ML19263E239
| ML19263E239 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 05/30/1979 |
| From: | Janacek R COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Ziemann D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7906050369 | |
| Download: ML19263E239 (38) | |
Text
O One F6rst National Plau. Chicagognols Commonwealth Edison Address Reply to: Post Office Slox 767 Chicago. Ithnois 60690 May 30, 1979 Mr. Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactors - Branch 2 Division of Operating Reactors U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Dresden Station Unit 1 Response to Request for Additional Information Concerning Fire Protection NRC Dochet No. 50-10 Reference (a):
D. L. Ziemann letter to C. Reed dsted May 1, 1979
Dear Mr. Ziemann:
Reference (a) transmitted a request for 3dditional information concerning the Fire Protection Program at Dresden Unit 1.
Attachmente 1 and 2 to this letter provide our responses ;;. Enclosures 1 and 2 of Reference (a), respectiv c/,
Please address any additional questions you may ha.e concerning this matter to this office.
One (1) signed original and thirty-nine (39) copies of this transmittal and attachments are provided for your use.
Very truly yours,
- en Robert F. Janecek Nuclear Licensing' Administrator Boiling Water Reactors attachments 2300 035 7 90g gg 0
Commonwealth Edison NRC Docket No. 50-10 ATTACHMENT 1 RESPONSE TO ENCLOSURE I REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION PART I PART II 2300 036
Dresden 1 Part I Question 1 The screen wash pumps are classified as safety related by the licensee's sub-mittal. If this is the esse, then the licensee should provide a three-hour rated door between the diesel fire pump cc.prtment and the screen wash pumps or pro-vide an explsnation of why the screen wash pu=ps are not necessary for a safe shutdown of the nuclear unit.
Response
The screen wash pumps for Dresden Unit 1 are classified as non-safety related.
2300 037 4
e
_Dresden 1 Part I Q_uestion 2 The warehouse wall which faces the core spray pump is an unrated wall.
The ware-house and its occupancy expose safety related cables in the warehouse associated with the core spray and post incident systems. In addition, the warehouse com-bustible loading seriously threatens the capabilities of the existing sprinkler protection.
The licensee should clarify what his intentions are for the ware-house in respect to its removal or redesign in terms of occupsney.
Responee The warehouse area at the north end of the warehouse will be utilized as a mechan-ical maintenance work area on the ground floor, and as a lunchroom on the second floor.
The cable trays cross the north wall in what will be the lunchroom.
Only work benches and st:all machine tools will exist on the ground floor.
The existing fire protection sprinkler system will remain in service in both the lunchroom area and the mechanical maintenance area. The sprinkler system in the lunchroom will be modified, if necessary, to cover the cable trays passing through.
2300 038
Dresden 1 Part I
_uestion 3 Q
The hose stations on the turbine mezzanine floor are not adequate to cover the area bounded by the colu=n rows 21-28, D-H.
The licensee should provide hose stations or an evaluation which indicates that the area does nat pose a hazard from the standpoint of fire damage to the facility.
Response
The turbine mezzanine area between column rows 21-28, D-H, covers the condensate demineralizers and the regeneration equipment demineralizers. No safety-related equipment is located in these areas. The tanks are separated from the rest of the turbine building by shield walls. Combustible material and fire loading in this area is negligible as snown in the Unit 1 Firo Hazard Analysis.
2300 039
Dresden 1 Part I bestion 4 There are certain fire doors which tre supervised and certain security doors which are also supervised. The security doors which also function as fire doors should be noted, and a list provided to the staff.
Response
The following are fire doors which are electrically supervised.
1.
B-12/3 Exterior at Transformer 11 from Room 100 El. 517'-6" 2.
B-56/13 Corridor 207 from Control Room 202 El. 534'-0" 3
B-58/14 Auxiliary Instrument Area 201 to Switchgear Loom 200 El. 334'-0" 4.
B-66/15 Auxiliary Instrument Area 201 from Switchgear Room 200 El. 534'-0" 5.
B-55/25 Toilet Room 208 from Control Room 202 6.
B-24/28 Exterior from Fuel Oil Room 124 7.
3/33 Exterior from Diesel Generator Room #1 New HPCI Building 8.
4/34 Exterior from Diesel Generator Room #2 )
Unit 1 2300 040
Dresden 1 Part I Question 5 The licensee should submit a list of hose stations and systems which are required to be included in the technical specifications.
Response
Hose stations are listed in Table 3.12-4 of the existing Unit 1 technical speci-fications.
Systems that will be included when modifications are completed are the North Auxiliary Area, Unit 1 Cableway and the Hydrogen Seal Oil Unit.
k 2300 041
Dresden 1 Part I Question 6 The licensee should either commit to the staff's training requirement for the fire brigade that each brigade receive quarterly drills and that no individual shall miss more than two drills / year or provide justification for why this is not necessary.
Response
Fire brigade training is conducted quarterly, with all brigade members required to attend.
This requirement is part of the Station Technical Specifications.
Training is in accordance with NFPA 27 (Private File Brigades) as stated in the i
Technical Specifications.
Two of the quarterly training secsions are practical (hands-on) type training utilizing station fire equipment.
Part of these two sessions include practical drills as outlined in NFPA 27. We believe this approach meets the requirement that each brigade member will be involved with a minimum of two drill.s per year.
2300 042
Dresden 1 Part II PF 1 Staff Concern Water damage to safety related load centers ~ and switchgear from fire hose streams may render safety related systems inoperable.
Staff Position Water dacage protection should be provided over MCC centers and switchgear which serve safety related functions for safe shutdown. These include 480V Switchgear 16 and 17 and MCC 25 and 26, 480V Load Center 14 and 15, Power Centers 19 and 20 and over the 125V DC panel vast of 480V Power Center 19.
Response
Openings in the tops of 480V Switchgear 16 and 17, MCC 25 and 26, 480V Ioad Center 14 and 15, Power Centers 19 and 20 and the 125V DC panel west of 480V Power Center 19 will be sealed to protect against water damage.
2300 043
Dresden 1 Part II PF 2 Staff Concern The hydrants which are located on the Unit i side of the fire water loop do not have 2i" gate valves on the hydrant ports.
This condition could require shutting the hydrant down in the event of necessity to replace hose during a fire and would interrupt hose stream protection for large flamable liquid hazards.
Staff Position The hydrants on the Unit 1 side of the fire protection loop should be provided with 2i" gate valves on the hydrant ports.
Response
The hydrants on the Unit 1 side of the fire protection loop will be provided with 21" gate valves on the hydrant ports.
2300 044 e
Dresden 1 Part II PF 3 Staff Concern Drains in flammable liquid areas are not provided with traps to prevent back-flooding into other safety related areas.
Staff Position Drains in flammable liquid areas should be provided with traps.
Response
The present drainage system is adequately designed to prevent the spread of flam-mable liquid fires to safety related areas or to other areas containing combustible liquids.
The purpose of traps is to prevent odors and/or vapors from backing up into other The flammable liquids used in significant quantities at Dresden 1 (e.g.,
areas.
lube oil, diesel oil) are heaty viscosity, and thus would not present a vapo" hazard.
It is not credible to postulate a fire which would spread through the drains.
If a flam::nble liquid fire occurred and the flaming liquid was to spread into a drain, the fire would be extinguished by lack of oxygen before the liquid could travel very far.
Areas in the Dresden 1 Fire Protection Report which contain significant amounts of combustible liquids include the clean and dirty oil tank room, the turbine oil tank room, the feedwater pump area, the Hp seal oil and emergency feed pump area, and the HPCI building which houses the HPCI and ESAP Diesel Generators.
Drainage in each area is described below.
1.
Clean and Dirty 011 Room - Titrbine Building Ground Floor: The floor of this room contains an oil sump which is drained by a 4" line. This drainage line runs outside to an oil separator.
2 Turbine Oil Tank Room - Turbine Building Ground Floor: A 4" drain located in this room drains to the same line draining from the Clean and Dirty 011 room sump.
2300 045
Part II PF 3 (Cont'd) 3 Feedwater Pump Area - Turbine Building Ground Floor: A 3" floor drain is lo-cated near each of the threre primary and tb: ee secondary feedwater pumps.
These six drains run to a en mnn line to the 5000-gallon turbine building floor drain tank.
4.
H2 Seal Oil and Emergency Feed Pump Area -. Turbine Building Ground Floor: Two 4" drains located in this area 6cain to a su=p located at elevation 495' in the turbine building. The contents of this sump are eventually pumped to the tur-bine building floor drain tank.
5.
HPCI Building: The HPCI building is located away from other plant structures.
The area of the HPCI building which contains the diesels is divided into two independent halves. Each of thes^ separate rooms contains its own sump and four 4" drains which run to the sump. The contents of each sump are pu= ped outside to an oil separator.
Reference Information Relevant to Fire Protection Systems and Programs Part 3, Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, Revision 1, August 1977 (Dresden 1 Fire Protection Report) 2300 046
Commonwealth Edison NRC Docket No. 50-10 ATTACHMENT 2 RESPONSE TO ENCLOSURE 2 DRESDEN UN7T 1 FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW TRIP REPORT 2300 047
Dresden 1 PF 1 The doorway in the north auxiliary bay to the outdoor transformer should be sealed to provide a three-hour rated barrier.
Response
The doorway in the north auxiliary bay will not be sealed, but the outside surface of the door will be protected with a sprinkler system (one or two heads) whose wate.r supply is independent of the transformer deluge system.
2300 048 PF 1-1
Dresden 1 PF 2 The bus duct penetrations in the north auxiliary bay wall should be protected by a deluge system with independent feed from the transformer deluge system.
Response
The outside bus duct penetration in the north auxiliary bay wall will be protected with a sprinkler system (one or two heads) whose water supply is independent of the transformer deluge system.
2300 049
'PF 2-1 b
Dresden 1 PF-3 Hose stations should be provided in the containment.
Response
There is a demineralized water system with service station outlets at various lo-cations in the containment.
The sphere service station outlets are fed by the "A" (clean) demineralized water storage tank. The heating boiler makeup pumps take their suction from this tank and supply water to the sphere through line 7124-2"-J1.
The Ophere service station booster pump takes suction from this line and feeds the sphere service station header 6958-2"-J1.
This pump is located on the 517' level in the southwest part of the sphere, and is rated at 50 gpm at a head of 190 feet (82.3 psig discharge pressure; see Dresden 1 equipment manual, p. 4-II-59).
Calculations indicate that 50 pai at 50 gpm can be attained up to the 584' elevation.
A one-inch booster hose with a fire service nozzle requires 50 psi at the nozzle to daliver 13 to 21 gpm.
The emergency condenser and poison storage tank are located at the 649' elevation, and the steam drum is at the 615' elevation.
The fire loadings at the elevat. ions above the 584' elevation is minimal, consisting essentially of cable providing power and control to valves and instrumentation for the emergency condenser and the poison storage tank.
The one area of high cable concentration in the containment, which is the electrical penetretion area, will be protected with an automatic water suppression system.
A fire hose just outside of the containment is also available to fight a fire in this area if necessary.
In view of the above information, the fire protection facilitie:3 in the containment will be modified to include one-inch booster hose reels at the service station out-lets such that the booster hose can reach those areas which contain significant amounts of combustibles at the 584' elevation and below.
Portable fire extinguishers are already provided in areas of the emergency con-denser (649' elevation) and the steam drum (615' elevation).
These extinguishers and others located in adjacent areas, if needed, are adequate to control and ex-tinguish fires at these elevations. At elevations of 584' and below, the one-inch booster hose stations, as proposed in addition to the portable extinguishers that are already available, will provide adequate fire fighting facilities to control and extinguish fires in the containment.
PF 3-1 2300 050
Dresdea 1 PF-4 The west wall of Fire Zone 8.4.2 (condensate pumps and H2 seal oil unit area) should be upgraded to provide a three-hour rated barrier for the door and pene-trations (electrical and piping).
Response
The west wall of Fire Zone 8.4.2 will be upgreded to provide a three-hour rated barrier for the door and the electrical and mechanical penetrations.
2300 051 PF 4-1
Dresden 1 PF-5 Fire detection should be provided in the instrument shop area adjacent to the battery room.
Responry Fire detection will be provided in the instrument shop area adjacent to the battery room.
2300 052 PF 5-1
_Dresden 1 PF 6 The sprinkler protection for the north auxiliary bay should be extended to cover the cable riser area to the cable tunnel, including protection from an exposure fire in the northwest corner of the feed pump area.
Response
Sprinkler protection will be provided to cover the cable riser area to the cable tunnel, including coverage for an expsoure fire in the northwest corner of the feed pump area.
2300 053 PF 6-1
-~
Dresden 1 PF 7 Heat collectors should be provided for the temperature sensors actuating the CO system in the primry feed pump area.
2
Response
Heat collectors will be provided for the temperature sensors actuating the CO2 system in the primary feed pump area.
2300 054 PF 7-1
Dresden 1 PF 8 A curb shculd be provided at the door betweer. the diesel fire pump and the service water pump area.
Response
A curb will be provided for the doorway between the diesel fire pump room and the service water pump area.
2300 055 PF 8-1
Dresden 1 PF 9 Portable foam equiprant, including pickup tubes and foam concentrate si.ould be provided.
Response
Portable focm equipant will be provided for the station fire brigade use.
2300 056 W W1
Dresden 1 PF 10 An extra hazard sprinkler system should be provided for the clean and dirty oil storage room.
Response
An extra hazard sprinkler system will be provided for the clean and dirty oil storage room.
2300 057 PF 10-1
Dresden 1 PF 11 Fire detection should be provided in Fire Zone 4.8.7 3 (Bus 11 and 12 4KV switchgear area).
Response
Fire detection will be provided for 4KV Bus 11 and 12 (Fire Zone 8.4.7.3).
2300 058
~
PF 11-1
Dresdend PF 12 Fire detection should be provided for the 125V DC panel west of 480V Power Center 19.
Response
Fire detection will be provided for the 125V DC panel west of the 480V Power Center 19, 2300 059 PF 12-1
Dresden 1 PF 13 Fire detection should be provided in the outside HPCI containment penetration rooms.
Response
There are only about 12 cables in each division penetration enclosure, and each safety division is separated by a three-hour fire barrier. There are no exposure hazards in the penetration enclosures, and the cables are instrumentation, control or power cables.
The power cables are for valve operators and are therefore only energized intermittently.
Based on the minimal fire loading and the lack of an initiating source, either in-ternal to the cable system or external to the cable system, and the fact that the electrical circuitry involved is self-conitoring, fire detection will not be in-stalled in the outside HPCI containment penetration rooms.
2300 060 PF 13-1
Dresden 1 PF 14 Curb gate valves should be provided for the Unit 1 hydrants on the yard loop.
Response
Drawing M341 theets 1 and 2 dated March 21,'1979 show the fire protection yard loop. The isolation valves that are provided allow for isolating the outside northeast section of the loop. Isolation of this section of the loop would in-terrupt the water supply to two hydrants. Neither hydrant is necessary to pro-tect any safety related equipment.
The isolation valves provided also allow for the isolation of the. southeast section of the outside loop. Isolation of this section of the loop would interrupt the water supply to two hydrants. Neither hydrant is necessary to protect any safety related equipment.
Based on the fact that only a small number of outdoor hydrants are isolated from their water source and that,no safety related equipment fire protection is com-promised, it is our position that the isolation valves which are provided are adequate. Therefore, curb gate valves will not be provided for Unit 1 hydrants on the yard loop.
2300 061 PF 14-1 O
Dresder. 1 PF 15 The globe valves in the fire water syatem in the HPCI buildir.g should be replaced with OS and Y gate valves.
Response
OS and Y gate valves will be installed to replace the globe valves which were in-stalled in error in the fire protection water system in the HPCI building.
2300 062 PF 15-1
Dresden 1 PF 16 Where two divisions of safety related cables are routed in close proximity in the containment, the cables should be covered with a flame retardant coating.
Response
Safety related cables of separate safety divisions which are routed in close proximity in the containment will be covered with a flame retardant coating until they are physically separated by three feet horizontally or five feet vertically.
2300 063 PF 16-1 D
Dresden 1 E 17 The emergency condenser condensate return valves should be placed on independent power sources and their control and power cables physically separated.
Response
C.E.Co.'s response to this Staff Position will be made by July 9, 1979.
2300 064 PF 17-1
Dresden 1 PF 18 An additional Evans sl:culd be provided to permit mke-up to the eergency con-denser independent of the existing make-up valve.
Response
C.E.Co. 's response to this Staff Position will be mde by July 9,1979.
2300 065 PF 18-1
Dresden 1 PF 19 The redundant level indication for the emergency condenser should be physically separated (by separate fire areas) or an additional means provided to indicate level for make-up control independent of. fire damage.
Response
C.E.Co.'s response to this Staff Position will be made by July 9, 1979.
2300 066 PF 19-1
Dresden 1 PF 20 Fire stops should be provided in vertical cable tray risers in the containment et 15-foot intervals.
Response
Where there is a significant amount of cable in a vertical riser in the contain-ment, fire barriers will be provided at approximately 15-foot intervals. A room witha 20-foot ceilingwould not require a fire barrier. A room with a 30-foot ceiling would have a fire barrier 15 feet above the floor level.
Attached is a list of the cable in the long cable riser at the southeast corner of the sphere.
The majority of these cables are control or instrumentation cables. The power cables are for valve operators or for the poison storage tank heaters. The valve operators are only energized intermittently. The poison storage tank heaters are only used when Unit 1 is shut down. These heaters are usedtokeeptheboronsolutignabove70F,andtheonlytimethattheboron temperature would go below 70 F is when the unit is shut down.
Since the probability of a fire starting from a source internal to the cable sys-tem in this riser is very slight, a fire barrier will be installed at 15 feet and 30 feet from the bottcm of the riser. Fire barriers will not be installed at higher elevations. The two barriers which will be installed will protect the cables and riser from fires caused by an external source, and since initiation of a fire from an internal source is highly improbable, protection at the higher elevations in this riser is not necessary.
2303 067 PF 20-1
STAFF POSITION 20 TRAY LP Page 1 of 4 (Vertical Cable Tray in the Southeost Corner of Dresden 1 Sphere)
CABLE NUMBER SERVICE FROM
- TO 1003 Fuel Rack Carrier Pwr Ctr 7 BKR 52-2331 Carrier X-38 Motor 1004 Fuel Rack Carrier Pwr Ctr 7 BER 52-2331 Local Control Station South 1005 Fuel Rack Carrier Pwr Ctr 7 BKR 52-2331 Local Control Station North 1009 Fuel Rack Carrier Carrier Limit SW-North LS/N Pwr Ctr 23 BKR 52-2331 2234-1 V'lve M0/541 Fuel Transfer Control Sta. at Fuel llandig Canal
. Valve M0/541 Motor a
2234-2 Valve M0/541 Fuel Transfer Control Sta. at Fuel Handir Canal Valve M0/541 Motor 2241 Valve M0/524 Control Sta. at Fuel Handig Canal,-
Valve M0/542 Motor 7 2305 Poison Storage Tank Heater 1 Pwe Distr PNL 48 BKR 52-4801 Heater Wireway 2306 Poison Storage Tank Heater 2 Pwr Distr PNL 48 BKR 52-480'2 Heater. Wireway 2307 Poison Storage Tank Heater 3 Pwr Distr PNL 48 BKR 52-4803 Ifeater Wireway 2308 Poison Storage Tank Heater 4 Pwr Distr PNL 48 BKR 52-4804 Heater Wireway 2309 Poison Storage Tack Heater 5 Pwr Distr PNL 48 BKR 52-4805 Heater Wireway 2310 Poison Storage Tank Heater 6 Pwr Distr PNL 48 BKR 52-4806 Heater Wireway 2311 Poison Storage Tank Heater 7 N
, Pwr Distr PNL 48 BKR 52-4807 Heater Wireway u
2312 Poison Storage Tank Heater 8 O
Pwr Distr PNL 48 BKR 52-4808-Heater Wirevay O
2313 Poison Storage Tank Heater 9 Pur Diser PNL 48 BKR 52-4309 Heater Wireway g
2314 Poison Storage Tank Heater 10 Pwr Distr PNL 48 BKR 52-4810 Heater Wireway 2315 Poison Storage Tank Heater 11
\\
120V Power Distr PNL 48 IKVA Tranaf Heater Conn Box (MS 477) 2316 Poison Storage Tank Heater 11 120V Power Distr PNL 48 IKVA Transf Heater Conn Box (MS 476)
STAFF POSITION 20 TRAY LP
-Page 2 of 4 CABLE
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NINBER SERVICE FROM TO 4429 Sphere Ventilation Sys Aux Control Sphere Vent Control PNL Expan Tank Level Control SW 4440 Sphere Ventilation Sys Aux Control Sphere Vent' Control PNL Cooling Unit 177B Control 6016 Room 600 Fans K177A & B Sphere Vent Conte PNL Manual Str A Fan B Motor 6036 Instr & Scanning Room Fan K178B Pwr Ctr 4 BKR 52-2451' Fan B Motor 6038 Instr & Scanning Room Fan K178B Disch Low PS/519 Sphere Vent Control PNL ELP-6 4540-A Poison System Valves Controls Console 5 Control Room Nitrogen Press SO!303 & POS/303-16.2 4540-B Poison System Valves Controls Console 5 Control Roon Nitrogen Press S0/303 c POS/303-1 & 2 4545 Poison System Valves Controls Poison Injection Valve POS/300-1 k.2 Penetration f67 4547 Poison System Valves Controls Poison Injection Valve S0/300 Penetration #87 4548 Poison System Valves Controla Poison Injection Backup Valve POS/301 - 1 & 2 Penetration #87 4549 Poison System Valven Controls Poison Injection Backup Valve SO/301,
Penetration #87 4550 Poison System Valves Controls Press Equalization Valve POS/302-1&2 Penetration #87 4551 Poison System Valves Controls
{
Press Equalization Valve S0/302 Penetration #87 4554 Poison System Valves Controls Poison Injection Valve S0/300 Poison Iejection Backup Valve POS/301-1&2 CD 4556 Poison System Valves Controls c3s Poison Injection Backup Valve S0/301 Poison Injection Valve POS/300-1 & 2 4
1053 Instr & Scanning Room Fan 178A Pwr Ctr 7 BKR 52-2341 Fan A Motor 1055 7..mstr & Scanning Room Fan 178A Dischg Low PS/519 Sphere Vent Control PNL ELP-6 3
1034 iervice Power Splice Box Area 9 Pwr Ctr 7 BKR 52-2336
RAY LP Page 3 of 4 STAFF POSITION.20 CABLE R-..
_XUMBER SERVICE FROM TO 1018 Service Power 5849 Spare Valve Motor 5850 Spare VLV Motor 5851 Spare
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VLV Motor 5852 Spare VLV Motor -
5854 Spara Valve Motor 5855 Spare Valve Motor Limit Sei 5856 Spare.
control Sta. Area 8 5857 Spare Contro? Sta. Area 8 5879 Spare Pwr Ctr 7 Contactor 61 Valve Motor 5880 Spara Pwr Ctr 7 Contactor 61 Valve Motor Limit Sw 5881 Spare Pur Ctr 7 Contactor 61 Control Sta. ' Area 8 5882 Spare Valve Motor Limit Sw Control Sta..
Area 8 N
5884 Spare u
Valve Motor O
5887 Spare o
Control Sta. Area 8 5889 Spare O
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5892 Spare O
control Sta. Area 8 5894 Spare Valve Motor 5895 Spare Valve Motor Limit Sw e
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Dresden_1_
PF 21 Transient combustitles should be removed from the fuel storage ecea irmediately.
An hourly fire wabh patrol should be established until the area is cleaned up.
Response
The transient cocbustibles have been removed from the fuel storage area.
2300 072 PF 21-1
-