05000280/LER-1980-007-03, /03L-0:on 800116,during Normal Operation,Heat Tracing Circuit 4 on Line 1-CH-56-152,boric Acid Supply to Blender Failed.Caused by Water Penetration of Heat Tracing Tape.Tape Replaced W/Higher Water Resistant Tape

From kanterella
(Redirected from ML19260D961)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
/03L-0:on 800116,during Normal Operation,Heat Tracing Circuit 4 on Line 1-CH-56-152,boric Acid Supply to Blender Failed.Caused by Water Penetration of Heat Tracing Tape.Tape Replaced W/Higher Water Resistant Tape
ML19260D961
Person / Time
Site: Surry Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 02/11/1980
From: Stewart W
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19260D943 List:
References
LER-80-007-03L-01, LER-80-7-3L-1, NUDOCS 8002120673
Download: ML19260D961 (2)


LER-1980-007, /03L-0:on 800116,during Normal Operation,Heat Tracing Circuit 4 on Line 1-CH-56-152,boric Acid Supply to Blender Failed.Caused by Water Penetration of Heat Tracing Tape.Tape Replaced W/Higher Water Resistant Tape
Event date:
Report date:
2801980007R03 - NRC Website

text

.

N f40 F oR M 366 U. S NUCLE AR REGULATORv COMMISSION (7 7? P LICENSEE EVENT REPORT EXHIBIT A CONTRot stoC<. !

l l l l l l

iP' tease PRINT oR TvPE ALL ReouiREo sNFoRMATioNi i

[o1.] l,v I A l SI P l S I 1l@sl,0 l 0 l -l 010 l 0l 0 l 0 ) -l 0 l O l@! 4 l 1l ll 1 l 1 l@l l

l s, c.1 t m s..cooi t,a ~si ~u

.i-2, a

6.u ~si m i u C oN*T lo t il

,"g ggi 0l 5] q 0 l 0l 2 I 8l0 @l O f Il 1 l 6l810 @l012 l 1l1 l8 h l@

3 6

6.

6' DOCKE T NwMs Ea (JI 68 tvtNT DATE Je 7b RtPO=TDATA 40 EVENT DESCRIPTION ANo PROBABLE CONSEouENCES h 1 o ! 21 [ Durine normal operation. routine survet11,nc.o r e, von i n ct rho r, t iii ro nc ho,e 1

IotalI tracing circuit 4 (panels 8,9) on line 1-CH-56-152 Boric acid supply to the l blender. This is a degraded mode of operation permitted by T.S. 3.3.B.3,

.ITT'Tl l o is t and is reportable as per T.S. 6.6.2.b. (2). Since the temperature of the I

,line was maintained as required, the redundant circuit was operable and theret p ;were at all times two operable flow paths for Boric Acid to the core, the l

health and safety of the public were not affected.

I o,,

=ar ctat s=,

,=,

,=,

_.o~,~, coo.

l S l H j @ [Ej@ l Al@ l HI 11 A lT lE l R l@ [Z_J@ [7, j @

o 9

7 a

6 io ii 32 iJ 18 is 20_

s E OUE NTiat oCCun aE NCE pfponT REV 1'oN

- EVENT vt An aEPoRTNo COoE TYPE ho

@,"LE a,noI 81 i L-J l47 1 Ld 1 01 3 i LL_1 L_1 to_]

gi,";

_2:

2J 23 24 26 27 28 M

Jo 31 32 TAKEN A

o O PLA 1 M T o Houas 22 s a v.

D FOR 3.

sUDPL M MANUFAC afa LA_l@L Z_l@

lZf@

LZJ@

l 0 I 010 I o 0@

L NJ@ J@

lC2l6l8l@

ai 34 23 36 3d so 41 42 43 44

' 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION ANo CoRREC rive ACTIONS h IA review of the heat tracing circuit showed that failure was caused by water l i

o

, penetration of the heat tracing tape.

The corrective action implemented 1

twas to replace the heat tracing tape with higher water resistant tape.

I 7

i 3

I I

li t a l l I

7 e,

e0

's'T *C orwin sratus @ Es'cE nv' OperatorSurveilla@nce seo.ra oiscovrRv oisca rvion [E_J@ l ll 0l 0 l@l NA l

l A l@l l

i s

  • alnviry co'5 re wt Awou T os acTiviTv @ l tocariom or Rats Ass @

ante cao esmetsasi li is I LZ_J @ LIJ@l NA l

7 l

,, a so,. 7,...cs ",,s l0[di.l0 l @ g @ leas airic= @

=vu rvez NA i 7

,, a so~~.l',wuns otscairtio*@

~uw.E.

l' l e ] l 0 l 0 l0 l@l NA

___l Ioss e, on oO Acs'To racitiry @

IY)!

)I["

we cas:

..Tio~

l1 l 9 l [Z_J@l NA l

7 8 9 10 80

, 'u' ' 'c,'g,,,,,,,,, g NRc usE ONLY 121 cl [

@l NA l

lllllllllltl 7

8 9 iO 65 69 80 N A'/E oF PREPARER 5d. b e bteWart (804) 357-3184 PH oN E :

b73 8 0 021 c 0 66+

ATTACIDtENT (PAGE 1 0F 1)

SULTRY POWER STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET t:0; 50-280 REPORT !0: 80-007/03L-0 EVENT DATE:

1/16/80 TITLE OF ltEPORT:

Lou Current on Heat Tracing 1.

DESCl!IPTION OF EVENT:

During normal operation, routine surveillance revealed the f ailure of heat t rac in); circuit 4 (panels 8, 9) on line 1-Cll-56-152 Boric Acid supply to the blender. This is a degraded mode of operation permitted by T.S. 3.3.B.5, and is reportable as per T.S. 6.6.2.b.(2).

2.

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES AND STATUS OF llEDUtIDANT SYSTEftS:

At all times during the event, the temperature of the affected line was maintained as required. The redundant circuit was operable. There were at all tines two operable flow paths for boric acid to the reactor.

Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3.

CAUSE

The f ailure of the circuit was due to water penetration damage f ron previous leaka ge to the heat tracing tape on the af f ected circuit.

Lagging on the affected line was also replaced.

4.

III!fEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The heat tracing tape was replaced with a more water resistant heat tape.

5.

SCIIEDULED CORRECTIVE ACTI0ti:_

The problen was corrected imnediately and no further action is required.

6.

ACTIO:: TAl:EN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

Continuous surveillance is naintained on the Ileat Tracing System.

No additional action is considered necessary.

7.

CE!FRIC I!!PLICATIONS:

A task force has been created to investigate the failures of the IIcat Tracing System.

.c CN