ML19261A578

Safety Evaluation Supporting Reevaluation of Petroleum Product Pipeline Across Site

ML19261A578
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	01/19/1979
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML19261A577	List: ML19261A576 ML19261A578
References
TAC-7655, NUDOCS 7902050070
Download: ML19261A578 (7)

Text

O' f * "%,"a,

-2 UNl?!D STATES y$,Jj NUCLEAR REGULATORY CcMMisslCN

- Q ls usmcres a 1:ms

."5l SAFETY EVAL"ATICN 3Y THE OFFICE CF MUCLEAR REACTCR REGULATICN SUPPCRTING REEVALUATICN CF PCTRCLIUM PRODUCT PIPELINE ACROSS SITE CUCUESNE LIGHT CCMPANY BEAVER VALLEY PCWER STATICN, UNIT NO. 1 00CXET NO. E0-334 Introducticn In resocnse to our letter of June 16, 1978, Duouesne Light Comoany, the licensee, submitted an evaluation entitled, " Potential Consequences of an Oil Pipeline Failure--Beaver Valley Power Station" dated July 14, 1978. The licensee concludes that the probability of a failure, fire and explosion from a petroleum products piceline which carries gasoline across the Beaver Valley Power Station site about one-fourth of the time, is sufficiently small (less than the 1 X 10-7 per year which is within Regulatory Guide 1.91, Revision 1 guidelines) such that the failure need not be addressed. However, the licensee addressed the potential censecuences of a failure of the line as we requested, and concluded that sucn a failure would not present a significant safety hazard to Beaver Valley Unit Mo. l.

Evaluation The Seaver Valley Power Station is located just dcwnstream of the Shipoingport 3 ridge (Route 168) on the south bank of the Ohio River about 35 miles dcwnstream of ?ittsburgh, Pennsylvania (Figure 1).

Unit No.1 is in oceration; Unit No. 2 is presently under construction.

A petroleum products ter ninal facility cwned and coerated by the Mooil Pipeline Comcany is located on the ocposite (north) bank of the river.

The terminal facility consists of a nuncer of largs tanks which handle gasoline, heating oil, kerosene, and diesel oil. The terminal pumos these creducts through a buried piceline under the Chio River, across the Seaver Valley site and easterly away frcm the site to other terminals in the Mccil system. The line is cresently in use about 50 percent of the time. Casoline is pumced during about half the line usage time (or one-fourth of elapsed time).

790aos 007o The ciceline has an 3-inch diameter, is fabricated of carbon steel and has a nominal 0.322-inch wall thickness.

Its design cressure is 1440 psig, with operating pressure berxeen 350 and 1000 psig. The line was installed in 1947 and rerouted to its cresent location in 1955. A 200-foot section of the line, in the vicinity of the Unit flo.1 main intake structure, was reclaced in 1972. The piceline crosses the site fecm west to east, generally rising in elevation tcward the east (Figure 2).

It is buried to a deoth of 5 to 30 feet. This meets the 4 foot depth requirement of our Safety Evaluation Recort dated October 11, 1974 wnich was issued prior to the Operating License of Unit No.1.

The main intake structure for the 3eaver Valley Pcwer Station, Unit flo.1 is on the south bank of the Chio River.

In the event of a gasoline leak from the Mobil line in the vicinity of the Beaver Valley Unit No.1, it is most likely that gasoline would be absorced by the sand and gravel and loose granular soils on the site. Any excess from a substantial leak would tend to run tcward or into the river or possibly partially form puddles in low areas along the cipeline. Three.

principal icw areas for cuddling exists. One sucn area is to the east of Unit No. 2 where a check valve in the pipeline was installed in August 1978 (Figure 3). However, this area is further frem critical structures than the most likely possible locations for gasoline puddle formation, wnicn are shown by rectangular, hatched areas in Figure 2 to be in the vicinity of the main intake structure.

Aside from the main intake structure, the control room is the closest safety-related structure to the location where a gasoline puddle might fom. The control rcom is situated on a grade elevated 55 feet above the grade at the intake structure and is located about 625 feet frem the center of the postulated puddle formation at the intake structure. The centrol rocm is also cartly shielded from the two rectangular potential ouddle famation areas shown in Figure 2 by the Unit No.1 turbine building. Other safety-related Category i structures and ccmpenents at various locations on the site are more distant from puddle formation areas than the control recm and are shielded by other structures from these areas.

We have reviewed and are in concurrence with the licensee's estimate of the likelihood of pipeline failure. We also estimate that tne likelihood of a leak and resulting fire is extremely small. Our review and estimates are based on review of the licensee's calculations and fecm information available from the Decartment of Transcortation? We agree that the installation of the caeck valve in :ne line snould limit tne amount of lost fuel and fire during a major leak en site.

"aterials Transcortation Bureau, Cecarrent of Transcortation, "St.crarv g Liquid Piceline Accidents Recor.ed on 20T Form 7CCO-i Frem January i, me thru Jecember 31, 1977", dated a gust i, l.:73.

u Since construction activities are considered to have the most cotential

creduce a significant leak and an ignition source, the licensee has restricted construction activities including excavation to a minimum distance of 25 feet from the cieeline. Construction activities are taking clace at much larger distances from possible ouddle fomation areas. Restrictions have been placed on limiting oassage of loads over the line and storage of loads within 25 feet of the line.

Construction personnel are kept informed of the line location and it is flagged. Since it is unlikely under these restrictions that a construction activity will lead to damage to the buried pipeline or ignition of leaked gasoline, we estimate the likelinood of a pipeline failure occurring in the 800-foot section of interest (within the exclusion area of Beaver Valley Unit No. 1) to be very low.

A fire, if initiated subsequent to cipeline damage, would most likely occur near or on the river (due to a gasoline slick) and would pose negligible problems to the control room, considering the low elevation, distance to tne control room, and precominant westerly winds at the s i te. The shock wave cressure incident on the control room building snculd a gasoline ex:csion taka place was calculated oy tne licensee

(.55 :si) to be less than the 1 psi ;eak cositive incident overpressure as defined in Reg. Guide 1.91.

The staff's estimates of the overoressure at the control room wall indicate that the c:ntrol. room is protected frcm the dynamic overpressure effects resulting from any credible detonation of onsite spilled material as discussed in Reg. Guide 1.91 and therefore, the staff agrees with the conclusions of the licensee.

The principle structure which might be affected by the explosion and fire is the main intake structure. The bounding incident for the main intake structure considered during the review of the 3eaver Valley Unit No. I for an operating license was the explosion of a gasoline barge on the Ohio River at the mouth of the intake. The barge exposion is still the bounding accident for the intake structure; the consecuences of that

.:cstulated accident led the NRC to require an auxiliary river intake structure 1800 feet upstream wnica will assume the safety related function of the main intake structure in ne unlikely event it is lost cue to ne carge or pipeline exposion and fire.

Environmental Consideration We have determined that this matter dces not involve a chance in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in oower level and will not resuit in any significant environmental imcact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded dat this matter is insignificant fecm the standcoint of environmental imcact, and cursuant : 10 CR 551.5(d)(1), that an envi~ nmental imcact sta: ament er negative

eclaration and environmental im act accrnisal need no :e orecarec in :0nnecticn with tnis matter.

.1 Conclusion We have concluded that:

(1) because the present mode of use of the Mobil Pice Line Comoany piceline does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the present mode of use of the line does not involve a significant hazards consideration to the operation of the Beaver '/ alley Power Station, Unit No.1, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the heald and safety of the public will not be endangered by continued coeration of the Beaver '/ alley Power Station, Unit No.1, in the present manner, and (3) continued use of the oi::eline across the site will be in comoliance with the Comission's regulations and operation of the plant will not be inimical to the cor=on defense and security or to the health and safety of the puolic.

Date:

January 19, 1979

M eP# $,,9 @, l.\\, u %.1 h'3 $+ 1 7

uf D ~

>~.1.y_w-w,, t'?.b c' A=femn f'

~@i.,ur "

1. ~ c,%. s Q

,p s-

. w -

a~ w c v &-

e

<. /g %Q.x.. p.. 7p

..' w

, i p,<

\\ -

w, t - c. -

a; w q'e y.x

)s

~s u

s v.e ey,

.d w,a;-

\\p...

..i DC N. m...~ =. vs...'{IDLAND@q (C3'.h;[4 4,.m.s,.;Q^.i,/

y Jy',./.,

p N. q N % % iO'T'u'M w, ',,

h.g._

e p_, %~

4 DJN?'.\\ [OE /36,g%N'3N'

. ' U/.

• ,, -R.,.., ' O', },& ' 9 '?

4 'f f, i EQh RQQi@@$$y?$

Mp'Nh k$w.wb.%$g$h h J.be' D;

6 X

z4 -

sqg

, A, A k b5

%:W h?

j $

fOQ&W' Ni &

' I [r$ ?i M 5 k. S % f C & w '=c=

'.?8WY!

h W

I' n'.%'g?=iM t

u.

0g f nd % ; M !. w, ' Q  % %,_!ua'1@h55=M&?vg/

.t 7&~.";y; i

ks k J W M ';N@e., M.'7M r

j

\\Q,!

setvsa v(tTF T.,f-c ~.hn,z;., s r 45.,W/

t Q t'

w-go.,ta rarian x

pe

(

7 f.7 SHIPPINGPORT ATOMIC POWER STATION

1. Nf'.'b-Y

/

$ K'4Yd.h Q & N. % h,. b. j

/,[,'.

RQ; <-9.i y

=QM e44Qis(s,co-.s l '(4A%,.a. -

f.

~

a

'?

%o bM, A #e

@==g. r's.,/-

f w

x

_i s.!!

hki-Iam.d.w.m %:m;=;. __ss&=M'~ h'/h'((',

'e,,

h'A

-~lh m...

- ( N-x h~s O

-ws.

~

- e g N. P m&

k Rw U

4r cua gg W. awe-=%-

+

,ss. 4

'-Rm *ufws='%Ca;e; W;=X.W c.

s-c-f iG i _ e.4 7 ' &

l c S..mppmgport.,, _.

q r -.gg+....., ;.

'....: g'~.~

r, Q

&;: e, n %., \\,,,o~wy'.A.D4V.flf^e:,.t 'ii%.- ~lTQ/.<

ky'.

)

m4 s.

w i, 8

~sx 4

y

~s -=ac s,.. t.'L.S G n t1* y ^"'s. > p&.s\\(~

i,t'~'/

c.

iy N ~g,m,1ti g44 sus e

g h )(:h. Le,i &,%.e;.f' r. n4lf

,7----..','

h*-

b t

\\

A.

s

'N,m M~>y 2

e

,, p.u.

M sS R $. n @.If}lf.'f* h @ Q l,v%

'k'%[3f!l.'[

,s/

'%&&khN 1

'fn \\f '.,, MO"Y, '55=.'

I'

//

eoSIiaar j

m\\ w

. w.j w i

. '.w_d',yf; i Qk. & m. - ;.

-~ s~ /. ece &

p.R x. ; y ~c:

vg 9

N u$

s

.R 1

j

~i ':ap.8,

\\

.h e

f

,f

%( Nw* // p~'h'. O r

N

[

cA w\\

y y 's,..,))

s t

f.. /../

e b

• /

f'f,'

l Q'q?v[/,?,

I^

'x, ' ;: i{.. S. N x ('

In.4,f(/ s %

SEAVER VALLEY

/

._ s

%c pcuEa sm:;.

2..;

f

'f

~

-acc 3

,%.-., (

s m,

gy nauRE,

i

' g: j w w,,

- x i

el,

,~

j

t.,~s.

'N,

...., % g/

j

" M.,). - A ';%-

i

,/

e e

77'~~~~,, - ' -

l

-o.

i

~,

BEAVER VALLEY PLANT INTAKE OHIO RIVER STRUCTURE /

/

/

POSTULATED aaaaa f A;/DCLES

/('/ /,,

,' /// f

///,I//I') ; j'! /

' mobil PIPELINE a

I y

O G

a a=

4 s.-

A I

OFFICE BUILDING UNIT 1 TURBINE 8UILDING l

C 0

0 0

0 M

g#

/

UNIT 2 i

O O

O O

O 4

J N

UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM dONTROL ROOM UNIT 1 FIGURE 2

.I*

4 e

d P

O c ;an--_- _w_-\\ n%. -

--..- g y c g

,a

. 2 e

w m.

L

- ~

4 es aw **.'.. g-f2_ _

- P '- #

~

- i Q

U 7 L.J

, ',. * * * ~

l/

,_ -.. ~~~~~

D>

s ~. n,..

e-.

..M"

, h.; '

'W.

~

._ =

M

(*) L Z c:~. N

>O y %c i,.J g =p -

. N6 q

el'",, -

"wm..we J

,,,,,7

,w i

i

.w%

,e e

D T'

,-/"

Oy _

r,,,) aC C

\\ g ro. %

r, Z t.J v i

i.f

//

=o 1

_ c-L O =J 76 i

',d' ar-

{/

y L,,.

p

~r

/ ',, - -

O

f i

\\

'1 i

i l

f

')

~~' \\ l\\

.J 3

f

}

/ q 'h (~'~

$ Q '.d

~'_

t

\\

nJ

/b,p,;,

.t s'-

l 'A s

4 c- -

W'

,,, ' ' ~ * ' ' -.i f' r #

b' Q

s s

i

'L

'$4'I

- i 4. j ~ ~

~ ~

-1 C; ::

,.S.

' I l M M ',

J ~ [,,...]..-

.f

~.

r 'S

",']

/,

- a

].

T., / N ;[ N d,[

F#

..f.,

f,d,. k,. p]M

l. ~M/b!3I

,l ~l~

-Y,.1 r -

'~C%.,/ ~, v -\\.

.a.j 7

. Q.

6. u,4

- -.C N r s.

l l

j=

'..p; :. Q.- ;.f. 3f l'

i

_e s

i

• --';., ~ W I" c' s.s > t. " _k,,

1

,y 7

-;[,;N My

?-

x i

n

~. Q y._ \\, mg..2 - -=.='_- - -.J p:

,s I

6 yi

,w --_,.e

't 1""" M

'5

.(

.,J ml

-a.

c,o o

f l

a.

/

]s,,. s l

,I 1

1 r

,i

.1,,.,,>.

N e.

y

.w g

j 4

4 I-(

' Mi g g~

g p.

.

• i rs, -<-' 4 ',

1

. '- ~o o

.D, c.3 l

b-.! ;,

n

-!.),, Av~1

), n ;a,....

's a

4 AW, t

\\

• l

• L.i kqu l,=

w-=5=c

=l m

/. -J,

ic

\\

S*

s e.

g s

-e v......d....',.'.,,,,,$. _

{ '.

^

cl

,Wi n

r m

....t.....

p)

.I j,,,r.

r /* *

,4[

o y

w,-

'O

~

""V"",_

i de

w.

s

2

/ / /,,(

,[ -f. +

. =. -

. u..,. x

. u, i.

. c s,

r

. b

%.y.!]

H

' t. ' j n. -,,g/,.. t, sl w% 1.:.

,../

y.

,,.p 7,,. -

% ;.;v,,v. ',),,, '.<f* yip. \\,

,,x ur

u..' I..'v+.j e m

~~ -

.+x_,

p,

,w,-

.m

.',,, *4 i p-y a.-.....~....

'f.

,,e'

,/

c,,w i

....u..

); '

t,

/#,

t.,,,...,.,.f..: O

~

,. q ; p.,,,

,, mc

r....p/, ?r./

7,4.,,,,,p.

6 i

t.!,f. ! !, f.f ; y i..

8 Ov-4,,-*

%,,,l j 8

.,. !, ijM ?}!l 1.

(.*

3 Q g}s,r,p:,9.e p

ijs:mi,n.p1 !!.:p@y ".nig hfpyh,p g.

9y "d

6,

. //

M, I'h

.<,/ p,6:, U,':4> :

e, i

d $[i[.-fkh!!tilid,h:q9,,P;m.i,g,ff .n i ,, i r. ,4 i.pz9 p}n s: .,m m l ,'/./ /, ,,N. hi,;[;g}}Jj'[!3(fjj i

• l$RQ-k.

.<', _ e,,4;,;,f,,,, ev (^p . 5e;'f,[ ,::-smnw.=un1 mumm.m.. l

---

?

~, g;,;ff -s s:, ', .f. .a sv./t.

• La,c,+.'t Mf.:ser
• ,%./ i s

s, s.o b n e m .9 e

• 9 g

.#}}