ML19261D676
| ML19261D676 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001100 |
| Issue date: | 04/23/1979 |
| From: | Lichtenberger H ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY |
| To: | Rouse L NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7906260008 | |
| Download: ML19261D676 (90) | |
Text
/
.C E Power Systems Tel. 203/688-1911 Combustion Engineenng. Inc.
Telex. 99297 l
1000 Prospect Hill Road Windsor. Connecticut 06095 M
78' POWER q
e.a.__.3 SYSTEMS f
RKEIVED 5
APR3 01979 > f6
~
s
- v. s p.s so.m April 23, 1979 T
A) -
SNM License 1067
\\
Docket 70-1100 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Attention: Mr. L. C. Rouse, Chief Fuel Processing & Fabrication Branch Division of Fuel Cycle & Material Safety Gentlemen:
It is requested that Combustion Engineering's Materials License No. SNM-106/
Docket 70-1100 be amended to allow an increase in the maximum enrichment of enriched uranium from the present 3.5 wt.% U23s to 4.1 wt.% U23s. The present maximum possession limit of 500,000 kilograms uranium is adequate and no fur-ther change in this limit is reauested.
Criticality safety analyses of each step in the fuel fabrication process have been reviewed and updated where re-quired and are discussed in detail in this amendment application. An indepen-dent review of all criticality safety calculations is presently being performed under the direction of the Nuclear Safety Committee.
Their conclusions will be forwarded under separate cover. The entire fuel fabrication process was re-viewed for Health Physics and Industrial Safety considerations and it was deter-mined that no significant changes have taken place that would compromise the present margin of safety in these areas.
The revised license application section includes several editorial changes nec-essary to reflect our request for the 4.1% limit.
These are included as revised license pages.
Section 19, " Nuclear Criticality Safety Limits", is being revised in its entirety to provide the basis for Safe Individual Unit (SIV) limits and spacing criteria associated with the surface density technique.
The previous technique used to demonstrate criticality safety of our fuel fabri-cation facility has been the surface density method with its associated conserva-tism. The increase to 4.1% enrichment and the demand on available floor area by expanded storage facilities and additional equipment in recent years has made analysis by surface density impractical in many cases.
It was therefore necessary to use computer code calculational techniques to demonstrate criticality safety for most of the equipment and processes.
The surface density technique is still relied upon to demonstrate safety of mass and volume limits in hoods or where sufficient floor area is available to satisfy the conservative spacing criteria associated with this method.
2313 250 7 9 0 6 2 6 Ooog.
123ng
3 For computer calculations, the three dimensional Monte Carlo Code, KENO-IV was used exclusively. The sixteen group Hansen-Roach cross section library was used for homogeneous systems while the CEPAK Code was used to generate four group cross sections for heterogeneous systems.
A detailed validation of the KENO-IV Code and the above mentioned cross sections for low enriched UO2 systems, is presented as a complete revision of our previous validation contained in Exhibit D of the license.
Exhibit C, " Nuclear Products Manufacturing Operations and Processes", had to be completely rewritten to provide clarity and uniformity of presentation.
The calculational models, assumptions used in the analysis, and highest keffs are discussed in this section, while drawings of the calculational models and details of results obtained (including graphs of keff as a function of fuel concentration and/or mist densities) are presented in Exhibit D, the demon-stration section of the license.
Accordingly, it is requested that Section 19 and Exhibit C of the present license be deleted in their entirety and that the enclosed revised pages dated 3/22/79 be inserted in their place.
It is also requested that the following editorial page changes be made effective to reflect the increase in maximum enrichment that is requested:
Delete Pages:
Add Pages:
I-1, Rev. 1, 4/16/73 I-1, Rev. 2, 3/22/79 II-1, Rev. 2, 3/15/74 11-1, Rev. 3, 3/22/79 IV-1, Rev. 7, 6/23/75 IV-1, Rev. 8, 3/22/79 Fig. V-1, Rev. 1, 2/4/77 Fig. 5.1, Rev. 2, 3/22/79 X-1, Rev. 7, 6/23/75 X-1, Rev. 8, 3/22/79 X-2, Rev. 2, 9/16/74 X-2, Rev. 3, 3/22/79 XII-1, Rev. 2, 3/15/74 XII-1, Rev. 3, 3/22/79 XIV-2, Rev. 9, 2/10/77 XIV-2, Rev.10, 3/22/79 XVIII-1, Rev. 2, 3/15/74 XVIII-1, Rev. 3, 3/22/79 XVIII-2, Rev. 1, 4/16/73 XVIII-2, Rev. 2, 3/22/79 Fio. XVIII-3, Rev. O, 9/16/74 Fig. XVIII-3, Rev. 1, 3/22/79 Exhibit D, which provides details of calculational models and results obtained, has been completely rewritter. in support of the criticality safety analyses dis-cussed in Exhibit C.
Section numbers have been assigned in the respective portions of Exhibit C and all revised pages are dated 3/22/79.
Supportive documentation for use of the surface density criteria are also included in Section D.
The proposed license changes contained in this application are considered to be a major amendment as defined in 10 CFR 170.31 and the required fee of $34,600 is being forwarded directly to the License Fee Management Branch under separate cover.
The depth and magnitude of the proposed amendment and the necessary review time by NRC is recognized by Combustion Engineering, Inc.
Approval is requested by 8/1/79 2313 251 to assure continuity of our fuel fabrication operations in our efforts to meet contract requirements at enrichments greater than 3.5%.
Your suoport in meeting this date would be greatly appreciated.
If you have any questions regarding the content of this application, please contact Mr. G. J. Bakevich of my staff at telephone extension 3150.
Very truly yours, t
H. V. Lichtenberger Vice President-Nuclear Fuel Nuclear Power Systems-Manufacturing HVL/GJB/ssb Enclosures 2313 252 APPLICATIO ' FOR SPECIAL NUCLEAR LICENSE 1.0 In order to permit Combustion Engineering, Inc., to fabricate fuel elements at its Nuclear Manufacturing Facility in Windsor, Connec-ticut, Combustion hereby applies for licenses for the following authorizations:
Receive, possess, use and transfer Special Nuclear Material under Part 70 of the Regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in order to permit the manufacture of fuel assemblies utilitizing par-tially enriched uranium (up to 4.1 weight percent in the isotope U235) in the form of uranium dioxide pellets and in assemblies; Deliver Special Nuclear Material to a carrier for transportation under Part 71 of the regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and; Receive, possess, use and transfer Source Material under Part 40 of the regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in order to per-mit the manufacture of fuel assemblies utilizing source material.
It is requested that the terms of the licenses be for five years from their effective dates.
2313 253 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision.
2 Date: 3/22/79 Page: I-l
4.0 GENERAL TERMS, C0flDITIONS AND PROVISI0tlS OF LICENSE 4.1 Activity Combustion Engineering, Inc., desires to obtain the necessary licenses to permit the manufacture of fuel rods / elements and assemblies / bundles utili-zing partially enriched uranium (f 4.1% U235) at its Nuclear Manufacturing Facility (Bldg. #17) Windsor, Connecticut with storage in Bldg. #21 or in trailers between Bldgs. #17 and #21, as described in Item 10.2 of this license.
4.2 Terms of License It is requested that the terms of the license shall be for five years from the effective date.
4.3 Material Specification Combustion Engineering, Inc., requests authorization to receive, use, possess, store and transfer at its Windsor site, the following quantities of radioactive materials:
Isotope Form Quantity Location 4.1% Enriched Uranium U0 500,000 Kg Manufacturing - Bldg. #17 2
Storage - Bldg. #21, & in trailers between Bldgs. #17 and #21.
Development - any building 235 Uranium of any Any 4800 gms U Any building.
Bldgs. #17 235 Enrichment
& #21 limited to 350 gm U
$ 19% enriched Natural and/or Any 23,000 lbs.
Any building Depleted Uranium 239 Pu Encapsulated 8 sources, Neutron Source each contain-Any building ing 16 gm Pu Pu Encapsulated 5 sources, Neutron Source each conta' Any building ing 2.0 gm Pu Any Form 160 micrograms as analytical Any building samples 2313 254 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
8 Date:
3/22/79 Page:
IV-1
Fiqure 5.1
'!indsor Site B~uridina'L'ocations ~~
~ I l
i
/
I at N ao raceterits enrNiiricaTiom m o l
L STORact l rs g N
,3 i
2 TEST AJttDiy N5 3 FREISiNGER DEVELOPWl:N / LABOR ATORY N La-4 IV*ER SYSTEuS A0piNiSTRAfsON { ENGINEERING 9
FAM/INGTON RIVER 5 muCLEAR LABORATORIES c) 0 6 POT WASTE VAULT
$[
64 FAOLITiES ENGINEERING C'll &
^
7 ftwERH0uSE ( CENTRAL CHILLING PLANT l
7A CENTRAL RECEluhG e-
/
8 EAST CuAFs3 NOUSE 5
l
{
9 ELOtit.G 73WER N
1 10 SE AACE PLAPe T (CMA E X 48 L
i It tire PLup ecusE 0
az
'12 huCLE AR ENGir*Ef RING ( PHYSICS 13 mCST 0uak0 HCUSE ca C3 M C;NING FA *lLITIES'
,N f
15 f acitti ES ENC 4NEERING ( SERveCES I
6 turtE Aq L AaCRATCRY Ex TENSION CC "
17 TLG Fa9R6 CAT 10N FACluTY lF 18 NUCI E aR LABGRATORY E x TENSION m
CrueOSTION ENGNEERING 19 cat N6TRAI4WE ( ENGINEERING SilE BOUh0Af(Y 20fk"ItiTIES ENCia EERING ( SERVICES o
2t 44tE AR MANUFAC TURING WART HOUSE M
2250SSit ErONEERING AND Siuut ATOR C) g
,23rCSSit EroNCERiNG C
24fCS% Ea#D.EERir4 8
I 6
COAL CASgEATION PLANT
]
N 3
U waste pao kTUneo-e
%g
=
l e
w p
h{
D
-s CpEAT N
m R3 i
,f5 Soro t
.. tn g
M cn YD h.i s
l
- rr..T - *"". ,M Af *'
SP.
s.
er
=
powvn 1
I D
JQmgAp%
w I
_ fffWS.' W J W 5. ~ -se -
~
~
- r
. hEK.: ~
1
=:-
=r
.,,n
:
t.. ~+ n' <
,. c., a -.
."_e*
t it
- c..
s -.
.q... 7..--
10.0 RECEIPT OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR AND SOURCE MATERIAL 10.1 General Information Enriched fuels in the form of UO are procured from an outside 2
source in the size, shape and enrichment required.
Special Nuclear and Source Material intended for use by the Manufacturing Facility are stored as described in Exhibit C.
This mat-erial is limited to a maximum enrichment of 4.1% except that up to 350 235 gms U of f 19% enrichment is allowed in Bldgs. #17 and #21.
Receiving personnel are instructed accordingly, and receipt of enrichments in excess of 4.1% are checked against a running log.
10.2 Storage of Shipping Containers All Special Nuclear and Source Material will be received in shipping containers of a type which have been approved by the NRC Division of Material Licensing. The Department of Transportation and other Federal and State Regu-latory Agencies, as applicable, as being appropriate for the material being shipped. These containers are stored in locations designated by the Nuclear Materials Manager.
Container arrays are limited to 100 transport units, and spaced at least 20 feet from any other fissile material.
Damaged packages will be segregated into arrays not exceeding 50 transport units.
Unopened packages as described above may also be stored in locked trailers which may be parked in the vicinity of Buildings #17 and #21.
A twenty-four hour guard service is maintained at the Windsor site.
In addition, periodic checks of each building area during nonworking hours are made. All fuel storage shall be within 100 feet of a criticality detector. Trailers will be free of combus-tibles.
Except for the 350 gm authorization previously mentioned, Special Nuclear and Source Material allowed in Building #17 and #21 must be enriched to less than 4.1 weight percent in the isotope 235.
This'value is determined by reviewing the vendors analytical data, verifications of the incoming shipping documents and/or an independent assay as described in Section 9.5 of this application.
Uranium of higher enrichments may not be received in Buildings
- 17 and #21.
Instead, such materials are stored under the direction of the Nuclear Materials Manager in areas provided by the Nuclear Laboratories.
License No SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
8 Date:
3/22/79 Page: X-1 2313 256
(THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK) 2313 257 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
3 Date:
3/22/79 1263.3 Page: X-2
12.0 Scope of Fuel Handling Operations The Nuclear Power Systems Division at Windsor is engaged in the development and manufacture of fuel for commercial operations.
All manufacturing operations are carried out by Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing-235 Windsor, and consist of receiving low enriched (5.1 w/o 00 ) and pro-4 2
cessing the powder into pellets which are loaded into rods for final fuel assembly fabrication.
Development and analytical operations are carried out by the Nuclear Laboratories. These operations may require uranium in any form and of any enrichment.
2313 258 License No. SNM-1067, Occket 70-1100 Revision:
3 Date: 3/22/79 Page: XII-l
Fluorometric analyses for measuring trace contaminants, such as uranium and beryllium, and determining their content in wastes.
Combustion techniques for carbon hydrogen and oxygen in uranium-containing bodies and cladding.
Spectrophotometric determination of uranium content of salvage materials.
14.3 OUTSIDE WASTE STORAGE AREA Combustion has provided an outside pad for the storage of low level contam-inated scrap.
The pad is 14' x 80' and is contiguous to the south wall of the Building #21 warehouse. This pad is designated on Figure V-1 as Waste Pad 14' x 80', and is contained within an 8' high chain link fence.
235 No more than 500 grams of U will be stored here and no single package _will 235 contain more than 100 grams of U All packages will be placed on pallets and package stacking will be limited to two high.
Maximum residence time of a package on the pad will be six months.
Packages will not be opened outside the building under any circumstances.
Packages will contain no liquid wastes.
2313 259 License No. SNM-1067 Docket 70-1100 Revision:
10 Date: 3/22/79 Page: XIV-2
18.0 MONITORING SYSTEM In the Manufacturing Facility, Eberline Instrument Corporation, Model RM-2 and RM-12A radiation monitors are installed so that all Special Nuclear and Source Material located in or about this facility is within 100 feet of a detector. This distance is reduced as nec-essary to compensate for intervening shielding.
Figure 18.1 shows the location of the monitors in this facility.
- The monitors have a range of 0 to 20 mr/hr. The radiation intensity is shown on a meter mounted on the front panel of the monitor. There is an alarm which serves as a local and general audible radiation evac-uation alarm. An audible and visual alarm for each of the above units is also located in the Health Physics office in the Manufacturing Facility.
An externally mounted light and buzzer serve as a power failure indicator.
The response time of the sensing element and the alarm to the initial de-tection of any incident of radiation in the order of 300R at one foot from the incident is less than 2 seconds.
The monitors are connected to the emergency power system, which is sup-plied to all emergency lights and alarms in the event of a general power failure within the facility. This electrical system renders the device operative at all times. Operation is further enhanced by visual observa-tions by Health Physics personnel.
Furthermore, alarm operation tests of the radiation monitors are performed each calendar quarter by Health Physics personnel. A Ra-226 source is used to perform these tests.
2313 260 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
3 Date:
3/22/79 1269:3 Page:
XVIII-l
(The radiation monitors themselves are not in a true sense fail-safe; however, it is felt that the power supply they are connected to, plus daily frequent visual inspection and source checks, overweigh the ad-vantage of a fail-safe device).
These devices are set to alarm when the gamma radiation flux reaches 5 mr/hr. When the alarm goes off, the Emergency Evacuation Plan is immediately put into effect.
2313 261 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
2 Date: 3/22/79 Page: XVIII-2
{
J 6
'4J g.
L -Q 1
og U
- s. a
=
s 8
u__- u, +. -
.s 0
4 t
t i
s -
D g
7
- .< **,ga s.
t M
% 6 F
- 1 qa
-.>g N
e.
$hNNM r ' -
e 8.*
R
~
0
~ -
1
~ +
MAL M
L ant
.t, hP LAtI g
g g
g.
- 4La<
J.9 to, -
i 1i i
gi
. y g= =
L ggw g=
t
[E
.*3 t
p e.
gg t
f rv. l C
, i n$
V 4>
- i
_.~
,- s.
NC~ O NN l
T
,i N
O s
TC i
M ql N
_n G
A 5
E E
R A
GN i i D
I A
G L
IlI
-]i 0 DO 4
R m
_ e
$u
, t o
A-h L
s T
R y
A A
t C
,S O
G L
N 7
L._ a m
A 8
r 0
e E
G C
1
=
O N
C R
I 8
l E
P D
E I
1 A 1
L D
U D
L B
r t m
I e y r
Q 0
u i P
6 g.
l O
O i a H
s S
F c i
1 t
E L
f i
L C
e M
r t
A P
t E
o ss P
w i
A yaA s
t t.L Y
t
$eei t
e R ieoA L
tC B
m E
%A%A M
a TP OU t W E
c MA tr8 n
i* 0 A
u AEC v*T MRF F sS E
O l*1l I
i 6I thk a,
u B
9 L
08 u
TL 5 1 m F
t T
N L N a E
9 L A A
0 s
4 E
3 P
2 tN e
O o
t lE 9
G e
N I
D.
t tUB.
2
19.0 NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY LIMITS This section provides the limits which may be applied to the Nuclear Laboratories, and to the UO perations carried out by Nuclear 2
Products Manufacturing-Windsor.
All Laboratory operations are limited to 350 gm U235 for uranium enriched to more than 5% U235, and to 740 gm U235 for uranium enriched to 5% U23s or less.
Each such limited operation must be separated from any other limit by at least 12 feet.
Criticality safety of the less complex manufacturing operations is based on the use of limiting parameters which are applied to simple geo-metries.
Safe Individual Units (SIU) are selected on the basis of opti-mum moderation, and full reflection using published nuclear criticality safety data. These are spaced using the surface density method.
The remaining manufacturing operations are evaluated using two dimen-sional transport and/or 3 dimensional Monte Carlo Codes. The sixteen group Hansen-Roach cross section library is used for homogeneous systerrs while the CEPAK Code is used to generate four group cross sections for hetr ogeneous systems. A detailed validation of these calculational codes and cross sec-tions is provided in Exhibit D, 2313 263 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date:
3/22/79 gggg Page: XIX-1
19.1 LIMITS FOR INDIVIDUAL UNITS Safe Individual Unit (SIU) limits have been established using 1,2 published data.
Safet factors applied to units calculated to be one percent subcritical, and incorporated in the SIU's are:
Mass 2.3 Volume 1.3 Cylinder Dia.
1.1 Slab Thickness 1.2 These values are further reduced where necessary to assure maximum fraction critical values of 0.4 for geometrically limited units, and 0.3 for mass limited units.
An additional reduction has been applied to several mass and volume limits to assure that spacing requirements remain constant for all enrichments.
Resulting SIU's are tabulated in Table 19.1.
2313 264 1
UKAEA Handbook AHSB(1) 2 H. K. Clark, " Critical and Safe Masses and Dimensions of Lattices of U and UO Rods in Water", DP-1014 2
License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision: 0 Date:
3/22/79 Page: XIX-2
TABLE 19.1 Safe Individual Unit Limits for 5 4.1% enriched UO at optimum 2
moderation. All Mass and Volume limits adjusted to provide con-stant spacing areas for the enrichment shown.
Heterogeneous limits have been developed with optimum rod sizes (up to 0.4" diameter) taken to al ow for rellet chips, etc.
HGM0 GENE 0VS HETEROGENEOUS Limit f*
L'mit f*
Mass (Kg UO )
2 5.5 % U 3s 54
.19 50
.26 2
2 2.5-3.0 41
.23 38
.29 3.0-3.2 36
.23 36
.29 3.2-3.4 35
.25 33
.29 3.4-3.6 32
.26 30
.30 3.6-3.8 28
.26 27
.29 3.8-4.1 24
.25 24
.27 Volume (liters)**
5.5%
31
.39 22
.40 3
3.5-4.1 25
.38 18
.38 Cylinder Diameter (inches) 5.5%
10.7
.34 9.5
.36 3
3.5-4.1 9.8
.33 8.9
.34 Slab Thickness (inches) 5.5%
5.1 N/A 4.1 N/A 3
3.5-4.1 4.6 N/A 3.7 N/A Fraction of the equivalent unreflected critical spherical volume or mass.
Includes all available container volumes.
2313 265 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: XIX-3
19.2 INTERACTI0tl AflALYSIS (Sur face Density Method)
Activities involving SNM m y be conducted in single or two level areas of the facility. The surface dens'.ty method is used to evaluate arrays of 2
.3, and each geometry 0
SIV's where each mass limit has a fraction critical of 5.4.
All SIU's must have a separation of limit has a fraction critical of 0
at least one foot, edge to edge.
Spacings for mass ~ limited activities carried out in the single level portions of the facility are such that the contained UO and moderator, if " smeared" 2
over the alle ad spacing areas would not exceed 50% of water reflected in-finite slab surface density assuming optimum mass moderation.
For cylinder and volume limited activities, a spacing limit based on 25% of the minimum water reflected infinite slab thickness applies.
Slabs specified in 19.1 require no additional spacing, and may border the spacing boundary of any other array unit.
Portions of the facility contain two levels, each of which may be used for SNM.
In all cases, the floor deck of the second level consists of a 3/8" steel plate (minimum), which is at least 10 ft. above the ground floor. Mass limits on each level are spaced to 25% of the applicable slab thickness, and cylinder or volume limited units are spaced to 16% of the applicable slab thickness.
All array calculations have been performed assuming a doubly infinite planar system, based on the consideration that components of subcritical infinite arrays can be combined where the unit size and cell spacing is preserved.
Array reflection consists of a 16" thick concrete floor, and a 4" thick con-crete roof 25 ft. above the floor.
2313 266 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: XIX-4
TABLE 19.2 Spacing requirements for mass, volume, or cylinder SIU's specified in Table 19.1.
Spacing areas will be established to provide equal distances from the edges of the units to the spacing boundary in all directions.
Co-planar slabs specified in Table 10.1 require no additional spacing.
Limit Spacing Area 2
Mass 3.5 ft 2
Volume 9.0 ft 2
Cylinder (per ft. of length) 5.0 ft Mass limited SIU's may be stacked on a vertical centerline with at least 10 inch edge separations. This is demonstrated below.
s For two story operations, a 3/8 inch steel deck,10' above the floor separates the operating levels.
Spacing is as follows:
2 Mass 7.0 ft Cylinders 2
(11" 4 x 40" 19.)
27 ft Stacked Mass Limited SIU's If mass limited SIU's are stacked along a vertical axis, a sufficient constancy of surface density exists to permit application of the above limits.
Consider an infinite array of 31 liter spheres as sketched below:
2313 267 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: XIX-5
4" Concrete A
U(3.5)02+HO 2
g 2 gm U/cc g
I A
Z = <25' N
10" z
I
)
V i
Y 16" Concrete x, y This configuration has been evaluated using KEN 0 with 16 group Hansen-Roach cross sections with the following critical parameters:
N x,y (cm) t/ft z
1 59.6 8.1 2
86.0 7.8 3
114.0 6.6 4
122.6 7.1 5
145.8 7.3 Accordingly, stacked units with at least 10 inch vertical separation, and no column exceeding 5 units, can be spaced with the area being increased by a mul-tiple equal to the number of units in the stack.
To provide additional safety, stacked units will be limited to a maximum volume of 20 liters.
2313 268
~
License No. SNM-1057, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date:
3/22/79 Page:
XIX-6 12iHrd
All storage racks, furnaces, containment and processing equipment which provides nuclear safety limiting parameters will be designed to assure against failure under normal and reasonable overload conditions and under con-ditions of shock or collision foreseeable in the plant area. All equipment designed in-house shall incorporate a minimum safety factor of 3.
Any equip-ment procured out of house shall incorporate this requirement in the purchase specification. All equipment design shall conform to standard design practices, thereby assuring adequate structural integrity. Materials of construction will be selected to assure, as far as possible, resistance to fire or corrosion.
Whenever more than one SIU is allowed in any given hood or box, positive spacing fixtures shall be used to assure spacing. Carts, limited to one mass or volume SIU shall measure at least three feet on a side, and shall be designed to assure that the SIU is centered.
In ct:ses where the spacing area extends beyond the equipment boundaries, such as tre storage facilities, the spacing houndary will be indicated with a colored line. The line may be crossed by carts only to permit an operator to transfer that SIU to an available storage position.
2313 269 License No. SNM-1067 Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date:
3/22/79 Page:
XIX-7
EXHIBIT C NUCLEAR PRODUCTS MANUFACTURING OPERATIONS AND PROCESSES This exhibit contains detailed descriptions of all operations in the Manufacturing Facility (Buildings #17 and #21). Sufficient detail is pro-vided to permit an independent verification of the adequacy of the controls for the purpose of assuring safe operations.
Several proprietary drawings are included; these are identified with the letter E in their identification number.
Nuclear criticality limits are taken from Section 19. However, in certain operations, the intricacies of the equipment require further analysis, which is provided herein.
Details of specific calculations used to support various aspects of this analysis, and several statements and considerations in Section 19 are dis-cussed in Exhibit D.
This exhibit is considered to provide a typical analysis for operations con-ducted within the scope of this license.
Present arrangements of the equipment in the pelletizing facility are shown in Figure E-1.
This arrangement may be changed in accordance with the procedures of Section 8 and the limits provided in Section 19.
2313 270 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date:
3/22/79 Page: C-1 1233:a
1.0 RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY The principle radiological safety effort in the pelletizing facility is, as described in Section 15, the control and evaluation of airborne contamination. Hence, all operations are performed in hoods or dry boxes which are under negative pressure with respect to the room. All air re-leased from the facility is passed through absolute filters rated at a 99.97 removal efficiency for 0.3 micron particles.
These filters will be replaced on a scheduled basis, or when hood velocity oc differential pres-sure measurements indicate the need.
Each new operation will be evaluated using air sampling equipment as des-cribed in Section 15.6.2.
Once established, random checks will be carried out at each work station, and all operators will use lapol-mounted air sam-plers on a scheduled basis to assure that monitoring is carried out at least 10% of the time. Air samples will be taken at positions which closely approximate breathing zone area.
It is the intent of Combustion Engineering to assure that operations on uranium do not cause exposures which exceed a
-10 level of 0.25 x 10 pCi/cc. Operations which, because of their associated physical characteristics (including material handling and ventilation),
result in higher exposures will be modified to achieve the above limit. On the other hand, it is recognized that the behavior of individual operators can be a significant contributing factor to an individual's exposure, and that this may not be amenable to the desired degree of improvement. Where the individual operator is found to contribute significantly to higher ex-posures, closer personnel surveillance will be maintained. Thus, an individ-ual whose 40 hr exposure exceeds 50% of MPC will be continuously monitored a
with a lapel sampler.
If his exposure exceeds 80% of MPC, he is removed a
from exposure to airborne contamination.
It is the responsibility of the licensee to evaluate these situations to determine the relative contributions of individuals and equipment.
2313 271 License No. SNM-1067. Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: C-2
2.0 VENTILATION Ventilation in Building #17 is provided by four separate exhaust systems as described herein:
FA-1 Powder Preparation and Pressing - This system has a capacity of 12,100
-13 SCFM and operates with yearly averaged discharge levels of <2x10 Ci/
cc.
It incorporates prefilters and a double bank of 12 absolute filters, each 99.97% efficient.
The air exhaust from this system which is either returned to or released from the plant is sampled 100% of the time and analyzed each day.
FA-2 Furnace H Burnoff - This system has a capacity of 1340 SCFM and operates 2
-13 with yearly averaged discharge levels of <3x10 Ci/cc.
It incorporates prefilters and a single bank of 4 absolute filters, each 99.97% efficient.
The air exhaust from this system is released from the plant and sampled 100% of the time and analyzed each day.
FA-3 Pellet Grinding and Rod Loading - This system has a capacity of 19,422 SCFM and operates with yearly averaged discharge levels of <3x10-13 Ci/cc.
It incorporates prefilters and a single bank of 21 absolute filters, each 99.97% efficient. The air exhaust from this system is released from the plant and sampled 100% of the time and analyzed each day.
FA-4 Recycle Powder Area - This system has a capacity of 6000 SCFM and operates with yearly averaged discharge levels of <5x10~I4pCi/cc.
It incorporates prefilters and a double bank of 6 absolute filters, each 99.97% efficient.
The air exhaust from this system is released from the plant and sampled 100% of the time and analyzed each day.
The capacities of the ventilation systems have been matched to provide a negative pressure differential between the Pellet Processing Facility and all surrounding work areas.
2313 272 License No. SNM-1067. Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: C-3
3.0 Ug POWDER PROCESSING 3.1 Receipt of Material All UO2 pcwder is received in licensed shipping containers from C-E's dry process oxide conversion plant at Hematite, Missouri. The as-received 9.75" diameter inner stainless steel U02 p wder cans are stored in the vir-gin powder storage area (W.S. P-1 in Figure E-1).
The moisture content of the powder is less than 0.5 wt.% as verified by 8 years of moisture analysis on each shipment. However, prior to shipment of the powder from the Hema-tite plant, the powder is visually checked to assure that the moisture con-tent is less than 7 wt.%.
(This dry process UO powder is transformed rap-2 idly to a muddy, fluid state at moisture levels of 7% or higher).
The inner shipping cans as well as the outer shipping container are leaktight so as to prevent any uptake of moisture in transit.
(U0 is not hygroscopic). Any 2
damaged shipping containers will be visually inspected to assure that the moisture content of the fuel is less than 7 wt.%.
3.2 Virgin Powder Storage Area The virgin powder storage area is isolated from the remainder of the plant on all sides by concrete block walls, a double steel roof, and a metal fire door. This door is normally in the open position, and is automatically closed upon activation of the fire alarm, and on failure of electrical power. This is considered adequate to exclude the introduction of water in the event of a fire. This area will be kept free of combustibles, and is located such that there are no potentially hazardous items such as boilers in the vicinity of the area. An ammonia cracker is housed in a concrete bloc'( building which is located some 25 feet northwest of Building #17.
In view of its many redundant safety features, it is not viewed as a potentially hazardous item.
The storage area itself is a : - 6 array of parallel roller conveyors, each 128 inches long. The steel structure associated with the conveyors provides a minimum edge to edge separation distance of 12 inches between all powder containers, both horizontally and vertically.
2313 273 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision: 0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: C-4
Criticality safety Analysis Ine following conservative assumptions were incoproated into the calcu-lational model of the Virgin Powder Storage Area:
- 1) All steel structural materials were neglected.
- 2) The fuel was assumed to be a homogeneous mixture of U0 containing 2
7.0 wt.% H 0, 2
- 3) The rack was filled to capacity (330 cans of U02 powder) and each individual can was assumed to be full.
4)
Effects of interspersed water moderation and flooding were not addressed.
The KENO-IV Code with sixteen group Hansen-Roach cross sections was used to determine the reactivity of the Virgin Powder Storage Area under the con-ditions noted above.
Dimensional details of the model are provided in Section 1.1 of the demonstration section of this license. Ak f 0.9412 0.0078 eff was obtained for an infinite system in the horizontal direction.
3.3 Batch Make-Up Powder containers are removed from the virgin powder storage area and placed on a conveyor (W.S. P-2) (safe cylinder limit) for transfer to the Batch Make-Up Hood (.S. P-3).
A maximum of three powder containers are clamped to fixtures in the hood, where an appropriate batch of less than 35 Kg CO is 2
weighed out and put into 5-gallon pails.
The batch weights and enrichment are recorded on the container.
A water tight cover is secured to these batch con-tainers and they are then conveyed (W.S. P-4) to a lift (W.S. P-5) for transfer to the blender hoods (W.S. P-6).
The batch make-up operation is enclosed in a ventilated hood.
Sufficient negative pressure is provided to assure a minimum face velocity of 100 fom.
Criticality Safety Analysis The following conservative assumptions were incorporated into the calcu-lational model of the Batch Make-Up Hood and associated conveyors (W.S. P-3 and P-4):
- 1) The 3 stainless steel U02 p wder cans inside the hood were considered to be full at optimum moderation and maximum enrichment (4.1 wt.% U235),
21 The 5-gallon batch make up bucket inside the hood was assumed to con-tain 002 powder at optimum moderation and maximum enrichment (4.1 wt.%
U235),
License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date: 3/22/79 23J} }74 Page: C-5 12S3.3
- 3) All structural steel in the hood was neglected.
- 4) All sealed containers of U0 n conveyors (W.S. P-2 and P-4) 2 adjacent to the hood. were assumed to contain 7.0 wt.% H 0.
2 The KENO-IV Code with 16 group Hansen-Roach cross sections was used to determine the reactivity of the system under various conditions of moderation.
Optimum moderation of the fuel containers within the hood occurred at a fuel concentration of 1.8 gm U/cc in water, assuming no external mist. The highest reactivity of 0.7934 0.0070 for an infinite system (at 1.8 gm U/cc in water) occurred for the full flood case.
Additional calculations for the external full flood condition were run for various concentrations of fuel in water ranging from 1.2 - 3.5 gm U/cc. The peak system reactivity of 0.8595 0.0117 for the flooded cases occurred at a fuel concentration of 2.6 gm U/cc in water.
Dimen-sional details of the calculational model and results of the calculations are discussed in Section 1.2 of the demonstration section of this license.
3.4 Powder Preparation and Blending 2 p wder from one batch container (135 Kg 00 ) is transferred to a blender 00 2
where it is mixed with a binder (W.S. P-6).
Two separate blenders feed a common powder spread funnel by means of individual powder transfer pipes entering at a 45 angle. An identical powder prep line runs parallel to this one at a center-line distance of 13 feet.
The blending operation is enclosed in a ventilated hood.
Sufficient negative pressure is provided to assure a minimum face velocity of 100 fpm.
3.4.1 Drying Agglomerated 002 p wder is spread onto the dryer belt (W.S. P-7) from the powder spread funnel to a controlled depth of 1/2". A complete enciosure is pro-vided around the dryer belt assembly and this enclosure is maintained at a slight negative pressure. The discharge end of the dryer belt utilizes a wiper blade to prevent the flow of significant amounts of material to the plenum under the belt.
Nevertheless, this plenum shall be inspected once per week and cleaned as necessary.
2313 275 License No SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date:
3/22/79 Page:
C-6
The belt dryer assumely operates on a 1/2" slab limit. (The criticality safety analysis also assumed an accidental accumulation of up to 1/2" of -
powder under the dryer belt in the event of malfunction of the wiper blade).
The safety of the dryer assembly is assured by this restricted slab thickness.
The dryer heater controls are wired to the motor control such that the dryer belt cannot be activated unless the heaters are turned on, and to stop the belt under conditions of high heat (high heat automatically shuts off the heating elements).
3.4.2 Granulation Dried oxide is gravity-fed into a granulator (U.S. P-8) where it is sized for subsequent pressing. The granulated powder is then gravity-fed through a discharge funnel ending in a 2 inch square opening.
A short adapter af 2 inch circular cross section is welded to the funnel to allow connection of a 2" diameter hose which is then connected to a portable hopper below (W.S. P-9).
A complete enclosure is provided around the granulator.
It is maintained at a negative pressure to preclude dusting.
Criticality Safety Analysis The powder blending, drying, and granulation stations (W.S. P-6, P-7, P-8 and P-9) were divided into two parts for calculational purposes:
The back end of the station included the blenders,the powder transfer pipes leading to the powder spread funnel, and the first 10 feet of the 30" wide dryer belt. The spread funnel is fixed in position to restrict the powder discharge from it to a 24" wide by 1/2" deep layer of UO
- 2 The following conservative assumptions were incorporated into the cal-culational model of the back end:
2313 276 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: C-7
- 1) The blender hoods are restricted to 535 kg U02 per station.
It was assumed that this mass of U0 was located at the base of each 2
blender hood directly above each powder transfer pipe.
2)
It was assumed that the above masses were hemispherical in shape, and were at optimum moderation and maximum enrichment (4.1 wt.%
U235). The radii of these hemispheres varies as a function of the assumed concentration of UO in water in order to maintain a fixed 2
mass of 35 Kg UO in each.
2
- 3) Although the belt dryer is limited to 1/2" of U0 powder, the g
model allows for an accidental accumulation of 1/2" under the dryer belt in the event of malfunction of the wiper blade.
- 4) The powder transfer pipes and powder spread funnel were assumed to be filled to capacity with U0 at optimum moderation and maximum 2
enrichment (4.1 wt.% U235),
- 5) An infinite array of stations was analyzed although there are only 2 parallel stations.
Sixteen group Hansen-Roach cross sections were used in KENO-IV to deter-mine the reactivity of the system under various conditions. Optimum mod-eration (assuming no external mist) occurred at a fuel concentration of 0.8 gm u/cc in water (very undermoderated system initially). Variable density external water mist was then introduced to determine peak reac-tivity of the system. The highest k of 0.8498 0.0103 occurred for eff the fall flood case although a secondary peak of 0.7656 0.0077 was found at 0.025 gm/cc interspersed water moderation. As this system was initially undermoderated, it was difficult to determine whether the large amount of water necessary to bring the system to peak reactivity was a result of the large amount introduced into the fuel directly (0.8 gm U/cc in water) or the result of full density external water introduced in the flooded case. As a final check, the fuel concentra-tion in water (gm U/cc) was varied while holding the external moderation 2313 277 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Data: 3/22/79 Page: C-8 1%C32
condition at full flood. A peak reactivity of 0.8684 0.0101 was obtained at a fuel concentration of 1.2 gm u/cc in water, although the reactivities of the other cases resulted in statistical overlap, and were therefore essen-tially of the same magnitude. The conclusion drawn from the above analysis is that peak reactivity for this system occurred as a result of external flooding and reflection rather than by optimization of the fuel concentration in the various individual fuel-bearing components of the system.
Dimensional details of the cal-culational model and results obtained are discussed in Section 1.3 of the demonstra-tion section of this license.
The front end of the station included the last 10 feet of the 30" wide dryer belt, the granulator, the discharge funnel and hose, and a cylindrical press feed hopper.
Two different hoppers are available for use depending on the enrichment being pro-For 5.5 wt.% U235, an 11" diameter, 40" long cylindrical hopper with a cessed.
3 conical top is used.
For enrichments up to 4.1 wt.% U235, a 10.5", 17.7" long cylindrical hopper (safe volume) with a flat top is used. The longer hoppers will be stored under lock and key prior to the start of processing of any enrichment greater than 3.5 wt.% U235 Reactivity calculations were performed at the maximum allowable enrichment for each case.
The following conservative assumptions were in-corporated into the calculational models of the front end:
- 1) All system components except for the dryer belt were assumed to be filled to capacity with UO at optimum moderation and maximum enrichment (3.5 or 2
4.1 wt.% U235),
- 2) Although the belt dryer is limited to 1/2" of UO2 p wder, the model allows for an accidental accumulation of 1/2" under the dryer belt in the event of malfunction of the wiper blade.
- 3) An infinite array of stations was analyzed although there are only 2 parallel stations.
Sixteen group Hansen-Roach cross sections were used in KENO-IV to determine the reactivity of the system under various conditions.
For the first case, the system was analyzed at 4.1 wt.% U235 with the 10.5" diameter,17.7" long press feed hopper.
Optimum moderation (assuming no external mist) occurred at a fuel concentration of 1.8 gm U/cc in water. Variable density external water mist was then introduced to determine peak reactivity of the system with the 10.5" hopper. The highest k eff of 0.9386 0.0075 occurred for the full flood case.
33 7g License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision: 0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: C-9
235 For the second case, the system was analyzed at 3.5 wt.% U with the 11" dia-meter, 40" long press feed hopper.
The maximum k in the absence of external eff water mist occurred at 2.2 gm U/cc in water. This result was derived from cal-values of 0.800 culations at 2.0, 2.2, and 2.4 gm U/cc with associated keff 0.010, 0.833 0.014, and 0.804 0.014 respectively.
Variable density external water mist was then introduced to determine peak reactivity of the system with of 0.934 0.017 occurred for the full flood the 11" hopper. The highest keff case. This result was derived from calculations at 0.001, 0.01, 0.05, 0.10, and values of 0.825 0.016, 0.821 0.020, 1.0 gm/cc of H O with associated keff 2
0.805 0.012, 0.850 0.014, and 0.934 0.017 respectively.
Dimensional details of the calculational models and results obtained are discussed in Section 1.4 of the demonstration section of this license.
3.5 Final Mixing Filled press feed hoppers may be rolled to assure complete blending of the die lubricant (W.S. P-10).
3.6 Pressing The filled portable hoppers are transferred to the pelletizing presses (W.S. P-11) and secured to assure their stability and the containment of powder.
Powder is gravity fed to the press, and compacted to green pellets which are placed into furnace boats. The boats have a maximum height of 3.7 inches. Only one boat shall be at each press at any one time.
Each press is provided a spacing 2
area of at least 20 ft.
The press is provided with enclosures which assure adequate ventilation at the opening face, and at the junction of the portable hopper with the press.
Air flow rates are sufficient to assure face velocities of at least 100 fpm.
Two work benches (W.S. P-12) are provided for inspection of pellets. These stations are limited to one safe mass 'each.
3.7 Dewaxing and Sintering Furnace boats containing green pellets are charged in a single line to a 2313 279 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date:
3/22/79 Page:
C-10
dewaxing furnace (W.S. P-13), and then to a sintering furnace (W.S. P-14),
where ur. der controlled conditions, the pellets attain the desired properties.
Because the UO is in a compacted form, dusting is minimal, and ventilation 2
is not required. Hydrogen burnoff exhaust is vented from the building, and is filtered and monitored as specified in Section 2.0.
The furnaces and their interconnecting conveyors are slab limited, with pellet heights never exceeding 3.7 inches.
It should be pointed out that the thickness of sintered pellets in the furnace boats will be considerably less than that of the green pellets be-cause of the densification which occurs during sintering.
Furnace boats containing sintered pellets are stored at W.S. P-15.
A maximum slab thickness of 3.7 inches is permitted.
3.8 Final Sizing Sintered pellets are transferred to the grinder feed system (W.S. P-16) where they are aligned for the grinding operation which is carried out under a stream of coolant. The coolant is centrifuged (W.S. P-26 safe volume) to remove solids, and is recirculated at a uranium concentration considerably less than ene gm/ liter. The infeeder, grinder and outfeeder (W.S. P-16 and 18) have pellet con-figurations limited to 3.7 inch slab thicknesses.
Grinder sludge is removed from the centrifuge and dried in an oven (W.S. P-24).
The dried material is subsequently stored in the concrete block storage area awaiting final disposition.
A complete enclosure is provided around the grinder to preclude the dusting of UO. This enclosure is maintained at a negative pressure with respect to the room.
2 The centrifuge is limited to a safe volume of less than 25 liters, as shown in 2
Figure E-4, and is provided a spacing area of 9.0 ft. The grinder coolant may collect in a one inch deep sump in the grinder and in a 25 liter sump behind the grinder, as shown in Figure E-1.
Experience has shown that no appreciable sludge accumulates in the grinder sump.
The centrifuge is cleaned periodically as re-quired to permit continued operation.
2313 280 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date:
3/22/79 Page:
C-ll
Because of its low uranium concentration (5.0 gm U/ liter, the coolant is of 5
no concern with respect to nuclear criticality safety.
Nevertheless, Figure settling which E-1 does show spacing for the grinder sump to allow for any UO2 may occur.
Grinder coolant is normally recirculated, but may be disposed of by evaporation, or by discharge to the radiation waste system.
In the latter case,
-5 the uranium concentration is verified to be less than 2 x 10 pCi/cc.
Properly sized pellets are transferred on a conveyor (W.S. P-18) to a storage rack (W.S. P-20).
Both are limited to a slab thickness of 3.7 inches.
2313 281 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date:
3/22/79 Page:
C-12
- o., w, S M v u.Q
4.0 STRUCTURAL MATERIALS All storage racks, furnaces, containment and processing equipment which provide nuclear safety limiting parameters will be designed to assure against failure under normal and reasonable overload conditions of shock or collision foreseeable in the plant area.
Materials of con-struction will be selected to assure, as far as possible, resistance to fire or corrosion.
2313 282 License No. SNM-1067. Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: C-13
5.0 SCRAP RECYCLE All clean scrap is accumulated for reprocessing and recycle with the feed material.
Scrap may be milled to yield desired particle size best suited for the processing, oxidized and reduced to assure removal of vola-tile additives and to achieve the desired ceramic properties of the re-sulting recycle UO, and blended to assure uniformity. The following equip-2 ment is in luded in the pellet shop and annex:
a) 0xidation and reduction furnace (W.S. P-65) b) Milling equipment (W.S. P-62) c)
Boildown equipment (W.G. P-23 & P-24) d) General purpose hood (W.S. P-67) e)
Filter knockdown hood (W.S. P-69) f) Storage facilities (as shown) e of Blender (W.S. P-64) h) Micronizer (W.S. P-68)
The furnace is similar in its operation to the furnaces previously described.
Although the feed and exit zones of the furnace are not ventilated, sufficient reserve ventilation (Approximately 1800 SCFM) exists to provide such ventila-tion if surveys indicate the need.
The remaining operations except blending, are all carried out in hoods with sufficient ventilation to assure a face velocity of 100 fpm.
The air flow rates and ventilation details for these operations are shown in Figure E-3.
.These operations are controlled by use of mass or volume limits in accordance with Section 19, with spacing provisions taken from Table 19.2 of that section, as shown in Figure E-1.
Positive spacing fixtures are used to assure spacing wherever more than one SIU is allowed in any given hood or box. A material balance log is maintained at the Milling Hood and Micronizer to provide addi-tional assurance that the criticality limit of one safe mass will not be ex-ceeded at these locations.
2313 283 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: C-14
6.0 STORAGE AND TRANSFER 6.1 Concrete Block Storaae Area A concrete block storage area is provided as shown in Figure E-1 (W.S. P-27 and P-70). This storage area is intended for volume limited SIV's and has a c'ximum height of 7 feet. The blocks are of solid 10" 3
thick concrete, having a minimum density of 125#/ft. Mortar is used to join the blocks and to secure the structure to the building wall.
Steel shelves, of at least 16 ga. thickness are built into the structure with a vertical spacing of at least 16 inches.
Each storage position measures 16" wide x 14" deep, and is lined on three sides with 1/4" thick mild steel. The criticality safety analysis demonstrates that the spacing boundary can be located 48 inches from the front of the shelves. All pellets are contained in 3-1/2 gallon or smaller containers; homogeneous UO is contained in 5-gallon or smaller containers.
2 Criticality Safety Analysis The following conservative assumptions were incorporated into the calcula-tional model of the concrete block storage area:
1)
Each storage position was assumed to contain a 5-gallon poly bucket filled with UO at optinum moderation and maximum en-2 richment (4.1 wt.% U235),
- 2) The system was assumed to be infinite in the horizontal plane.
- 3) Variable density external water mist was introduced to deter-mine peak reactivity of the system.
The KENO-IV Code with 16 group Hansen-Roach cross sections was used to de-termine the reactivity of the concrete block storage area under various con-ditions of moderation. Optimum moderation of the fuel occurred at a concen-tration of 2.5 gm U/cc in water assuming no external water mist. The peak reactivity of the system, keff = 0.9207 0.0081, occurred at an external water mist density of 0.75 gm/cc.
Dimensional details of the calculational model and results obtained for the various conditions analyzed are presented in Section 1.5 of the demonstration section of this license.
23i3284 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: C-15
6.2 Pellet Storage Shelves Steel shelves (W.S. P-22 and P-ll4) are provided for pellet storage.
The shelves are three high. They have a width of 18" and are limited to a slab thickness of 3.7 inches. The criticality safety analysis demonstra-tes that the spacing boundary can be located 60 inches from the front of the shelves.
Criticality Safety Analysis The following conservative assumptions were incnrporated into the calcula-tional model of the pellet storage shelves:
1)
Each shelf was assumed to hold a 3.7 inch thickness of UO2 at optimum moderation and maximum enrichment (4.1 wt.% U235),
- 2) The system was assumed to be infinite in the horizontal plane.
- 3) Variable density external water mist was introduced to deter-mine peak reactivity.
- 4) All steel construction material (except the 1/4 inch shelf thickness) was neglected.
The KENO-IV Code with 16 group Hansen-Roach cross sections was used to de-termine tha reactivity of the pellet storage shelves under various conditions of moderation. Optimum moderation of the fuel occurred at a concentration of 2.7 ym U/cc in water, assuming no external water mist. The peak reactivity of the system, k
= 0.8188 0.0088, occurred at an external water mist eff density of 0.175 gm/cc.
Dimensional details of the calculational model and results obtained for the various conditions analyzed are presented in Section 1.6 of the demonstration section of this license.
Addional storage (W.S. P-15, P-19 and P-21) is provided for slab storage of finished pellets. A 5.5 inch slab limit is imposed, based on the following:
Sintered pellets, when randomly loaded into sintering boats, or storage trays, pack to an average density of 5.9 gm/cc, with a 2a variation of 0.394 as de-termined from a series of 14 measurements. Thus, at a 95% confidence level, the V
/V ratio does not exceed 0.995 and from Figure 1.E.16 of UKAEA H0 UO2 2
5.4" Handbook AHSB 1, the critical infinite slab thickness for 4.1% enriched 0
License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date: 3/22/79 2313 285
" S*
'-'6
diameter pellets is 6.7".
Applying a safety factor of 1.2 yields a slab limit of 5.5 inches.
6.3 Transfer of Material Material may be transferred on carts which accommodate one mass or slab limited SIU, or may be transferred by hand, one SIU at a time. Carts used for mass limited SIU's shall provide for centering of the unit, and shall measure at least two feet on a side.
Because most spacing areas do not extend beyond the physical boundary of the equipment, spacing between transfer carts and the equipment is of no concern.
In cases where the spacing area extends beyond the equipment boundaries, such as the storage facilities, the spacing boundary will be indicated with colored tape. The tape may be crossed by carts only when they contain no more than one mass or volume limited SIU, and then only to permit an operator to transfer that SIU to an available storage position.
2313 286 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date:
3/22/79 Page:
C-17
7.0 PRETREATMENT OF LOW LEVEL LIQUID WASTES In order to effect a reduction in the quantities of UO released to 2
the retention tanks in Building #6, low level liquid wastes, consisting primarily of floor mop water will be pumped into a 10 inch diameter,11 foot long settling tank with a release line located 18 inches from its lowest point. The water is then passed through a high efficiency closed loop centrifuge system, sampled to verify acceptable discharge levels, and transferred to the retention tanks in Building #6. The settling tank is located in the rod loading area, and is shown as W.S. P-113 in Figure E-1.
Based on past experience, wash water may contain up to 10-3pCi/cc b0.5 gm U/t).
Much of this activity quickly settles to the bottom of the tank.
Accordingly, criticality considerations are applied only to the lower 18 inches of the tank, with the balance of the tank considered to have a suf-ficiently low uranium concentration to preclude further criticality consider-ations.
Although the diameter of the tank (10 inches) slightly exceeds the Section 19 limit (9.8 inches), it is well below the mininum critical diameter (10.8 inches) for a fully reflected infinite cylinder.
In addition, the optimum concentration necessary to achieve criticality in a 10.8 inch cylinder is between 2000 and 2500 gm U/t, a factor of 4000 higher than the uranium con-centrations observed in the mop water handled. The volume of the settling tank is 23.2 liters. The allowable surface density (ta) is taken as 25% of the critical infinite slab thickness (tc).
Accordingly, ta = 1.55" or 3.65 2
2 liters /ft.
The required spacing area for the tank is therefore 6.35 ft,
Sludge and other uranium bearing solids will be collected in volume limited SIV's.
This material may be subsequently loaded into trays to a maximum depth of 3.7 inches, dried in an oven (W.S. P-23 or 24) and stored in author-ized packages awaiting fin'l disposition.
a 2313 287 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision: 0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: C-18
8.0 R0D LOADING AND ASSEMBLY FABRICATION 8.1 Dellet Alignment and Drying Pellets from the pellet fabrication facility, or from outside vendors are placed on a downdraft table (W.S.100) where they are loaded for place-ment into drying furnaces (W.S.101 and 102).
On the table, the pellet con-figuration is limited to a 3.7 inch slab thickne.s. The UO2 pellets are placed on aluminum troughs ir, approximately 12 foot lengths before being loaded into the furnaces. The inside diameter of the furnaces is 20", and the overall length is 13 feet.
The furnaces are dry and about 12 inches above the floor level.
Water entry is possible only when the doors at either end are open; however, un&r this condition, free drainage will occur. With the doors closed, the furnace is a sealed chamber and moderation control is assured.
Criticality Safety Analysis The following conservative assumptions were incorporated into the calcula-tional model of the pellet drying furnaces:
1)
It was assumed that all aluminum pellet troughs were fully loaded with maximum diameter pellets (0.3765") at maximum enrichment (4.1 wt.% U 35),
2
- 2) The furnaces were assumed to be infinitely long and spaced 36.5" on center.
An infinite array was assumed, although there are only two furnaces.
3)
Variable density water mist was introduced to determine peak reactivity of the system.
- 4) All aluminum pellet troughs were omitted and the variable density mist was substituted in their place.
2313 288 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: C-19
8.2 Rod Loading and Fuel Rod Transport Carts Pellets are transferred to a downdraft loading table (W.S.103) where they e e limited to a 3.7 inch thick slab configuration, inspected, and loaded into.ods.
The loaded rods are placed into carts (W.S.104) each of which can hold up to 250 fuel rods in parallel sleeves which are spaced on four rings in an annular fixture with an I.D. of approximately 10 inches and an 0.D. of approximately 22 inches. Guard rails prevent the carts from coming any closer then three feet center-to-center. The carts are used in normally dry areas to transfer the rods to operations which include end plug welding (W.S.105),
weld deflashing (U.S.107 and 10d) and leak testing (W.S.109). These opera-tions are performed on one rod at a time.
Rods are immediately returned to the cart after each step is.:ompleted.
Finished rods are fluoroscoped (W.S.
111) and are checked for errichment (W.S.112) with a slab limit of 3.7 inches.
Criticality Safety Analysis The following conservative assumptions were incorporated into the calculational model of the fuel rod carts:
- 1) Only the 1/4 inch thick, 4" 0.D. inner steel cylindrical annulus was accounted for in the model. All other steel construction material was neglected.
- 2) The carts were assumed to be infinitely long and spaced 36 inches, center-to-center to form an infinite array in the horizontal plane.
- 3) The fuel rods are contained in 1/2 inch, Sch 40 PVC tubes, each 134 inches long. There are 250 tubes arranged in 5 concentric rings with an average pitch of 1.18361 inches. The fuel tube region of the cart is thus a cylindrical annulus beginning at 4" from the centerline of the cart and extending to a radius of 7.312 inches.
In the calculational model, it was assumed that all 250 positions were occupied by the largest diameter rods (.3765" 0.D. U02 pellets at 10.03 gm/cc stacked density with a Zr-4 cladding thickness of
.028 inch) at maximum enrichment (4.1 wt.% U235),
2313 289 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date:
3/22/79 Page: C-20
- 4) Four group cross sections were generated using the CEPAK Code for various external water mist conditions for the six regions used in the model:
the fuel annulus, the inner steel ring, the three variable density mist regions, and the concrete floor and ceiling.
The KENO-IV Code was used to determine the reactivity of the fuel rod trans-port carts under various external water mist conditions. The peak reactivity of the fuel rod cart, k
= 0.7756 0.0052, occurred for the full density eff water condition.
Dimensional details of the calculational model and results obtained are presented in Section 1.8 of the demonstration section of this license.
2313 290 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date:
3/22/79 Page:
C-21
8.3 Autoclave Corrosion Test The six autoclaves used for corrosion testing of finished fuel rods are shown as W.S. 116-121 in Figure E-1.
The stainless steel tanks are 14 feet long and have an inside diameter of 14 inches with a wall thickness of 1.5 inches.
The center line distance between autoclaves is a minimum of 66 inches.
Each autoclave is limited to 32 fuel rods by administrative control. The fuel rods are held by stainless steel fixtures consisting of eight plates which are five inches wide and 1/8 inch thick.
During opera-tion, the interior of the autoclave can experience all conditions of water moderation, from completely dry to full density water.
Criticality safety of the autoclaves is based on dimensional comparison with the fuel assembly storage area. The fuel assemblies have been designed for maximum reactivity and have a k of less than 0.90 in full density water.
eff (See Section 8.7).
The rod spacing in the fuel assembly is thus the optimum.
If the fuel rods were aligned in the autoclave at this optimum spacing, it would thus take 256 rods to achieve a k of approx.
0.90.
The maximum eff number of rods allowed (32) provides a large margin of safety under all con-ditions of moderation and reflection.
Even with all six autoclaves filled, the number of fuel rods present (192) would be less than the number required for one fuel assembly of the 16 x 16 type.
In Section 8.7, a 10 x 13 array of fuel assemblies spaced 20" apart (minimum) led to a k of 0.89.
The eff autoclaves are spaced a minimum of 66 inches eiter-to-center and would be considerably less reactive than the fuel assemoly storage area because of greater leakage.
8.4 Fuel Rod Storage Area The multi-level storage area (W.S.122 in Figure E-1) for boxes of fuel rods consists of up to 10 tiers of 32 locations each.
The steel fuel rod boxes have a maximum length of 14'4" and an inside width and depth of 8 inches and 5-3/8 inches respectively.
A vertical spacing of 12-1/2 inches between boxes is maintained, the first tier being 18 inches above the con-crete floor.
Lateral spacing is restricted by physical barriers to a minimum of 4 inches.
The rod boxes rest on roller conveyors to facilitate movement in and out of the storage array and are held in place by a fixed brace at the License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision: 0 Date:
3/22/79 2313 291 Page: C-22
back end and by a sprina loaded door at the front end.
Each box is equipped with a tight fitting aluminum cover which overla.ps the outside edge of the box by a minimum of one inch. One box may remain uncovered for short periods of time to allow for the addition or removal of rods for inspection purposes provided that personnel are in attendance. The entire storage array is covered by sheet metal on all four sides to assure the exclusion of water.
Spring loaded doors overlap the rectangular openings in the front of the rack and allow access only for insertion and removal of the fuel rod boxes.
Each spring loaded door covers the openina in front of four rod boxes on the same horizontal plane. The roof of the storage rack consists of corrugated fiberglass on a 3% pitch to assure adequate drainage to the floor. All joints and connections on the external covering of the rack are seale6 with waterproof caulking. Moderation control is thus assured under all conditions. Water accumulation in the vicinity of the storage rack is not considered credible in view of the close proximity of an open equipment pit in the floor which is 30 feet x 60 feet x 18 feet deep. A 3 foot deep sump at the bottom of the pit is equipped with a level detector which activates a pump to transfer any accumulated water to the industrial sewer system.
Criticality Safety Analysis The following conservative assumptions were incorporated into the calculational model of the fuel rod storage area:
- 1) The fuel rods, if in a tightly packed hexagonal array, would result in over 300 rods in each box. An infinite array of boxes in the hori-zontal tiers was assumed.
The fuel was homogenized over the volume of the box and was assumed to be dry.
- 2) All rod boxes were assumed to be filled to capacity at maximum enrich-ment (4.1 wt.% U235).
The smallest diameter rods (0.382 inch) were used to obtain maximum fuel loading. The Zr-4 cladding (0.025 inch thickness) was homogenized with the fuel.
2313 292 License No. SNM-1067 Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date:
3/22/79 Page:
C-23
- 3) A lateral separation distance of 3.5 inches between rod boxes was assumed.
Interspersed moderation was not used based on the design of the storage area.
- 4) All steel construction material was neglected.
- 5) A 15 tier array was analyzed although a maximum of 10 shall be permitted.
The 16 group Hansen-Roach cross sections were used in KENO-IV to determine reactivity of the system under the conditions noted above. Ak f 0.7994 eff 0.0050 was obtained for a 15 tier infinite array. A second calculation of a finite array with 16 inch concrete reflectors on all sides yielded a k eff of 0.7372 0.0045.
Details of the calculational model are presented in Section 1.9 of the demonstration section of this license.
8.5 Double Shelf Rod Storage Racks The double shelf storage racks for fuel rods hold a maximum of 12 steel boxes identical in all respects to those in the multi-tier array described above.
Each box is equipped with a tight fitting aluminum cover which over-laps the outside edge of the box by a minimum of one inch.
One box may re-main uncovered for short periods of time to allow for the addition or removal of rods for inspection purposes provided that personnel are in attendance.
Spacing between boxes in both a vertical and horizontal direction is a minimum of 6 inches.
Minimum center-to-center spacing between storage racks is 55 inches and the racks are considered to be present in an infinite linear array.
The location of these racks is shown as W.S. 129 in Figure E-1.
The following conservative assumptions were incorporated into the calculational model of the double shelf fuel rod storage racks:
- 1) The fuel rods, if in a tightly packed hexagonal array, would result in over 300 rods in each box.
The racks permit storage of 12 boxes each (6 in the vertical direction) and an infinite linear array of storage racks was assumed. The fuel was homogenized over the volume of the box and was assumed to be dry.
2313 293
. License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 kevision: 0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: C-2a 1E 3.0
- 2) All rod boxes were assumed to be filled to capacity at maximum enrichment (4.1 wt.% U235). The smallest diameter rods (0.382 inch) were used to obtain maximum fuel loading. The Zr-4 clad-ding (0.025 inch thickness) was homogenized with the fuel.
- 3) All steel construction material was neglected.
- 4) Variable density external water mist was introduced to determine peak reactivity of the system under optimum conditions.
The sixteen group Hansen-Roach cross sections were used in KENO-IV to determine reactivity of the system under the conditions noted above.
The highest k f 0.8886 0.0070 was obtained at an external mist eff density of 0.06 gm H 0/cc. Dimensional details of the calculational 2
model and results obtained are presented in Section 1.10 of the demon-stration section of this license.
8.6 Fuel Assembly Fabrication Fuel rods are loaded into the assembly skeleton in a fixture which provides a lubricating water spray (W.S. 123, 124). These fixtures are designed to assure that water cannot be retained. Nevertheless, safety for this operation has been established with full moderation and reflec-tion. The criticality safety calculations for a fully reflected fuel assembly are presented as part of the criticality safety analysis of the Fuel Assembly Storage Area in Section 8.7.
A maximum k f 0.8961 eff 0.0092 was obtained for a 10 x 13 array of flooded assemblies.
Details of the analysis are discussed in the following section.
8.7 In-Plant Storage of Fuel Assemblies Fuel assemblies are stored in a vertical position using racks (W.S.130) of adequate strength to preclude loss of the design spacing. The assemblies may be wrapped with plastic with the bottom ends open to assure free drainage.
There are 94 storage positio'ns and an adjacent inspection area consisting of 8 positions. Within the same room (but at greater separation distances) there are two horizontal loading tables (W.S.123 and 124) where the fuel rods are 2313 294-License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date:
3/22/79 Page:
C-25
initially loaded into the assembly skeletons, a vertical wash tank (W.S. 132) where the assemblies receive a final demineralized water rinse, two fixed vertical inspection stands equipped with elevator platforms (W.S.131 and 133) to allow final Q. C. dimensional checks, and two marked floor areas where the assemblies are loaded into ship-ping containers prior to outdoor storage.
Each of these stations is physically limited to one fuel assembly except the shipping containers which hold two. The assembly storage room can thus contain a maximum of 111 fuel assemblies (94 storage positions plus 17 additional locations).
Criticality Safety Analysis The following conservative assumptions were incorporated into the calcu-lational model of the fuel assembly storage area:
- 1) A 10 x 13 array of assemblies was modeled with the design spacing of the storage positions. This effectively brings the 17 additional assemblies closer together and provides greater interaction with the 94 assemblies in the storage area than is actually possible.
The array contains 130 assemblies while the maximum number in the room is limited to 111.
- 2) All steel construction material was neglected.
- 3) Variable density water mist was introduced within and between the assemblies to determine peak reactivity of the system under optimum conditions.
- 4) Four group cross sections were generated using the CEPAK Code for the 3 regions of the assemblies:
fuel, water holes, and external water mist between assemblies.
These 3 regions were then smeared over the entire array using the D0T Code to obtain one set of flux weighted lattice cross sections.
- 5) Four group cross sectio'ns were generated using the CEPAK Code for the 8" concrcte walls,16" concrete floor, and the external water mist be-tween the top of the fuel assemblies and the ceiling.
The ceiling was considered to be 8 inch thick concrete, though 4 inches is usually assumed.
2313 295 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision: 0 Date:
3/22/79 Page: C-26
The 4 group cross section sets described above were then used in KENO-IV to determine the reactivity of the fuel assembly storage area under the above noted conditions for both 14 x 14 a.M 16 x 16 assemblies. The highest k f 0.8961 0.0092 was obtained for eff an array of 16 x 16 assemblies at full density water moderation and reflection.
Dimensional details of the calculational model and re-sults obtained are described in detail in Section 1.11 of the demon-stration section of this license.
8.8 Shipping Container Storage Shipping containers (Models 927Al and 927Cl), each containing two fuel assemblies, are stored outdoors in arrays up to three high.
The width and length will vary; thus, the quantity of containers is limited only by the width and length of the space allocated for storage. The containers are stored on a pavement or blacktop surface. The steel shipping container, approxi-mately 3 feet in diameter and up to 217" long, houses two fuel bundles of the types previously described in this license.
The two bundles in each container are separated by six inches. An eight foot high chain link fence encloses the storage area, and all stored fuel is within 100 feet of a criticality alarm detector.
Containers are separated by at least 20 feet from any other fissile material.
Criticality Safety Analysis The following conservative assumptions were incorporated into the calculational model of the shipping container storage area:
- 1) The fuel assemblies are assumed to be made of 4.1 wt.% U235 enriched UO2 with no poison shims.
The most reactive assemblies (the 16 x 16 design) were used.
- 2) The three high double infinite array of shipping containers was assumed to be reflected by 4 inches of concrete above and 16 inches of concrete underneath, with a 25 foot separation distance between the two reflectors.
?313 296 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision: 0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: C-2 7 12'd33
- 3) Variable density water mist was introduced to determine the peak reactivity of the system.
The density of water within and exterior to the containers was made identical.
- 4) Four group cross sections were generated at the various mist densities using CEPAK for the following regions of the model:
fuel cell, water holes, steel strongback which holds the bundles, the mist region bet-ween the assemblies, the mist region exterior to the assemblies and container, the outer steel shell of the container, and the concrete re-flectors.
The above cross sections were used in KENO-IV to determine peak reactivity of the system under the conditions noted.
The highest k f 0.8601 eff 0.0082 was obtained for the full flood case while a secondary peak of 0.6206 0.0051 was obtained at a water mist condition of 0.035 gm/cc H 0.
Details 2
of the calculational model and results obtained are presented in Section 1.12 of the demonstration section of this license.
This analysis also provides the basis for considering an open or closed assembly shipping container as an SIU which requires no spacing beyond the physical boundaries of the container. Accordingly, individual containers may be m.ed in the facility in unrestricted numbers (W.S. 134 represents a typical location for open containers).
8.9 Fuel Salvage Off specification fuel rods are cut open and placed into a fixture to facilitate the removal of UO2 pellets (W.S. 106).
The recovered pellets are sorted to segregate scrap from reusable material.
Ventilation is provided, and the operations are monitored in accordance with Section 15. This opera-tion is considered a mass limited SIU, with limits taken from Section 19.
8.10 In-Process Storage of Fuel Pellets in Containers 2 pellets received in the United Nuclear Container #2901 may be stored UO in the plant, two containers strapped to each pallet, one pallet high. The pallets may be stored anywhere in Buildings #17 or #21 with no additional spacing required beyond their physical dimension which is greater than 40" x 40".
The containers are received in a horizontal position.
This condition License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date:
3/22/79 2313 297 page:
c.28
will be maintained in Buildings #17 and #21.
8.11 Rod Transfer Flat carts measuring 3' x 13'l/2' are used for transporting up to two steel boxes with inside dimensions of 5-3/8" x 8" x 14'4" long, each containing over 300 fuel rods.
The rods are assumed to be in a close packed hexagonal lattice with a maximum water to UO y lume ratio of 0.48, 2
based on a rod 0.D. of 0.44", and a pellet 0.D. of 0.3765".
From Figure 1.E.16 of UKAEA Handbook AHSB 1, the critical infinite slab thickness for 4.1% enrichment is considerably in excess of 6.7 inches for this degree of moderation.
However, using this value as the critical slab thickness, and applying a safety factor of 1.2 yields an allowable slab thickness of 5-1/2 inches. Acco:dingly, the rod transfer cart with two 5-3/8 inch deep boxes is safe.
Carts may be placed alongside each other, or will be spaced a minimum of 1 foot from other fissile material.
2313 298 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision: 0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: C-29 123S.3
9.0 HIGH ENRICHMENT URANIUM Up.to 350 gms U235 of f 19% enriched U0 may be allowed in 2
Buildings #17 and #21 for purposes of evaluation, analysis, or waste management which consists of scanning drums in preparation for their burial.
Such material will be transferred, controlled, and accounted for in accordance with currently approved nuclear material control plans, and except for the drums, all material will be placed in discrete loca-tions specifically designated and posted for this material.
None of these materials will be processed through manufacturing operations in Buildings
- 17 and #21.
2313 299 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: C-30
EXHIBIT D Criticality Safety Analyses This exhibit contains details of the calculational models used to assess criticality safety of various manufacturing processes and related equip-ment addressed in Exhibit C which are too complex to be handled by the surface density technique. A drawing of each computer model and plots of k vs various moderation conditions are presented in Section 1.
eff Justification and discussion of the surface density technique as applied to this facility are discussed in Section 2 while a detailed validation study of the criticality safety codes and cross sections used is provided in Section 3.
2313 300 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date:
3/22/79 Page: 0-1
g 6 e I
l n
5
~
m;c.,.g J.
s
..?-
v;
~
o i
I
~
g e
z g.
a i
v
,,, a e
h n
=
$f O
h6 y
5, l
I;
_I
$g?5
.a-
. -. n g
52 5
7 h
a 3
6 i
g g
x r
-+
i 3
g gs g
s..
(
3-i
-.=
i
- 2 S
.e-- M g
m a.
.c; t..v, l
.a e
m rt
~
g y
1 e
r - --
(g, y,! l l.
g;;
s m :-...
'.pf l
. g-.
sll
'['...
n 1
i L
1 g
+y,i...g.
- ij
- g g.
ai n yl a
p i if l
- ildl2 11l E!
R i
i t
i NM LUNL i
i; e
a:
e I.. j!
j 2313 301 i
e te v in u
$3
- d E
5 c
f h
Datei 3/22/79 9
rils 2
g License No. SNM-1067 Docket' 70-1100 Rev. O Page:
D-2 4
-- 1, 5o
- ,:~
PJ
N C')
1.2 - Criticality Safety 'todel-Batch Make Up Area M
d-LEGEND r-VIRGIN PO'NDER CONVEYOR (W.S. P-2)
--)
A.75bA X li LONG y
@ UO POLY BUCKET liDIA X 13' HIGH 2
N N
x s
Ng E o wigg m
tu wT.% u-ns f- ~ ~~~~
-~~~~T etc.34 i
Ma
/
lWT.% H o t
UO POWDER m
% 33 2
,?
m._
41WT.%U-235 g"
7wT.%H O m
3g 10,,
2 (N',N Y
5 -
-TABLE etc. sot, csa a e' (W.S.P-3) x o
BATCH MAKEUP HOOD
-UO -H 0 9.75 OtA.Xll,LONG o
c m
s
- y 2
2 i2" Woc-N\\
12' 2-"2
/
uo2POWOER 4.1WT.%U-235/
s
}
/-.'
y' g 7.WT.%Hpo,_/
FLE.34,,
f}
N s.N x u,
..N,
g'
-- 2 5'-
- 'b h0) 1041De CEs$
\\'.k, I
h l'
6 m
ge
~ ~. -
.d mo x
l I.,
- 6" 17"
['
g.
g
- 26 2
407 7
.g g
x\\\\
N M @ N\\\\ N' *' N'8.
N x
ELE.15" BATCH MAKEUP CONVEYOR (W.S.P-4) t (a
NUCLEAR FUELS M ANUF ACTURING WINDSOR J BABEK M -h nv.
orsc - on
- = _::,:
<;st
.tv.
otsc m ou
- = ::,;
c:st
- , "a ;,ay,n CRITICALITY LAYOUT
.r1:40RAuY nCvlSED
'$ dy i.
Iyg,Gfy v,3 a
-ovau:
r, r>
a 4
e.- n EATCH MAKEUr'
'\\0 3 j oj.
f a FR ntv.swa nrm-3to E
3 '- jp u w so e5EW cF y4 Coggggl07;;jctyt7g!!gINC.
HOOD
,A
\\b, 7,.,
je WR R&T t M rGf l_ _.,
COMP CCLE h0
['a[
@,N;.- ~..,... ?.a,5S h ? S f."3 L.
NFM SB 1570 02
.s I
NUCLCAR DIVISION t ll"WAS 12
/-/ e.irwas x y
3,i3*W AS g 4 5" u m m eua='m aav + o= =a no~ c oa -='ais s
PER RFV REQ NFM-70
'#2
$HEET 2.
OF Z.
M vioso noa v acus-. 1 wirr
...o co.. <.
r M~
i J
k t e.-(If o
ffIlh ~ ~
pMMO t hK-d 6* n[l v-0
- abed 0 * ^a'd 00 t t-ol gapo'a.
490l-UNS *0N asuaan i
64/22 /f.. ag eg ] -- p -- -- ~ ~-- -
- - - ~ ' ~ - - - - ~ -
~
. l.
i 1
m
- 7 _ _..
e i
t i
1..
L i
1 1
.-I 4
1
^
_ _. ~.
o 1
C N
=
-M I.i
. -.)
g-l.
l SA
_____._____'_._____.Z._
- g b
4 -
l r-
.+
.1 l-
. _ _.. _ _.. _. _. _. ~ _
_.________.__v__J AP c) i-en C-a m
g_,Q_'._._-______..
e "O
ae--
N
$w o
E i
i I
- m O
~ -- -
j J
e-I
- I L
i
<?
N O
l "O
hi --)
i e
C 4
- a e
)
i e
e 3
o e
__- p.
.___ _ _ _ _ _ j u
O M
M p.
I L.---
c N
.3 L
C
_c o
O
- C
- e U
M
-==-l
-N u.
u x
m LAJ c
H y_._.__..._____..
U o
o N
p,/q _._____ _
D 2"
1 E
i l-l,.__
. _J_..
_J C7 g
i 1.
.i.. _
.._._._t.
_tn.
p q.
e-I H
.).._____.
l i.
i o
g q._..____..____._._________________.
l
_O.
4 1
-l 4
4 1
1
....s.--
4 1
?
l
.I h
e 4
I s
_LO i
8 5
1 1
I l
i
{
8 1
l j.
- . i.
i
. _ _ _ _ _ ~, _
_______4 1
i
.1
~!
i l
t
'l I'
__._..l.
._....-_...l.
.... l. _.- _ _ _ Q.
O C
O O
O m
0")
0e f%
W e
e x N e
Fiqure 0-1.2.2 f
Datch Make-Up Hood _
l h
I i
~
j s
i Ei
' '? ;
i 1.8 cm U/cc in H 0 i
i i
i 2-
.r s
+
aI i
i i
m l
l Variable Density External Hist j
i j
r
- j. i i
j i
j l
l i
1 C
O
}
i i
.).
.l.
u. -. m cr. y
. i, t
e l
l i
i 1
l io
- c. c3 l q i
.i
.i 3 l
j.
l,
.i.
.p i
1..o l
'l i
r l
i l'..
(
J r
j
- 4 j
l
- i M
i i
{
. 8 5,_,
l 1
- i i
i i-L__.
.l L
i.i. o i
I l
j i
j, L l t
i M
o 4
4- }
l j.
-m l
i I
i i
,i l'
l 1
I 6
l i
+
l
~
i t
i k
eff l'
h l
l i
i l,i 2a l
l i
T I
-l i
j l
I i
i 1
i i
I i
i
!l i
l
- 1'
.75 4 I*T J.
I
- l l-l I
i
--.s a l
t, i
i i
i 1 '.
l l
j i
i-i u: e l
1!
l l
I C
L l
l l
i y
[ p
'T l
i m
i l
i,1 i
no 1
l-me i
l i-1 i
t l.
l q
p t
i t
i l'
.O I
f i
1 i
- l..- ' e j.
l'.
f
.i.
i 4
t
. !.j. _ !.'. !
6 i=O M_
N 9
I i gi u l'
i i
.i i
j i
i 65 l l
i i
l,-
co iou : e~ q t
e t I
-l-I l
- r a
l N
{.u u l
.l l
i i
i i
i.
j i.
l.
.-o i-,
. g g -. c_
1 l
{
j i
g i
i l.
i 4
4 g
i l.
i.
i
- p m._,
I j
j' j
.f l
l.
l L~O i
e i
i
~
l' ~ hy j-t i
L i.
[
-i-c 1 i
l I
i i
i.
r o
l n.
.i-l
.1.
i
.I
. i
'l i
-l.
i i
I l
l i
i
'l y
i-i i
l i
. ['
i i
s 1
i l
- l l
i k<w l
i p f-l i
i-h 2-y
.I-i r
7,.
e l
L e
r 1
q.,,
j _
l
-l
[.,
l__.
I
-l l
l f
i
' i.
i 0
.05
.15
.25
.50
.75 1.0 gm/cc H 0 2
. m.,. m m,,, m m
$ 1'4 3'.1 0; x 4 HJNa 6. 0101 X ut 2y/
e
I bf N S h ~@al l IO!
Q(0(2)*0 T~
f ?,j ; "
9'
~*
~ ~
T E
9-U
- Obed 0 *^a8 UDLl-OL qapoO E
i
'v l90l khs 'Oh asuaan l
i 3
64/22/L :ageu i
i-
.___.j-I i
.l.
l l
t 1
e t
_._...l
.l _ __;.__._'.
O, i
i f
_ _- l l_
j._
9
_-.._____;_._._'._._.___..__._.____i_.___._,_
1 i-i
_-.~._e._...___
l
.__._.__...._....____.___.._.___.__..._..._________p_)__L____
W
?
m s.e
}._.. _g
._. a 3
x I
l__.. y
.._7_.._
90 e-f
@f t
d I
},
O, 8
y
'i
- M i
.I i
H e H --
ff l.. _ '.. _ _ _
.j E
l.
-n p.y_
O i
yo
. _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ g.)_
.___.3-.- _ _.__
N i
- r
.--4-_
i C
o l --- -,
8 N.
'gn y
c o
- C O
e l-,
O GJ L1.
j.
g p_ _
g.{
a; y L
m i
i C.
3 3
t zy,.c w
~. - _..
y, 4 -_ _ _ _._.
C U
I.
1 w p
<a
. g, -l. _ _..
ca 1
i
~. _ _ _. _ - - _ _. _ _...
-)
8 e
t 4
_ j -__
n i
I l _.
g _ ___._
l 5
CT i-.._.
w
.i I
W i
N
.. _ _ _.. _ _ g _, y _. _ ___..
p p,y.
i.
i m
i I.
l F
,8 8
_._1.__._
__i
__.._____.__-._ _q
.._-.9
- - _. + _. _.
g i
F 7__________.___.________.__.__._.i___.________._._'__________1 i
t j
i t.
o..__
_ c, i
i a
i i
i i
4
^
.).
-_.i j.
i j.
i
{
j i
i j
i
-. h. _. _.._
o 0
0 G.
CO.
N.
I c
w w
o o
m 5
d i L-C
- aSed 0 *^ad 00ll-OL '40>l300 to z
6L/22/E : ale 0 L90L-WNS *ON asuaan y
sa s
=
't c_ $
O 9,
d.
e w
2 x
E 5
h h,
I z$
O
.j i
u.
ee s,a s
s v~
2 s
u.
m s U:,-!
.3 a
s
=
m t
-1 o
('",ft!
~
., g a
'8 d
[?J 3:j
=
~
i u*
n e
90E E((2
.a a
.I!i l
s s
t
<t g
I j
!"!A i 1
~
j, i
d L! !!
M e
l 5
17 r
i
.s r-L &.m~
s) c i
1 i
s
- v ib T3(Aff V E
j '-l"'
s
$' E,5
!( u-1 5
" 9 l\\ Ah El U; LGhUd0r-f;.
,$W
~w'?
8 m
gaz a
U r7
=
a$2 o
c 5
'o I-M
'N S
W S
4 e
e 1
W
~
O d O
'J
,r U
a n
5 a
5 1 z
P +, ', k.
h5
[
k EN b
a t
~
4 d
u x
gq a"
3
/~
mhm og m
o Su h
' IN
- tea h
G is
_W o*
m M
i l
[
g
(
i a
e W
8 l
I h
@h o
1 s,
m,
~
M
~
~N i
I I
o p
'p gr I. la N
j gr-l
.c D
- I g
~~
j@
~i h 3
o o
g a
~
nur 8
WD
hon M MN 9N,.6o3;,,n',mN%@ld =3d s
c
%r gs 7a. + [i} 2 r q b.
1l-ijj.:'{;{
1l-C.>g e 7cs aaavOo' m'c oe@
2 scc T h, 5,_
c> m ea y
- J.,
f ll i!
- ii' y
!ili iI i34
,t!;'
.ii;.
RsmNsm,eaO t
i i
,ii!
{i, j'
i!
t1i' i' i'
.i ll!
..!4
!jji
,'l k.
1 i
il;
<I I:
I i;i-l, l,'ll,,tti
~
i i
~
,i;j i:li' l'
- i li!.
I 4l!t!
i
['
i-b.
1
.1 s.
ii
,l i'
{
- '1 T1
,lil t!
ll-
- i
.i
~
~
4 4
nLe l
'l!l,t.'
91 i
!1
' ' i l,
lj!
i;i,:j,'l!
.l 4
-1 X
=
C 1
1
,0
.j5i, r
mN I
- ,llt
,, i T1li I-i-
i!,
';l iil!
i!
lilil o]l t
dn ii:
_i l'
i
,i i.
f'
.4 E
iX k
i!:
lllliii l.
l
- ).!
l l.
- i. i' l
,,'I I
- !i
h.
a.!.
- 0 ca 4J' l
B i,
3
~
n t
1 o
s
. i-I i
I
!,l'
-1i!i!-}.
'l!-
,;- ii 1[,+
!l:l'I L
O
. i i
2 i
3 t t
H
. a
,1 1 t l
n
- S a
D n
- i;iI'
- i{l TN,
- i,I j!i+
l.
l!i-l
!lj 0
i n
r 1
c eo e
c ri t
/
ut x
U g a E
i r
- i-
- l I!i1i T *1i.l' i
- il!l,!
I
- !i m
F a o
q p
N e
l.
.,i 1!
i i
r P
- ,j;
- !l T-1
,!6!
!llii' l
Ir
- i. ij,ii
- k.
r 0
e d
4
~
~
w o
~
P ii!-
!i.
I T
I-
,l
- !li
- t!
- i!-!
1 iil.,l,iI
.jllt sW aJ 7,
,0 g
y i;l:l;el i
- ,I
,!.I i
l6
.gw
- ,.l'i1 j,'
.i '
0
~
,. j.
4
.tt l,i
- i*l-1
[:!'
,i'
.tiiijl
- i T.
- iilI' i '
llI!
.l l a.
0 i.
i-
.*i.. i lf:-lf,l
.1 l!
l
- l.
,I1l
- i'
~
.ii,;iiIlj
.l
!ti:?lI*
I2 0
l
.ii!
- !-.f l-i,;i i.!
i-ll..l<
!i!
T
, i:,liL i-l.'
l!-
,;li 1l l!if;l
.i-;l'!,l:
- j.
i'
- ii !2 0
0 0
0 f
0 0
0 6
4 5
ea 9
8 7
k 2
80r ElU E N l M._____l_l W 6-0
- abed a
.......__.o
'~
1~
O *AaB 60 t t-04 10U00 I
_. _. _.. _ _ _ _. _.L90l-UNS "_0N asuaan. _.. _ - __ _. -
ll f
f
....-._.e_
+--i..-e.
..__p..
e>..e-.--
_*e-.
t f
- _--_-...__i_-.,_.. _.
-.-__ - - - ~..._-m._
-O CO 9~
g d*$
,^
~
-___L-.
._. - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _. - - _..__ m r.,
I O 3
e 9
- C d
C*
C m
._.1 s.,
Lna
= r-
=~
AA 1
U s--
C lc 0
10 l
D
?
- 3 CC C
e Cl L
_. __. +
.)
C N CJ l
N.
.O I 4 i
F 4 C
LAJ e-x
+
i I:
C e
to r-N
- p I
I M
U M
C%
U r-C N
M
. -- -- g p
U O
C O
'D C
L r-ry.
to o
E 3 #
E O
L o
e 4
e
.i
^
t.L.
to O'
e-
.._.n------.--.
C1.
L 4
C
=
O C
C
)
L c-i i
to L
c CJ i
V I
e T.J t
c_
i C) g N
.____.__________q g
I i
._ _ j l
e i
g
.i a,, _,.,, _ _,
_g N
i
.g i
t 1
q
-.. ____.._7._
'j.
6 i
t i
1 i
i _
_ _...._4 _._ _ : _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __.. _
N
_. _ _.________.j i
o i
J t
a 3
s a
.j l
L 1
d
- it n-.
i o.
Ln c
c tn a
CC CC 0N N.
N.
e e.M
+g
4 TNN.i
{lNIih l r,9 ki Q.{._ {DDP p _O *A03. - _ _ _
_. e.
N UL-0 0D[l-Q[ 10pOG e
- 0!; 0';uaan 62/22/f,:0100
'~'
~
' ' ~ ',
s p,4 _..
_ N, N
t 1
h,y N
i.'
kg p e y __ _ _
m
$0 z2 T
4 i
c2 C
}
LU e~
- e
.V g
U fy._.-....__-..._.._._...-_.__--
m e
w 8
C V
O t
<0 O
j e--
4J e-p i Ln k
N C
r-yy}.
o c m
,c L
r-3 l
3
+2 LL.
O M y
L y
W M
- - - - ~ -
y h
3 E
CL j
1 c
pay - - - _. -..... _.
- _ N, I
n's j
O O
Q LJ TO l-e -l
~ c.
LJ m
..~~._..
1
. _ C, C
l-eq C
._-._...__._._..__.________..beq.-_____.--_
..y.
-3
+
C O
C
% DO C
O 9
CD 0NO N
r.-
o
.M
+\\
e e
e
1.A Powder Pren Station-Front End l
I e
l j
),pm'ccest*ETE itoon ca tir.txo Q
.---u' wet TILT uog (ei)-Hp
-ry "m
I a
e
- s (-
_e g_
wtn I
te t
'l
-n o o pg i
/
(
tA
- R eb l
_f.
E
~-
e c.
N
~
I}
g i {l L_J z
e
/
x p2' J y x y \\ _.< m.
3 ss pme3s tg 3. ; t,g q
g gg g
ess t t tog
- a
.xN N T \\'\\x
. u -,0, sic M
$e D** 307'"
es<
f LA C 1, ic.
- D) re nic1W To unt f
p, i 5 't.
c) sg m 2' ass
(
s tss are cms t_
i,
.. 3 o
,, Z l
r3 s et sum) 7 vi a t
ut icio L co g
I i.u, stt.orn i
i t.;.g
.c. o
(
4 VN 1 Tnt iti wcn esorMR n uuo ron (s wa wT sum) l NNE
' \\g r(eetw nto i.oerta N\\
t ht s1sec.a scPets nustD foR h 15 wT.%um)
N 6 w iwi.s um)
\\
~,
\\
ut wit 5 N
47.7
\\\\
L TWO PCA1 Antt PFi% ftED DeOittR% Akt AwtAtti.OtttW%C, On g '\\
thROuDaT Blos. P%ottSSED.
^
l a.7 Jco cuat
-c*u' m G..
I I
tJM - D -64CG
(*
ttoon k*
f POWtER PREPASATiott STATtCtt i
l (F Aon1 twQ l
l I.
i
=
"d=
a17] POWE st j '* T4.E*r * *'"***-.M Nn 68
- '* Q W.Y.'t 5.~l3 D i. ~NUNOK "_
i__
i
.u_. _.=. c. _._-.
~~
ev. mms,o sw cc.
===*
U*wT t 01 i
~ ~,E94-D = c We
?'. t"'l' g
t
~~
1 I
kk k{kb p )p,I h
.py g w Oh, n
-o 2l-0
- abed m
0 * ^0ll 00ll-OL 101300 64/22/f
- 0100 ~~
l90l-LlilS orj asuaan
~,[
d 4
I I
4 l
p e- -e s.
M o
+
l l
l 80
+
,.e_.
.en-- - _ -. - -
o___
-*_S c:
I' c
T e
t.
J; I
u y
C
+2 l
C
.LA A
=
g L
j e
N e
t c
"I*
C L
e-~
O D
l g
.,C e
r-sa L
<- p on i
s
_ o,
. m 3
m
+2 N
U 9
Ln m
U Q
t'3 N
D C
C i
o L
l 8
e i
e L.-
e i
I U.
~3
+J
+J 4
-. j C1
<C X
- L w
8 W
ec C,
O
--.,--3-----------------
I i
1 l
a L
i c
t 8
_.______q T
4 e.
5
. 1 n.
i o
N
_. 3 y
,8 1
i l
- j. _. _ _. _... _, - _
.W m
4 I
t
____..__.__..__.m g..
1 l
i-l 1~
h I
-_.... 1
._.y 1
i i
I C
i
_..._______.___p__..
____.._6
-_..I..-.
_.a__.__
i L_._.
c, m
W CO
% O h
CP WN e
3 m
Ez R
,i : ii 1l>
i
~
i,1
.t L.
.l'Ii I
-1 tt l1 3
,W(~_CS_9 Nq M nN
. GP
?( - M;(
r C
e II i l
1
" _,, C ge2 C.$m cC cN,.euooo -
3E,r=W o= a,ueau a cQmRM guB
.l
.,,. - i.
n
~
t!
j;6-I:
i
.!ei' l
i i
.;i'I:.lii;
.' i.
1,
!9 u
,i ji
!t-
. i
,iI r
,.l
'l!!
I i,
,I
- i, i
8
!, ' i ;;.-
il.
t l.iI'[;
t!l I
l
,s i!
l
'l
,,i'i n~
nt
.x
.s l
i:Il:'
', i,
,l l
- ' ;.- i;
,,,!i,'
l iiI.
, i ' i I 7
,i, t
,1
,0 i
9 f $
l
\\l 2
a M
h
,o,d
- L at rg
~
r-- -
M-Sz g
E
$ ~~ h~ h s.
p
.-a
- E f-55 SAl 3
F *-
09 a
gD n
a
_q 7
~5 Q
m y ?
'm
?
E E
- . 4 9
li i 5
. 2 E
B 8x h
T
,g 4-f8 l
- T
-4 /"
h e-Bf
>f y
gg p\\-
/
==f:
==
t 1
1 p
__c
)p
.1 7
- ' { ; -~
I 1
-.~L _ _.
T
(
4===
v:
( nn 2
E g!
!.! nz;
.~
!!15!
,3)I '
I nL g
i
,e k
i d'*f F3 459'-l.1 7
[d l li p$lj j;
L r 13 g6 : r
- ij 1; 4
"Yg bhk l!kIh$hhh l['
313 z
i?
.Q h
h h
License flo. Sfif t-1067 Date:
3/22/79 d
Docket 70-110r)
Rev. O Page:
D-14 7',", v,,1J.,v, i
P.R r
v g m mm qM m.Cr c2_6c x-QuEd r=
s_ '
Q-1
- il,,,,P]iI' it,
,:ii4,!:
- ti#
i!
4!:1
.i r c g _. = =2<I_
_ Cr r a
r
<m tll!
e eo oce,
i i
'ili3 1,
li
!.i e
>Cz ec 3 ~ somUo
)
NeC i"em 5 amcaU f,
es'mNse.oseo :
,i,;!
,l'
.i, 10 4
i
- i i -
- t i
,;. i
,6i!
,j:
.1 i :,;'
i 1
i
.t; iilii+
,,l l_
T1 l5
,a 3
L.
- i
- n. v wx i' '
l T
- i ;
i!>
.t wa t
1
=
,0 s
~N
',i l
'1
,li ii :
!,!iifi' i
1*!
l0
,2 eH 3
.;i'
_
- 1 ', i; il i:
1il,!
iit I!
i
,,;ll l.,
E_
vi c, i.
a
+
e t
O 1
r s
2 A
i H
t 1
e 1
u'
- fj ii 1'!
t:
i'
..i 2
i 5
n c
r i
i a
e I.
d.
2 r
t t
W i:
T*1,j,'
,:,I'
- I!i.l,!
..l;i t
,' l
/
c l
o a
c D S U
l e k a
l.,1 r c n
m g
u o r
.i B t
i 1
1-t
.I!I' 1i:
,i.I!
c l
e r
x e
E te o
r N
,r
.I.i
,1-
.[
,l.-
!gil' l0 c
n 2
i4 o
C i
.i!
1
!;i i
<i.f' 7
as 7I*
i eb b
T 1I,
ii
.1 i
.t l
cC l5 1
i',,,i','
l.
4 I
- j,'
.I
!2t;!
.li
!i' 4
,i l,
f' il i.,
l;;,:1!!I ili!.
l0 1
, i li' i!.-!
,'l
- i',,,'
- l, i
,!A
!!ij
- e',i.
,1 ei l5
.ii!ILi
!L
- ,i'I
,Ii
>j!
.l:i!i1 (i
k{!
t ii'f 0
f,'
0 0
9 e 2.-
8 k
1
Figure D-1.5.2 i
Concrete Block Storace Area i
t 2.5 cm U/cc in H 0 1
e 2-
-l r.
i i
Variable External 1-later flist l
t D
. LD i
i i
i m
i i
A l
o
'l M i
j t
i i
}
l i
+
i l
i g.
l l
C O.
j i
i
.t j
l l
l l
l
.l Y
E A
i.
i i
i
=.
.l.
.Q.
c.
j j.
4 l
'i j
I i
l t
I l
l
- 1. 0 '
N r
1 i
j t
i i
9
.i o
I I
i l
l 3
i l
8 i
t l
,i.
6 l
i.
I i
i
,t J
I
.95 '
i 1
i I
T i
T l
=.
l 1
1 k
V I
r L
I
'i 1
1
".LT I
1 J
eff TI.
i i
l l
120 1
.L i
i
]
L
. i 1
.35 i.
o I
i I
i
.f i
I l
l l
g i
i J
l l
1 l
3, c
t 1
i
.i i.
,1-i i
C > I I
[
+
'gg l
l
.f f
1" l 6 i
ca l
i i
i l
l.
l i
4 q.
pc y
..... f,.
j.
i
- v. c
._ =
i i
i l
t j
t
=_
- .i
- j. i.
'l I
- i a r-i i
'i 9 d. ' =m i
i I
i t
i
.75.
i L
s ! =
i I
i e
i l
i
.l i
mu t ' m.
i
.l co '~
l
}'
+
{
l l
l
~
j cd }; C l
i
.l.
.l
- o.j' vv s.
.t.
+
i l
i "o
tu i
l I
l-i 4
' dr I
i j
3 1
_ _a l
=. m,7 j
-l i
i i
i t
i l
l _..'_ i.__.!_'
L l
I __
I _. __ I
.I___.i l.___l
.. l.. __ _.,. _ _ l 1
I
._.__l u
0
.05
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6 7
.8
.9 1.0 qm U/cc H O 2
,m,r.m,,.,.,r,<.,,,
e, n. n/ y vbl r
SPt
.f.
W 6 l$3Ns C1 v. X L L a
v v
v g
a
.Ii ni y
n t
hfI
((k[
b.
h,,
h0 o
ll.
a.
wl L
li
-6
~'
!. ' !, I L l-0 *a6ed 0 *^ay 00tl-OL 10'@00 i
6L/22/f; : ale 0 490L-LINS *0N asuaan I:,... '..
p
~
i, k!;::f;!.
I' 3.,.,.
r
!5i 5fg !
C t,1. _.
.y };' ilg _]
i:
i t{e 1
C,:
1
,8 p,,,
3 i f. I. ;.,
!! jp:.4 '
- '. 3 " *-, L ! i
- ei 1 : ; *,. ; ; ; g i ; -
! )5. i ' t.._if:
! II I. :' f. < l t ' '
gg.
!r
. ( h'.;l 1 !;I8; ;:
N O>
e--
D
.c M
b o
m L.
O
+2 m
n o
l o
l' r-(
i O.
b a
l W
\\
it
'~
~
'f O.
- lt e
l
'8 m
o TsT e
Y i i
~"
t..
3:..
pl <
FCY)
IX fi 57 5
'n v.
a 15 HIT hl Es [
~
i o
D I
e j
,9 e
'? u
- l.
< " P.
o 2r n
w S '.?
'e A
H o
g j!
- 6 -
s
/h I,
'I l
v7 m/
c r/
"Y i
h f--
....1
,.. g s
s A
E b
j A
- g
'y y
e *ll -
I E
N r'
i 4
5 35 L
a
+
x b)*
Nz e
?=
1 d
3m 1
4 1
4
i.i
,t l
,l,,!'l.
,Ii;lmc__ecc-(d:=&;=,==C';==c?(waI
]-
C=.ws03 h c'2 N-m mN l-4
-1 ii' nO DcC-e c
RsxmNe. Coco t e >ee ce c~ a0uuoo
'. j,,'
sec.r=v c= om=au u i
,f.
- 4.
!!:!i
. ' i k:
r
- 1 i-i i.Ii i
- ;
1
- i.. ;i 1!-
i -..
I I
.i!
'l,
,'l; ij..,i.
i' i l
5
,d 3
.l I,
.i.L m1
,'A
(
I'I',!
7,*
f!;ij
.i
,ii,, i'
- c. 6 1
T i1.
,G
,iv
,!!l,i<
.if,'
li'!ii!!
- il-
, j:>
,t-I mO i
t
-l l
0
. i 3
!i-Iii
,l i:.
-'l i1 ii' l
!j.
iiei
,,;l<
I
- i s.*-
- i1 4
s t
O e
s 2
v i
l M
l:
,1i.
j,1 H
1 e
n
. h r
i 6
S e
t 5 c 1
e a
, ',. i,i'
,li-I ii T 1 ' i' j.ll
.!l!,i!;
. i:
i, c
c M
2 /
D a U
r l
l.
e o a
r t
n n
u S r
.i
't i2 6f
!I'l.!.
llii,'
lil-
-, ; i-q c
e i
t t
1 F
e x
5 l
E e
o ii:
l,i
.7
- j. '
i!
T l
I liI.'
i.tltl,l, 1
P M
0
-l 1 ~
l 2
t il Ij,
,{
i
,,;!i
!1j
..I t* 1 rb
~
',f
!l, l.
i!(.
' -- i e+'
.t
' ; ;,,ii
,!l;,
T*
i i i.
l 5
1
- 1 l:
i.
i-i i!
i :..~.
.l,
-ifr
~
t!
i
- i, I
.j.,,
- ,lj.I:
, j;:,.ii
'l
.ili-
. 0 I
_l
.*, :' i:i. ;-
-.i 4
i>l t-
~
l.
l'
.i
,i'
- l!,
,.i O
l ij.;,!,
,jg,l!l:i,,:
l.l.:,
- .-l l
fiiI;i,;
I'I,
~
,m f
5 0
.r 0
0 8
8 e2 7
k
bfb[
l p q. _ _ __ _
o, 6L-U
- obed 64/22/E : age 0
~ 0 * ^ 0'd 00ll-OL la3300 t
&OL-MS on asuaan.
j i
t
- C) i i
I
. l' u
~
l l
i
- co 6
p
,-t...--_-_...-.
-. ~. - _ _ _ - _ - -
l gd g
i C%
..-w
~
0:
g.,
m
..--._.-.-.___--.-____-__~~_.~--e.--
c1c c; L N
O I
C J
.c e
(/)
C H,
y-________..__..__..._.._.____.-
LO i
- 0 e
c u
O N
U M
I L
N
- r e o
=
m L o C
3
(.A E
CJ C
C O
ee-p
+-
b b b
h
.e, l
i O
to m.
L l
- . l I
'c 3
o j
(.a)
N
_ (vt 9
l p
q__
i l
l p.
JN g __. __ ]
p.g_...___.__.._..__
t p,y 4_.._.____
e n
I I
l t
H.H...
._..____..____a F-
__. _ _ _.._.____._ _ _ _ l
.I. M =
. _ l _ ___. _ _ _._ -- - - u - - - c' o
% o a o
C4
%N CO.
N.
u
1.R Funi %d Tranennre rwtc 6ECMOGE hE CUS 9 n" 5R H
FUEL tJixTUhE
_i} g O x
4 CONCRETE yog MIST-t mum STEEL
- q.. g hy/
~m g1 w3r 3 1
g 1511 R MIST-R 15 - 9 y,
.N 3G
^
Tof 7I - ['ETAI L-B 12m n ym N
a 7
og, Q
L L
sf q IBTYP Tye m
4
-p=m--
= __
4
.o
- - -. - - =
( Q_ -
z 4
._ glyl y
15 g,,,
_. l 6
l.
.q 3'3 3g 4-
- t 49 m
=
n 8-i n,_--.__.
. n
__..g p
,g y
,3._-__.___-. _ _
7 i
e' I
o N
E
__/ \\
\\
y/
\\
- 39b, d
d J
=-
.. _ =.
=
n L-h w
bi T. __._
^-
7 Ii Y
s-q q
b;'. '*.
N F M -C
'+07 5
- 3,. i.,, coNuwTE FLOO" D
s
~
-=
es-s o cm e
vo c>
FUEL TRANS CART ASSEMBLY Ie w=
u
- 1.,
~
- n cn c 2 SCALE: %
cQ
.m C
O I eM
.~ C
$ I a.,
N O
y, p a
g-y T - -d oV e
T_ )
U U
- e-O at, I
naweeveas Z
UNLf 4 OTHE R*ist SPE Cire,[D
......j _
i6..
- * **'*3.7 3.'.
u.
a Oswt Nr.iONING ab IOtt R ANONG
{., _., e Pt R 4'.71 -1 si', IT F 1 WFR on w.
,2 6
E *7. !** ^ ~+~
DIME NSONS APPLV AT &c'F IMP'o ty ) nut seAti ufe AeING '
"UC L
'C* * ' 5'5 " " 5
.,..'e i % wi s %. c.C
'oFise.r.s hau a 4's' is ous is I
res sat'~
. ad T. cos
- oso p,., t
,.g g i um
. i u { _t _y i
. i.,e R aa..
-e iNo C W N/ E tn t r isRf Am LuuNiet$ 9 ed APPRO M 4 ggga g
OR f H44 F at a t 15 144 f o i '11 R A
e l
, ~s
..,. um go.N nre-c_no75 c3 f."',,
ca s, o, I c-.
o 7
g I
s i
4 1
3 1
2 l
1 s
vC,r~ W(cfo.W Jm.'m.__C eg1 c ;_
,l am) p mN 0
c ii!
.t 9'i1 k
T1
,l
,,! ll:.L'-
c i
cI (N i, g
1 gN,O oeoC Cc y ' cN #aisOo T
RNNm%m.eumO e.>am Ee,rCv. J= Omc?'s a e
9
,,* ; i- '
3
,l
. ; i:,>
I
,1 l
!'Il l.,
I'
,4i 8
- 1
.i..
1 id
.i '
.1 i.,'
I'
- V
. A ii l
41 f
i 1
I 7
1 iG i
l i
-l.ll,i
- .ft l
t
,.j-.:.
Ii L'
i
.t
- i.
i '
I 6
t s
/
i
,l t
s tr l
-i.
I<
i r'
t; i
a a
C n
0 r
2 1
t e
H
. r t
I 5
8 o
x i+
- 1 ii '
,I l
i i i.+
. c o
E c
1 s
/
n y
m D a t
r i
g e T s
l.
,t j!
g.
i,
r n
u d e
q o D
i R F
e a.
l l
l I
i i; l.
9 i-
,,?
- \\.
I e
b u
a F
i r
a V
li
.il
,' j
- i i,
l, l'.i',,I
,i
i,,
/.
,C
,b j
,i.
- i. 3 b
_,!i i.
i!
6:
i i,
- i' j',.
, i:
I r
i l
2 s
- l i.
T1
.f1, i J i'
I 1
T 1-
{1
'i+l i
I J
.lj lj s -,
Il.
f 0
f 0 0
0 6
e2 7
8 P-2
I
/'
di'
=
?
d
}
^
v o.
c_
IL s
a ll 7]
\\
j f
I 1
c, E:
=*
I 0
s 5 \\!
h e
rp
{ $
f,.~][
(-
4 t
a h.
y c
s v
p l
No.
]1 y
[;.8 E:p 5
N E.
s r__
(
)
_ _,h '
o,g g
s i
_/ 1
- 7. n u
p, g 0
z s
~
s s
.4 C
AS r,
r o
.e4_1 4,
9
..a4.s o
f s
n
.x
- ~5 CL
-]
s.
sa w
l
. ?'
k,
.a a
2 i
- l. _..l k ?3 i hA p
=,! j gT a
b; 0 ;
a_ i 83 l e
,7 l
EQ 'l F' 2
~
8 w
P 50 i
i g
9 gr o
j '/
g j.
W
-'? W y
e i
[ S ITI !! I
/ ' b ' '- I
\\
h! I A
' f y lli p; o; !,
l
)
k 7N
. -- - ) :)
o g
)
-;:l;3:;:14'i 5'
- s s
e:;
2 e
!,! u.~ n) F i ' j !
p 0
a
?
l g
5
- 4..,.. ', 3 5 g
e g
n 3
._i.:_'..4.__3
- __i_._-,l g
F.,
-[
lie
!.t b,d r
I
_ l.i.,;l t._i tu I.':,
o i
85
'.,d;il
' i'l License No. SNM-1067 Date: 3/22/79 L -,
"2 Docket 70-1100 Rev. O I
!U Page :
D-24 m.'u.c 5
2 J'. !ll }
?
., 2 c
- u. ilili.I
=i 2313 a2l'
!! r C;
W-gll i.i3
- n. :'
F l
C C
T l
I I
l I
I I
S2-0 :arsed 0 *Aag GO L L-OL 0'4300
{
j 64/22/C :a4eG 490L-WNS *0h asuaan g g
O E bs 7
3 w
[k k
b, g f g
e 2
m z
l JO g
v b.
h I 5 z
- So i i i d
t o
g W
E I ;
o b-I O
_)
ill o
r O.
k gi g
o n!.t a, e'= a 6
.de e
au?
s g
s a
- a l
=$
$., l<5 o 1
3
,~
1 M
l
\\
L.
- i
\\
<t U
z A a te u r.
-,, o
" f a ",
O b]
's h
[g h
,g U
Q $
0 o
G
$C I f I l 5 0
q, E 57 8
~
c m
y
=
o-4 1
o
- O Cl U "7,$*[ '3 at<'
m o
d-s L
M E
%z l e,., '
~ N2
- 3 O
a A
- ~
3, 6,
,e.3 *e m
M C
o8 i
6 Ilj'$
3:
u g
2.
o s
V 5
5' 9 8 51 5!
o 5
?
5 5
'i s"
'i 5
5 $!i "E j
o l
t
.C l
f{
D 4
'tn 9
OJ p
M N
b t~
W M
W e*
o O
H
.?h a
e e us oco ddJ
$ 25 agv sew o
a.
<ws s.3 y
V sJ p '
yey
=lN
<sw
-o e
n.
e w
us 4
C
>>C e. 4*
bl ea w
~
3 Q
[
M i
s t9
'J O
J q'
z u.
E
-JW d
[
W g *a a
v y e w
c y
x w
o u 8
G d i
5 a
5 1 e e
c g
+
a
'o
~ -,,
O
+"?-.-
cr d'
=
e O
r
..?.
- 8
_i h
[
.o D
w n
Dm
%j W
.....ee-e
Fiau e D-1.10.1 i
Double Shelf Rod Storane Racks C4 l
Dry Fuel O
l m e Ci ?c,;.
i I
e l
l Variable Density External riist
.f.,.i I
i t
e~
i a
1 j
i
.. m i
1 I
i
.j.
j i
.I.
N
(
i f.
.i
,e es,..,
i
{
I j
o.
l I
- i i
,i l
I
.90._.
7
.. _ }
l l
i l
i l
^
_ 7 M
I i
l-i T
i I
L !
1 1
i r
!m 1
i A -
r t
N l
I' I'
T.
1 i
.I i
i l
1 i
i e
i i
t I
.qq {
j t-i
..i 1
y 4
a 1
l l
x i
L i
k eff 2a j s
t i
e j
i i
e A
4 i
l
{'
I.
.70 y -. _.
I 6
l mC i
+
i r
.~,
l j
.I 4
o I i.
I _
t
..l 1
[
ZC
[
j 1
4 s
n C
1 l
f i
g l
1 ofi a.
o I
F.2 3 W p-e t
}
i E
I g
F
.60 t
uu i
a o (d I
l
- e-O i
- hE_,
l l
i j..
.s_ _
l g
g I
71:
l r
.-N-l l
l l
i l'
9 l
i 4 TC l
I f
I t
l A~~
. 50 }_.
4 t
{
l I
i e
l W
l l
cin l
t l
i j
I i, C
\\: _ g l
I i
t I
b i
i l
J.-
m, i
f.
I j
l t
t 6
j
,1 I
L I
- ch, i
l l
i f
1
- l i
i
. l _ _.. -- _ f..
l i_.- I
.___J_
_.._.l_._.A__..
I 0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9 1.0 gm/cc H O 2
,,,..m c,_. 7 n,,
An u w e Je L
a i & & ); el
- ( J A.
I A ( 6
,4
f l
lj
. -, j.I..,J r
,ml
(-
a s(,
~v i
gyQ L
.,_ _,_._ _ r._._...
,,,.1,.,,
s_
____-,..__.s___,__
.u=.. __
m l' [
fI i,
I;@' l~.-
/2-0
- L'd
- U *^Jd 1% t -W s
- w,.,s u.o p )
l i
LL!t-ti 3.,4 r>a s
1
,.il i.i
!i i
I.
6t/22/C :33'0 il c
~
[0,2,l11 l
~ j eI
..... n I.
3 i
i b
g
t T : ' ';),
ig
i
=
]
S I
g
- -..,IU
!+e y '.i;,;,f.a,-
i
',i.:
- it;.
1.
I d;.!. [' [11',
7 J \\'
-l h.g m~
i.,
\\
r l
g r
p4 g3
},.g,
. - r., p.y n,,, o
,,VlQ. 3, d; d; i) -- d - d. e t..
4, -. gM,4, 6. [ ;IL__ L
.t.
-~___-
,g l
a
.d
't i
.y
-- w.
=
s 1
u y
F" i.}.:
i I
te o
C l
s'I!
l.Of,1
~
3 8
4> #
fH 0
G N
- L,.
0
-r s ;4
___.j_uljl, o _~
J
~ ' -
_. n D_f1 o II; l
I T II~O _U__LL iL_Cl r
a o a u o -
s,.
.i
((]~~~J fD~D-t1 o ot
- I
)
[D__D _O 0 J LT~I.D I
Tr f
t uJ oo O o o oP s
a:
t l
21' g, 3
E e
. _ e'r _ _,
f
[b-~O-~D.J.]_.D__0 _u J.E D__CO l'
uJ
._y_.
y fD o o Q_0_ _CO O U~O D 32 Til i
3
,j i
f(T-U'~O l'T O O lT' O O O O-~D Ul Ir
~
2 tr Nl f
N P
yl.s
.a3 (C
S*1
/k.._.-.
... u
.i L_
,/
._.1 e
.*=eeg g e. w. g.
pyg.s0 ev n.e. e -
-_ q 9
. _ = - -
4 0
TABLE D-1.ll.1 Design Parameters of Fuel Assemblies Fuel Assembly Fuel Rod Array per Assembly 14 x 14 16 x 16 Total No. Fuel Rod Positions per Assembly 176 236 Fuel Assembly Pitch, in.
8.180 8.116 Fuel Rod Pitch, in 0.580 0.506 Fuel Rod Clad Material Zr-4 Zr-4 Clad 0.D., in.
0.440 0.382 Clad Thickness, in.
0.028 0.025 Diametrial Gap, in.
0.0075 0.0070 Active Length, in.
136.7 150.0 Total Length, in.
146.963 1 61.5 Fuel Pellet Material U0 00 Dish Depth, in.
0.bl5
.0$9 Diameter, in.
0.3765
.325 Length, in.
0.450
.390 Density, g/cc/% Theoretical 10.412/95.0 10.41/95.0 Density Stacked, 9/cc/5 Theoretical 10.03/91.5 10.03/91.5 Spacer Grid Material Zr-4 Zr-4 No. per assembly 8
11 Inconel 1
"N 5.90 0
5.90 0
2313 25 License No. SNM-1067, D0cket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: D-28
Figure D-1.ll.1 l Fuel Assenbly Storace Area i
I -
14 x la Assemblies i
t l
c.
j i
Variable Density External flist R
RN i
I p
sm j
i i
.n l
.i a
1 i
i
,1 i
i 1
I j
t I
e c o c._.
i m
i N
- 90 '
-i
~i -
T l
l i
t i
i i
i l
t J.
i i
4 t
i i'
e; i
1 I
t i
.80 '_
.i.
o i
i i
i i
1 xl r
l l
A I
i
~
k t
i e
eff:
e 120 i i
1 zc i
t l
L l
I
.G e !
.70 T
I l
4 q
i r.e*
l F
I g
I f
i i
O I j
(
i i
zc' l
j N !
i t
O l-
[
l
.l
}
e i
MM' C
C' l
l
+
l i
j
]
. }
i j.
OM I
j t
I I
{
l i
a t
wo; $
., U U
l t
i f
i
.60 l_
l
--. _ l.
_.. _ - p e
i q
o.
j j
j j
j i -- a I
4 i
1 l
l i
i.
l 6
j i
{am j
i i
l i
i
. i I
j i
i
{
l i
l l
j i
.i I
l lw
. J.a l
i l
.50 L_
~
l g
]
h M
I I
i i
i r
+
i l
i 6
I t
i na i
~
l 1
.i
=J I
_ ___ _. l
_.___._.l-.
i
. l _
u_.
l l
1 l
_J- -
1A, i
L
.I_._i 0.5
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9 1.0 gm/cc H O 2
o,s,...
pbg %(
w w
$ 1. 6 #.1
.4 (43*e!
i Oi w h X vi
. e 3
bb k(((
l
(.i 0
_.__ p a_..___.-____.__._._
__ o.
-.a OE-0
- abed 00t L-04 gapoO 64/22/E
- age 0 0 *Aag fggt-ggs cu asuaan (D
1 1
[
k.
4 l
h.
.~
-Dh k-n cN i
i
~
a
.e m
D m
La N
O C
e W
e m
~X O
- e L
E, r--
C C)
La N
I W
m "E
o m m
_ _ an G) e-U L -
D m
N
~3 Q
C E
C.
U CJ CT
.r-Q x
Q
..~
___-.._--._..]
m D
a) 2 1
.c g
7
-. n,
- =
._. j u_
e u,
!m Mu i
I, y
...._..___..._..___N I'
i
.-_e
_.. -~
l l
i
-_.._-_w..
he Q
.__...J_._________l.
___.._l____.-__l______._____ _l_..__._._________._..._a C%
C
% o O O
Ch CC
,C) N N D
T
??
{l((
k h
3
-* ~ - -, -
_.p hii!
I i
i'
, T'. f{.
- f i.
i 8
- h :1 i
.[
i, l
g 2,
h,y !'!
I
\\
i y,! if ll,ll l lf' ll l
Cf;ll-Of 13 900 I
l;.
LC-0 :aC'd 0 'Aad 19"J L-WM *0N 4%d)n tl ;') :.*: (L 64/42/E :31eO
',, i, o i f l[* s'al' l
4
+
g ;g,>.y l.t.
jpjyl,-lpn' i.:
,se.,
I Y
h f[; 11-
' Il i
g d
!s W
l
&w 1
4 g
g-l l.,bf 5-l
. y,
'e I
l#
i r
e a
l
.g-y 1
y 3
,21;-
I t
8,,
-=-
c3 2
Ij; s
[y l
s
't E
$2
!!l I3 b
?k
]
~
a:
s I
$};4 gM p!?
2 t
l 1
f I
a
_ _ f; 1._
c 4,
i, 1
E l,/ ',
/j i
Ie!
N g
3
- [*l
.I
,k
}4I'$- ll P
t i
e yj r-i e
~
lb t%-
s t
w I
T
~
I>
L.
'9
... _ _ _ _ _. =. -
b t =
w O
b bfb i
\\
p.
p
_. o 21.- 0
- 00Ud J
Gull-OL 10'F00 6L/22/L N100 o_ Aad 290L-14!4S ON asuaan e
e i
mur i
E
.x N
11
==
e t_,
L N
L M
-,I c.
o m
l C
r-2 3.,
rc
- a O
e-~
c
- O u
u O
e c
42 l
N
.C X
l u
- c C
0 r-M N
3~.
O
.C m
m C
- LO
()
a -
a s
U.
4 E
E Q
U.
t L.
W m
L r~~
to l
c; p
-__.*-_.._-..--,-._-e
- ,.--.m.-
.-_.-4.__
m..
A w
)
G) 70
- (v) c)
4
.N l
l
~~~
~ ~ ~ ~ '
{
Fi a/
4NkQ
._.L_.__.__l_____.___._l_.
.__l g
k.
. I _ __ _..
y.
J o
o o
% e o
e G.
C3 N.
ON W
LO.
4i
2.0 USE OF SURFACE DENSITY TECH!110VE 2.1 Use of Surface Density Criteria of 50% for Mass Limited Units on Single Levels Mass limited units having a maximum fraction critical (f) of 0.3 are to be spaced to a maximum array surface density of 50% of the optimum critical surface density based on mass per unit area. This criteria is supported as follows:
Consider the following infinite planar arrays of units containing moderated U0 having an enrichment of 5%.
For these arrays, the following parameters 2
apply:
235 Material - UO, 5% U
, fully moderated 2
3 Unit Size - a - 17.955 kg U, 38.548 cm. diam., 0.6 gm U/cm 3
b - 17.955 kg U, 35.023 cm. diam., 0.8 gm U/cm 3
c - 18.094 kg U, 33.612 cm. diam., 0.91 gm U/cm 3
d - 17.994 kg U, 28.402 cm. diam., 1.50 gm U/cm These units represent 30% (f=0.3) of the minimum unreflected critical mass of 60 kg at optimum moderation (Fig. 1.d.13, UKAEA Handbook).
Allowable Sur-face Density - The minimum mass surface density for U(5)0 is 2
2 calculated to be 10.4 kg/f t.
The safe limit is therefore 5.2.KgU/ft.
Spacing Re-quirement
- 56.87 cm center spacing in a square lattice.
Reflection
- Sixteen inch thick concrete reflectors on top and bottom of array, spaced 28.43 cm from the center of the units. (a)
Calculated Resul ts
- KEN 0 calculations for these arrays yielded the following:
2313 330 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: D-33
Unit ke a
0.946 1 0.0055 b
0.950 0.007 c
0.9408 0.0083 d
0.885 0.008 From this analysis it is concluded that use of a limit equal to 50% of the minimum critical slab surface density (at optimum moderation) expressed in terms of mass per unit surface area is safe, with a maximum nominal array reactivity of 0.935. These calculations clearly demonstrate that the license criteria provides adequate safety for plant applications.
However, reviews of calculated arrays as described in Reference 1 could call these limits into question, and therefore require further attention.
Specifically, several arrays of under moderated low enriched uranium show surface densities which, in some cases, are less than 50% of the infinite slab thickness for material of like moderation and density.
However, the license criteria specifically limits use of the method to spacings based on optimum mass per unit area moderation.
Examination of the spacings in Reference 1 show that when compared to slabs having optimum mass per unit area moderation all arrays have surface densities at or above 85% of the optimum infinite slab value. This is shown in Table 2.1.
(a) At the given sphere spacing, a 16" concrete reflector in contact with the sphere array produced no significant change in reactivity.
(b) These KENO calculations were performed by Battelle florthwest Laboratories using 16 group Hansen-Roach cross sections. When used to check experimental U0 F cylinders, and calculated values published in 22 DP-1014, the calculated reactivities were within one percent of unity.
1)
R. L. Stevenson and R. H. Odegaarden, " Studies of Surface Density Spacing Criteria Using KEN 0 Calculations".
Unpublished.
2313 331 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: D-31
TABLE 2.1 2
y KENO Calculated Arrays of Low Enriched Uranium Subscrits
.=
2 k
Array Composition Subcrit f**
gm U/cc KgU/ft e
ta/tc*
El' 1
U(5)O cylinder 2
j{
11.5 cm.r x 138.6 cm 0.3 2.0 12.7 1.019 0.006 1.15 2
U(5)0 F 22 cylinder l[
11.4 cm.r x 152.4 cm 0.3 1.0 10.1 1.005 0.009 0.85 x
E+
3 U(5)0 cylinder 2
g 16.0 cm.r x 211 cm 0.3 5.0 40.1 1.000 0.006 3.6 8
o
- Derived array Surface Density / Surface Density of Optimum Moderated Infinite Slab n
3[
- Fraction of critical values taken from Ref. #1.
i 8
O N
tra o7 E7 P
hi u
53 a N
w Pl
- 3
- - bi
~
iv 23 u>
2.2 Double Level Areas a)
Mass Limited Units By doubling the required spacing area for mass limited units on each level, the overall mass surface density is preserved.
b)
Geometry Limited Units Spacing requirements for geometry limited units on two levels are based on 16% of the infinite slab surface density at op-timum geometry. Units are limited to a fraction critical of 0.4.
This limit has been validated by two KEN 0 calculations, one for 10.7" 4 x 72" 1. cylinders (f = 0.36).
9 These cases are described.
Case 1 235 UO, 3.5 w/o U Material 2
optimum moderation Individual Unit Limit 10.7" 4 x 72" 19 Fraction Critical 0.36 Array Reflection 16 inch thick concrete floor, 4 inch thick con-crete roof, 25 feet above the floor.
Infinite square pattern on Array Pattern two level s, with 10 f t.
vertical separation between level s.
In one case, the upper pattern rests on a 1/2" thick steel plate; in the other, on a 3/8" thick steel plate.
With the units spaced on a Array Surface Density 80.4" pitch, the total array surface density (both levels) 2 is 2.36 t/f t, or 16% of the critical infinite slab surface density.
2313
,33 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision: 0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: D-36
Calculated Array Re-With 1/2" steel, k =0.9262 1 e
activity 0072 with 3/8" steel, k "
e 0.9273 0.0074.
With both the upper and lower arrays in contact with the 3/8" steel deck, k =0.9223 e
.0070.
2313 334 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: D-37
2.3 Calculation of Fraction Critical The concept of fraction critical for an SIU is based on an arbitrary definition which ratios the SIU mass, or equivalent spherical mass to that of an unreflected critical sphere of the same material, assuming optimum moderation.
Several prescriptions for calculating this value have been described in the literature.
Depending on the method selected, somewhat varying results may be obtained.
In evaluating SIV's for this license, nonspherical SIU's are reduced to equivalent spherical shapes using buckling conversions, in conjunc-tion with somewhat arbitrarily selected extrapolation lengths which vary with fissile density and moderation, physical form, and unit shape.
For this license, extrapolation lengths are taken directly from Figure 2 of LAMS-2537. As they are consistently used, any bias introduced is consis-tent, and based on sphere data taken from the UVAEA Handbook, is also relatively minor.
As a further check on the reasonableness of the use of these values for low enrichment uranium, we have compiled critical data from WCAP-2999, DP-1014, and the UKAEA Handbook for 00, and from LA-3612 for U-metal 2
mixtures and UO F solutions. These data are presented in Table 2.3.1 22 and show that for the oxide, there is close agreement for the reflected sphere radius, for the material buckling, for the reflectdd extrapolation length; and that 4-4.5 cm represents a reasonable value for reflector savings. These considerations lend support to the use of the extrapolation lengths as provided herein.
Another variable which must be defined for the license is the unreflected critical mass or volume.
These values vary from one author to another.
For this license, all unreflected critical sizes are taken from the UKAEA Handbook.
Examples of the fraction critical calculations follow:
Consider the 10.7" diameter cylinder limit.
From data taken from Figure 1.D.14 of UKAEA AHSB Handbook 1, the minimum 235 critical unreflected volume for homogeneous 3.5%
00 is 79 liters.
2313 335 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision: 0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: D-38
The volume of a sphere having the same buckling as the 10.7"o cylinder of homogeneous 00 is:
2 2
2 2.405
= 0.0230 cm" B
=
SIU 10.7 x 2.54 + 2.25 2
3 Y SIU 2.1 x 4.19 B
= 26.9 t The fraction initial of the SIU is:
26.9 t/ 79 L 34 2313 336 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date: 3/22/79 Pa[e':"$993
TABLE 2.3.1 Critical Parameters for Optimum Moderated Low Enrichment Uranium 2
R N
B r
Rcb-R cr cb m
cr WCAP-2999(a) 24.66 0.0104 6.3 3% U0 2 DP-1014(b) 24.03 0.0103 6.88 3% U02 UKAEA (c)
Handbook 24.29 28.79 4.5 3% UO2 LA-3612 (d) 17.91 22.16 4.25 5% U-Metal LA-3612 (e) 22.42 25.69 3.27*
5% UO F 22 (a) Figure III-15 & Figure III-10 (b) Pages 37 and 57 (c)
Figures 1.D.10 and 1.D.14 respectively for reflected and bare volumes.
(d + e)
Page 26
- UO F, being a solution, has somewhat smaller reflector savings than do 22 oxide or metal systems.
2313 337 License No. SNM-1067. Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date: 3/22/79 Page:D 40
s Consider also the SIU for mass limited homogeneous UO at an 2
235 enrichment of 3.0%
U.
A mass limit of 41 Kg UO is indicated.
2 From Figure 1.D.13 of UKAEA Handbook AHSB (1), the unreflected critical mass for this material is 185 Kg U0.
Fraction critical 2
for this SIU is calculated as follows:
41 Kg U0 /185 Kg U0 F
=
2 2
0.222 (May be conservatively rounded to 0.23,
=
as shown on Page XIX-3) 2313 338 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date: 3/22/79 Page: D-41
4 2.4 General Considerations for 16 x 16 Fuel Several aspects of fuel handling as they relate to the 16 x 16 fuel design are not specifically evaluated in view of the general ob-servation that the reduced pellet and rod diameters render this material less reactive than the 14 x 14 fuel which has been extensively evaluated herein.
This finding is based on study of DP-1014 and evaluations made in connection with the calculated values reported in Table D-11.1.
2313 339 License No. SNM-1067, Docket 70-1100 Revision:
0 Date: 3/22/79 k'c b.