at this point because we were having problems controlling 23 24 25; i
2000 '06
)
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28 i
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then at 30 inches in automatic so then we then went on natural circulation, 2l j
we thought, and we were feeding up the steam generators to 21 feet or 31 50% on the operating range to try and to establish natural circulation.
i 4l Sl HUNTER:
Looking right in that area, okay, you now were downstairs, you 6i came back, you say the plant looked fairly stable apparently that is i
7 the way you're coming across, pressurizing level was still high and the O
pressure was down, that's the two key things that you picked up. You've decided that the levels were you've checked. Down locally.
10l t
11{
ZEWE:
And all do seem to agree, so.
12l 13'i HUNTER:
They all seem to agree. Then you started the get some pump 14' vibrations, I gather, okay, going back now, when did you feel that you 15i really had started deteroirating that you felt like there, like you 16l were, I wouldn't say losing control, I'll say not understanding or not 17 having a good feeling about all what was happening?
18 19!
ZEWE:
In particular when we started to see a flow oscillation on the 1
20i pumps it was really distrubing because I couldn't 21:
i 22 HUNTER:
What do that mean to you? When you start seeing that?
23 24l 5
2000 '07
29 i
!lt l
ZEWE: Well, that pumos were cavatating some how, but I really didn't 2
know how yet. I didn't realize yet that we had shifted the bubble from 3
the pressurizer to the loops yet, allright, cause if I had I would 41 have-we just didn't recognize it..
Sj HUNTER:
Okay, did you-did you have any feeling of about the uh motor i
7l the electromatic relief valve at that time? uh well what was what was 0
your..?
9l 10f ZEWE:
As soon as we had tripped and Ken Bryant, the other snift super-11{
visor, came over from unit one, allright, and I asked him to look over 12 the computer alarms and he he looked at the discharge temperatures of i
13!
the relief valves and he said that RC-RV-2, the electromatic, was a 14 little bit high than normal but it was only about 225 or so. Normally 151 it runs about 180 or so.
16i 17:
HUNTER:
Allright.
18i 19!
ZEWE:
Because it does read hich or least that one or the code safetys 20j do read high. We find the discharge temperature abnormally high and I 21l didn't think to much of it because it had just been, you know, in the l
22' first 10 minutes and I figured that she had lifted because we did have 23 a high pressure trip on the reactor and so I figured that that discharge 24l temperature should be a little bit high yet.
So I didn't think anymore 251 j
20nD '08 3
i i
[
30 i
i l'
I about it and we had agreed that was fairly normal just from lifting so i
2 I didn't go back to that until quite some time later like it was like v
- l after 6:00, I guess, before we went back to that set. It was sti'l a S
little high let's go ahead and shut the block valve and soon as we shut -
- i c
l the block valve the pressure within the reactor building.
dropped 6!
off significantly, right away.
8!
ZEWE:
So we knew then that it had b ?n the electromatic.
91 i
10f CRESWELL:
Where did you figure the pressure in the containment and the 11; build up of water in the sump was coming from?
12!
l 131 ZEWE:
From the R.C. drain tank, because we did check the R.C. drain 14!
fairly soon into it and it didn't have any level in it out it was real 15; hot and the pump had a very low discharge pressure light level wasn't 16!
really there 17i 181
[ TELEPHONE CALL]
19!
20j ZEWE:
We went and I knew that either the relief valve had stuck open 21l or we had ruptured the electromatic or the, the ructure disk on it so -
22l that I felt certain that the water that was going into the reactor 23 building sump was from the R. C. drain tank and also that's also se're 24l the pressure was from. Some where around this same time area, alright, i
25l 2000 '09
{
31 ll' the "B" steam generator was lagging the "A" by pressure to about 300 2f pounds or so I wonder if I really don't have a leak off of B the steam
'"l I
generator so we went and isolated the "B" steam generator feed.
4l t
- 9 HUNTER:
l You felt like you had a leak in the containment on the shell OI side.
71 i
8!
ZEWE:
Right and as soon as we did that which was before we isolated 9l RCV-2, the block valve for the electromatic, we looked at the pressure 10!
in the building the pressure in the building was about 2 1/2 pounds it 11{
had been increasing, and it stopped increasing leveled off and started 12 to trend down again. So I said I'll be darn the leaking generator was 13!
1eaking into the building but then it wasn't real long afterwards that 14i we isolated the block valve and pressured took a marked dropped down L
lsi then I said it wasn't that the "B" steam generator it was the electromatic 16!
but the electromatic we have a red light for the valve whenever it 17 lifts of course that was still out and I really didn't realize it the 18l electromatic was still hung open partially.
19i 1
20!
CRESWELL:
Okay.
The red light was still on i
21l 22f ZEWE:
It was out 23 24!
23ll 2000 '10 l
k
I i
i
(
32 1
ll' CRESWELL:
It had burned out it hadn't been replaced?
2:
31 ZEWE:
No the bulb I believe it is still good. That is the electrically l
41 signal that tells the valves to open.
5!
HUNTER:
But it was deenergized.
But it was out same as not energized.
7 8
ZEWE:
Right, right.
91 10 HUNTER:
So you had indication that it was open that it doesn't have a 31!
valve stem indication on it.
i 12l l
13l ZEWE:
No, it does not.
I 14!
lSi HUNTER:
The valve the temperature on the exhaust discharge.
16; 17!
ZEWE:
Yes.
18!
19i HUNTER:
Okay you picked up the reactor coolant drain tank you picked 20!
up the sump level you saw the high temperature.
21!
I 22l 23 24l 2000 '11 25>
r l
!)
t 33 lI l
ZEWE:
The sump level the operator in the auxiliary picked up the sump 2
level and he said that he the sump was at 6 feet which was the maximum 3
indication in the auxiliary building on the radwaste panel. We don't 4l have any level for the RB sump in the control room i
Si I
HUNTER:
(alarms?)
7l 0
ZEWE:
The only thing we have really as is when the sump pumps come on 9f and off and come up on the computer when the sump pumps run so when we 10!
had checked and the sump pumps had come on but they isn't to usually
\\lli because the pumps do run pretty periodically but we do have some conden-12 sation.
(
131 14l ZEWE: Water and some nonprimary leakage in the reactor building so I 15 didn't think that was to odd at first but then when he and said that 16:
the RB sump level was high at 6 feet and then I directed the control 17 room operator to tell the A. O. to turn off the reactor building sump 18I pumps.
191 201 HUNTER:
Those pumps to where?
21:!
22l ZEWE:
They pump normally-23l i
24l 25l l
2000 9 2 4
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34 i
lll HUNTER:
Where were,they lined up at that time?
2!
3l ZEWE:
They should be, I didn't verify it at that time, but they should have been lined up to misc waste holdup tank.
i SI I
I CRESWELL:
Lets me ask you this you referred to a that uh that he told 7
you it was 6 feet-8 QI ZEWE:
The primary operator.
10l l
11l CRESWELL:
okay..
the primary operator which would have been Ed Frederick-12l l
13l ZEWE:
No, the primary auxilary operator that was in the primary side 14f of the plant.
15i 16l HUNTER:
Is he down by the waste panel?
17t 181 ZEWE:
Yes he is.
19i i
20f CRESWELL:
Do you recollect who he was, what his name was?
i 21t i
22!
ZEWE:
Yes, if I remember right I believe it was Terry Daugherty.
23 24l 2s!
2000
'l3 i
i
35
{
It l
CRESWELL:
Okay.
2l 3
ZEWE:
So then when he said that it was high then really my control 4!
room, the operator put it all together because he said Bill the sump "i
levels is high I think we oughta to turn off the reactor building sump
~
OI pumps I said yes and see make sure that he turns them off so he called 7l the operator back and he turned them off and this would like half hour 8
or forty five minutes...
91 10f HUNTER: Let me gec a little bit technical there, okay? When you turned 11 the pumps off, all you do is turn the pumps off. The discharge isolation 12!
valves will stay open or closed?
13 14' CRESWELL:
They stay open?
15.
15i ZEWE:
Yeah he just went from automatic to off 17i 181 HUNTER:
To off so you have a path from the reactor building sump thru j
i 191 open piping to the reactor, the miscellaneous drain tank in the auxiliary
+
20l building.
21l 22 ZEWE:
Miscellaneous waste hold up tank yes.
l 23 24j 25l
?nng 9 4 m
l I
i
{
36 i
i lf HUNTER:
Give me your elevation from the sumo to the miscellaneous 2'
l drain tank.
31 l
Al ZEWE:
Well the RB sump is in the basement of the reactor building
.I which is approximately 281 elevation.
6i 7
HUNTER:
Okay.
8 9
ZEWE:
And the sump, you know, is maybe 7 or 8 feet deep so and the 101 holdup tank is at a higher elevation than the sump by several feet 11l plus the filters in that are on the 305 level.
I 12l l
13i CRESWELL:
What's the other likely path that you know, if it wasn't 14l lined up to..?
15' 16 ZEWE:
It could oe lined up the to the auxiliary sump building.
17!
181 CRESWELL:
What would be the relative elevations between those two?
19!
20{
ZEWE:
Pretty close to the same because the auxiliary sump is in the 21 basement of the auxiliary building also.
22f 23 24 25 l
l l
2000 '15 h
il
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i f
37 t
il' CRESWELL:
So the night end to seek their own level, if in fact that 2
i they were lined up that way. So it there anyway that we know or?
3I 4
HUNTER:
See what the line up was or is still not available to look at I
S{
today?
Si 7l ZEWE:
It's still available but I not sure of the actual radiation O!
fields in the areas of the valves but the thing that keeps coming to my 9
mind is that, alright, is after we turned it off the sump pumps, alright, 10 the operators at least two or three auxiliary coer(2Lua oro su il in lli the auxiliary building both on the 305 elevation into the 281 which is 12!
the basement were in there for at least a hour and a half to two hours 13 after we turned off the pumps and the floor drains were not flooded i
14!
like they were abaut twenty of seven or so that water came after and 15I that level was so radioactively hot that we seen it as soon and it got 16!
to the aux building on our monitors. I'm positive of that.
17!
I 18!
CRESWELL:
Did you have any radiation level problem with this initial 19!
oump over to the aux building?
20; 21l ZEWE:
No.
l 22 23 CRESWELL:
No indication what so ever of any radiation?
24j l
25j 2000 ^16 i
(
i
I l
38 i
Il' l
ZEWE:
Not in the auxiliary building at this point. Alright, the only 2';
radiation alarms that I remember was, that we have intermediate cooling 3'
water that cools our letdown coolers.
And they are the monitors them-4 selves are right beside the aux, the reactor building sump and they are 5
very low setpoints and they normally they are very sensitive to background k
radiation and we have been running the last several. months with them in alert and then we had going to the charts showing that when ever we had 8l tripped the reactor or shutdown that the levels on the monitor came 9I down and as we come in power that they came up on so that it was just 10f background. Alright, and we had submitted or I had personally submitted lli to the health physicts department or health physics supervisor to I
12!
reevaluated new setpoints for that so the alerts weren't in all the 13l time.
But these were in high alarms not just the alert but high 14:
alarms but I figured that he did blow the drain tank to the sump. The 15I sump is right next to those so I figured that ttley were high and those 16, were the only indications that we had any radiation problem. Those 17 didn' t bother me.
18i 19}
HUNTER:
Alright, the auxiliary operator had reported that you had 20i water going over and you had been there. Did you get a report on the i
21}i miscellaneous drain tank level as whether or not t.lere was any problem 22 at that time?
23 24i 25I i
2000 '17 I
I
1 I
j 39 1!
ZEWE:
No.
P 2!
HUNTER:
He.has the sump level at 6 feet.
4i 5
ZEWE:
Right.
6i 7
HUNTER:
Then he what was the miscellaneous tank at that time?
a!
9f ZEWE:
I don't Know at the that time but I do know that later on, 10f alright, which I believe was early the next morning when I come in 11 about 4:00 in the morning or so that I remember verifying the levels in 12f that tank and it was 7.1 feet or 7.4 feet in tnat tank indicating that I
13}
that tank never overflowed.
141 15; CRESWELL:
Let get back to the intermediate cooling water radiation 16 monitor, does it have a capability of isolating the intermediate cooling 17!
water loops?
18i 19l ZEWE:
(automatically you mean)?
20l l
21!
CRESWELL:
Yeah.
22l 23!
ZEWE:
No it does not.
I 2 41!
25; l
2000 '18 i
i I
I 1
40 i
11
{
CRESWELL:
So is there some way of monitoring the activity level in the f
2l intermediate cooling water loop? Some other method such as..do you 3t get-1 4l 5
ZEWE:
There are two separate ones that are just the letdown coolers, 6i you have one for the intermediate system outside in auxiliary building right next to the fiitermediate cooling water pumps we have a separate 8
monitor alright and.. It didn't show anything.
9!
10 CRESWELL:
It never went up through the whole thing?
11l 1
12' Z. EWE:
I couldn't say that.
13l
- 14l, CRESWELL:
Okay.
15i 16 ZEWE:
I think it was as far as I can remember every alarm that we had 17 up there was in, after we had the hot water in the auxiliary building.
13!
We had everything in I really didn't pay particular attention to one 19i like that I was more concerned with the other ones but just off the top 20]
of my head I would say that that probably seen the water that was on 21; the floor to and it was..in alarm.
I 22l 23 24 2000 9 9 25i i
1 i
I I
f
I f
{
41 1,
l'
{
CRESWELL:
Now were would you attribute the first release of activity 2fj in the auxiliary building? Where do you think that came from, that 31 large burst?
4j
- )
c ZEWE:
I don't know to this point because I hac thought about it pretty 61 great length up to this point and I am yet to find out exactly where i
Tl that water came from. It had to be reactor cooling system grade water.
0l Alright? Cause its activity and I thought first that we are were blowing the reliefs in the letdown system. Alright?
10j 11 CRESWELL:
On the makeup tank?
t 12i i
131 ZEWE:
On the letdown line or the makeup tank?
14!
15 HUNTER:
Where do they blow to those valves?
16; 1T; ZEWE:
They go to the RC bleed tanks. The one for the letdown comes off 18!
of there. The one on the cleaning makeup suction makeup tank goes to 15 the RC bleed tanks. There are two reliefs on the demineralizer on the 20' letdown systems.that do not but as far as I don't-know should not have i
21l been any reason for them.
22!
l 23 9n00 '20 24 25!
l
i i
42 1f HUNTER:
I gonna be the devil's advocate, do you swear that those lines 2;'
go to the bleed tank?
31 4I ZEWE:
I can swear that the one for makeup tank does only because of c-
~l Friday which was two days later, about 6:30 or 7:30 that we reached 80 Of pounds in the makeup tank while we were degassing and we popped that 7
relief and overflowed two bleed tanks and I'm positive of that.
8l 9
HUNTER:
Now I didn't want to use the word swear but that is a good 10 check now.
11:
12l CRESWELL:
That setpoint-it was normally about 83 pounds, something i
13!
like that.
14' 15)
ZEWE:
Whats that?
16i 17!
CRESWELL:
Make up tank relief.
i 18; 19l ZEWE:
80 pounds is the setpoint and it went just about 80 pound because 20' we were we had some leak from the vent header into the auxiliary building i
21!
that day and we were letting the makeup system the tank build up in i
2 21 pressure so that we didn't have to pump it in to the auxiliary because 23, of that had leak, and it finally got so much that we were degassing l
24j from the reactor coolant system to makeup systems and the pressure was l
25i i
?000 '21 l
uw-l i
i 43 i
If just getting up to where we had to periodically vent it to the vent header and try to keep the relief down to mimimum but at that point 'ke pressure was getting high enough to were we couldn't vent it off fast enough and we exceeded that and then that relief opened up and it blew c*i the make up tank back into the R.C. bleed tanks.
I 6i
'l CRESWELL:
Okay.
)
81 9
CRESWELL:
Now, in looking at the charts it looks to me like there were 10f some early increases say of iodine on the letdown line. Do you recall 11$
any alarms ccming in, radiation alarms, coming in on the letdown line 12!
fairly early in the event?
131 14' ZEWE:
No I did not. I don't recall that The first real-it seemed like 15; all the alarms came in pretty much together there about quarter to 16i seven or twenty to seven it started to seem everything come up at once 17' and it was after we had restarted the 28 coolant pi.mp and it all came IS!
in shortly thereafter.
19i i
20!
CRESWELL:
That's clearly indicated on the chart time fra:1e that you i
21; talking about everything is avalanching ct that point.
f 22l 23 ZEWE:
Yeah. But if you go on back, you see one that stands out. okay?
l 24j That makes a couple of changes before you really get into the 25i f
9 0. t_10 ' 2 c?
.m
i i
{
44 I
l 11 ZEWE:
That maybe true, but I really didn't know that thougn-didn't find out.
3
. 4!
HUNTER:
Looking at the relief valve of the letdown line, you're, you c'
have a any personnally been invcived when it lifted and then if fact t
61 saw a bleed tarA lsvel change?
I just trying to get a feel (GARBLED) 7!
Si ZEWE:
We have lifted it before, okay and our indications are that our 9l flow our letdown flow will pulse as the relief valve lift: but we have 10 never lifted it significant amounts of time to really see a change in a 11!
large volume,tsek like the bleed tank.
12!
i 131 HUNTER:
Right okay.
141 f
15; ZEWE:
Cause you're talking of upwards of 78,000 gallons.
16:
17l HUNTER:
Ouring this time that the water came in you found you had 18!
found that you the water then you had the extra water coming in apparently 19i coolant because of the activity the gasing and all the auxiliary building, 20l was in fact that at the point do you recall that when you were having I
21 the nigh ce'ta P's on your on you letdown filters and letdown were I
i 22l under distress?
I i
23l l
24i f
25!
t 2000 '23 4
f
i
(
45 il' l
ZEWE:
I afraid you lost me.
2l l
31 HUNTER:
Well you ended up with did you were there any other were there 4'
l any activity were there any problem with the letdown system that you i
5 recall like high filter celta P's or that type thing?
Gi 7
ZEWE:
After the accident.
81, 9
HUNTER:
Yeah uh but even during the incident were the letdown flow 10 was.n't maintained or you might have had a problem with the letdown flow ll!
where the relief valves might have lifted?
t 12l 131 ZEWE:
We did have some irratic letdown flow indication, alright during i
14 the process you know something after the trip and before we had the 15:
large release some variations in letdown flow alright then the operator 16i informed me of after the fact but I actually did not observe the them, 17!
no.
18i 19:
HUNTER:
You couldn't time that?
I trying to understand that sequence 20j and look at where the reactor coolant comes from.
l 21 22f CRESWELL:
When did you first feel that you had uh fuel damage?
23l 24 25 i
l 2000 '24 4
{
46 1
t II; ZEWE:
Not until.........
i 2!
I 3
MARSH:
Okay, if you would rephrase your last question.
4l 6
5 CRESWELL:
Oh, my last question, okay.
What I asked was whether..when 6
did he feel like there was significant fuel damage or that he noted 7
that fuel damage had taken place?
81 9
ZEWE:
The first indication that I had at the time was when all the 10!
alarms came in. Allright, the dome monitor in the reactor containment 11{
came on and I knew that all the auxiliary building alarms, no matter if 12' I did put hot coolant into the aux building, the high dome monitor..really l
13i alarmec De.
?
14l 15'i CRESWELL:
So that was a key '.nat you really had something going on 16 serious in the reactor.
Okay, were your failed fuel detectors operable 17 during this period of time..on the letdown system?
ISI 19 ZEWE:
The letdown system? Yeah.
20l i
21l CRESWELL:
They were operable. But they didn't indicate any,..you i
22l know, indicate any alarms from the failed fuel, right?
I 23 24 i
2000 '25 25,
~
l i
f
l
{
47 r
l'
{
ZEWE:
At a certain point, no.
2' 3l HUNTER:
We're keying in an some points so..the tape..it may be a little beneficial I presumed that..we presumed that, I think to a 5
point.
You had problems starting makeup pumps.
This was mentioned a 6!
number of times.
Can you clarify this for us a little bit.
Is this a l
7!
problem that you had many many times, or at what point do you attribute 8
the problem, the failure of the pump to start?
The operators had 9!
trouble with it and are you aware or cognizant of that type of problem?
10 It may not even be a problem it may be normal.
11!
12!
ZEWE: Well, normally you have to take the makeup pump control switch l
13 and hold it to start for a second or two, allright, allow the oil 14 pressure and that on the pumps to build up and allow the main pump to 15 run.
I feel that the only problem that my one operator had was that he 16i just hit it, and in trying to get it on quick, he hit it and was trying 17 to do other things and realized that it didn't start.
Then he hit it 181 again, just as he was looking to see if the turbine had tripped and 19!
everything else, all right.
He just went, it just didn't his excitement.
20l That's my own opinion. It didn't start because--
l 21f 22 HUNTER:
It didn't register anything.
23 24i 2000 '26 25!
i i
l i
e i
i f
f i
48 1
{
f i{
ZEWE:
I'd seen that and just as I reached down, my other control room 2'
i operator then grabbed it and it started right away for him.
He held it 31 l
for about a second or two seconds, you know, and it come up normal.
4i i
~l*
HUNTER:
Was there any seal leakage problem on the make up pumps at any 61 time that you were aware of.
7l 8
ZEWE:
Seal leakage?
9 10 HUNTER:
Seal leakage.
11; l
121 ZEWE;_ On the make up pumps, no.
I 13]
14 HUNTER:
As far as you were aware of, they were normal.
I am not 15; saying they were or not.
I am not saying they were abnormal I am just 16' saying-were you aware of any seal leakage or any problem?
17!
18!
ZEWE:
Nothing abnormal, no.
19i i
20l CRESWELL:
What sort of indications would you have again.
Let's go l
21l back to the period of time when the fellow with you had the pump curve, 22 the one that had net positive suction hasu plotted as a function of 23 pressure.
What indications Jid you have that the pumps were cavitating, 24 just Kind of go down the list.
200] '27 25 j l
1 e
i f
[
49 i
1 ZEWE:
Flow was changing all right. For t.he four pumps that we had, one 2l we didn't have full 100% flow, all right.
It had come down somewhat 31 and it was still, like 85% flow, but it wasn't right.
It would come i
4l down a little bit and up, and the halves would vary a little bit, not a 5
great deal.
That was the vibration on it.
6l l
7!
CRESWELL:
Okay, so what would have been, who was it that had the pump 8
head curve, and so forth.
9!
10 ZEWE:
George Kunder, our Unit Superintendent-Technical Support.
i 11!
12{
CRESWELL:
Okay.
So George had had this.
13 14 ZEWE:
It's--our normal heat up and cool down curve has that curve 15; line.
16i 17 CRESWELL:
Okay.
181 19!
ZEWE:
We have the brittle fractured curve, and then we have our rod 20[
drive curves and our fuel pin compression curves and our reactor coolant i
21l pump curves and our decay heat curves--are all on two separate curves.
22 One is wide range and one is narrow range.
23l 24 25l i
t i
2000 '28 t
9
i I
j l
[
50 l
CRESWELL:
Okay.
So who participated in the decision to trip the pumps, the lube pumps were first, right? They were tripped first.
Who made the decision, you know, and on what basis was the decision made to, say, to trip the first two.
5!
61 ZEWE:
Based on that indication that something was going wrong with the I
pumps, but also the...you know, while the Bravo [B] pumps and not the A 8l pumps here or 9l l
101 CRESWELL:
Well I just try to get a feel for what the considerations l
11 are in setting the pumps off. Okay. And we talked about cavitation, how 12 you recognized that. What do you think would have happed if you left 13I the pumps on, if you hadn't tanke..
14!
15)
[ INTERRUPTION - TELEPHONE]
16i 17!
CRESWELL:
Were you concerned with pump damage or seal damage during 18.
cavitation or vibration, or.
.?
19!
20j ZEWE:
.es I was.
21l 22i CRESWELL:
What is the worst thing that could have happened if you had 23 left the pumps on? What was your feeling?
l 24!
25 l
?.nn] '29 g
i l
l 6
)
{
51 i
I I:
ZEWE:
I felt at that point that we would probably lose the pumps 2!
j anyway.
3!
4 CRESWELL:
Okay, by what means?
Si 61 ZEWE:
Just to make it fail from cavitating.
7!
8!'
CRESWELL:
Like the impeller would be damaged, shaft seal...I'm trying 91 to get a handle on it.
10f 4
11!
ZEWE:
Well, either impeller damage or ruin the shaft seals, because i
12{
the vibrations now were getting higher, and the vibration on the shaft--it 13 could be seal damage, damage to the impeller bearing or any number of 141 things.
l 15!
16:
CRESWELL:
Okay.
17' i
18i ZEWE:
The point is, I just didn' t know.
19; 20]
CRESWELL:
Okay, so that was, and I'm not saying one way or another, i
21l but that that was the information that you had and that was the decision 22 that you made. And we understand that you chose a possible cause of the 23 spray, the two initial ones and then the others.
Is that correct?
24 2s 2000 '30 l
t I
i l
{
52 lli ZEWE:
Yes it is.
2f I
31 CRESWELL:
- Okay, that is our understanding.
That's good.
Okay.
Now 4l the pin compression curve, the fuel pin compression curve--could you elaborate on how that contributed to the decision.
Is that on your OI heat-up and cooldown curve also?
I 7l 8
ZEWE:
It just applies on a cooldown, right. And there are two curves, 9f one for forced flow and one for natural circulation flow.
10l l
11 CRESWELL:
Okay, looking at the curves, you and the other fellow there, t
12!
we aren't sure of him.
l 13l l
14!
ZEWE:
Well, here's just another thing too. It wasn't just George and I 15:
discussing it point blank, removed from the other guys all right.
16' 17!
CRESWELL:
Okay.
18{
19!
ZEWE:
It was really a team effort the whole time. I'll listen to a 20f control room operator or A.0. [ aux operator] any time. They have some i
21; terrific ideas. So we were really trying to work together at this time.
22' We were joined then, too, by Mike Ross, u a Unit 1 Supervisior of 23 Operations too, and a couple of other people by this time. Allright, so 24j we were all involved in it, talking to each other, who had to, you 25i i
c ng 031
?q..
i i
I
{
53 l't know--trying to come up with better ideas, all right, all talking 2';
together. And it's true, it was my final decision to knock off the 3I pumps. So I had to do that under my direction.
4l 5!
CRESWELL:
I am trying to understand though, how the fuel pin compression j
O!,
curves-you said the concern is the rate the reactor's cooling down or heating up.
81 9
ZEWE:
You want to keep the fuel pins under compression, all right, so 10 that our fuel pins are pressusrized.
11; i
12!
CRESWELL:
Okay.
i 13 14 ZEWE:
You want to keep a higher pressure outside, ar.d you don' t want 15i to cooldown too rapidly and have the fuel pin expand.
16; lIj CRESWELL:
Okay, the pressure inside the pin : night cause the clad to 18L rupture, or do you get bent reactor coolant system.
.?
19l 20l ZEWE:
Or deformed.
I 21' 22, CRESWELL:
Were you in a conditior at that point where you felt that 23 you might be exceeding the limits, the differential pressure across the 1
241 clad?
25l 7G00 ^39 i
- l. Is s
v V b-i i
f
j 54 i
i 11
^
ZEWE:
Well, just based on that curve, we were very close to it, yes.
21 I
CRESWELL:
Okay.
4; 5
ZEWE:
And George was really the one, you know, that checked out the 6
monitor. And we were discussing that, plus the pump curves too.
i 71 l
8l CRESWELL:
All right, at that time you have thermocouple temperatures i
9 available to you-from where? The thermocouples indicate to you, on the 10!
computer?
11!
12 ZEWE:
Yes.
I 13l 14!
CRESWELL:
Is that the only place that they indicate, is that the only 15:
place, on the computer, that you have the thermocouple indication?
16i 17!
ZEWE:
The thermocouple indication for what, now?
ISI 19I CRESWELL:
Excuse me, the incore thermocouple system.
20l i
21!
ZEWE:
Yes, only on the computer, yes.
22 23 CRESWELL:
Allright, did you in fact pull that off or look at it, or 24 are you aware if it was?
25l 2000 '33 1
f
(
55 1'.
ZEWE:
I did not do it, no.
i 21 l
CRESWELL:
Is that indicated anywhere else, like on a recorder, or is 4!
there any record of that except on the computer?
5!
O ZEWE:
Just on the computer, or we can read it on relay room remotely, 7!
but that requires the I&C -
ee to set up and do that..
I 81 l
9f CRESWELL:
Okay.
t 10' 11j ZEWE:
So really all that I had available was the computer itself, at 12 that point.
13l i
14!
HUNTER:
We noticed that-your people have too--that during this time 15!
span is set apart of the alarm computers stop printing out, and then 16i it restarted again.
Were you aware of that at that time?
17l 181 ZEWE:
Not until afterwards.
19j I
20j HUNTER:
Okay.
21{
22i 23, 24 '
25j 2000
^34 t
4
F 56 l:'
, ZEWE:
The computer was quite backlogged at this time, in that the I
2l alarms and the scan function that it has, was really behind where we 31 were in actual time, all right, because the computer can only print so i
4I fast. And may get 50 alarms you know in a very short scan of time, so it. backlogs itself.
6i i
7I HUNTER:
Okay who can we talk to specifically about that particular 8
item.
91 i
10 ZEWE:
You can talk to any of the computer people that we have.
11; 12 HUNTER:
Okay, about what happened to the computer that morning, because 1
131 that complete section's missing.
The paper is there, you know, but it 14!
looks like it stoos and then it started.
Would it be one of the operators 15!
that we would ta'.
to, who would normally.
16!
17!
ZEWE:
I would say that there it's just a function that the computer 181 just wasn't functioning for that period of time, but I am not sure wny, 19!
but I would think that one of the computer people, like Bill Fels who 20!
works on our Unit 2 computer, may be able to handle that. But off hand I
l 21l I don't know why it would do that. Even if it should backlog itself, it i
22j should still retain memory of the alarms, and it would still come out 23l even though they would be behind time, so to speak.
l 24l 1
25!
i I
2000 "35 I
I
\\
l t
{
57 i
l 1!
HUNTER:
Okay.
2' f
31 i
ZEWE:
It would be 15 minutes late, but it would be out.
4l c;
'{
MARSH:
Do you have any feeling on exactly how long the backlog was 6i j
- running, how far back it was at that time?
7l l
al ZEWE:
No, I do not.
I remember looking at it a couple of times, and 9
it was backlogged. And I am sure that I noted my time then, in order of 10l minutes and so forth, but I really don't remember how far it was at 11 this time, no.
12!
13i MARSH:
There's been comments on other incidents or other situations, i
14 that this has run over 30, 40 minutes backlogged.
15; 16; ZEWE:
Oh yes.
I've seen it every bit that far back, depending on what 17l you have. It monitors so much that it just the mechanical limitation of 18l it, to fit it on at the actual time.
19f 201 HUNTER:
Okay. One thing that I want to clarify is that the motor 21l operated valve on the RV2 [RVC2], the r
'.ar operated valve on the 22l pressusrizer relief valve, RCV-2-that's an open and close motor operated?
l 23l 24l 25l l
2000 '36 i
I 58 l
l t
1:
ZEWE:
Open - close.
2' 3
HUNTER:
Is it throttled, or can it be throttled?
j 41 ci "l
ZEWE:
It is not.
Open or shut.
6i 7I HUNTER:
So, if the guy goes shut, it is shut, and if he opens it it 8
comes open.
9 10[
ZEWE:
Correct.
11; i
12; HUNTER:
Okay.
Everytime you had an ESF initiated, the decay heat 131 pumps stopped.
I think that's..
14:
15!
ZEWE:
Yes they do.
16; 17!
HUNTER:
That's your low pressure injection pumps.
18!
19l ZEWE:
They start on the high pressure injection signal, right.
20 l
21l HUNTER:
Right, and you--in fact then, they run on recric.
22 23l ZEWE:
Yes they do.
Minimum recirc.
24 i
25i i
I 7QQG 777 i
Lv J
J/
i
l 59 i
i HUNTER:
And do you have any requirements for shutting those down, or is there any limits on how long they can run?
31 I
4!
l ZEWE:
Not any real time limit, no, but normally if we have the actuation, el
]
then we go to bypass. If they are not needed, all right, if we determine 6i they are not needed, then we go ahead and turn them off.
I 7\\
0 HUNTER:
Okay.
The operating procedures, then, would have and of the 9
limitations or precautions associated with those pumps. The interesting 10 point that is that you, in fact, had some boron samples come up during 11f the particular time.
They was an indication that the boron was changing.
12l 13l ZEWE:
Yes, it was.
14!
15:
HUNTER:
Yot. had, how many samples did you have run, or were you involved 16 in having them run?
17f 181 ZEWE:
Yes, we had called the Health Physic' Department to sample as 191 soon as we tripped, because, well, for iodine and so forth. All right, 20 for a trip, mainly just for productivity that we would have as a result I
21; of the trip. And the first boron sample that I had back was around 700 22i ppm boror.. And I said "What are they doing down there," obviously 23 because we had been on high pressure injection, putting in water from 24i 25j l
2000 ^38 i
r l
f 60 1
the BWST at 2270 something, allright, and the cooling system had been 2{'
over a 1000 to begin with. And we had only added boron to the system, 31 l
plus we had added baric acid from the boric acid mix tank too, to the 4j j
tystem. So the boron couldn't be low.
Si i
6i HUNTER:
You added boric acid -for a reason?
7 88 ZEWE:
Yes, yes.
9l r
10f HUNTER:
Would this be like an emergency borate situation where a guy ll; actually added high concentrate boric acid?
l 12!
(
13)
ZEWE:
Yes he did.
14!
15i HUNTET2 Okay.
That was based on--why did you emergency borate?
16i 17 ZEWE:
Well, because we had just run a shutdown margin calculation as 18{
part of the trip, and it was about 6% shutdown. But the source range l
19l and intermediate range, I noticed it on the recorders.
We have a strip 20I chart recorder that has the source range and intermediate range on it, 21I and while we were--I believe that it was after we had stopped the last l
}
two cooling pumps, we didn't have any ficw and we were establishing 23l high levels for natural circulation.
I looked, and the intermediate 24 25l 20ng
,39
61 1!
j range amps and the source range count was coming up. They were acting a 2t i
little bit erratically but the trend was up. And I couldn't understand 3i that, and I said "why is counts going up?" And then, I got that first i
4l boron sample of 700, or it may have been the 400 then. I think that's
- l
]
how it was--I had the 700 sample and then I requested that we immediately take another, that that had to be an error.
So that when the counts started to go up, and just then--it wa soon behind that that we got 8!
the 400 ppm boron sample. And I said 'sait a minute, boron is going 9f down and reactivity looks like it is going up. Something's really 10 wrong, it looks real", allright, that the boron's going down and the 11f that we really weren't 6% shutdown because the NI's were really seeing 12l the flux. So then we initiated boric acid.
13 14 CRESWELL:
Let's go back, because I want to try to get a feel for the 151 time frame. On a normal unit trip, you would request a sample rignt 16 away, is this within minutes, or 20 minutes or a half hour, or 17l 181 ZEWE:
You do it--within 4 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, you have to have a sample, but I 19' always request to have at least a coron sample done as soon as we trip, 20l to establish our shutdown margin, all right, because I am not sure 21l whenever I trip the exact date of our last analysis. All right, I just I
22l do that as a matter of practice, to always establish where you're at 23 there for your shutdown margin.
I 24i i
25i i
l 6
I 2000
^40 1
l l
62 I
i 1
CRESWELL:
If the boron-you would do a shutdown margin calculation 2*
i based on the boron concentration when the reactor tripped, the latest boron concentration, then would you come back with the sample number and verify that you--well you thought you would have more.
You thought c'
j that you would have 1200 or a 1000?
6i 7
ZEWE:
I would have mare--I would be more shutdown and what my shutdown 8l margin was and fortunately I had two B&W startup people there. I actually 9!
had them do the shutdown margin for me--two nuclear engineers were
\\
10 there.
11I i
1N; CRES'.sEL L:
Can you tie to some event or 'fome time, when you actually 13}
had the sample results given to you or indicated to you, or when he 14; actually pulled the sample?
15i 16!
ZEWE:
I don't remember exactly when he drew it because-well, first of i
17j all we would have to open up the valves for him to take the samole, aid 1$j I didn't do that.
l 19!
20t CRES'wELL: Logged in the control room operator's log? The open sample i
21l valves?
t 22!
l 23!
i 24 1
251 20nD '41 f
i
l
(
63 l
ZEWE:
Normally they do, right, and I am not sure if it was logged, due 2
to the confusion and everything. I am not sure, but it is operated from the control room, all right. They have the one sample valve control, 4
which we have indication of, up in the control room. They have control, et]
but we have the two other isolation valves that is required to open up OI for letF wn samples. CAV6 and 10 you control from the control room, all 7l right. So they'd call us up and the operator would have to open it up i
8!
for them to draw and sample. I am not sure when they did that, all 9l right. So I am not--well, the operators probably remember doing that.
10f ll!
CRESWELL:
But whose the chemist on, do you recall who was on that i
12l shift?
13 la' ZEWE:
Yes, Mike Janouski.
l 15, 16!
CRESWELL:
There was two of them.
17l 18:
ZEWE:
There should have been three radchem techs, all right, and the 19l three of them are either--they work in chemistry one time, and they 20!
work in health physics the next time.
21l 22 CRESWELL:
Okay.
I 23 24j 25l i
i f
2000 '42 I
l j
l
[
64 1l ZEWE:
And I am not sure who was in chemistry that particular night.
2h 31
,i CBSWELL:
Okay. To pursue that we can, in fact, talk with them as far 4!
as the time they logged the sample and some of that data. Okay, but you SI j
did get two samples, at 4 and 7:00. What about after that?
Si 7l ZEWE:
I didn't after that, no, because shortly thereafter is when we 1
0 went into the site emergency. And then we were worried about that. We 9f were sure then that the reactor was really shutdown by that boron 10 margin.
11; i
12l CRESWELL:
Okay, one thing that we have picked up in the sequence was 13 an indication of a manual scram reactor trip. Somebody tripped the 14 reactor sometime down in the sequence.
It seemed like it was down a 15l ways.
Were you aware of that, when that happened, or does it ring a 16 bell to you as far as why that would be a manual trip sometime later in 17!
the sequence of events?
18r 19 ZEWE:
No, not really. I didn't do it and I am not sure how late it 20; was, unless it was about the time that we had seen the increasing flux 21l in the core.
It may have hit it then.
22 23 CRESWELL:
It's at four fif teen. That's.
24 25l l
2000
^43 i
l 65 li ZEWE:
That wouldn't ha'e been it, no.
i i
2.
CRESWELL:
That's fifteen minutes al'er the trip.
4j c
~
ZEWE:
Right.
61 7
CRESWELL:
Is that like a routine thing that's done by the operator.
9 ZEWE:
Right. Normally whenever we do trip, we do a manual trip then to 10 ensure that we pick up the trip confirmed relays, all right, because 11I the trip confirmed is what sends, you know, some other functions to i
12l determine bypass valves and trip the main turbine, too.
All right, but 1
13 initially that should be done very early. As soon as we trip we should 14!
trip the reactor, and maybe they tripped it then and then they tripped 15i it a second time. I am not sure.
16; i
17{
HUNTER:
Okay, we'll go a little further in that area and probably be 18!
back to talk with you some more.
This is where you are getting into 19!
problems because of the raactor coolant pumps, and later you get some 20l noise and vibration and on down in the time. But we'll pursue that, 21{
i try to cover these specific areas.
Okay, one other area that I want to l
22l touch and then we'll wrap it up.
You have a T average indication on 23f the strip chart which I have seen, an indication, I presume, and I am 24!
going to go to the control room today to do some, you know, walk through.
I 25j 2000 '44 l
{
66 l
4 lt i
ZEWE: We have a digital display.
2!
3 HUNTER:
Okay, and then you have a recorder.
4!
c
~
ZEWE:
And a recorder.
61 71 HUNTER:
Okay, and now, another-what's the range of the digital display.
8 1
9 ZEWE:
520 to 620 10i i
11l HUhTER:
That's tne normal..
12l i
1 13 ZEtiE:
That's the normal range. It will drop down to lower than 520, 14 but it isn't accurate.
15, 16!
HUNTER:
What about above 520?
I mean, 620 excuse me.
17; i
18f ZEWE:
Right, I don't recall ever seeing it greater than 620.
I have 193 seen it as low as, like 509, when the actual coolant system could be i
20!
300.
It just drifts, once its less than 520.
21l 21l 23 24 25j i
2000 '45
- I
i i
l 67 l'i HUNTER:
It's at the tail end of its curve.
Okay, the recorder is also 2
520/620.
We looked at the recorder traces and we'll still loaking at 31 that. Is there any other indication of Tav, is the recorder on the 7
d"'
side panel or on the backboard?
I 5l l
6I ZEWE:
Right on the front.
7l 8!
HUNTER:
Right on the front.
What about on the back board or the side 9
panel or anything?
Is there any other Tav indication?
i 10!
lli ZEWE:
No.
121 1
13l HUNTER:
We were listening to some tapes before and there s-- okay, 14 hey, we had the Tav indication, the guy gave us--there was a number of 15 in excess of $20 degrees.
16!
17[
ZEWE:
We have Th indication on a recorder, and it's off to the left 18!
where the control rod drives are monitored, and then some thermoccuoles 19i are monitored, and the turbine temperatures are monitored there.
We 20I have indication there, all right, of reactor coolant system to the A i
21; steam generator and reactor coolant system to the B steam generator.
22 23 HUNTER:
Are these your wide range Th?
24l 25) l f
m 2000
l l
68 l
11 ZEWE:
That goes up to 800 degrees.
2' i
3!
HUNTER:
And give me some feeling about those recorders during this 4'I event.
Did they go above 600?
Si I
6 ZEWE:
Yes they did.
7l O!
HUNTER:
How high did they go?
9l 10 ZEWE:
They went up--they were over 700 degrees, if I remember right, 11 and this was some time later, that it was close to 760 or so.
12l t
,3 HUNTER:
Okay now, you said monitored Ths, Tcs, wide range Ths and Tcs?
141 15!
ZEWE:
Well just over there is Ths plus lot of other. The Tcs are wide 16!
range, all right, so we always have them.
17!
IS HUNTER:
Right, and what about the thermocouples? Are there any thermo-19) couples monitored back there?
20j i
21i ZEWE:
No, no.
22l 23l HUNTER:
You said what you meant was the hot leg rod drive temperatures, i
24]
that kind of thing?
25!
i
{
69 1!
l ZEWE:
Right that's a separate recorder that has all the rod drive 2?
i temperatures. Then you have other ones for outside atmospheric conditions, 31 j
for temperature, delta T, and you have ones for the turbine and bearing 4:
temperatures and lube oil, and you have that one for the RC pump tempera-l tures, for the oil coolers...
6l l
HUNTER:
Right.
81 9!
ZEWE:
..then you have the other one that has the Ths on it.
10j 11!
HUNTER:
Is that only two points on the recorder, or is it a strip 12l chart?
13{
14!
ZEWE:
Yes, it's a multi point recorder. It scans. And it just prints 15i the point and right underneath it there, it lists what each of the 16i point are.
17' 18{
HUNTER:
Yes, I understand.
Okay, that's good. To my knowledge right 19!
now, I don't have that information, and that's what I wanted to hear.
20!
That indicated that you had some very high hot leg temperatures.
t 21l l
22 ZEWE:
Yes.
23[
i 24l 25i 2000 '48 W
4
I i
{
70
[
1 HUNTER:
The hot leg RTDs that it looks at, do these look at thermo-2'!
couples or RTDs.
i 3;
t 4!
ZEWE:
RTDs.
i 51 Of HUNTER:
Okay, so they are looking at the hot leg RTDs, which are
~l
'l what--in that line, I don't remember the physical location.
s!
9f ZEWE:
In the hot legs before the steam generators, yes.
10f 11!
HUNTER:
Lika, if you come out of the reactor ano then up, where woulo 12f they be?
In the flat part of the pipe or.
.?
i 13l i
14!
ZEWE:
In the vertical section before it bends over the candy cane. You 15i have your flow element..
16; 17!
HUNTER:
Right 18i 19; ZEWE:
.and then you have your RTDs right next, and then it comes up 20l and then bends over what's called the candy cane, 21; 22l HUNTER:
Right, I understand that.
23 2?j 25!
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I
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71 1{
ZEWE:
and down through the once through steam generator.
2' i.
3t HUNTER:
I understand, okay.
4h l
5)j ZEWE:
We also connected up a bridge circuit to the RPS. Our instrument 6!
department connected it up and we monitored, all right. They had a l
7 chart of bridge readings corralated to temperatures, and we were moni-O!
toring the Th temperature.
10l HUNTER:
What time did that happen, what time did you get that hooked i
11!
uo?
i 12!
l 13l ZEWE:
This was some time later toward mid-morning or so.
14' 15!
HUNTER:
Okay, all right. We pick thut uo, but that's backina up that 16!
multi point recorder with actual bric je readings?
17f 181 ZEWE:
Yes it was.
19l 20f HUNTER:
Okay.
Fine. We've covered the areas. We didn't, you know--we've 21, got other questions to come as we go through but they.
i 22l i
23l CRESWELL:
We can pretty well terminate it here. Yes, get something 24l done about that throat.
25i 00 W- @ 9
i IP i
j 72 s
lf j
HUNTER:
Yes. Sounds like you need to get home and get some sleep.
2l l
f ZEWE:
Only because I got-well, I don't want to--I'm a baseball coach 41 and the kids are off today and I promised we would have practice at cl "l
2:30.
61 7l CkESWELL:
Oh, good grief!
8!
t 9
ZEWE:
But honestly, now I hopes it rains so I can s'eep.
10!
11 HUNTER:
We really do appreciate your discussing this, and again, we 12l are trying to come up with the chronological sequence of the events.
13!
And we will in fact be getting back to you in, probably some general--but lf hopefully we'll start coming down into certain areas and we'll even 15; point the times to you, because you are aware that we build it, we will 16i then be able to say, okay, let's talk about this and this is the time 17' and then you can, if we need some points, clarify. A lot of things.
18f i
19i ZEWE:
That will be real good.
20l
~
21 HUNTER:
A lot of things you_3'e involved in, like I checked with Ed 22 Frederick, I want to know the make-up flow. Now you guys are the ones s
23 who know the make up flow.
24 i
25 1
l!
200] '51 i
?
o
(
73 I
l 11 j
[ INTERRUPTED BY TELEPHONE]
2!
3 HUNTER:
Okay, some of the data we are not going to be able to get 4t except from you guys, and that is what we are going to do.
We'll going to keep poking and poking and talking until we understand and get the 6l data that we need, and understand the event. And I think something i
7 good--in fact, I know something good will come out of this.
We've got 81 to understand exactly what happened and that's what we are here for.
9 10f ZWE:
Well that's for sure.
11!
l 12 MARSH:
Bill, before we run there's my card, and there's a phone number 13!
where I can be reached.
Down at the bottom all three of us can be 14 reached at that number and that's my home up on top.
If anything does 15!
occur to you or any problems come up, I do not expect you should be 16i hasseled by anybody over this. If you feel any pressures whatsoever, 17 you get through to me at that number, or if you recall something im-181 portant that's where we're located.
19!
l 20!
ZEWE:
Okay, fine.
21; I
22 MARSH:
he appreciate your time.
23 Iw t
25 l
2000 ^52 i
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i 74 i
i I
l 1!
HUNTER:
Thank you, again. I am sorry about the throat.
2:
I 3
MARSH:
I am going to cut this off at 9:39.
4!
i 61 7!
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11!
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