ML19260A813

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Notice of Violation from Insp on 790503-04
ML19260A813
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 08/22/1979
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML19260A803 List:
References
50-219-79-10, NUDOCS 7912030252
Download: ML19260A813 (2)


Text

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APPENDIX A NOTICE OF VIOLATION Jersey Central Power and Light Company Docket No. 50-219 Based on the results of an NRC inspection conducted on May 3-4, 1979, it appears that one of your activities was not conducted in full compliance with the con-ditions of your NRC Facility License No. DFR-16 as ?ndicated below. This item is a Violation.

A.

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants, Criterion V, Instruction, Procedures, and Drawings, states in part: " Activities affecting quality shall be pre-scribed by documented instructions, procedures,... appropriate to the circum-stances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures,...."

The accepted Operational Ouality Assurance Plan,1973, Page 4, states, in part, "It is the policy of Jersey Central Power and Light Company to meet the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR 50, Appendix B... relating to the operation... of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. "

Contrary to the above, Emergen'.y Procedure 532 - futomatic and Manual Scram, Emergency Procedure 51',.1 - Feedwater Pump Failure, and Emergency Procedure 514 - Reactor Isol; tion Scram, all of which were applicable to the circumstances and were i nobnented during recovery from the reactor scram on May 2,1979, did not incorporate a suitable restriction such as the one in Operating Procedure 301 - Nuclear Steam Supply System, which states, in Section 7.2.2:

"Never isolate all recirculation loops at the same time. The suction and discharge valves of at least one recirculation loop shall always remain open and, if possible, at least one pump should always be running to provide continuous circulation and indication of reactor vessel water level." As a result of these deficient emergency procedures, the scram recovery actions included shutting of the discharge valves of all recirculation loops, an action which had the following conse-quences:

1.

Dropping of the water level above the active core below the 7 foot 2 inch Limiting Safety System Setting established by Technical Specifi-1461 153 o

79uos

Appendix A 2

cation 2.3 fer initiation of core spray, without core spray being initiated; 2.

Dropping of the watar level above the active core below the 4 foot 8 inch level established by Technical Specification 2.1 as the Safety Limit during the shutdown mode; and 3.

Starting of pumps in two idle recirculation loops with the temperature of the loops about 72 degrees F and 92 degrees F less than the reactor coolant temper &ture, exceeding the 50 degrees F thermal transient limit for pump starts established by Technical Specification 3.3.c.2.

This violation caused, or contributed to, an occurrence related to saf.ty.

1461 154