ML19263C088

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 62 to DPR-57 & Amend 3 to NPF-5.Determines That Change to Manual Action Rather than Automatic Undervoltage Trip Does Not Decrease Safety Margins.Recommends Issuance of Amends
ML19263C088
Person / Time
Site: Hatch  
Issue date: 01/22/1979
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML19263C087 List:
References
NUDOCS 7902020353
Download: ML19263C088 (3)


Text

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f UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMiss!ON y

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-.e e,r GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHCRPE ELECTRIC ' EMBER 5 HIP CORPORATION leJNICIPAL ELECTRIC A55OCIATION OF GECRGIs CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA DOCKET NO. 50-366 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amencment No. 3 License No. NPF-5 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Ccamission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Georgia Power Company, et al, (the licensee) dated January 18, 1979 as supplemented January 19, 1979, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Cccmission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commissien; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Ccmmission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Ccmmission's regulations and al'.

applicable requirements have been satisfied.

790202035[3

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 is hereby amended to read as folicws:

(2) Technical 5:ecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 3, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATCRY COS"'.ISII:N

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<-d Th oma s A.l2 "M -<. LIppol i to,' Chief Operating Reactors Branch =3 Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

Janua ry 22, 1979

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMEND.ENT NO. 3 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-5 00CKET NC. 50-266 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. Overleaf pages are provided'for your conviencnce.

Remove Insert 3/4 8-11 3/4 8-11 3/4 8-12 3/4 8-12

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.8.2.1.1 The above re::vired A.C. distribution system buses and inverters shall be determined OPERAELE:

At least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment a.

and indicated power availability, and At least once per 31 days by determining that the 250 volt b.

DC/600 volt AC inverters ^944-5002 and 2R44-5003 are OPERABLE by verifying inverter output voltage of 600 volts + 5% while supplying their respective buses.

4. 8. 2.1. 2 The above specified RPS instrumentation MG sets 2A and 2B shall be determir'd OPERASLE:

a.

/

least once per 8* hours by verifying:

1.

RPS instrumentation MG sets 2A and 2B voltage to be between 108 and 132 VAC, and 2.

No unexplained change in RPS instrumentation MG set 2A and/or 25 current in excess of 5% from the value observed during the Startup Test Program, At least once per 6 months and prior to resetting the Reactor b.

Protection System trips following a seismic event of Operational Basis Earthquake intensity, by demonstrating the OPERABILITY of RPS instrumentation MG set 2A and 2B over-voltage, under-voltage and under-frequency protective instrumentation by performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION including simulated a;tomatic actuation of the protective relays, tripping logic and c u';ut circuit breakers and verifying the following setpoints; 1.

Over-voltage < 132 VAC, 2.

Under-voltage > 108 VAC*, and l

3.

Under-frequency >_ 57 Hz.

  • If the undervoltage trip is <108 VAC, increase surveillance to once per hour and the following ACTION statement applies to Specification 3.8.2.i and 3.8.2.2:

f With RPS instrumentation MG set l A and/or 1B voltage outside the range of 108-132 VAC, immediately transfer the RPS irstrumentation affected to the alternate source, if its power is acceptable. Within I hour, verify by test that each manual half scram is operable. Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> demonstrate the Operability of all Class IE Ivads connected to the affected bus (es) by performance of a Channel Functional Test.

If the tiG set (s) are not Operable and returned to service within that 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, declare the affected RPS instru-i mentation inoperable, HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 8-11 Amendment No. J, 3

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS A.C. DISTRIBUTION - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.2.2 As a minimum, the following A.C. distribution system buses, inverters and motor-generator (MG) sets shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Two 4160 volt Essential Buses, 2E, 2F and/or 2G, b.

One 600 volt Essential Bus, 2C or 20, c.

One 120/2u8 volt Essential Cabinet, 2A or 28, d.

One 120/208 volt Instrument Bus, 2A or 2B, e.

A.C. inverters 2R44-5002 and 2R44-5003*, and f.

If in service, Reactor Protection System instrumentation MG sets 2A and 25.

APPLICABILITY:

CONDITIONS 4 and 5.

ACTION:

a.

With less than the above required A.C. distribution system buses and inverters OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, irradiated fuel handling, positive reactivity changes or operations that have the potential of draining the reactor vessel. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

b.

With RPS instrumentation MG set 2A and/or 2B voltage outside the range of 108 to 132 VAC, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of all equipment which could have been subjected to the abnormal voltage for all Class IE loads connected to the associated bus (es) by performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST or CHANNEL CAllBRATION, as required, within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

c.

With RPS instrumentation MG set 2A and/or 2B inoperable, restore the inoperable MG set (s) to OPERABLE status within 30 minutes or remove the inoperable MG set (s) from service.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.2.2 At least the above required A.C. distribution system buses, inverters and MG sets shall be determined OPERABLE per Specifications 4.8.2.1.1 and 4.8.2.1.2.

HATCH - UNIT 2 3/4 8-12

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,e U'JITED ST ATES j

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMissiCN

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 q 'uh 'l 2,

- j_r SAFETY EVALUATICN BY THE OFFICE CF NUCLEAR REACTCR REGULATICN SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NOS. 62 AND 3 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES NOS. DPR-57 AND NPF-5 GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC sS50CIATION OF GEORGIA CIT ( OF DALTON, GEORGIA EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS N05, 1 AND 2 00CKETS NOS. 50-321 AND 50-366 I.

Introduction By letters dated January 18 and 19,1979, Georgia Power Company (licensee).

proposed amendments to the Technical Specifications appended to Operating License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5 for the Edwin 1. Hatch Nuclear Plants Units Nos. I and 2.

The proposed amendments would revise the surveillance requirements for the Reactor Protection System (RPS) rower supply.

II.

Background

During the review of the operating license for Hatch Unit No. 2, the staff identified certain specific deficiencies of the power supply for the RPS. Part of the staff's concern was that multiple undetected randon failures could occur and could produce pcwer of such poor quality as to preclude automatic or manual scram of the control rods. The concern of multiple random failures was allayed by requiring surveillance of the RPS power supplies which are non-Class IE systems.

Included in this surveillance is the requirement for semi-annual verification that the undervoltage trip level is set at >108 VAC. Subsequently, the licensee's submittals and discussions with the staff indicated that the installed undervoltage relay trip setting operates in the range of 30-60% of operating vol tage, i.e., 36-7L VAC. Since the undervoltage protection at this trip level does not satisfy the trip level of 108 VAC called for by the staff conditions, the Technical Specifications require removal of the RPS frca service as " inoperable", even though the RPS system icself is operating within its normal range of 108-132 VAC. However, removal of the RPS from service reduces the available sources of power for the reactor protection system.

Since RPS circuitry is relied on even in the shutdown condition, the removal of one of the sources of RPS power is undesirable, if adequate protection can be otherwise provided. The licensee's request was submitted to alleviate this situation.

79020203%3

. III.

Evaluation The licensee proposes to replace the present undervoltage trip with trips which will function at 108 VAC. The licensee proposed that during that period of time until the present undervoltage trips can be replaced, that surveillance of the power supplies be increased to hourly.

If the power supply voltage is outside the range of 108-132 VAC, he will immediately transfer the RPS instrumentation affected to the alternate source, if its power is acceptable. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, he will verify by test that each manual half scram is operable and has not been damaged by sustained undervoltage. Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> he will demonstrate the Operability of all Class IE loads connected to the affected bus (es) by performance of a Channel Functional Test.

If the power supplies are not Operable and returned to service within that 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, he will declare the affected RPS instrumentation inoperable, and follow applicable Technical Specifications.

We have reviewed the licensee's submittals and determined that the pro-posed revision is acceptable to protect the RPS from sustained under-voltage conditions. The acceptability of increased surveillance is amplified by the design of the Class IE loads connected to the assor' ted bus (es) which include low-voltage alarms in the control room. Sinc it is very unlikely the sustained undervoltage lasting less than or.

hour would damage protective systems, the change to manual action rather than an automatic undervoltage trip does not significantly decrease applicable safety margins.

Environmental Considerations We have determined that the amendments do not involve a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this deternination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environ-mental impact and pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.5(d)(4) that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmenal impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

Conclusions We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and do not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the oublic will not be endangered

, hy operation in the prnposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in corrpliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated:

January 22, 1979